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ABSTRACT  
 
The entitlement of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) individuals to claim asylum on 
the basis of their sexual identities has been a contentious matter, as sexual identity 
was not a ground of claim explicitly recognised under the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom (UK) has incrementally recognised the ability of 
LGB asylum-seekers to claim such protection over the last twenty years.1   
 
This thesis undertakes a socio-legal investigation of the British asylum system from 
the perspective of LGB asylum-seekers.  Using evaluation theory, it examines the 
fairness with which LGB asylum claims are treated in the UK, and the standards to 
which they are entitled.    As the starting point, this thesis explores the legitimacy of 
using fairness as its standard, and examines the content of this standard.  From this, it 
advances ‘structural principles’ that are used to examine the British asylum system 
since the UK Supreme Court’s seminal decision in HJ (Iran).  Investigating the 
British asylum system through the framework provided by the structural principles is 
supported by qualitative data obtained from interviews conducted with legal 
practitioners, activists, academics, decision-makers and asylum-seekers, and from 
replies to the Freedom of Information requests addressed to the Home Office.  This 
has helped to conduct a substantial analysis of the British asylum system, as 
experienced by LGB asylum-seekers today.  It offers tangible praise, critique and 
recommendations with respect to their treatment regarding matters of procedural 
fairness, i.e., that relating to the asylum process itself, and substantive fairness, i.e., 
matters pertaining to the outcome of the claim for protection. 
 
This thesis submits that intersectionality and the diversity of sexual identity should be 
at the core of an asylum system that deals fairly with LGB claims for asylum in the 
UK.  LGB asylum-seekers require access to an asylum system that is sensitive and 
empathetic to their experiences, and which avoids essentialising sexual identities and 
conducting ‘single-axis’ analyses.  The system must operate with flexibility, in line 
with the unique needs and experiences of LGB asylum-seekers, and with respect for 
their fundamental rights. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
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Chapter One  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The area of sexual identity-based asylum has remained a contentious area of refugee 
protection since the UK accepted that lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) individuals 
could make such claims.  This thesis aims to investigate asylum claims made in the 
UK on grounds of sexual identity for their fairness.  This introduction will set out the 
context and research questions in more detail before outlining the methodology of the 
investigation. 
 
 
2. The Context of Sexual Identity-Based Asylum 
 
Over the last twenty years, traditional asylum-receiving countries have recognised 
that individuals fleeing maltreatment on the basis of their sexual identities are capable 
of making successful asylum claims for protection.  To do so they must hold a well-
founded fear of being persecuted in their country of origin for this reason.  Such 
countries have included the United States of America (US), Australia, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom (UK).1  In the absence of a clearly espoused category for LGB 
claimants, these claims have been processed under the ‘particular social group’ 
category.  The category was devised for this very reason, to encompass claims based 
on grounds for which the existing terms of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees (Refugee Convention)2 did not provide.3  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Amnesty International, ‘Crimes of Hate, Conspiracy of Silence: Torture and Ill-Treatment Based on 
Sexual Identity’ (2001) 26.  By 2001, 18 countries had granted refugee protection on the basis of the 
claimant’s sexual identity. 
2 ‘Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (Adopted 28 July 1951, Entered into Force 22 April 
1954) 189 Unts 137. 
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Within this group of asylum-receiving countries, the UK’s recognition that LGB 
individuals are entitled to refugee status has perhaps been the most begrudging.  The 
UK authorities did not grant asylum status on this basis until 1998.4  In subsequent 
years, however, the British approach has evolved to render the UK one of the best 
places to seek asylum on the grounds of one’s sexual identity.  It currently professes 
one of the most advanced bodies of case-law and policies on this area amongst 
traditional asylum-receiving countries.5 
 
For example, at the Home Office, caseworkers are trained on dealing with sexual 
identity in the asylum context.6  Decision-makers have recourse to Asylum Policy 
Instructions that were formulated specifically to address sexual identity-based 
claims.7  Where possible, Country of Origin Information reports have been developed 
to include sections describing life for LGB individuals in those particular societies.  
 
Moreover, in 2010, the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) released its decision in HJ (Iran) 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (HJ (Iran)), which removed discretion 
from the determination procedure.8  Decision-makers had until then used discretion to 
argue that LGB asylum-seekers could eliminate the risk of persecution by ‘acting 
discreetly’ in their home societies.9  The UKSC held that decision-makers could not 
deny LGB claimants protection by contending that it would be ‘reasonably tolerable’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: 
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” within the Context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (7 May 2002) 
HCR/GIP/02/02, paras 1-4. 
4 Derek McGhee, ‘Persecution and Social Group Status: Homosexual Refugees in the 1990s’ (2001) 
14(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 20, 29. 
5 Sabine Jansen and Thomas P. Spijkerboer, ‘Fleeing Homophobia: Asylum Claims Related to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in Europe’ (COC Nederland/VU University Amsterdam, 2011). 
6 ‘Freedom of Information (FOI) Request 27021’, Home Office, Families and Gender Team (9 
December 2013) 4. 
7 Home Office, ‘Asylum Policy Instruction: Sexual Identity Issues in the Asylum Claim’ (February 
2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/404372/EXT_Asylum
_Instruction_Sexual_Identity_Issues_in_the_Asylum_claim_v5_20150211.pdf> accessed 14 April 
2015.  
8 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
9 ibid [7-8] (Lord Hope). 
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for them to conceal their identity to avoid persecution.10  Prior to the UKSC’s 
decision in HJ (Iran), it had been estimated that 56% of sexual identity claims were 
refused on this basis.11  The Court stated that if the fear of persecution was a ‘material 
reason’ for concealing one’s sexual identity, the claimant deserved protection.12  By 
stating that ‘discreet’ behaviour in avoidance of persecution was itself persecutory, 
the UKSC was praised for dismantling a prejudicial aspect of the UK system for LGB 
refugees.13  Whilst a shift has taken place within LGB decision-making since the HJ 
(Iran) decision, barriers remain for LGB asylum-seekers.  These are encapsulated by 
allegations that a ‘culture of disbelief’ pervades the process and processors of sexual 
identity-based asylum claims.14  
 
The current UK regime for determining sexual identity-based asylum claims is highly 
conflicted.  On the one hand, there is the broader, embittered dialogue on 
immigration, reflecting the economic anxieties of the European populace that 
immigration, including asylum, is an economic drain on the receiving countries.15  On 
the other hand, LGB claimants, NGOs working with such claimants, and legal 
representatives have voiced their dissatisfaction with the UK asylum process, 
describing the unreasonable standards to which such cases are held.16  Claiming a 
disproportionately high refusal rate in LGB claims, critics have argued that the 
insurmountable standards applied to such cases reflect the last bastions of 
homophobia lingering within the asylum system.17   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ibid [29] (Lord Hope). 
11 UKLGIG, ‘“Missing the Mark” - Decision Making on Lesbian, Gay (Bisexual, Trans and Intersex) 
Asylum Claims’ (14 October 2013) 4. 
12 HJ (Iran) (n 8) [62] (Lord Rodger). 
13 S. Chelvan, ‘Put Your Hands up (If You Feel Love)’ (2010) JCWI Bulletin 56, 57. 
14 UKLGIG, “Missing the Mark” (n 11) 4. 
15 Migration Watch, ‘The Economics of Large Scale Immigration’ Briefing Paper (July 2014) 
<http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/pdfs/BP1_34.pdf> accessed 13 June 2015. 
16 Nathaniel Miles, ‘No Going Back: Lesbian and Gay People in the Asylum System’ (Stonewall, 
2010); UKLGIG, ‘“Failing the Grade” - Home Office Initial Decisions on Lesbian and Gay Asylum 
Claims’ (8 April 2010). 
17 Owen Bowcott, ‘Gay Asylum Seekers Feeling Increased Pressure to Prove Sexuality, Say Experts’ 
The Guardian (3 February 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/feb/03/gay-asylum-seekers-
pressure-prove-sexuality> accessed 14 April 2015. 
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The former Immigration Minister, Damian Greene admitted in May 2011, that the 
Home Office was not collecting data on the asylum claims made in the UK on sexual 
identity grounds, despite the government’s commitment to protect from deportation 
LGBT asylum-seekers at risk of persecution.18  He, nevertheless, vowed to do so in 
the future.  In the face of a clear admission that claims based on sexual identity are 
not being monitored, however, it becomes clear that independent research is required 
to make up for this absence.   
 
 
3. Research Questions 
 
The main research question of this thesis is: to what extent does the British asylum 
system determine the sexual identity-based asylum claims of LGB individuals fairly?  
This central question breaks down into the following sub-questions: 1. Is fairness the 
correct standard for examining the decision-making in sexual identity-based asylum 
claims?  2.  What is a fair asylum system?  3.  Has the UKSC decision in HJ (Iran) 
resulted in the fair determination of LGB asylum claims?  4.  Is the British asylum 
system sensitive towards the complex and diverse experiences of LGB asylum-
seekers, relating to identities that are similarly disposed?  5.  If so, how is this 
reflected in the substantive decision-making?      
 
This research begins with the hypothesis that the British asylum system is failing to 
treat the claims of LGB asylum-seekers with the fairness required.  The right to seek 
asylum is a fundamental human right.19  As a signatory to the Refugee Convention, 
the UK unreservedly agreed to protect the rights of refugees and to properly consider 
the claims of asylum-seekers within the spirit, purpose and principles of the Refugee 
Convention.  Accordingly, clear and sustained public (UK and international) 
perceptions that the UK may not be acting within the spirit, purpose and principles of 
the Refugee Convention should be a cause for concern for claimants, the UK public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Karen McVeigh, ‘Gay Asylum Claims Not Being Counted Despite Pledge, Admit Ministers’ The 
Guardian (1 May 2011) < http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/may/01/gay-asylum-claims-not-being-
counted> accessed 14 April 2015. 
19 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) 
UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 14. 
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and the international community.  These concerns will be thoroughly examined in the 
light of the concept of fairness proposed in the thesis.  Therefore, an essential part of 
this research is to elucidate and propose an appropriate understanding of fairness in 
the context of LGB asylum claims.   
 
The first part of the thesis will explore the value of fairness to the evaluation of the 
UK asylum system, where fundamental rights are at stake.  This analysis will then be 
used to examine what a fair asylum system would look like, through the development 
of a set of ‘structural principles’.  These indicate the key components of a fair asylum 
system.  This aim is addressed in Chapter two of this thesis.   
 
The second part will investigate and scrutinise the process of determining sexual 
identity-based asylum claims within the British asylum system in the post-HJ (Iran) 
climate, with reference to the appropriate legal and evidentiary standards. As the 
UKSC’s decision in HJ (Iran) was lauded for improving the standards of LGB 
determinations, this thesis analyses its impact on actual decision-making.  Thus, this 
thesis situates the research in a specific timeframe, focusing on examining LGB 
claims lodged or decided from 2010 onwards. This thesis will use the ‘structural 
principles’ advanced in Chapter two as an analytical framework to assess the fairness 
of the British asylum system.  Issues of non-compatibility with the principles will be 
assessed to identify where the problems (if any) lie in the determination of LGB 
asylum claims.  
 
Through an empirical research component, this thesis relies upon, and significantly 
expands, the existing work in the field of sexual identity-based asylum claims (which 
is referred to through the analysis in Chapters three and four).  Whilst empirical 
research on the asylum experiences of LGB individuals is not new, existing in the 
sociological/anthropological domain, subjecting such empirical data to a legal 
analysis is academically significant.  
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4. Terminology 
 
One must introduce and define the terms utilised throughout this thesis.   
 
A distinction must first be made between the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum-seeker’. 
Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who ‘owing to 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country’.  In this thesis, the term ‘refugee’ describes a claimant 
granted protection by the country where asylum has been sought.  Distinctly, the term 
‘asylum-seeker’ describes someone who seeks refugee status, but whose claim is not 
yet definitively evaluated.20   
 
The terms ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ refer to emotional, romantic and/or sexual same-sex 
attraction, that is, women who are primarily attracted to other women and men who 
are primarily attracted to men.21  Similarly, the term ‘bisexual’ refers to those 
individuals who are attracted to both men and women.  Together, these terms 
encompass three aspects or components of ‘sexual orientation’, i.e., one’s sexual, 
romantic and/or physical attraction and behaviour.  Aside from being 
heterosexual/straight, homosexual/gay or lesbian, or bisexual, other categories of 
sexual orientation exist.  For the sake of simplicity and clarity, this thesis solely and 
specifically refers to lesbian, gay or bisexual as minority categories of sexual 
orientation – minority for the fact that they are non-heterosexual categories.22  These 
categories provide the prism through which non-heterosexual asylum claims are 
evaluated.  Thereupon, this thesis also uses the term ‘sexual minorities’ to refer to 
these three commonly recognised sexual orientations that exist in addition to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 UNHCR, ‘The Facts: Asylum in the UK’, <http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/the-uk-and-
asylum.html> accessed 10 April 2015.  
21 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status Based on Sexual 
Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (23 October 2012) HCR/GIP/12/09, 4. 
22 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (March 2007) 
preamble. 
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dominant ‘heterosexual’ category.  Finally, ‘sexual identity’ refers to an individual’s 
conception of themselves and the way that they choose to express this conception.23  
The term ‘sexual identity’ encompasses one’s sexual orientation, sexual behaviour 
and preferences, gender roles and other forms of expression relating to one’s 
membership of a particular identity community.24  
 
Although sexual identity and sexual orientation are evidently terms covering different 
scopes of meaning, for the purposes of this thesis, they are used interchangeably.  
This is deliberate; the use of ‘sexual identity’ emphasises the complexity of the 
concept and its expansive definition, covering many aspects of one’s personal 
identity.  It would appear logical to use the most inclusive term, namely, sexual 
identity, but this would ignore the research and dialogue in this area being foremost 
constructed around sexual orientation.   Furthermore, not to trivialise the distinction, 
sexual orientation-based claims are sexual identity-based claims, orientation simply 
being one aspect of one’s identity.  Moreover, these choices regarding the use of 
terminology acknowledge that claimants may not have constructed minority sexual 
identities beyond the recognition of their attraction to members of the same sex, or 
their non-identification with the dominant, heterosexual narrative.  
 
Gender identity-based claims will not be explored in this thesis.  Gender identity 
refers ‘to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, 
which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the 
personal sense of the body’ and other expressions of gender.25  Gender identity is an 
important component of sexual identity.26  For instance, the LGB community is more 
commonly referred to as the LGBT or LGBTI community, thus including transgender 
and intersex individuals.  Despite this, the exclusion from this thesis of gender 
identity-based claims is a carefully considered decision.  The issues relevant to a 
claim for asylum by transgender and intersex individuals can be unique and separate 
to those faced by individuals who identify as LGB.  In attempting to cover both bases, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Michael G. Shivley and John P. De Cecco, ‘Components of Sexual Identity’ (1977) 3(1) Journal of 
Homosexuality 41-48, 41-42. 
24 ibid. 
25 ‘Yogyakarta Principles’ (n 22) preamble. 
26 Shivley and De Cecco (n 23) 41-42. 
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there was a danger that no issue would receive the depth of analysis deserved.  
Furthermore, although it is impossible to quantify the number of transgender and 
intersex claims made in the UK, feedback from stakeholders working in the field of 
sexual identity-based asylum explained that the numbers were low.  Thereupon, 
accurately accessing and representing transgender and intersex claims through 
empirical research would be unreasonably difficult for a doctoral thesis.   
 
 
5. Methodology 
 
It is essential to provide an overview of the methodology employed in this thesis. 
Early on in the research process this author determined that a full investigation of the 
UK asylum system experienced by LGB asylum-seekers required a qualitative 
research approach.  By combining both doctrinal and non-doctrinal legal analysis, the 
author could uncover the true impact of current UK asylum law and policy on the 
individuals claiming asylum on sexual identity grounds.  By contrast, a non-empirical, 
solely doctrinal analysis would be too detached from the legal system in current 
operation.  Consequently, the resulting approach to the research question prioritises 
qualitative and empirical methods to produce a current and accurate analysis that also 
foregrounds the experiences of LGB asylum-seekers.   
 
Several approaches shape the research methodology adopted.  This section first 
explains intersectionality and sexual diversity, the key concepts underpinning this 
thesis, before outlining the socio-legal nature of this thesis’s approach.  Subsequently, 
the methodology explains how doctrinal research, empirical research and the 
development of an appropriate theoretical framework each influenced the eventual 
execution of this research project.   
 
5.1 The Key Concepts of Intersectionality and Sexual Diversity 
Recognising that asylum claims can be made on the basis of one’s sexual identity is 
part of a broader movement towards recognising, articulating and legislating on the 
rights of sexual minorities within all states.  By way of example, same-sex sexual 
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activity was not legalised in parts of the UK until 1967,27 1969 in Canada, in 1994 
across Australia, and not until 2003 across all of the US.  Same-sex relationships have 
been legally recognised since 2001 in New Zealand, 2003 in Canada, in the UK from 
2005 in the form of civil partnerships, and 2009 in Australia.28  Same-sex marriage 
has been one of the remaining ‘frontier’ issues of LGBT equality.29  For example, in 
the US, same-sex marriage was only federally recognised in the case of Obergefell v. 
Hodges in June 2015, after a particularly conflicted and protracted battle.30     
 
With this perspective, one can understand that asylum is but one area of law that has 
been forced to understand minority sexual identities in order to confer upon LGB 
individuals their deserved rights.  Thus, law and society must imbibe the reality that 
sexual attraction or orientation for LGB individuals is part of a more substantial 
sexual identity (as it is for heterosexuals).  Additionally, identity construction can be a 
long-term process, especially for groups whose sexual or gender expressions are 
stigmatised and/or actively oppressed socially.  
 
In the light of the wider struggles of LGB equality, this thesis promotes two key 
concepts to assist decision-makers and decision-facilitators with asylum claims made 
on grounds of sexual identity: intersectionality and sexual diversity.  These concepts 
will be used as analytical tools throughout this thesis. 
 
5.1.1. Intersectionality 
The first concept is that of intersectionality.  Intersectionality is essential to areas 
where the law is forced to understand the realms of identity.  It explains that the 
impact of discrimination or oppression cannot be understood through the lens of a 
single identity category.  For the most pointed analysis of oppression and its 
consequences, one must recognise that our experiences are shaped by all the identity 
categories to which we affiliate.  As a result, multiple lenses are required for use in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Same-sex sexual activity was decriminalised in England and Wales in 1967 by the Sexual Offences 
Act 1967, in Scotland in 1981 by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, and in Northern Ireland in 
1982 by the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982. 
28 Jones Day, ‘Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships’ 
<http://www.samesexrelationshipguide.com> accessed 10 April 2015.  
29 ibid.  
30 Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. (2015). 
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one’s analysis and decision-making.31  For example, an incomplete analysis would 
result from failing to account for the way that sexual identity is shaped by categories 
such as, sex, gender, race, education, social class and/or age.32        
 
Crenshaw first advanced the concept of intersectionality.  She argued that it was 
flawed to treat as mutually exclusive dialogue on specific identity categories, such as 
race and gender.33  Expanding upon the experiences of Black women in feminist 
discourse, Crenshaw contended that the experiences of Black women differed from 
White women.  Similarly, when assessing oppression on grounds of race, the 
experiences of Black women differed from those of Black men.  Thus, pursuing 
‘single-axis’ analyses erased and denied legitimacy to the experiences of those 
holding affiliations according to multiple identity categories. 34   The lasting 
consequence was the characterisation of feminism or civil rights by those most 
privileged in the group, at the expense of those whose identities were more complex.  
This generated discrimination for these sub-groups along multiple lines.  Therefore, 
Black women experience discrimination not just for being Black or female, but also 
for being Black women specifically.35  Only by focusing on the oppression specific to 
this subgroup can an understanding of their experiences be developed.  Otherwise, 
narratives that supposedly include the subgroup will serve to erase them and reinforce 
their oppression. 36  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Suzanne B. Goldberg, ‘Intersectionality in Theory and Practice’ in Emily Grabham et al., 
Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (eds) (Routledge-Cavendish, 
2009) 124. 
32 Danielle N. Shapiro, Desdamona Rios, and Abigail J. Stewart, ‘Conceptualizing Lesbian Sexual 
Identity Development: Narrative Accounts of Socializing Structures and Individual Decisions and 
Actions’ (2010) 20(4) Feminism & Psychology 491-510, 505; Layli Phillips and Marla R. Stewart, ‘“I 
Am Just So Glad You Are Alive”: New Perspectives on Non-Traditional, Non-Conforming, and 
Transgressive Expressions of Gender, Sexuality, and Race Among African Americans’ (2008) 12(4) 
Journal of African-American Studies 378-400, 379. 
33 Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 
139-40. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against 
Women of Color’ (1991) Stanford Law Review 1241-99, 1244. 
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Examining the oppression of Black women highlights that all identities are 
intersectional; we can be affected uniquely by the multiple identity categories with 
which we affiliate ourselves.  This is also true for LGB individuals.  Although they 
are categorised by their sexuality for the purposes of the asylum examination, sexual 
identity is shaped by more than sexual attraction.  Single-axis analyses do not 
competently explain the behaviour or experiences of asylum-seekers at the country of 
origin or in the UK.  Asylum-seekers are marked by their diversity.  People seek 
refuge in the UK from nations across the globe; they speak different languages and 
come from different cultures.  Many will adhere to a particular set of religious beliefs, 
or none at all.  Their lives will have been shaped by their education (or lack thereof), 
and their economic circumstances.  They may have been members of ethnic 
minorities in their home societies, or they may have held political views that went 
with or against the majority of their fellow citizens.  Although one aspect of their 
identity formulates the basis of their claim, we cannot disregard the fact that an 
intersectional approach, based on recognising the multiple affiliations that a person 
holds, can help decision-makers to understand persecutory experiences and lives of 
LGB asylum-seekers.  The consequence of improved understanding is the improved 
quality of decision-making.  
 
Intersectionality has been criticised by poststructuralists for encouraging the indefinite 
‘mitosis’ of identity categories, and essentialising identity categories in an identical 
fashion to single-axis frameworks.37  Ehrenreich has described this as the ‘infinite 
regress problem’.38  The ‘infinite regress problem’ undermines the idea of plural 
analyses when the endless creation of sub-groups results in the ‘individual’ existing as 
the only coherent category.  Such poststructuralist critique does not apply to this 
thesis’s application of intersectionality, which focuses on the convergence of 
identities, not their difference or divergence.39  In other words, intersectionality is 
used in this thesis to highlight that the cross-section of identities can complicate 
experiences, not to identify sub-categories of LGB identities.  Furthermore, as Collins 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 James J. Dean, ‘Thinking Intersectionality: Sexualities and the Politics of Multiple Identities’ in 
Yvette Taylor, Sally Hines, Mark E. Casey (eds), Theorizing Intersectionality and Sexuality (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) 119. 
38 Nancy Ehrenreich, ‘Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support between 
Subordinating Systems’ (2002) 71 UMKC L. Rev. 251, 272. 
39 Goldberg (n 31) 126. 
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explains, intersectionality does not mandate an additive approach, nor does it 
command the privileged treatment of a certain category of oppressed individuals over 
another.40  Thus, intersectionality is used in this thesis to examine the points of 
contact between the various aspects of oppression.   
 
Likewise, ensuring that the approach to determining LGB asylum claims is 
intersectional does not involve arguing for privileged treatment for this particular 
minority.  Sexual identity is the focus of this particular analysis, but it is not a 
platform to command better treatment above other applicants.  As Crenshaw cautions, 
the concept of intersectionality is not innovative; it is not ‘being offered as some new 
totalizing theory of identity’.41  In fact, the use of intersectionality can and should be 
utilised within all asylum claims to magnify the junctures of identity and experiences 
of oppression.  This would inject the system with greater fairness overall (Chapter 
two).   
 
Intersectionality theory already applies within the field of asylum.  For example, the 
UNHCR Handbook on determining refugee claims emphasises that ‘it is immaterial 
whether the persecution arises from any single one of these reasons or from a 
combination of two or more of them’.42  Additionally, it is natural for the different 
grounds of claim to overlap in the persecutory narratives of many claimants.43  This 
was exemplified by Macklin, who posed the example of an ‘Asian woman who has a 
well-founded fear of persecution in Africa’.44   She pointed out that the woman could 
rely upon the grounds of race and sex as causal reasons for her fear of persecution.  
That refugee law recognises the ability to claim asylum on multiple grounds is an 
important expression of the intersectionality concept and a great basis for expanding 
its role within the refugee status determination (RSD).  By introducing the concept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Patricia Hills Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of 
Empire (Routledge, 1990) 207. 
41 Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins’ (n 36) 1244. 
42 UNHCR, ‘Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (December 2011) 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, paras 66-67. 
43 ibid. 
44 Audrey Macklin, ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’ (1995) 17(2) Human Rights 
Quarterly 213-77, 263. 
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into the area of sexual identity-based asylum claims with focus and direction, it will 
empower claimants to present their narratives in their full richness and density.  
Additionally, it will encourage decision-makers to understand the varying strands of 
one’s identity (and the way in which they inform one another).  This will improve 
sensitivity to the unique positions that LGB claimants often hold in their countries of 
origin and to their distinctive experiences of persecution. 
 
By underscoring the need for flexibility at all stages and allowing claimants to 
construct identities (and their experiences of oppression) as they wish (insofar as it 
may be appropriate), this approach avoids essentialism.  The use of intersectionality, 
nonetheless, requires monitoring to ensure that decision-makers do not use 
intersectionality as a ‘formula’ to build new categories upon which newer stereotypes 
could be attached.  In this thesis, intersectionality is used to improve the way that 
decision-makers can understand human behaviours and interactions.  The purpose of 
the concept is to ensure that even the most marginalised members of the LGB asylum-
seeking community receive access to the same quality of decision-making as their 
more privileged counterparts.  This line of reasoning is critical to the second 
analytical tool of this thesis.     
 
5.1.2. The Diversity of Sexual Identity 
From intersectionality, one must extract and expand upon a theme that forms the 
second key concept of this thesis: the complexity and diversity of sexual identity.  
This illustrates the idea that both the processes of constructing one’s sexual identity, 
and the identities themselves, are diverse and complex (and often incomplete or 
ongoing).  Sexuality is such an intricate matter that no definitive explanation of sexual 
identity development has been agreed upon.45  It can be impossible to disentangle an 
identity whose creation has been reliant on so many additional factors, including 
environments of stigma or outright intolerance.   
 
It is clear that legal systems have struggled with the rights of sexual minorities 
because policy-makers and decision-makers have been unable to grasp these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Michele J. Eliason, ‘Identity Formation for Lesbian, Bisexual, and Gay Persons: Beyond a 
“Minoritizing” View’ (1996) 30(3) Journal of Homosexuality 31, 31-32; Shapiro et al. (n 32) 492-493. 
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fundamental characteristics of sexual identity.  Instead of accepting the diversity of 
sexual identity, legal systems have sought to deny, reduce or essentialise.  Therefore, 
policy-makers and decision-makers have made decisions failing to endorse the 
absolute equality of LGB people, which are being readdressed.46  Consequently, 
before any decision on sexual identity-based asylum is made, the evaluation must 
begin from the position that sexuality is complex, changeable and diverse.  This is a 
result of the diversity of an individual’s personality, background and experience, and 
the presumed variations in identity construction.   
 
Thus, RSDs must first tackle the recognition and endorsement of sexual diversity.  
For the process of granting protection to genuine claimants to be fair, asylum 
decision-making must disavow, explicitly, the possibility of decisions essentialising, 
stereotyping or constraining LGB people. The asylum system has struggled with 
understanding sexual identity in the past.  If the British asylum system is to achieve, 
as closely as possible, the ideal of fairness, it must do so by entrenching this concept 
into all corners of the system.  Accordingly, sexual diversity should have both 
procedural and substantive impact.   
 
Moreover, it is in the interests of the asylum system to adopt a meaningful position on 
sexual diversity and to be sensitive to the needs of LGB asylum-seekers.  First, it 
would have a profound impact upon the quality of decision-making and public (and 
applicant) confidence in the system.  Secondly, there is a clear economic argument in 
favour of improved decision-making: it results in fewer appeals, fewer fresh claims, 
and fewer applicants receiving financial support for prolonged periods of time whilst 
their claims are processed.  The validation of sexual diversity would also provide a 
space of existence (and capacity for protection) for the claimant whose identity is in 
flux, or cannot be concisely articulated.  It follows that at all points in the system, 
flexibility must also characterise sexual diversity analysis.  Sexual diversity is a 
means of facilitating the accurate determination of LGB asylum claims.  If it is used 
to bind and deny, the system will have misappropriated it.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 By way of example, in the British context, LGB individuals gained the right to serve openly in the 
military in 2000 as a result of the case, Smith and Grady v. UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493; same-sex 
couples obtained the right to adopt through the Adoption and Children Act 2002; and the Employment 
Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 provided protection from discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation.  
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The key concepts of intersectionality and sexual diversity are the philosophical 
bedrock of the ‘structural principles’ and the subsequent appraisal of the British 
asylum system.  These concepts, if need be, can be broken down to the simplest 
precept – the asylum system can only be fair if it is flexible enough to include and 
protect those whose lives do not come within the confines of the dominant, master 
narrative.   
 
5.2 Developing the appropriate methodology: a socio-legal approach 
This research is a socio-legal work.  Wheeler and Thomas explained that the word 
‘socio’ in social-legal studies refers to ‘an interface with a context within which law 
exists, be that a sociological, historical, economic or geographic, or other context’.47  
Socio-legal studies have also been defined by the Economic and Social Research 
Council as ‘an approach to the study of law and processes’ which ‘…covers the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the law as a social phenomenon’.48  The 
research’s socio-legal focus is informed by a desire to examine the experience of UK 
refugee law as lived (intersectionally) by LGB asylum-seekers.  The asylum system 
plays a vital social function: it confers legal status and, thereby, protection to 
individuals seeking safety from persecution, and offers them the opportunity to 
rebuild their lives.  Without examining this system as a ‘social phenomenon’, we 
cannot gain the necessary insight on the fairness of the legal process for sexual 
minority claimants.   
 
The desire to foreground the experiences of LGB asylum-seekers also inspired the 
socio-legal approach.  This is underpinned by feminist theory, namely that research 
must avoid silencing the voices of women and turning them into the objects of 
research, rather than the subjects. 49   In this instance, the researcher has been 
particularly conscious of not turning LGB asylum-seekers into the passive 
participants of this study, upon whose experiences meaning is imposed.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Sally Wheeler and Phil Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in David Hayton (ed), Law's Futures (Hart 
Publishing, 2010) 271. 
48 Economic and Social Research Council, ‘Review of Socio-Legal Studies: Final Report’ (ESRC, 
1994) 1.  
49 David E. Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (3rd edn, Sage, 2013) 167. 
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Consequently, the desire to inject the voices, in the most active sense, of LGB 
refugees into this thesis, necessitated a non-traditional methodological approach to a 
legal thesis.  One hopes that adopting these research strategies reduces the distance 
between the researcher and the ‘LGB asylum experience’, and produces an original 
contribution to the field of sexual identity-based asylum.   
 
5.2.1.   Doctrinal Research as the Preliminary Research Stage  
Doctrinal research was the necessary first step towards examining the British asylum 
system.  Doctrinal research is defined as that ‘which asks what the law is in a 
particular area’.50  Traditionally, the researcher used it to describe the existence of the 
body of law and its application.51   Williams argued that there are two forms of legal 
research, which this thesis has combined when pursuing doctrinal research.  First, 
there is ‘the task of ascertaining the precise state of the law on a particular point’, and 
secondly, there is ‘the sort of work undertaken by lawyers…who wish to explore at 
greater length some implications of the state of the law’.52  
 
In the case of LGB asylum, the wealth of material available on the practice of UK 
asylum decision-makers meant that doctrinal research could be more rewarding than 
merely outlining the law.  Doctrinal research could provide a preliminary evaluation 
of the current asylum policy, an assessment of the problems within this area, and 
guidance regarding potential reforms.53  Indeed, doctrinal research as a first step 
engendered a clear grasp of the asylum procedure in the UK and the practical stages 
through which an asylum claim may proceed.  It also facilitated an understanding of 
the competing tensions affecting the delivery of the RSD and the specific issues 
relating to claims made on sexual identity grounds.   
 
5.2.2.   Empirical Research as the Secondary Research Stage 
A solely doctrinal focus was insufficient to examine the complexities of everyday 
asylum decision-making.  Specifically, it could not represent the voices of sexual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong  
Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 18. 
51 ibid 19. 
52 ATH Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 206. 
53 Dobinson and Johns (n 50) 20. 
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minority asylum-seekers or situate the evaluation of the British asylum system in the 
post-HJ (Iran) climate.  Consequently, an empirical research component to the project 
was developed, which would enable the direct appraisal of the asylum system from 
2010 onwards.  Semi-structured interviews were utilised as they allowed interviewees 
to build a narrative of experience and enabled the researcher to explore how varying 
aspects or stages of the asylum system affected particular individuals. 54   The 
empirical research consisted of interviews with 10 professionals (academics, 
solicitors, barristers, and NGO employees working on support and advocacy); 20 
LGB asylum-seekers (10 men and 10 women from a variety of regions); and one 
former Home Office decision-maker.  As the researcher could not obtain interviews 
with current Home Office personnel, two Freedom of Information (FOI) requests 
were addressed to the Home Office, posing questions that would have been raised in 
potential interviews.  A request to interview members of the Judiciary was 
unsuccessful.  The interview transcripts were analysed thematically to focus on the 
particular experiences of the interviewees within the framework of the decision-
making process.  This qualitative analysis allowed the researcher to test the standards 
experienced by the interviewees within the British asylum system.  This produced a 
better appraisal of the British asylum system and assisted with determining whether 
the decision in HJ (Iran) resulted in fairer decision-making.  This combined doctrinal 
and empirical approach thus produced a more holistic analysis of the British asylum 
system. 
 
Hutchinson describes the first step of empirical work as checking that the doctrine, 
when properly interpreted, is being correctly followed.  This, he believes, would 
establish whether the problems ‘are a result of poor doctrine or lack of compliance 
with the doctrine’.55   Accordingly, examining the impact of current policy on 
determining LGB claims is critical to this evaluation.  Through doctrinal research as a 
first step, the researcher assessed, in summary, the policies and doctrines affecting 
this area.   This enabled a better understanding of the current asylum doctrine within 
the UK and the policies that underpin it.  It also assisted in identifying the ‘correct’ 
doctrine for the asylum system to protect genuine LGB asylum-seekers.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Max Travers, Qualitative Research through Case Studies (Sage, 2001) 2. 
55 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research 
Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 8. 
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subsequent steps of the investigation within this thesis, including the construction of 
an analytical framework (Chapter two) were, thereby, wholly dependent upon the 
doctrinal research process. 
 
Finally, there remained one final concern.  The researcher was conscious of the 
contentious nature of migration in the UK, its impact upon UK migration policy, and 
the public attention that the area of sexual identity-based asylum has received.  
Consequently, a strategy was necessary to distinguish and separate the research from 
the issues raised in the media.  This would prevent the substantive evaluation of the 
British asylum system from being dismissed on grounds of partiality or pandering to a 
media narrative.  The appropriate strategy was to begin the evaluation from an 
objective and legally reasoned platform.  This ‘legal platform’ developed into an 
integral strategy of the thesis: a theoretical framework.   
 
5.2.3. Developing an Appropriate Theoretical Framework as the Tertiary 
Research Stage  
This thesis developed a theoretical framework (‘structural principles’, elaborated in 
Chapter two) to ensure that the analysis did not replicate dominant media narratives.  
The principles identify the essential characteristics of a fair asylum system for LGB 
asylum-seekers.  The framework articulates the values of this research and provides 
continuity of these themes, from theoretical to analytical chapters.  It also ensures that 
the appraisal is independent and balanced, given the highly charged hypothesis.  
Moreover, it provides the tools to replicate the investigation for other Convention 
grounds.   
 
The importance of the structural principles is reinforced by the philosophical 
arguments underpinning fairness.  In fact, the structural principles act as the core 
expression of the fairness concept, extrapolated from UK administrative and 
international human rights law, and supranational treaties (see Appendix B).  The 
principles seek to avoid essentialising the behaviour or needs of LGB asylum-seekers.  
They are underpinned by the key concepts of intersectionality and sexual diversity, 
which aim to accommodate the complexity of human behaviour.  A theoretical 
framework constituted by the ‘structural principles’ allows this thesis to 
simultaneously identify the characteristics of a fair asylum system for LGB refugees 
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(and indeed, asylum-seekers lodging protection claims on other grounds), and to use 
the framework to test the British asylum system for its compatibility, and therefore, its 
inherent fairness.  Thus, the framework provides the final essential component for 
successful completion of this research.  
 
5.3 Rooting the Methodology in Evaluation Theories 
The methodology of this thesis is grounded in evaluation theory.  Although the theory 
has not been conclusively defined, it is understood as a process of information 
gathering.  This information is used to make decisions about the appropriateness of 
the programme or procedure assessed and whether an alternative approach would be 
preferable.56   
 
Evaluation theory supposes that the approach to an assessment is entrenched in the 
evaluator’s values.57  Values have an intrinsic, irremovable place within the act of 
evaluation, as ‘wholly disinterested knowledge claims are unattainable’.58  Values 
need not impair one’s evaluation, providing the evaluator is self-aware and honest 
about the values held and how they will affect the assessment.59  Evaluation theory, 
therefore, informs the methodological approach to this thesis.  The research advocates 
explicitly the values by which the standards of an asylum system ought to be based 
and assessed, namely, the values of fairness, equality and social justice.  It also 
provides decision-makers of the British asylum system with a clear and objective 
evaluation of the system.  
 
The ability for an evaluation to advocate a set of values is useful, powerful even.  If 
those values are held in high esteem by the society one’s research seeks to address, 
the dissemination of the research can have greater significance and impact. 60  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Marvin C. Alkin, ‘Evaluation Theory Development’ (October 1969) 2(1) Evaluation Comment 2, 2-
7. 
57 Jennifer C. Greene, ‘Evaluation, Democracy, and Social Change’ in Ian F. Shaw, Jennifer C. Greene 
and Melvin M. Mark (eds), The Sage Handbook of Evaluation (Sage, 2006) 118. 
58 Jennifer C. Greene, ‘Participatory Evaluation’ in Linda Mabry (ed), Evaluation and the Postmodern 
Dilemma. Advances in Program Evaluation (Vol 3, JAI Press, 1997) 27. 
59 Michele Tarsilla, ‘Theorists’ Theories of Evaluation: A Conversation with Jennifer Greene’ (2009) 6 
(13) Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation 209-19, 211. 
60 Thomas A. Schwandt, ‘Evaluation as Practical Hermeneutics’ (1997) 3(1) Evaluation 69-83, 78. 
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Consequently, many evaluators encourage the explicit articulation of the values 
motivating the evaluation, particularly if they engage concepts that are ‘revered’ by 
society, such as fairness, equality and democracy, for example.  Thus, in espousing 
values arguably important within British society that form common touchstones of the 
UK legal system the researcher hopes that the research results will have a greater 
impact on the system upon which it comments.  Finally, as evaluation is a political 
act, with the ability to influence relationships of power, this thesis also acknowledges 
and engages with the broader political dimensions of asylum and migration.61    
 
This thesis is rooted in the tradition of democratic evaluation: because the priority 
value is the public interest, the evaluation results must be accessible to non-specialist 
audiences. 62   In particular, this research is inspired by the sub-tradition of 
‘Deliberative Democratic Evaluation’, which seeks to address inequalities affecting 
various minorities and pursue the advancement of social justice.63  House and Howe 
argue that the evaluative model utilised must ensure that the interests of all 
stakeholders are included, particularly those most marginalised.  Similarly, this thesis 
includes the perspectives of all stakeholders in the asylum procedure, whilst ensuring 
the prominence of the traditionally ‘voiceless’, namely, sexual minority asylum-
seekers.  Moreover, the proponents of ‘Deliberative Democratic Evaluation’, House 
and Howe, espouse values shared by this researcher.  Both draw upon Rawls’ theories 
concerning social justice, comprising of the equal ‘distribution’ of status, voice and 
participation to stakeholders.64  This thesis cites Rawls in Chapter two to explain its 
use of ‘fairness’ as the primary value and standard of this evaluation.  Despite 
advancing imperative strategic values, this thesis remains objective, reaching its 
conclusions through deliberation and reasoned argumentation.65        
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Greene, ‘Evaluation, Democracy and Social Change’ (n 57) 119. 
62 Barry MacDonald, ‘Evaluation and Democracy’ (1978) Public address at the University of Alberta 
Faculty of Education, Edmonton, Canada, 50. 
63 Enest R. House and Kenneth R. Howe, Values in Evaluation and Social Research (Sage, 1999) 97. 
64 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1999). 
65 House and Howe (n 63) 109. 
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This research is also influenced by the sub-tradition of ‘Critical Evaluation’, which 
focuses evaluation around societal critique. 66   It aims to reveal the ‘structural 
injustices’ within the programme being evaluated, ‘deconstructing inequitable 
distributions of power and reconstructing them more fairly and justly’.67	  	  This echoes 
a goal of this research, which can be summarised as revealing the injustice (if any) of 
the British asylum system towards LGB asylum-seekers and articulating the 
characteristics of a fairer alternative.  	  
 
Critical evaluation is also useful because it appreciates that the layers of context are 
important in understanding the impact of a programme (or, in our case, a legal field).  
Everitt describes critical evaluators seeing practice as ‘constructed within legislative, 
policy, and funding processes… shaped through dimensions of class, gender, race, 
age, sexuality and disability.’68  Thus, critical evaluation informs the necessity of 
understanding the asylum narratives (belonging to the individual and the system) as 
subject to multiple considerations.  Accordingly, critical evaluation has endorsed a 
key concept of this research, intersectionality (section 5 above).  This principle 
enables this research to take a critically evaluative approach to the British asylum 
system.    
 
5.4 Foregrounding the Thesis Investigation with Quantitative Data 
Before the subsequent investigation of the analytical chapters is carried out, one can 
ground the research in existing quantitative knowledge of sexual identity-based 
asylum.  Despite promising to collate statistics on LGB asylum claims in May 2011,69 
the Home Office’s response regarding its collection and release of data in this area 
has been contradictory and confusing.  Responding to the researcher’s initial FOI 
request for this thesis, the Home Office claimed to be ‘recording asylum applicants 
who had included their sexual orientation as part of their asylum claims in 2007’.70  It 
also assured the researcher that it would release its data at the end of 2013.  In a 
follow-up request, however, the Home Office stated that the data collection system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Greene, ‘Evaluation, Democracy and Social Change’ (n 57) 129. 
67 ibid 130. 
68 Angela Everitt, ‘Developing Critical Evaluation’ (1996) 2(2) Evaluation 173-88, 174. 
69 McVeigh (n 18). 
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was still a ‘work-in-progress’ and the data requested was not available.  
Contradictorily, it also stated that ‘the required information would only be recorded in 
the case notes sections within the Home Office database or held solely on the paper 
files’ and for this reason, the requested data was too expensive to produce.  This is 
confusing and suggests that a system for collecting data has not been developed at 
all.71  Why the Home Office has not developed an electronic database to monitor the 
treatment of individual grounds of claim is unclear and inadequate. 
 
Periodically, the Home Office releases general statistics (unspecific to LGB asylum 
claims) regarding the climate of migration within the UK.  These are useful in 
elucidating the landscape in which the subsequent examination and fieldwork has 
taken place.  Thus, in the year ending March 2014, 23,803 asylum applications were 
made in the UK on all grounds, of which 64% of initial decisions were refused.72  In 
the year ending March 2015,	  25,020 claims were lodged in the UK overall, of which 
60% of initial decisions were refused.73  
 
According to the response to the Freedom of Information request, 19,953 asylum 
claims were made in 2011, and 21,958 in 2012.74  The rate of refusal in asylum claims 
was 59% in 2011 and 56% in 2012.75  Of the rejected claims, 2,216 were allowed at 
the appeal stage in 2011, and 1,829 in 2012.76  Moreover, of the claims made in these 
years, 779 in 2011 and 548 in 2012 led to an application for judicial review of the 
decision to refuse the asylum claim.77 
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Other statistics suggest that between 2,000 and 3,000 individuals are held in 
immigration detention in the UK at any given time. 78   In 2012, 48% of the 
immigration detainee population consisted of individuals who had sought asylum.79   
 
In the sexual identity context, there are a number of independent statistics, which 
premise this research.  The research of the UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group 
(UKLGIG), released in April 2010 (prior to the HJ-Iran decision) surveyed the 
asylum claims of LGB individuals that accessed their services between 2005 and 
2009.  This amounted to 50 Reasons for Refusal letters of claimants from 19 different 
countries.  The research found that, compared with an average (overall) refusal rate of 
73% in 2009, the refusal of LGB claims stood at 98-99%.80  In 56% of the claims 
assessed, Home Office decision-makers asserted that individuals could return to their 
countries of origin safely, providing they acted ‘discreetly’.81   
 
An average refusal rate of asylum claims of 73% in 2009 and 74% in 2010,82 
compared with 2011 and 2012 (59% and 56% respectively), may suggest some 
change in the decision-making process, or in the quality of decision-making between 
2010 and 2011, although these statistics alone cannot provide an absolute 
understanding.  Nonetheless, in lieu of data from the Home Office on sexual identity-
based asylum claims, these statistics help to create the background for this research 
investigation.   
 
5.5 The Empirical Research 
The empirical research component of this thesis studies the experiences of LGB 
asylum-seekers under the British asylum system from the perspective of multiple 
stakeholder categories (explained below).  It is evaluative in nature, contending that 
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this approach provides a detailed and incisive study into the practical operation of the 
UK system for LGB claimants.83  
 
Empirical research is a powerful tool of assessment, particularly when gauging the 
efficacy of the law upon a category of society.  As Bradney notes, ‘empirical research 
into legal processes…. provides information of a different character from that which 
can be obtained through other methods of research’.84  When investigating certain 
legal issues, empirical research is indispensable, and even necessary.  Researchers 
such as Gilbert, as well as Hammersley and Atkinson, also observe that empirical 
work provides the opportunity for one to test out research theory. 85   In fact, 
Hammersley and Atkinson encourage researchers to enter the process with a 
hypothesis, or an idea of the ‘foreshadowed problems’, whilst remaining open to the 
research results.  It is unproblematic that this approach may later dictate a revision or 
abolition of the adopted hypothesis.   
 
This thesis does not approach the fieldwork with a strict hypothesis.  There is a 
general hypothesis that the current asylum system is unfair for LGB asylum-seekers, 
due to distinct problems with procedural and substantive aspects of the system (as 
Chapters three and four shall demonstrate).  These preliminary beliefs can only be 
identified and extrapolated with greater perception by conducting the empirical work 
to test the current system against the analytical framework. For this reason, it would 
be inaccurate to describe the research as an entirely ethnographic study, an approach 
that tends to prefer an inductive approach to theory construction.86  This project was 
embarked upon with a general idea about the quality of decision-making in the LGB 
asylum context and with some clarity regarding the principles that must govern the 
approach to such claims.      
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5.5.1. The Empirical Research Design 
The empirical research was designed with attention to the requirements described by 
King and Epstein, and Fink.  King and Epstein suggest the following four necessary 
components to successful empirical research: 1) identifying the population of interest, 
2) collecting as much data as possible, 3) recording the process by which the data is 
observed, and 4) collecting the data in a way that avoids selection bias. 87  
Furthermore, Fink argues that for successful legal research, the researcher must begin 
by establishing the objectives, and then fulfilling the following five requirements: 1) 
specific research questions, 2) a defined and justified sample, 3) valid data collection, 
4) appropriate analytic methods, and 5) interpretations based on the data.88  The initial 
components were identified from the outset, namely, that research would examine and 
evaluate the British asylum system for LGB asylum-seekers, leaving the mechanics of 
the research to be devised.  
 
The researcher determined that semi-structured interviews with each stakeholder 
category, constructed around the asylum procedure itself, would provide the greatest 
yield of information.  Many essential decisions regarding semi-structured interviews 
are made prior to, and during, the process of data collection, in terms of designing the 
questions.89  This, however, does not reduce the freedom given to interviewees to 
describe their experiences as they recall them.  In fact, by designing the data 
collection process around semi-structured interviews and the stages of the asylum 
process, a deliberate decision was made to empower interviewees with a framework 
to articulate their position on the fairness of the system.  This would enable claimants 
themselves to assess the system according to their own memories and experiences.  
Furthermore, rather than harming or distorting the relationship between the 
interviewer and participant, semi-structured questioning struck the balance between 
empowering interviewees and maintaining an efficient process of data collection.90   
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This method of empirical research could be dismissed, as people generally assemble 
their experiences according to their understanding of what is important.  Answers are 
shaped by what interviewees assume questioners expect of them, particularly in a 
research environment.91  It does not follow, however, that such research should not be 
conducted at all.  This tendency is the precise reason why such research is necessary.  
Without a greater repository of empirical data examining the experiences of real 
asylum-seekers, the fairness of the asylum system cannot be properly assessed.  
 
At any rate, triangulation was an important part of the research design.  This 
counteracted such critique, and ensured that the research was governed by the 
precepts of independence and objectivity.  Triangulation is defined as the ‘cross-
verification’ of data from multiple sources to provide a more ‘detailed and balanced’ 
picture in a given context.92  Triangulation, particularly in a thesis that addresses a 
crucial aspect of the on-going political dialogue on migration, would advance the 
credibility of the resulting analysis and conclusions.93  Although Gomm argues that 
triangulation raises the problem of what to do when sources disagree, assuming that 
there is a single ‘truth’ (which this thesis does not believe), this is not a relevant 
concern here. 94   The theoretical framework (Chapter two) provides us with a 
substantive understanding of how opposing perspectives should be reconciled within 
a fair asylum system.  Practically, the research is not concerned with producing a 
single ‘truth’, but examining what is practically feasible regarding the quality of the 
asylum system to which prospective LGB asylum-seekers are entitled.  This is a 
critical exercise that cannot be avoided, which involves balancing the perspectives 
and arguments of the different stakeholders.   
 
Triangulation is an unusual approach to asylum research in the sexual identity-
context, but can help make an original contribution to the existing knowledge.  Here, 
triangulation is utilised to consider the perspectives of all the stakeholders invested in 
the British asylum system.  Given the aforesaid contentious nature of immigration 	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matters, this is important and valuable.  Consequently, the researcher constructed the 
empirical work to consider the question of fairness from three perspectives: 1) 
professionals with notable experience in this particular area; 2) decision-makers; and 
3) LGB asylum-seekers whose claims have been considered in the post-HJ (Iran) 
climate.   
 
This translated into the goal of conducting interviews with three classes of 
participants: 1) professionals with experience in the field of sexual identity-based 
asylum, such as academics, solicitors, barristers and NGO workers; 2) decision-
makers, consisting of Home Office caseworkers and judges at all levels of the British 
Judiciary; and, 3) individuals who claimed asylum on the basis of their sexual 
identities and had either been granted or refused asylum, or were awaiting a decision.  
One argues that triangulation in this format improved the quality of the research.  It 
also ensured that the conclusions and recommendations produced are balanced and 
pragmatic, cognisant of the practical factors inhibiting the implementation of a better 
system.  This is essential, as the research does not simply aim to produce an original 
contribution to this field, but has the specific goal of impacting the design and 
operation of the British asylum system for sexual minority claimants.      
 
Deciding upon the appropriate sample sizes per category was a difficult process.  
There was an acknowledged tension between a greater sample size helping the 
research in its ‘representativeness’ of LGB asylum experiences, and ensuring that the 
research was completed within the set timeframe. 95   A variety of further 
considerations also dictated eventual sample sizes, e.g., time constraints, wanting to 
avoid information saturation, ensuring a balance between the doctrinal and empirical 
research, and the goals of triangulation.  Sample size was set at 10 professionals, 10 
decision-makers, and between 20 and 30 asylum-seekers.   
 
The empirical research was designed around probability and non-probability quota 
sampling, selecting in the first category representatives who had developed a 
reputation for their work in the field of LGB asylum.96  There are inherent limitations 	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to restricting the sample size of the first two ‘stakeholder’ categories.  It is still better, 
however, to incorporate their perspectives than none at all, as the subsequent chapters 
will exemplify.  Furthermore, the sample size of each category was restricted by the 
availability of willing participants.  This is not problematic.  Semi-structured 
interviews, as utilised here, lend themselves towards narrative building, eliciting rich 
responses through which opposing perspectives, even if small in number, can 
accurately and independently represent those viewpoints.  
 
Asylum claimants were selected with the goal of ensuring sex/gender balance, and 
more broadly, geographic representation.  Based on statistics of the largest asylum-
producing states in the UK, doctrinal research and anecdotal experience on the 
nationalities of LGB asylum-seekers, this research sourced participants from three 
broad geographic regions: the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East 
and South Asia.97  The researcher sought an equal distribution of participants from 
each of these regions.  Given the dominant prevalence of gay male experiences 
throughout the study of minority sexual identities, even within the asylum context, 
ensuring equal gender representation was important.  This would not only foster 
greater representation of female voices, but would enable an intersectional 
investigation, i.e., looking into whether there are experiential differences of the 
system depending on one’s gender/sexual identity.   
 
The researcher recognised that characteristics pertaining to his prior experience of the 
asylum system as a legal practitioner, and his personal identity could impact the 
execution of the research, including the way data was obtained from empirical 
research participants.98  This thesis does not regard bias to be a problem within this 
research, recognising that many researchers frame the world according to their ‘pre-
conceived ontologies’.99  Avoiding this tendency would not necessarily remove the 	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potential for bias or manipulation in the research process.  Indeed, throughout the 
process the researcher has reflected on the influence of the ‘self’ on the project, the 
associated limitations relating to one’s world-view and the power relationships 
between the researcher and interview participants.100  Moreover, as stated above, 
evaluation theory allows one to pursue research that is personal to oneself, and 
empowers researchers to entrench their values within their work, which this research 
also does.       
 
The researcher also recognised the ethical implications of interviewing vulnerable 
asylum-seekers.  The empirical research was thus designed with close consultation of 
the Social Research Association’s Ethical Guidelines.101  The researcher successfully 
obtained ethics approval from the University of Liverpool Ethics Committee, as the 
research proposed was ethically sound.  The ethical approval reference of the 
Committee is SLSJPhd1213/05.  The researcher sought to adhere closely to ethical 
considerations, obtaining informed consent before each interview, and seeking to 
avoid or minimise the harm caused to research participants. 102   The ethical 
implications of the research were particularly important, given the vulnerability of 
asylum-seekers and the sensitivity of the topic being researched.  For asylum-seekers, 
it is a legitimate fear that broaching certain topics within the interview could cause 
emotional distress or psychological harm, particularly for victims of trauma.  
Nonetheless, the risks to the interviewees were judged to be minimal for several 
reasons.  Interviewees were free to ignore certain questions and were signposted to 
support services that provided free counselling and therapy.  Furthermore, they were 
granted the ability to withdraw their participation in the research project at any point.   
 
Informed consent was paramount.  Anonymity was guaranteed to all asylum-seeker 
participants, alongside the confidentiality of the information exchanged within the 
interview.  Also, all prospective participants were given the opportunity to fully 
consider the Participant Information Sheet supplied, which was explained to them, 
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and to ask any questions.  Interviews only proceeded upon the satisfaction of 
interviewees and a fair warning of the distress that could be caused to them.   
 
When designing the empirical component of this study, close consideration was given 
to the idea that the research must adhere to the principles of ‘reliability, representation 
and validity’.103  The researcher is confident of the credibility of the empirical work, 
as the design has remained faithful to the basic components of the refugee definition 
and the stages of UK asylum procedure.  Moreover, the simplicity of the design 
means that it is easily replicable; the results are an absolute reflection of what has 
been studied.  Additionally, as decision-making in this area is hypothesised to reflect 
a restrictive approach that affects claimants seeking protection on all other grounds, 
the research results could potentially extend beyond the minority group concerned.   
 
A thematic analysis of the interviews was performed to provide the most incisive 
exploration, both of perspectives within a particular stakeholder category, and across 
the categories themselves.  A thematic analysis generally begins with the process of 
deciding what the themes shall be and what will count as evidence of a theme before 
coding the transcripts for examples.104  This thesis does not follow this procedure. 
Instead, the themes were derived from the law itself, from the components of the 
refugee definition, which claimants must prove they fulfil in order to be granted 
refugee status.  The themes also follow the distinction between substantive and 
procedural fairness outlined in administrative law (Chapter two).  For these reasons 
(alongside the preliminary hypothesis), the empirical work of this thesis is not rooted 
in grounded theory as many other qualitative research projects can be. 105  
Nevertheless, the approach of the research is not to impose the ‘foreshadowed 
problems’ onto the data, but to allow the interviewees to lead the appraisal of the 
system, in the inductive tradition.106  
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5.5.2. Conducting the Empirical Research 
The process of carrying out the empirical research was largely unproblematic.  From a 
shortlist drawn up of prospective professionals who could be interviewed, interviews 
were conducted with the following 10 individuals: Robert Wintemute, Professor of 
Human Rights at King’s College London; Joël Le Déroff, Senior Policy and 
Programmes Officer at the European chapter of the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association (ILGA-Europe); S. Chelvan, Barrister at Law and PhD Candidate at 
King’s College London; Catherine Robinson, Barrister at Law; Barry O’Leary, 
Partner (and Solicitor) at Wesley Gryk Solicitors; Liz Barratt, Associate (Solicitor) at 
Bindmans LLP; Paul Dillane, Refugee Researcher at Amnesty International UK; Erin 
Power, Executive Director at UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (UKLGIG); 
Lillian Tsourdi, PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law/Institute for European Studies 
of the Université Libre de Bruxelles; and Professional Participant A, a Support 
Worker within a British non-governmental organisation (NGO) that works with 
asylum-seekers.107  The roles attributed to these interviewees were accurate at the 
time of conducting the interviews and may have changed since then. 
 
Carrying out interviews with LGB asylum-seekers was challenging, as the difficulty 
in recruiting willing participants exceeded expectations.  For example, the Lesbian 
Immigration Support Group in Manchester declined to participate.  Their service 
users had given several interviews to other media organisations and researchers.  
Undoubtedly, this is the result of great media and academic interest, which has 
resulted in an element of ‘saturation’.  Despite this, a research vacuum has remained, 
which this thesis seeks to address.  Such interviews have contributed to newspaper 
articles that lack the requisite legal analysis, and to a thesis that only examines lesbian 
asylum experiences, and again, not from a legal perspective.  Still, it is understandable 
that the pool of potential accessible interviewees would be small, with many having 
shared their experiences already.  Equally, finding the appropriate avenues to reach 
out to an often-invisible LGB asylum-seeker community rendered the recruitment 	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process slow and laborious.  Thus, the sample size of this stakeholder group was 
reduced to 20, as the process of sourcing and conducting interviews was too time-
consuming.   
 
The recruitment of participants was promoted through a blog and an academic twitter 
account.  Several cases highlighted in the media were contacted, as were countless 
organisations supporting sexual minority refugees and asylum-seekers.  The research 
received strong assistance from two support groups, the UKLGIG and Imaan, a group 
supporting LGBT Muslims, which the researcher volunteered for whilst researching 
and writing this thesis.  Many participants came from these organisations.  Several 
participants were recruited through social media-based outreach, and the participants 
from these three sources further contributed to the work by introducing the research to 
other LGB asylum-seekers and refugees within their social networks.  Thereupon, 
‘snowball sampling’ had the greatest impact upon participation.  Participants reached 
into their communities on behalf of the researcher, and after conducting the interview, 
encouraged reticent or anxious friends to volunteer. 
 
Interviewing LGB asylum-seekers was a rewarding process.  Interviewees had no 
expectations beyond their desire to ensure improvements to the system for LGB 
claimants that would seek protection in the UK after them.  They were made aware of 
and remained untroubled by the inability of the researcher to help their own cases.  In 
many instances, participants had already obtained refugee protection.  Building a 
relationship of trust was important to facilitating maximum disclosure.  The 
researcher sought to achieve this in the preliminary stages, when the researcher and 
participant went through the Participant Information Sheet.  Interviewees were 
guaranteed confidentiality, anonymity and the ability to withdraw participation at any 
stage.  They were allowed to construct their memories as they wished, as the 
questions were simply a guideline.  They could decline to answer any question.  
Emphasising the goals of the research (to make recommendations for an improved 
system, where necessary) and ensuring that the interview was an empowering process 
for the participant ensured that the interview stage of the empirical research went 
smoothly.  One interview was conducted in Urdu, a mother tongue of both the 
participant and the researcher, and this decision elicited a stronger interviewer-
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participant dynamic, and data that was more rich and detailed than it could have been 
otherwise, but also more emotive.     
  
Upon completion of the interviews, it transpired that the sampling strategy for LGB 
asylum-seeker and refugee participants had been successful.  It ensured equal 
representation between those who identify as men and women, conducting 10 
interviews each.  There was a reasonable geographic spread.  Of the 20 interviews 
conducted, 7 participants were from Sub-Saharan Africa, 10 from the Middle East and 
South Asia, and 3 from the Caribbean.  Recruiting participants from the Caribbean 
was made more difficult by the non-responsiveness of the organisations that were 
approached for their African and Caribbean LGB membership, such as Proud 
Diamond and Movement for Justice.  Within the, admittedly, large geographic 
category of the Middle East and South Asia, 3 participants were from the Middle 
East, whilst 7 were from South Asia.  This was because of the difficulty in obtaining 
willing participants and the impact of ‘snowballing’ on the non-probability quota 
sampling.  It is difficult to know if this is representative, however, as there are no 
statistics available on the origins of LGB asylum-seekers specifically.108  
 
It is undoubtedly for these reasons, particularly ‘snowballing’, that Uganda and 
Pakistan were the most represented countries of origin amongst the participants (3 
Ugandans and 5 Pakistanis).  This was noted whilst the empirical work was being 
conducted and, so, prospective interviews with other willing participants from these 
countries were not pursued.  The research results will show that the interviews have 
provided data that illuminate the current state of the British asylum system, as 
experienced by LGB asylum claimants, whilst representing, to some degree, the 
regions producing the largest number of LGB refugees. 
 
More data is available on the demographic makeup of the asylum-seeker participants 
(see Appendix A).  For example, English language proficiency amongst participants 
was high, aside from two interviewees, one male and one female.  In terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 That said, information on the ten largest asylum-origin states over 2014 and 2015 suggests that the 
geographic areas of representation chosen are broadly accurate.  See, Refugee Council, ‘Quarterly 
Asylum Statistics’ (May 2015) 
<https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0003/4620/Asylum_Statistics_May_2015.pdf> accessed 8 
March 2016. 
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religion, 12 participants (five women and seven men) identified as Muslim, three 
participants identified as Christian (all women), and for five participants, their 
religion was undisclosed (two women and three men).  Moreover, in terms of marital 
status, 13 were single (five women and eight men), four were married (three women 
and one man), an additional two participants stated that they were divorced (one 
woman and one man), and the marital status of a single participant was undisclosed (a 
woman).  Finally, in terms of age range, seven participants were 20-29 years old 
(three women and four men), seven were 30-39  (four women and three men), and six 
were 40-49 (three women and three men), amounting to a relatively even split.   
 
During the process of interviewing asylum-seekers, MASY005, a participant of 
Indian origin, decided to supply the researcher with his Reasons for Refusal letter 
from the Home Office.  The appeal against the refusal of his asylum claim had just 
failed and he had decided to return to India voluntarily.  For the sake of parity, the 
researcher requested the other asylum-seeker participants who had seen their claims 
refused for access to their Reasons for Refusal letters, but the other participants were 
unable or unwilling to supply them for various reasons.  Thus, although an 
information disparity exists between the case of MASY005 and the other participants 
who were issued with refusal letters, having a copy of MASY005’s letter has been 
extremely useful.  Indian asylum applicants hold a precarious position in the UK due 
to the legal status of criminal sanctions within this country,109 and for this reason, 
India acts as a useful viewpoint, through which the operation of the system can be 
investigated with scrutiny. 
 
Incorporating the perspectives of decision-makers was the most challenging aspect of 
the empirical work.  From interviews with certain legal practitioners and discussions 
with the thesis supervisors, it became clear that successfully requesting the 
cooperation of the Home Office to interview caseworkers was unlikely.  An alternate 
strategy was devised, due to the importance of incorporating the perspectives of 
decision-makers.  Thus, the prospective interview questions for Home Office 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Dhananjay Mahapatra, ‘Supreme Court Makes Homosexuality a Crime Again’ The Times of India 
(12 December 2013) <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Supreme-Court-makes-homosexuality-
a-crime-again/articleshow/27230690.cms> accessed 15 April 2015.  
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caseworkers were submitted in the form of an FOI request.110  The first FOI request 
was submitted on 28 March 2013 and a response was received on 9 October 2013.  
This was followed by a second FOI request on 6 May 2014, to which a response was 
received on 13 June 2014.  The FOI requests queried the existence of statistics 
regarding the determination of sexual identity-based asylum claims, the production of 
objective evidence in relation to country conditions for LGB people, and training 
received by Home Office decision-makers on considering LGB claims.  As the replies 
to these FOI requests produced detailed information regarding the Home Office’s 
perspectives, it was unnecessary to pursue interviews with their caseworkers.   
 
Furthermore, to enhance the depth with which the position of the Home Office is 
understood, the analysis draws from the Asylum Policy Instructions on sexual identity 
and gender issues, and on assessing credibility.  During this process, a former 
decision-maker of the Home Office contacted the researcher through social media and 
volunteered to participate in the research, providing anonymity was gauranteed.  
Therefore, through a lengthy interview, the participant has attempted to represent the 
procedure and rationale of the Home Office and of the decision-maker category as a 
whole.  This, together with the Instructions and Freedom of Information requests, has 
enabled the research to achieve triangulation. 
 
For the Judiciary, a request was made to the Ministry of Justice to interview a sample 
of judges from the Immigration and Asylum Chamber on 28 June 2013.  Although a 
response seeking further information was received on 14 August 2013, there was no 
further response to the answers that were submitted on 5 October 2013.  As a result, 
there is an absence of judicial perspective in this research.  This could not be 
addressed due to the failure of the Ministry of Justice to outright grant or reject the 
request for access.   
 
Participant interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.  The transcripts were then 
subjected to a thematic analysis using NVivo software, according to themes 
constructed around components of the refugee definition and the asylum procedure.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The Freedom of Information Act 2000 gives the public the ‘right to access’ information held by 
public authorities. 
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Codes were created on the basis of the doctrinal research and empirical data.  The 
initial set of codes drew from the refugee definition, using each criterion or issue 
relating to the definition as a separate code.  The additional codes focused on the 
procedure and on the elements of procedural fairness embedded in the structural 
principles.  Thus, they attached to the stages of the legal procedure, such as the 
screening interview, substantive interview and detention, and to the second theme of 
the structural principles, such as legal representation and guidance (see Chapter two).  
This provided the researcher with easy access to the data collected on each particular 
issue, for analysis (by juxtaposing it with the data drawn from doctrinal sources) and 
inclusion in Chapters three and four.   This analysis was supplemented by an analysis 
of the responses to the FOI requests (which supplied the materials through which 
Home Office caseworkers were trained on sexual orientation issues), the 
aforementioned Asylum Policy Instructions, and doctrinal sources.  This thesis will 
evidence that the qualitative research enabled a real and current appraisal of the 
British asylum system against the analytical framework provided by the ‘structural 
principles’.  The researcher believes that 31 interviews, two FOI requests, and an 
analysis of Home Office asylum policy documents have helped to produce a 
representative and triangulated piece of work.  Should it somehow be considered not 
representative enough of the experience of LGB asylum-seekers in the UK, it 
nonetheless contributes significantly to, and substantially expands, the pre-existing 
knowledge on how the British asylum system’s responsibilities towards sexual 
minority refugees must be conceived.    
 
 
6. Thesis Structure 
 
The following chapters of the thesis set out the foundations and terms of the 
theoretical framework through which the British asylum system will be evaluated, 
followed by the appraisal itself.  Extracts from the interview transcripts and from the 
responses to the FOI requests are integrated throughout to meet the objective of 
analysing the system through the study of the three main stakeholder categories.  
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Chapter Two provides the theoretical and analytical basis for investigating the British 
asylum system.  It explores the concept of fairness as an identifiable legal standard 
embedded within UK law through legal philosophy, administrative law, and 
international and supranational treaties.  Having established why fairness is the 
appropriate standard for the investigation, the chapter will use the provisions 
espoused to advance the ‘structural principles’.  This is an analytical, legal framework 
setting out how the asylum claims of LGB asylum-seekers should be evaluated, 
underpinned by the concepts of intersectionality and diversity of sexual identity.  The 
ideal legal system set out in this chapter will then be used to evaluate the practices of 
decision-makers in the British asylum system when tasked with RSDs of sexual 
minority claims. 
 
Chapter Three begins the process of evaluating the British asylum system for sexual 
minority claimants from a substantive fairness perspective, using the framework 
(‘structural principles’) espoused in the previous chapter.  Deconstructing the refugee 
definition, this chapter evaluates issues pertaining to the claimant’s duty to establish 
that they have a ‘well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a 
particular social group’.  It explores how the definition of ‘persecution’ has evolved 
within the area of asylum, before analysing how issues concerning the thresholds of 
persecution arise in the LGB context.  This covers the criminalisation of same-sex 
sexual practice in many asylum-producing states, whether psychological violence can 
constitute persecution, and the role of discretion in RSDs after HJ (Iran) established 
that ‘acting discreetly’ to avoid maltreatment was persecutory.  It then examines the 
quality and use of Country of Origin Information reports in the LGB context.  Finally, 
it explores meaning of the notion of ‘particular social group’ and its implementation 
in the LGB context.   
 
Chapter Four addresses procedural aspects of the system, focusing particularly on the 
way that ‘credibility’ is utilised as the main means of evaluating the ‘believability’ of 
an asylum claim.  As part of this, the chapter explores how assumptions regarding 
plausible or likely human behaviour, the impact of trauma on memory and 
recollection, and the role of ‘truth’ in credibility assessments have affected the 
system’s ability to correctly decide claims in this area.  Additionally, the chapter 
addresses other procedural matters, including the subjection of LGB claimants to 
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detention and accelerated procedures, and the recruitment, training and conduct of the 
British asylum system personnel.  
 
Chapter Five, the concluding chapter, ties together the issues identified in relation to 
the preceding investigation of the British asylum system from the sexual minority 
perspective.  It will make final remarks regarding the British system’s consistency 
with the theoretical framework utilised to conduct the analysis, as outlined in Chapter 
two.  It will also comment on the overall fairness of the system and provide, if 
necessary, substantive recommendations on the areas for potential improvement.111  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (OUP, 2009) 121. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Theoretical Foundation and Analytical Framework: Fairness as 
a Legal Standard and the ‘Structural Principles’ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will explain the decision to investigate from the perspective of fairness 
the British asylum system as it applies to LGB asylum-seekers.  The key reason for 
using fairness as the foundation for this thesis is that fairness is the touchstone of the 
British legal system, in particular in the public and administrative law of the UK.  It is 
also the guiding principle of international human rights law vis-à-vis the treatment of 
refugees and their claims for asylum.  Accordingly, fairness will dictate whether the 
current UK system appropriately deals with the asylum claims of LGB claimants.  
This is done through the advancement of a framework of ‘structural principles’ that 
need to be followed to achieve a fair system for processing claims of asylum for LGB 
claimants.  
 
Furthermore, as evaluation theory informs this research project, fairness embodies 
certain essential values of this thesis regarding the way asylum-seekers’ refugee 
protection claims should be decided. 
 
 
2. Why is Fairness the Appropriate Standard in an Investigation of the 
British Asylum System? 
 
Much has been written about the extensive obligations owed by a state to its citizens.  
The place of the ‘alien’, such as an asylum-seeker, within the state-citizen contract is 
unclear, however.1  This thesis contends that a state also owes obligations to non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Denis J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (OUP, 
1996) 31. 
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citizens, which are articulated by the concept of fairness.  Thus, the duties of fairness 
are not predicated on an individual’s citizenship, but a state’s ‘control’ over the 
individual.  
 
The right to fair treatment is a central notion of legal philosophy.  Legal philosophy 
has answered significant questions regarding the importance of fairness, the purpose 
of the rule of law, and the relationship between society and the governing state. These 
questions, and the plethora of responses attempting to answer these questions, have 
influenced the attitudes taken towards fairness within the British legal system, as this 
chapter will evidence.  Fairness is an accepted legal standard within UK law.  As the 
rule of law underpins the British legal system, a law does not rule a state unless: 
 
[T]he life of the community is governed by clear, open, stable, prospective, 
general standards, government officials adhere to those standards, and there 
are independent tribunals (i.e. courts) that regulate the conduct of other 
institutions.2   
 
This is reinforced by the ‘associated principle’ of due process, which encapsulates the 
belief that ‘all governmental decisions ought to be made by processes that put the 
relevant considerations effectively before the decision-makers’.3  As a result: 
 
A decision is unfair if it wrongly neglects the interests of a person it affects.  It 
is procedurally unfair if it wrongly neglects a person’s interest in participating 
in the process; it is substantively unfair if its outcome wrongly injures a 
person’s interest.4      
 
This forms the fundamental basis of understanding fairness for the purposes of this 
investigation.  Separating fairness into its procedural and substantive halves provides 
a logical structure for this thesis.  Procedural fairness broadly relates to the asylum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (OUP, 2009) 18. 
3 ibid 21.  
4 ibid 121. 
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procedure itself.  Substantive fairness relates to the outcome of the RSD, although 
each component also has implications for the other.  
 
2.1 The ‘Duty to Act Fairly’ is Rooted in Legal Philosophy 
Looking to the origins of the fairness concept can help us to understand and elucidate 
what constitutes fair treatment in the context of LGB asylum claimants.  Many 
theorists sought to ‘isolate the special character of justice and fairness’.5  Hart 
explained that fair treatment concerns the idea of treating ‘like cases alike’.6  More 
illustratively, Finnis argued that fair treatment addresses three elements: first, 
relations between persons; second, what duty is owed to one another; and thirdly, an 
element of equality or proportionality.7  To this, Galligan argues in favour of a fourth 
component, that the actions concerned ‘comply with certain fundamental standards of 
right treatment’.8  For the purposes of this thesis, this is our basic understanding of the 
fairness concept. 
 
Social contract theory has also made an important contribution towards our 
understanding of why fairness is such a critical concept.  Through some of its most 
famous proponents, such as John Locke and John Rawls, social contract theory 
advances how fairness mediates the fundamental relationship between the state and 
the individual.9  The nature of this relationship warrants some scrutiny, however, 
given the question of whether the state owes duties of fair treatment only to its 
citizens, or whether they are owed to all those within their jurisdiction and control, 
including asylum-seekers.  Certainly, the work of Locke and Rawls could be 
interpreted as being inclusive in this way.  Fairness provides the equilibrium between 
contracting parties that is naturally agreed upon when neither party has an advantage 
over the other.10  It would be inadmissible to argue that access to fair treatment 
depends upon the individual’s status in a society.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Galligan (n 1) 56. 
6 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961) 163. 
7 John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980) 161. 
8 Galligan (n 1) 57. 
9 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (Belknap 
Press, 2007) 10-11. 
10 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 4 and 98; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1999) 
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In the context of refugee law, it is the work of Ronald Dworkin that we can draw the 
most from to understand why fair treatment is intrinsic to the application of the law 
and how it can be articulated as a fundamental right.  Fairness is encompassed by the 
principle of ‘equal concern and respect’.11  Dworkin stipulated that anyone who takes 
‘rights seriously’ must accept the connected notions of human dignity and political 
equality,12 notions that are significant in the LGB asylum context.  The principle of 
equal concern and respect is posited as a political right, the core principle of political 
morality, which compels governments to treat with respect their citizens and all those 
within their jurisdiction.13 
 
Dworkin also underscores the importance of the right to fair treatment through an 
alternate argument.  Rights are presented as protective measures.  Rights are 
articulated into the political and legal context to provide safeguards to individuals, 
against the inevitable decay of democratic institutions.14  Thus, rights ensure that 
democratic institutions treat individuals properly.  A right would exist against a party, 
a state, or an institution, where for some reason it would be wrong to treat a party in 
such a way, despite the persuasive considerations in favour of that treatment.  
Accordingly, although the immigration context contains sufficiently coercive 
justifications for not treating LGB asylum-seekers fairly, the potential affront to their 
dignity means that the public authority is compelled to adhere to the standards of fair 
treatment. 
 
Dworkin also acknowledged that the protection of minorities must be the central 
constituent element of any theory of rights and justice.  He warned against the 
political principle of ‘majoritarianism’, where political and legislative decisions are 
made to benefit the majority.15  As ‘majoritarianism’ can easily lead to the dismissal 
of the rights of minorities, it is imperative that minority rights play an inalienable role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978) 199. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid 272. 
14 ibid 90. 
15 ibid Ch 5. 
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in the structure and content of the standards of fairness.16  This addresses the 
relationship between fairness and rights, highlighting that the protection of the 
fundamental rights of all, especially minorities vulnerable to marginalisation, is an 
important component of fairness.  Thus, as members of a particularly vulnerable 
minority group, LGB refugees are entitled to access a fair asylum procedure and 
obtain a fairly constituted decision.  These rights are theoretically inviolable, given 
how deeply such a failure could puncture their dignity, integrity and the very security 
of their lives.  Fairness towards minorities, therefore, involves ensuring that their 
basic rights are guarded to ensure respect for their inherent dignity.  
 
Thereupon, Dworkin introduces the legal concept of ‘law as integrity’, which requires 
‘a government to extend the same substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses 
for some’.17  He argues that a state applying the standards of fairness and justice 
inconsistently lacks integrity, due to its failure to endorse across the board what it has 
allowed for some.  It is incumbent upon decision-makers to ‘protect political liberties’ 
and decide cases according to the methodology of constructive interpretation.18  Thus, 
although LGB asylum-seekers are not citizens of asylum-receiving states, they are 
still entitled to fair treatment and protection of their fundamental rights as individuals 
contracting with the same state.  From Dworkin it becomes clear that the fair 
treatment of asylum-seekers is integral to confidence in, and the respectability of, 
both the public authority and the state.    
 
Therefore, by looking into the origins of the fairness concept, we gain insight into 
why it plays a key role in mediating the application of the law, especially by the 
bodies of the state.  Fair treatment is the fundamental governing principle of the state-
individual relationship, arguably because such standards would be chosen if both 
parties were operating from an equal and balanced contracting position.  More 
concretely, ensuring that political structures adhere to standards of fair treatment 
helps to preserve the core dignity of all human beings.  Fairness provides safeguards 
against the potential abuse of the state’s power.  It is also critical to ensuring that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ibid. 
17 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986) 165. 
18 ibid 226. 
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minority rights are given equal importance to the interests of the majority.  Without 
law being applied on a non-discriminatory basis, a state lacks integrity.  Each of these 
arguments resonates strongly within the asylum context, despite the fact that 
immigration and asylum law is inherently discriminatory on the basis of immigration 
status/nationality.   
 
This foundation will be now expanded in the following two sub-sections to identify 
how fairness has emerged as a concrete legal concept in administrative law and 
through international and supranational treaties.     
  
2.2 Fairness as a British Standard through Administrative and International 
Law and Supranational Agreements 
Fairness, in terms of the state’s duty to act fairly and the individual’s right to be 
treated fairly, is an embedded feature of UK law.  This is evident mainly in two areas: 
administrative law, and the supranational and international treaties to which the UK is 
a signatory.   
 
Examining fairness through the lens of administrative law is essential.  This thesis 
recognises that principles of fairness in administrative law act as limitations upon the 
exercise of public law power by authorities such as the Home Office.  Administrative 
law, i.e., ‘the law relating to the control of government power’, ensures that public 
authorities exercise their duties fairly.19  Administrative law is described as ‘ensuring 
governmental accountability, and fostering participation by interested parties in the 
decision-making process’. 20   This thesis takes a ‘rights-based approach’ to 
administrative law, reinforcing its conception as being ‘based on the standards of 
legality to prevent abuse of power by public bodies’.21  
 
Most significantly, perhaps, fairness has also developed as a substantive legal concept 
through increasing international legal cooperation.  Beginning in the late twentieth 
century, this collaboration includes the international human rights regime, which was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 3.  
20 ibid. 
21 ibid 16. 
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directly inspired by Locke.22  The codification of rights as items that human beings 
possessed and to which they were entitled began with the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789 stating that ‘men’ were ‘born and remain 
free and equal in rights’.  From the eighteenth century onwards, natural rights 
gradually became less acceptable to philosophers and theorists, such as Hume, 
Bentham and Mill.23  The Holocaust of the Second World War resulted in state 
leaders returning to natural rights as a means of securing human life and dignity.  
Consequently, the ‘preservation of life’, in the tradition of Locke, led to the 
institutionalisation of rights protection through two key mechanisms of international 
collaboration.  The first was the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
(UNDHR), the precursor to two international human rights treaties: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  The second was the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), establishing 
an agreement (and set of principles) broadly outlining the commitment of signatory 
states to share in the responsibility of protecting genuine refugees.   
 
International human rights instruments, like the UNDHR and the Refugee Convention 
have helped to institutionalise rights, including the right to fair treatment, into the 
fabric of the law.  Fairness exists now as more than just theory, embedded as tangible 
rights and entitlements in the operation of the UK legal system.   
 
Arguably, the greatest contribution to procedural and substantive fairness within the 
UK comes from the ‘European Frontier’.  Those accessing legal procedures or relying 
upon their core entitlements in the UK have benefited greatly from the UK’s 
ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights 24  (ECHR or ‘the 
Convention’), and subsequent further effect given within domestic law through the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  Moreover, the UK’s membership of the European Union 
(EU) has made a pivotal contribution to fairness as a legal concept (see Appendix B).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Burns H. Weston, ‘Human Rights’, in Richard P. Clause and Burns H. Weston (eds), Human Rights 
in the World Community: Issues and Actions (2nd edn, University of Pennsylvania, 1992) 16. 
23 ibid. 
24 ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (European Convention 
on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) (1953). 
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This is especially in the light of the EU’s decision to create a harmonised asylum 
system binding upon all Member States,25 and the development of a separate rights 
instrument, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter or 
‘the Charter’).   
 
2.2.1. Fairness in Administrative Law 
Within administrative law, the constraints imposed upon the exercise of public 
powers are rooted in natural justice.  Natural justice describes the evolution of a body 
of rules and minimum standards conveying the duty to act fairly upon those with 
decision-making capacities.26  Natural justice is synonymous with fairness; the less an 
exercise of decision-making power resembles a ‘judicial’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ matter, 
the more appropriate it is for the term ‘fairness’ to be used over natural justice.27  The 
duty to act fairly has specific goals: to provide accurate decision-making,28 to 
guarantee objectivity and impartiality,29 and to protect human dignity by enabling an 
individual to participate in a decision, particularly when it is unfavourable.30   
 
Each of these goals is essential to the fair and proper operation of the British asylum 
system.  Undoubtedly, they are based on the values extrapolated from the previous 
section, representing, for example, principles that would arise from the ‘original’ 
contracting position.  Natural justice applies where ‘a right, interest or legitimate 
expectation’ exists.31  It is not intended to be a ‘precise and uniform code of 
procedure’.32  That said, what will constitute fair treatment will vary, depending on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This competence was confirmed by the ‘Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European 
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts’ 1997 O.J. 
(C340), now found in ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (TFEU) (26 October 2012) 
(C326/49), arts 77-80. 
26 Bernard Schwartz, ‘Administrative Procedure and Natural Law’ (1953) 28(2) Notre Dame Lawyer 
169, 182. 
27 Craig (n 19) 345.  See also, McInnes v. Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520 [1530]. 
28 David Resnick, ‘Due Process and Procedural Justice’, in James R. Pennock and John W. Chapman 
(eds), Due Process (Nomos, 1977) 217. 
29 Rawls (n 10) 210. 
30 Frank Michelman, ‘Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process’ in Pennock and 
Chapman (n 28) Ch. 4.  See also, R v. SSHD, Ex Parte Doody [1994] 1 A.C. 531 HL [551]. 
31 Craig (n 19) 340.  
32 Stanley De Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th edn, Penguin, 
1998) 540. 
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the importance of the right or interest at issue, the value of the right to fair treatment, 
and the cost of providing this treatment.33  In other words, the doctrine is also 
concerned with substantive justice, encouraging decision-makers to consider whether 
a particular framework will improve the standards of fairness without leading to 
inefficacy, delay or unjustifiable expense (see Appendix B).34   
 
Fairness plays a critical role in the asylum process from the administrative 
perspective.  Given that a life may be at stake if a claim is rejected (for example, 
resulting in a person being sent back to their home country), a higher standard of 
fairness is expected of public authorities exercising decisions where the individual’s 
physical and mental safety is concerned.  In the same regard, due process is absolutely 
necessary in the criminal justice system, where the accused’s liberty is at stake. 
 
In some areas of law, there are different legal systems in place within the UK.  
Administrative law has devolved status in Scotland, but asylum law does not.35  
Consequently, although the case-law in this section is primarily from the courts of 
England and Wales, this thesis contends that the principles extracted would apply 
across legal systems within the UK, and other asylum-receiving jurisdictions as 
well.36  
 
The first case to address the right to be treated fairly within administrative law was 
Ridge v. Baldwin.37  Here, the Chief Constable of Brighton was dismissed without a 
hearing by the local police authority.  The House of Lords held that it was within the 
rights of the complainant to be granted a hearing.  Lord Reid emphasised that a 
decision-making body, judicial in nature or not, was responsible for providing a fair 
hearing.38  This was especially the case where the decision potentially caused harm to 
the individual concerned.  Ridge was a landmark decision, as it broadened the remit of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Craig (n 19) 340. 
34 De Smith and Brazier (n 32) 542. 
35 See, the Scotland Act 1998. 
36 This is especially so given that the cases referenced pre-date the creation of the Scottish parliament 
in 1999. 
37 Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (Lord Reid). 
38 ibid. 
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fairness and dismissed the perception that natural justice did not apply to 
administrative cases.  It also entitled judges to balance the standards of fairness 
against efficiency considerations, to determine the appropriate standards in a 
particular setting.39  Following Ridge, in the case of Re HK the court also found a duty 
to act fairly entrenched in the principles of natural justice.40  Lord Parker CJ stated 
that it was not ‘a question of being required to act judicially but of being required to 
act fairly…to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which 
in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly’.41  Re HK reinforced the legitimacy 
of the duty to act fairly: even decisions and policies that appeared to be legal needed 
to be consistent with the principles of natural justice.  The primacy of fairness in 
decision-making was, thereby, re-established in the English courts.  Moreover, the 
decision provided a more expansive standard of fairness that incorporated not only 
procedural elements, but also addressed the substantive components of fairness 
regarding the duty to produce a correct decision.42  This embodies the aforementioned 
two-pronged nature of fairness, procedural and substantive, that is clear in 
administrative law and important to the asylum context.   
 
From this general duty to act fairly, the English courts have developed five tangible 
sub-principles of procedural fairness within administrative law (Appendix B).  The 
first principle is the rule against bias.  For a society to accept that the decision is 
procedurally and substantively fair, it must have been made by an independent and 
impartial adjudicator.43  The matter of partiality speaks directly to a key epithet of 
justice that addresses perception and reality; justice may still be served if a decision-
maker holds a particular bias, but justice must also be ‘seen to be done’.44   
 
The court sought to provide objective guidance on when a suspicion of impartiality 
should be explored.  This was challenging.  In order for a society to believe in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 De Smith and Brazier (n 32) 534; R v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex Parte Benaim and 
Khaida [1970] 2 GB 417 [430] (Lord Denning). 
40 Re HK [1967] 2 QB 617. 
41 ibid (Lord Parker CJ). 
42 Lawrence G. Baxter, ‘Fairness and Natural Justice in English and South African Law’ (1979) 96 
South African Law Journal 593, 625. 
43 John Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (9th edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 397. 
44 R v. Sussex Justices, Ex Parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 [259] (Lord Hewart). 
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decision-making power of public authorities, a balance must be struck between 
maintaining public confidence and preventing ill-advised challenges from being taken 
seriously.45  Thus, the court first proposed a test for bias in the case of R v. Gough, 
which stated that impartiality should be examined where there was a ‘real danger or 
possibility’ of bias.46  The Gough test was criticised by courts in several other 
jurisdictions for giving precedence to the court’s observation of bias over the public’s 
perceptions.47  The Court of Appeal returned to the test in Porter v. Magill, revising it 
so that the appropriate query was for a judge to consider whether, in the view of a 
‘fair-minded and informed observer’, there was a real possibility of bias.48  The rule 
against bias acknowledges that the public’s perception of impartiality, particularly 
amongst those relying on an interest or benefit from a public authority, is fundamental 
to the fair exercise of public authority power.  Thus, through this test administrative 
law advances a mechanism to hold public authorities accountable for discrimination 
within the exercise of its power.  
 
The second sub-principle of procedural fairness is the right to legal representation.  
The right is not absolute.  Understandably so, in the exercise of power by many public 
authorities, legal representation is unnecessary or would delay or hinder the decision-
making process.49  Instead, the right to representation is contingent on certain factors, 
such as whether the process is adversarial, the importance of the interest at stake, the 
capacity of a person to present their case without representation, and the legal 
complexity involved in making the decision.50  It is also grounded in how challenging 
the legal procedure is, i.e., whether the duty of fairness mandates an individual has 
assistance from a competent legal representative.51  The more a person has at stake 
and the greater the severity of a potential sanction, the greater the need for an 
individual to be supported by adequate legal representation.52  Moreover, research 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Alder (n 43) 397-399. 
46 R v. Gough (1993) AC 646; Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No.2) [2001] 1 WLR 
700. 
47 Craig (n 19) 417. 
48 Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 HL [102-103]. 
49 Craig (n 19) 369. 
50 ibid 370. 
51 ibid 164. 
52 Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd [1969] 1 QB 125. 
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into the workings of several tribunals has found that the success rate of claimants 
improved significantly where they were legally represented.53   
 
The third sub-principle of fairness is the right to notice, i.e., to be informed of the 
complaint or charges against a person.  In the case of Kanda, Lord Denning set out 
that the right to a hearing was accompanied by the right to be informed of the case 
that was involved: ‘if the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth 
anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is 
made against him’.54  This is extremely important to the asylum context, as the right 
to notice also includes the right to know the basis on which a decision is made, the 
evidence used,55 and ‘the right to be given a reasonable amount of time to prepare the 
case’.56  
 
The fourth sub-principle of fairness is the duty of the public authority to communicate 
the reasons for its decision to the individual.   The courts argued that either such a 
duty must be stated or implied in a statute, or there must be a ‘special justification’ or 
legitimate expectation that reasons will be communicated.57   Lord Mustill noted the 
support within the English courts towards the full disclosure of an authority’s 
reasoning, identifying ‘a perceptible trend towards an insistence upon greater 
openness in the making of administrative decisions’. 58    This recognition has 
developed so that where the subject matter is appropriately serious (this represents 
more than simply the consequences of an adverse decision), one can apply to have the 
decision quashed on grounds of the failure to give reasons, irrespective of the case’s 
core merits.59 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Hazel Genn and Yvette Genn, The Effectiveness of Representation at Tribunals (Lord Chancellor's 
Department, 1989) 25-35; Tom Mullen, ‘Representation at Tribunals’ (1990) 53 MLR 230, 230 and 
232. 
54 Kanda v. Government of Malaysia [1962] AC 322 [337]. 
55 Galligan (n 1) 356. 
56 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Anufrijeva [2004] 1 A.C. 604 [26]. 
57 Doody (n 30) [546]. 
58 ibid [561]. 
59 Craig (n 19) 341. 
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The final sub-principle of fairness is the right to be consulted before a benefit is 
denied.  Alternatively known as the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectation’, it was 
developed to defeat administrative decisions where the consultation rights demanded 
by fairness were not granted.60  In the case of Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs, Lord Denning rejected the trial judge’s argument that natural justice was not 
applicable because the decision was neither judicial, nor quasi-judicial in nature.61  He 
dismissed this distinction as ‘no longer valid’ and referenced Ridge in affirming the 
‘legitimate expectation’ of the opportunity to make representations before being 
deprived of something.62  In the case of McInnes v. Onslow-Fane, the dicta of 
Megarry VC articulated the scenarios under which legitimate expectation could 
exist.63  Where the content of the undertaking, policy guideline or conduct of a body 
leads an individual to expect that they will be granted specific treatment and a hearing 
before an independent tribunal, this should generally be granted.  These ‘may be 
called the expectation cases, which differ from the application cases only in that the 
applicant has some legitimate expectation from what has already happened that his 
application will be granted.’64  In the case of GCHQ, Lord Diplock also expanded 
upon the circumstances that would be applicable.65 
 
Accordingly, the legitimate expectation doctrine grants the right of judicial review to 
individuals with a real expectation that either the decision would be favourable or that 
they would be properly consulted and heard before they were refused.66  This is not a 
full legal entitlement; it exists as an interest, which can be utilised to apply for the 
judicial review of an adverse administrative decision.  It also ensures that decision-
makers continue to make decisions that follow the law and correct procedure, 
understanding that if their decisions are defective, they will be reviewed and even 
quashed.67  In the refugee context, the doctrine is necessary, especially given the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 ibid 340. 
61 Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149 [170]. 
62 ibid [170]. 
63 McInnes (n 27) [1527-1530]. 
64 ibid [1528-1529]. 
65 GCHQ H.L. 1984; [1985] Appl. Cas. 374 [408].  
66 Robert E. Riggs, ‘Legitimate Expectation and Procedural Fairness in English Law’ (1988) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 395-436, 396. 
67 Peter Cane, Administrative Law (5th edn, OUP, 2011) 77-80. 
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increasing tendency for RSDs to turn on issues of credibility, as Chapter five of this 
thesis will demonstrate.  Where decision-makers make assumptions regarding the 
persecutory narratives of asylum-seekers, it is crucial that asylum-seekers have the 
opportunity to refute or clarify these issues.  
 
Consequently, these principles demonstrate that the decision-making power of any 
public decision-making body in the UK, including the Home Office, is inhibited by 
the obligation under administrative law to act fairly and manifested by the five 
principles described above.  This thesis acknowledges that the exact nature of the fair 
treatment that should constrain decision-making depends on a number of factors, such 
as the nature of the decision-making power, the potentially adverse consequences 
upon the claimant, and the demands of the wider public interest.68  Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the duties owed by the Home Office are at the higher end of the scale in the 
light of the seriousness of the consequences to the asylum-seeker if refugee protection 
is to be denied.  Having established that the duty to act fairly is entrenched within UK 
administrative law, operating as a standard attached with significant substance and 
meaning, this thesis proceeds to examine how the UK’s international and 
supranational obligations also hold the Home Office’s asylum decision-making 
powers to scrutiny.  
 
2.2.2. Fairness in International and Supranational Law 
This thesis contends that the standards arising from the ECHR, the EU Charter and 
the EU as an organisation further entrench fairness as a standard in UK law 
(Appendix B).  They further legitimise the use of fairness as the standard for the 
investigation within this thesis, and offer guidance on its substance.   
 
The ECHR plays an important role in refining the standards of fairness in UK law.  
Article 6 ECHR protects the right to a fair trial in both the criminal and civil realms.  
Where a substantive claim fails under an article of the Convention, Article 6(1) 
enables a claim to be pursued on procedural grounds.69  In Maaouia v. France, 
however, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or ‘the Court’), responsible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 ibid 116. 
69 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 60. 
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for deciding upon alleged breaches of the Convention by a signatory state, denied the 
applicability of Article 6 to immigration matters.70  It held that the four-year delay in 
rescinding an exclusion order, which the appellant argued breached his rights because 
of the failure to grant him a fair hearing within a reasonable period of time, was 
neither a criminal matter nor a civil matter.71  Protocol 7, Article 1 of the ECHR 
(which was signed on 11 May 1984 and entered into force on 1 November 1988), 
provides a right to a fair trial for lawfully resident foreigners facing expulsion, 
intending to fill a gap by creating a provision that had been previously absent.  This 
absence was taken as proof by the Court to mean that Article 6 did not apply to 
‘aliens’ facing deportation or removal from a host country, i.e., it was not applicable 
to immigration matters. 
 
The Court in Maaouia relied on previous decisions of minor authority, rather than 
considering the matter afresh.72  This resulted in the noteworthy dissenting judgments 
of Judges Loucaides and Traja, who argued that the history of Article 6 ECHR and 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) had 
been poorly considered.  Significantly, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states 
that if a provision has the capacity for more than one interpretation, the decision-
maker must decide in favour of the more expansive reading, i.e., that which grants an 
individual greater rights.73   
 
Nonetheless, the ECtHR has also developed the right to a fair hearing in an important 
way, through the ‘equality of arms’ principle.  In the case of Dombo Beheer BV v. 
Netherlands, the Court stated that each party had the right to present their case under 
conditions that did not place them at a disadvantage, thereby allowing applicants 
equal access to the records and documents relevant to a particular case.74 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Maaouia v. France 33 EHRR 42 (2001). 
71 ibid [40]. 
72 ibid [33-39]. 
73 ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (23 May 1969) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, p.331, art 31. 
74 Dombo Beheer BV v. Netherlands App no 14448/88 [1993] [35]. 
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Furthermore, despite the exclusion of applicability of Article 6 ECHR in the refugee 
context, other Convention provisions encumber signatory states to comply with the 
duty of fair treatment.  For example, Article 5 ECHR protects the right to liberty and 
security, and engages fairness by providing the right for detention to be reviewed.75  
Through Article 5(4), detainees are empowered to use court proceedings to establish 
the legality of their detention.  Even if a previous case, on similar facts, has 
established the lawfulness of detention, the deprivation of an opportunity for review 
could, nonetheless, violate the provision.  Courts must conduct regular reviews of 
continuing detention and must have the capacity to test its lawfulness.76  In Chahal v. 
UK, the Grand Chamber found that the options of habeas corpus, judicial review 
proceedings, and a panel were all inadequate to provide the degree of protection 
required to satisfy Article 5(4) (as well as being inadequate for the purposes of Article 
13 ECHR, which addresses the right to an effective remedy in the domestic setting).77  
 
Like the rule against bias, Article 14 ECHR prohibits the protection of Convention 
rights from being conducted in a discriminatory or prejudicial manner.   
 
Article 13 ECHR also engages the duty to act fairly.  Where a Convention right of an 
individual has been violated, Article 13 guarantees the right to an effective remedy 
before a national authority.  Thus, Article 13 cannot be invoked independently from 
the freedoms explicitly articulated elsewhere in the Convention.78   Additionally, 
Article 13 and Article 35(1) of Protocol No. 11 emphasise subsidiarity, 
simultaneously requiring the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies before 
approaching the ECtHR, and stressing the responsibility of the domestic court 
systems to safeguard fundamental rights.79   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 ECHR (n 24). Art 5(4) states, ‘everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
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76 Fenwick (n 69) 58. 
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Moreover, Article 13 ECHR has been used in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 
ECHR (encompassing the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or 
inhumane and degrading treatment) to ensure that, where appropriate, the claims of 
asylum-seekers are covered by procedural and substantive protections.  The scope of 
the obligations under Article 13 depends on the nature and seriousness of the 
interference with another Convention right (especially where Articles 2 and 3 are 
concerned).  For example, given the non-derogability of Articles 2 and 3, the 
appraisal of whether a state has complied with the requirements under Article 13 
should be stricter in relation to Articles 2 and 3 than in cases involving derogable 
rights.80  Consequently, despite the non-applicability of Article 6 ECHR to asylum 
matters, the ECHR still constrains the Home Office’s powers through its other 
provisions.   
 
The way in which the above provisions engage the concept of fair treatment is 
illustrated by the following cases.  The case of Ipek v. Turkey concerned the detention 
and disappearance of the applicant’s two sons by the Turkish authorities.81  The Court 
found that the Turkish authority had breached its duty to engage in an effective 
investigation, as provided for under Article 2.82  The violations, consisting of the 
unacknowledged detention and disappearance (and presumed death) of the applicant’s 
sons, engaged Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the ECHR, and were arguable for the purposes of 
Article 13.  Consequently, there was a failure of the Turkish authorities to conduct an 
effective investigation into the violations, breaching Article 13.83    
 
Furthermore, the case of Ilhan v. Turkey concerned the apprehension and physical 
abuse of the applicants by Turkish gendarmes.84  Here, the ECtHR held that there had 
been violations of Article 3 and 13.85   The Turkish investigatory authorities had not 
interviewed the applicants, witnesses, or doctors who provided medical treatment 
after the physical abuse, and did not scrutinise contradictory statements from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 ibid 1013. 
81 Ipek v. Turkey App no 25760/94 (17 February 2004) [10]. 
82 ibid [169]. 
83 ibid [197-200]. 
84 Ilhan v. Turkey App no 22277/93 (27 June 2000). 
85 ibid [92-103]. 
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gendarmes. 86   Consequently, the applicants were denied a ‘thorough and fair 
investigation’ into these allegations.87  The case of Mehmet Emin Yuksel confirmed 
the approach of using Article 3 in conjunction with Article 13 to hold states 
accountable for the denial of procedural fairness, such as fair investigations.88  
 
The ECtHR has also addressed fairness within asylum context, applying Article 3 to 
the consequences of return in the case of NA v. United Kingdom, and to the reception 
conditions of an Afghan asylum seeker in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.89  
Therefore, although asylum matters are not decided upon under Article 6 ECHR, the 
combination of Articles 2, 3 and 5 with Article 13 provides safeguards against 
violations of the right to fair treatment.  
 
The European Social Charter (ESC) provides for economic and social rights,90 some 
of which have been explicitly extended to asylum-seekers through the Appendix of 
the Charter, and the case-law of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR).91  
By way of example, Article 12(4) of the ESC obliges signatory states to ‘undertake a 
system of social security’, which should also be extended to asylum-seekers, and 
Article 13(1) encompasses the right to social and medical assistance.  The case-law of 
the ECSR, derived from its complaints procedure, has also addressed the rights of 
asylum-seekers.  For example, in the case of Defence for Children International 
(DCI) v. Belgium, the ECSR found that Belgium violated several rights of asylum-
seeker children, as they were destitute and homeless, and deprived of medical care.92  
Similarly, in Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. Netherlands, the ECSR 
found that the Dutch welfare system violated Article 13(4) regarding medical 
assistance and Article 31(2) regarding the provision of housing, as adult asylum-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 ibid [95]. 
87 ibid [92-103]. 
88 Mehmet Emin Yüksel v. Turkey App no 40154/98 (20 July 2004) [32]. 
89 NA v. United Kingdom App no 25904/07 (17 July 2008) ECHR 616; MSS v. Belgium and Greece 
App no 30696/09 (21 January 2011). 
90 Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised), 3 May 1996, ETS 163. 
91 UNHCR and the Council of Europe’s Department of the European Social Charter, ‘Round Table on 
the Social Rights of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (Council of Europe, 7 December 2009) 7. 
92 Defence for Children International (DCI ) v. Belgium - decision on the merits, Complaint No. 
69/2011, Council of Europe: European Committee of Social Rights, 23 October 2012. 
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seekers were deprived of medical assistance and accommodation.93  Such rights are 
supremely important to the dignity of asylum-seekers, as well as their experience of a 
particular asylum system. 
 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (entered into force in 1999), the EU has 
declared its intention to create a ‘Common European Asylum System’ (CEAS).94  
Essentially, the objectives of the CEAS are to create common standards of protection 
across Member States, and increased cooperation, support and solidarity between 
Member States of the EU on asylum issues.95  Thus, the CEAS aims to stem the 
proliferation of divergent asylum standards across EU Member States and, in 
advancing common, minimum standards, allows for domestic immigration authorities 
to enact standards of a higher quality, surpassing the standards provided by the EU 
asylum instruments.  As stated on the European Commission website, ‘asylum should 
not be a lottery’.96  EU Member States must work together to ensure that asylum-
seekers are treated fairly and their claims are treated uniformly across the region.  
Therefore, the CEAS aims to prevent the ‘secondary movements’ of asylum claimants 
between Member States due to different legal frameworks and asylum standards.97   
As a result, four main legislative instruments have been implemented to create EU-
wide common standards on issues pertaining to asylum.98  These asylum instruments 
are colloquially known as the ‘Reception Directive’, ‘Procedures Directive’, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. The Netherlands (complaint), Complaint No 90/2013, 
Council of Europe: European Committee of Social Rights, 21 January 2013. 
94 Treaty of Amsterdam, reflected in TFEU (n 25) arts 67-80. 
95 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Policies – Asylum’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm> accessed 16 June 
2016. 
96 ibid. 
97 ‘Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and 
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need 
International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted’ (Qualification Directive) (30 
September 2004), OJ L. 304/12-304/23, recital 7. 
98 The researcher acknowledges that there are other Directives that are part of the EU asylum acquis, 
such as ‘Council Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally 
Staying Third-Country Nationals’ (16 December 2008) OJ L. 348/98 (Return Directive) and Council 
Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification’ (22 September 
2003) OJ L.251 (Family Reunification Directive), although the Family Reunification Directive does 
not apply to the UK.     
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‘Qualification Directive’, and ‘Dublin Regulations’.99  Although the UK ‘opted-in’ 
and adopted the first phase of legislation, it decided to ‘opt-out’ of most of the second 
phase.  As a result, it was not a party to the recasting of the three directives, but chose 
to remain a party to the recast Dublin Regulations.  So, only the first phase of the 
Reception, Procedures and Qualification Directives apply to the British asylum 
system, as the UK believed that adopting a common EU asylum policy would not be 
‘right’ for it.100  Arguably, the implications of the UK not opting into these recast 
directives is that it has resisted strengthening the legal standards on certain issues, 
such as the employment rights of asylum-seekers and their subjection to detention and 
fast-track procedures, in order to preserve autonomy for the state.101  The discussion 
below will thus concentrate on the CEAS’s first phase of legislation.   
 
The CEAS goals are relevant for the purposes of achieving a fair system, besides 
constituting political tools that aim to regulate the relationship between Member 
States and their obligation in the asylum context.102  For example, Council Directive 
2005/85/EC, the ‘Procedures Directive’, fulfils a key EU objective that emerged in 
the Tampere Conclusions (‘to introduce a minimum framework in the Community on 
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status). 103   Council Directive 
2004/83/EC, the ‘Qualification Directive’, sets out the standards for the qualification 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The recast (amended) instruments are currently: ‘Council Directive 2011/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third-
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform 
Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the 
Protection Granted (Recast)’ (20 December 2011) OJ L. 337/9-337/26; ‘Council Directive 2013/32/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting 
and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast)’ (29 June 2013) OJ L. 180/60 -180/95; ‘Council 
Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013 Laying Down 
Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection (Recast)’ (29 June 2013) OJ L. 
180/96 -105/32; ‘Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible 
for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a 
Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast)’ (29 June 2013) OJ L. 180/31-180/59. 
100 Cathryn Costello and Emily Hancox, ‘Policy Primer: The UK, the Common European Asylum 
System and EU Immigration Law’ (Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, 2 May 2014) 4. 
101 ibid. 
102 European Commission, ‘Green Paper of 6 June 2007 on the Future Common European Asylum 
System’ COM (2007) 301. 
103 ‘Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in 
Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status’ (Procedures Directive) (2 January 2006) 
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of refugee status.104  These two directives address the procedural and substantive 
components of fairness set out in administrative law.  For example, Article 9 of the 
Procedures Directive states that a determining authority must communicate asylum 
decisions in writing.  In negative decisions, it must provide the reasons and the details 
of how it can be challenged.  This corresponds to the right to notice and right to 
receive reasons under procedural fairness.  Furthermore, Article 9 of the Qualification 
Directive addresses substantive fairness, as it gives details and examples of what will 
constitute an ‘act of persecution’ for the purposes of a successful asylum claim.  
 
In addition to the CEAS directives, the EU Charter makes individual rights visible 
and explicit across the Union.105  It also enables a breach of these rights to be 
challenged at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), such as matters of 
interpretation pertaining to provisions of the asylum directives.  On 1 December 2009, 
the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, giving the Charter binding effect on all EU 
institutions and Member State governments.106  
 
Article 10 of the Charter guarantees freedom of thought and conscience.  Similarly, 
Article 18 secures the right to asylum.  Moreover, although Article 6 ECHR is held to 
be inapplicable to asylum cases, rights to the exact same standard are, nonetheless, 
secured via the EU, through the Charter.  Article 41(1) of the EU Charter affords the 
right to have one’s matters handled by a fair procedure, ‘impartially, fairly and within 
a reasonable time’.107  Article 41(2) includes the right to be heard before a decision is 
made, the right of access to one’s file, and the right to receive reasons for a decision 
taken by the authority, reinforcing certain rights within administrative law.  
Additionally, Article 47 of the Charter provides two further rights: the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal and the right to a fair and public hearing before an 
independent and impartial tribunal, within a reasonable amount of time.  Article 52(3) 
provides for the scope of the Charter. Although several provisions in the Charter are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104  Qualification Directive (n 97). 
105 ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ (EU Charter) (26 October 2012) 2012/C 
326/02.  
106 ‘Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community’ (13 December 2007) 2007/C 306/01. 
107 EU Charter (n 105) art 41(1).  
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intended to mirror those in the ECHR, this does ‘not prevent Union law providing 
more extensive protection’ – for example, in extending the right to fair trial to the 
asylum context.   
 
Indeed, the ability to provide greater protection to individuals within the EU 
jurisdiction was explicitly highlighted by the ‘Explanations Relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ (the ‘Explanations’).108  This is a document designed to assist 
with interpreting the provisions of the Charter.  For example, on Article 47(1), the 
Explanations acknowledge the parallels with Article 13 ECHR, but then state that ‘in 
Union law the protection is more extensive since it guarantees the right to an effective 
remedy before a court’.109  Additionally, the Explanation acknowledge that, although 
Article 47(2) of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR, ‘in Union law, the 
right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and 
obligations…nevertheless, in all respects other than their scope, the guarantees 
afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar way to the Union’.110  This is underscored at 
the very end, putting Article 47(2) and (3) in a list of Articles ‘where the meaning is 
the same as the corresponding Articles of the ECHR, but where the scope is wider.’111 
 
Therefore, despite Maaouia excluding the applicability of Article 6 ECHR to asylum 
matters, the substance of Article 6 ECHR standards enters the British asylum system 
through the EU Charter, whenever the UK is acting within the scope of EU law.112  
The EU Charter binds Member States not only when implementing EU law, but also 
in relation to any activities that fall within the scope of EU law.113  Therefore, given 
an asylum competence is found within the treaties (beginning with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam), the Charter binds Member States whenever they act within the field of 
asylum. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 European Parliament, ‘Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
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109 ibid, explanation on Article 47.  
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112 EU Charter (n 105) art 51(1). 
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These rights are reinforced by the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the field of asylum and 
its competence in providing guidance on the interpretation of EU legislation.  In the 
case of Salahaddin Abdulla and Others v. Germany, the CJEU emphasised that, when 
making a determination on the risk of persecution, decision-makers must operate 
‘with vigilance, and care,	  since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of 
the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of 
the Union’.114  The case-law of the CJEU has addressed, specifically, the fair and 
proper consideration of asylum claims based on sexual identity grounds, which will 
be discussed within the subsequent chapters. 
 
Through this section it has become clear that fairness is the appropriate standard for 
this thesis.  It has a sound theoretical basis in legal philosophy and is an accepted 
standard in the jurisdictions where the British asylum system operates.  UK 
administrative law, EU law and international human rights law have not only proven 
the relevance of fairness, but have also provided fairness with tangible elements.  
These add substance to the fairness standard and entrench the Home Office’s duty to 
act fairly in real legal provisions and principles.  Relying on the existence of this 
theoretical and legal foundation of fairness within UK law, the following section 
advances the ‘structural principles’ of a fair asylum system.  Building upon the 
epithets and laws advanced by UK administrative law and by international and 
supranational obligations (Appendix B), the ‘structural principles’ provide clarity and 
substance as to how an asylum system can exercise its duty to determine LGB asylum 
claims fairly. 
 
 
3. What Does Fairness Look Like in the LGB Asylum Context: the 
‘Structural Principles’ 
 
Having outlined the theoretical and legal foundation of the public authorities’ duty to 
act fairly in the exercise of its decision-making powers, the third section of this 
theoretical framework chapter sets out the terms of the fairness obligation in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. 
Germany [2010] ECR I-1493 [90]. 
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context of asylum claims made on grounds of the applicant’s sexual identity.  It is 
clear that acting fairly when deciding asylum claims is an integral responsibility of all 
decision-makers involved in the British asylum system.  The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has stated that the ‘importance of [refugee 
status determination] procedures cannot be overemphasized.... A wrong decision 
might cost the person’s life or liberty’.115  It is also important to re-emphasise why 
fair treatment is essential in the area of asylum.  The standards created by the fairness 
obligation act as protections against the incidence of arbitrary or incorrect rejections 
of genuine asylum claims.116  This is fundamental given that the essential liberties 
(and lives) are at stake for most asylum-seekers. Furthermore, returning to the 
administrative law guidance on when higher standards of fairness are appropriate, this 
thesis contends that a fairer asylum system will result in a more economically 
efficient system, an essential advantage in an era of increasingly ‘scarce resources’.117 
 
The structural principles set out in this section will elucidate the basic components of 
a fair asylum system, i.e., the necessary values for the claims of LGB asylum-seekers 
to be treated fairly.  The principles are grounded in the theoretical and legal 
foundation of fairness entrenched within UK law.118  They build upon the provisions 
discussed above to provide clarity and substance to the basic attributes of a fair 
asylum system.  These principles serve an additional purpose, however.  They also act 
as a basic analytical framework that, associated with the key concepts of 
intersectionality and sexual diversity, will be used in the investigation of the British 
asylum system for sexual identity-based asylum claims.  The investigation follows in 
the subsequent chapters (Chapters three and four).  
 
The principles advanced in this section are arranged under two main themes that have 
been extracted from the above exploration of section 2.  The first theme addresses 
substantive fairness, in terms of matters that impact upon a person’s interest in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 UNHCR, ‘Determination of Refugee Status’ (1989) RLD 2, Chapter 2. 
116 Galligan (n 1) 54-56. 
117 European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ‘The Way Forward: Towards Fair and Efficient 
Asylum Systems in Europe’ (September 2005) 48. 
118 Note that domestic UK law on asylum is primarily contained in the Immigration Rules (last 
amended July 2008) HC 293, paras 326A-325H. 
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outcome of a process, i.e. the decision whether to grant refugee status.  This theme 
advances principles that relate to the relationship between fairness and the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, as explored through Dworkin in section 2.1, as 
this is what is required to effect substantive fairness in the refugee context by 
facilitating a fairly constituted outcome.  The second theme concerns procedural 
fairness, in terms of matters that affect the person’s participation in a process, i.e. the 
process of claiming asylum.  This second theme transposes key epithets of procedural 
fairness outlined above into the asylum context.  The two themes are flexibly 
arranged and intersect frequently in this thesis.  The overarching purpose of these two 
themes is to fulfil the right of genuine (LGB) asylum-seekers to be granted refugee 
protection.  
 
3.1 The Relationship Between Fairness and the Rights of Asylum-Seekers 
The first theme in the framework of structural principles addresses how the fair 
treatment of asylum-seekers encompasses the protection of their fundamental rights, 
as articulated by the Refugee Convention and the international and supranational 
instruments described above.  This was briefly addressed in section 2.1, where it was 
discussed that Dworkin found that fairness requires decision-makers to avoid 
‘majoritarianism’ by safeguarding the rights of minorities.  The relationship between 
fairness and rights was also articulated by the ECHR, which uses principles of 
fairness to protect the fundamental rights of individuals.  In addressing this 
relationship further, this theme espouses concrete principles regarding the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers and the respect owed to them by asylum-
receiving states, the inherently flexible and evolving understanding of the concepts 
contained in the Refugee Convention, and finally, how the evidentiary standards of 
the refugee regime must function to achieve substantive fairness.   
 
3.1.1. Respect for UK’s Broader Fundamental Rights Obligations in Asylum 
Decision-Making 
The first component of the structural principles addresses a basic criterion for any fair 
asylum system. An asylum-receiving state must respect and protect the fundamental 
rights of asylum-seekers, despite their lack of citizenship within that particular state.  
It is a facet of the international human rights regime that, whilst the state-citizen 
relationship enjoys certain privileges and respect, possession of inviolable 
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fundamental rights is not predicated on one’s immigration status, but on one’s core 
dignity.119  This has been demonstrated in section 2, for example, by the ECtHR’s 
willingness to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers against breaches by 
asylum-receiving states.  Indeed, as explained previously, fundamental rights are 
essential to the protection of human dignity and the preservation of life, which 
inspired the international human rights regime.  The inviolable nature of dignity, as 
Dworkin discussed, provides the basis on which states must protect the fundamental 
rights of all individuals within their jurisdiction or control.  The principles of dignity, 
equality and mutual respect (section 2.1), dictate that asylum systems are also obliged 
to protect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers in order to operate fairly.  
Returning to the earlier contention that fairness is entrenched within UK law, recital 
10 in the preamble to the Qualification Directive emphasises that the Directive 
respects the fundamental rights espoused by the EU Charter.  EU Member States are 
also bound by this obligation. 
 
As the Refugee Convention and human rights instruments like the ECHR are both 
concerned with human dignity, there is cause to argue that the refugee protection 
regime is part of the human rights arena of international law.120  Weis contended that 
the impact of human rights on the refugee regime was to ‘considerably’ expand the 
‘ambit of protection afforded to persons generally’.121  For the reason of their 
interconnection, it is entirely reasonable to expect asylum systems to respect the basic 
rights of asylum-seekers.   
 
The language of the Refugee Convention’s preamble demonstrates the document’s 
human rights character.  This not only sets out the right for humans to enjoy, without 
discrimination, their fundamental rights and freedoms, as set out in the UDHR, but 
also emphasises their widest possible applicability.122  Weis states that the preamble 	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gives expression to the goals of the Refugee Convention and underscores that 
refugees are entitled to the same fundamental rights and freedoms set out for all 
humanity.123  After all, as stated in Article 14 ECHR, there can be no discrimination 
in protecting one’s fundamental rights.  The reality is, however, that the ECtHR 
applies a lower standard of protection for asylum-seekers.  This is demonstrated by its 
ruling on Article 6 (s.2.2.2).124  Despite this, the ECtHR has also affirmed the right of 
asylum-seekers to be fairly treated (s.2.2.2).  Moreover, Article 21 of the EU Charter, 
for example, also safeguards the right to non-discriminatory treatment, with the 
potential for protection that is more expansive in scope. 
 
The substantial responsibilities of EU asylum-receiving jurisdictions in relation to 
protecting the fundamental rights of claimants seeking refuge further elucidate this 
relationship.  Council Directive 2003/9/EC (Reception Directive) limits the power 
bestowed upon asylum-determining authorities by outlining their minimum 
obligations in relation to food, accommodation, clothing, financial allowances, 
medical and psychological care, and family unity, for example.125  Furthermore, it 
reinforces the role of the EU Charter and of Member States’ existing international 
obligations in giving effect to the terms of the Refugee Convention.126  Therefore, it is 
essential to the fair operation of an asylum system that the public authority concerned, 
such as the Home Office, which is responsible for first-instance determinations under 
the British asylum system, respects and gives effect to the fundamental rights of 
asylum-seekers during the RSD process. 
 
In the LGB context, the obligation upon asylum decision-makers to give effect to the 
human rights obligations of asylum-seekers is extremely important.  The UK is in a 
paradoxical position.  In the ‘Rainbow Index’, an annual report in which the legal 
situation for LGBT individuals across European countries is appraised and ranked, the 
UK was placed at the top with 86%, as the country with the most advanced legal 	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system for sexual minorities.127  Yet, this ranking contrasts starkly with the academic 
research and media reporting identifying the British asylum system’s prejudicial 
treatment of LGB asylum-seekers, violating their fundamental rights.  Millbank, for 
example, has previously described the UK’s ‘hostile’ approach to LGB asylum 
claims.128   
 
Given the relatively recent advent of sexual minority rights, it may prove a difficult 
task for asylum systems to accommodate these rights and understand how they should 
be given effect within the asylum context.  It is for such reasons that this thesis is 
underpinned by sexual diversity and intersectionality, so that the asylum systems are 
provided with tangible touchstones on fair asylum decision-making.   
 
To provide guidance on how human rights law applies with regard to the rights of 
sexual and gender minorities, international human rights experts constructed the 
Yogyakarta Principles.129  The principles were developed in 2006, in response to the 
documented abuse of sexual and gender minorities in many countries around the 
world.  The Principles apply existing international human rights principles to the 
context of sexual orientation and gender identity.  They do not by themselves have 
binding effect.  Given the ‘inconsistent and fragmented’ approaches that preceded the 
Yogyakarta Principles, they provide clarification on the appropriate standards of 
human rights law in the LGB context and facilitate the consistent application of those 
standards.130  Asylum systems can ensure the fulfillment of their fundamental rights 
obligations by referring back to, and making decisions in accordance with, the 
Yogyakarta Principles.   
 
By way of example, Principle 4 of the Yogyakarta Principles engages with 
substantive fairness by articulating the right to life in the sexual identity context.  It 	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states that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life, including by reference to 
considerations of sexual orientation or gender identity’.131  This principle provides 
greater instruction on how states can observe these rights, for example, by repealing 
‘all forms of crime that have the purpose or effect of prohibiting consensual sexual 
activity among persons of the same sex who are over the age of consent’.132  
 
This chapter turns to another structural principle.  This principle ties into the role of 
human rights in widening the protection provided by the refugee regime, as it relates 
to the scope of the Refugee Convention. 
     
3.1.2. Embracing the Refugee Convention as a ‘Living’ Document, and 
Interpreting its Provisions in a Pragmatic and Dynamic Way  
In recognition of the circumstances motivating the creation of the Convention, its 
inherent purpose, and the intentions of the Convention drafters, the structural 
principles assert that the treaty must be understood as a ‘living’ document.  This 
means that the terms of the treaty must be interpreted and applied with pragmatism 
and flexibility.  The RSD must be conducted to enable the Convention to provide 
protection to all individuals genuinely fleeing persecution in their home societies.  
This is regardless of whether the reasons for the mistreatment or the tools of their 
abuse were envisaged by Convention drafters or articulated in the Convention itself.  
The interpretation and understanding of the Refugee Convention within fair asylum 
systems must develop in line with the evolution of global societies, allowing for the 
emergence of refugee categories that were not envisaged by the Convention 
drafters. 133   This dynamic and evolving approach to the interpretation of the 
Convention is essential to the continued relevance of the Refugee Convention and the 
refugee protection regime in all asylum-receiving states.  It is fundamental to the 
ability of an asylum system to protect those who deserve the protection that the 
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Convention aims to provide, but whose circumstances and identities have not been 
expressly included within the language of the treaty provisions.   
 
The guidance available on the interpretation of the Convention recognises that the 
Convention is a “living” document.  Returning to Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, it is clear that the Convention must be interpreted ‘in light of its object 
and purpose’.134  The object and purpose of the Convention are to be found in the 
preamble.  These include the goal of extending ‘the scope of and protection accorded 
by such instruments [the Charter of the United Nations and the UDHR] by means of a 
new agreement’, whereby the Refugee Convention represents this agreement.135  The 
UNHCR Handbook on the determination of refugee status describes another objective 
as assuring those fleeing persecution ‘the widest possible exercise of their 
fundamental rights and freedoms’.136  The expansive scope of the Convention was 
identified within the travaux préparatoires (the official record of the drafting process 
of the Refugee Convention).  For example, during the drafting process, the French 
representative argued that the preamble would enable the ‘refugee problem’ to be 
‘expanded to its true dimensions’.137  Doing so was especially important, in the light 
of the Convention representing a compromise between doing what was ‘ideal’ and 
what was ‘practicable’.138  Hence, the Conference which adopted the Convention 
shared a ‘hope’ that:  
 
[T]he Convention would have value as an example exceeding its contractual 
scope that all nations would be guided by it in granting as far as possible to 
persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the 
terms of the Convention the treatment for which it provides.139 
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The spirit of the Refugee Convention as a forward-looking document, seeking to 
evolve through interpretation in response to the changing needs of global societies, is 
explicit in the historical development of this treaty.  As the Convention was 
specifically instituted in response to the events of the Second World War, the 
recognition that refugees were being created in alternate situations and geographic 
regions led to the UN Refugee Protocol 1967. 140   The Protocol removed the 
restrictions on the eligibility for protection, which were grounded on a particular 
geographical area and timeframe, allowing any person to seek asylum. 141  
Accordingly, the application of the 1967 Protocol to the remit of the Convention’s 
protection has enabled the refugee protection regime to exist as we currently 
recognise it. 
 
Further, within the terms of the Convention, there are several concepts that were 
deliberately undefined by the drafters, permitting academics, the UNHCR, and 
Judiciary members across asylum-receiving jurisdictions to grapple with how those 
terms should be defined.142  During this process of defining and interpreting these 
concepts, the need to interpret these terms innovatively has been continually 
emphasised.143   This allows for the Convention to encompass the diverse, changing 
and increasingly complex experiences of refugees in evolving contemporary societies. 
This is discussed further in Chapters three and four.   
 
On several occasions the British Judiciary has emphasised that the Refugee 
Convention is a ‘living’ instrument.  The House of Lords (now UK Supreme Court), 
for example, has asserted that: 
 
[T]he best guide is to be found in the evolutionary approach that ought to be 
taken to international humanitarian agreements.  It has long been recognised 
that human rights treaties have a special character… Their object is to protect 	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the rights and freedoms of individual human beings, generally or falling 
within a particular description…144          
 
Furthermore, this characterisation of the Refugee Convention has influenced the 
interpretation of Article 1F of the Convention, as acknowledged by Judge Storey in 
the case of Gurung:  
 
[I]t is particularly salient to recall the well-settled principle that the Refugee 
Convention is a living instrument whose interpretation requires a dynamic 
approach which bears in mind the objects and purposes set out in its Preamble, 
so as to ensure that it gives a contemporary response to contemporary 
realities.145 
 
The dynamic interpretation of the Refugee Convention as a ‘living’ instrument 
arguably reflects the pragmatism of procedural and substantive fairness, whose detail 
alters depending on the circumstances presented.  Similarly, the interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention must also evolve depending on the familiarity of the 
circumstances that it is presented with.  Indeed, it is due to the evolving nature of 
refugee law that many asylum systems, including the British asylum system, 
eventually recognised that sexual minorities are potential subjects of refugee 
protection claims.146   
 
A restrictive approach to the interpretation of the purpose and terms of the 
Convention results in new refugee categories being denied recognition as potential 
beneficiaries of refugee status.  It also actively denies protection altogether to 
potentially deserving applicants.  Accordingly, to adhere to substantive fairness (and 
the respect for human dignity, as argued by Dworkin), the asylum system cannot 
adopt an inflexible interpretation of the instrument from which rights to protection are 
granted.   Such an approach will result in asylum systems being unable to protect 
genuine refugees. 	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Similarly, although sexual identity has been recognised as a category capable of 
protection, many LGB claimants could also be wrongfully denied protection through 
archaic interpretations of the Refugee Convention.  The experiences forming LGB 
asylum narratives are unique and complex, compounded by the factors of 
intersectionality and sexual diversity (as outlined in the introductory chapter).147  A 
dynamic approach to interpreting the Refugee Convention is especially fundamental 
to the proper determination of sexual identity-based asylum claims, as the theoretical 
and societal understandings of sexual identity lack definitive conclusions.148  The 
potential for restrictive understandings of the Convention, representing a failure of 
substantive fairness, is even more acute in the sexual identity context, as the 
instrument was not drafted with the inclusion of LGB people in mind.149  Thus, 
inclusive approaches are necessary, otherwise LGB experiences are vulnerable to 
being excluded and having their claims denied.  Substantive fairness, in the asylum 
context is achieved by acknowledging that first and foremost the Convention is a 
‘living’ document. 
 
Explaining how the ‘living’ status of the Refugee Convention would operate in the 
LGB asylum context is important.  For example, within the RSD, where the agents of 
persecution do not belong to the machinery of the state, decision-makers are tasked 
with evaluating whether protection from the state was available.150  Claimants are 
required to explain why they are not able to access protection in their home country.  
This is because the Refugee Convention only provides surrogate protection where a 
state has failed to discharge its own duties to protect its citizenship.   
 
Seeking state protection, however, is extremely complex from the LGB perspective.  
Sexual minorities rarely have equal access to the protection mechanisms of a given 
state due to their subjugated status in many societies, reflected by a culture of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Monica Saxena, ‘More Than Mere Semantics: The Case for an Expansive Definition of Persecution 
in Sexual Minority Asylum Claims’ (2005-2006) 12 Mich. J. Gender & L. 331, 331.   
148 Michele J. Eliason, ‘Identity Formation for Lesbian, Bisexual, and Gay Persons: Beyond a 
“Minoritizing” View’ (1996) 30(3) Journal of Homosexuality 31.    
149 Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (n 143) [541] (Kirby J) (Australia). 
150 UNHCR Handbook (n 136) paras 97–101.  
	  	  
72	  
72	  
homophobia in a state’s legal system and its agencies.151  For example, where a state 
establishes criminal sanctions against same-sex sexual acts, a fair asylum system 
cannot expect a claimant to have sought protection against non-state persecution 
before seeking refuge abroad.152  Moreover, psychological barriers often prevent 
claimants from seeking protection against non-state agents such as one’s family.  This 
is more often than not aggravated by a willingness on the part of state authorities to 
overlook honour-based violence by the family or members of the public against the 
LGB community.153  Therefore, a fair system would interpret the Refugee Convention 
pragmatically, taking into consideration that in these circumstances, LGB asylum-
seekers are generally unable to prove (or will find it difficult to prove) that they 
sought state protection.  If they tried to seek state protection, it would either be denied 
or insufficient.  It is much more likely, however, that an LGB asylum seeker would 
never have sought the protection of the state, because this would render the individual 
a target of the state’s homophobic laws.  This is also tied to the next component of the 
structural principles. 
 
3.1.3. Applying the Evidentiary Thresholds of the Refugee Definition 
Pragmatically and Flexibly 
The third structural principle of the first theme builds upon the two previous 
principles.  Fair treatment is contingent on the recognition and protection of the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers and the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention in line with its status as an evolving document.  Under the British asylum 
system, the overall test for determining asylum claims is articulated as whether there 
is a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ for believing that the applicant will be 
persecuted if returned to one’s home society.154  This overall test is made of a series 
of composite tests or threshold questions that need to be determined during the course 
of assessing a claim for asylum.  The first test or question decision-makers need to 
address when deciding whether to grant an asylum-seeker refugee protection, is 	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whether they meet the requirements of the refugee definition in Article 1 of the 
Convention.155  Article 1 states that applicants must hold a ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution’ on the basis of a Convention ground or membership of a particular social 
group.  Accordingly the definition of refugee is said to encompass two important 
tests: first, on whether the thresholds of ‘persecution’ have been met, and secondly, in 
the LGB context, whether an application can demonstrate their membership of a 
‘particular social group’.   
 
The principle of applying the evidentiary thresholds pragmatically constitutes a core 
component of substantive fairness.  As highlighted by Article 8(2)(c) of the 
Procedures Directive, decision-makers should have the relevant knowledge ‘with 
respect to relevant standards applicable in the field of asylum and refugee law’.156  
Without this knowledge, substantive fairness in relation to the evidentiary standards 
cannot be upheld.  The evidentiary thresholds of the RSD should adhere to the 
aforementioned principles of substantive fairness, namely the dynamic interpretation 
of the Refugee Convention and respect of asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights.  The 
RSD must be intersectional, and in the LGB context, must understand sufficiently 
how sexual identity engages fundamental human rights and the developing 
understanding of sexual identity itself.  Without doing so, a fair asylum system cannot 
guarantee that the process will be fair in substance, i.e., result in the correct outcome.  
In the asylum system, the only correct decision for LGB asylum-seekers is that which 
will not injure their interest, as their interest is primarily in securing their safety.  
Further substance is given to this principle by examining the evidentiary thresholds 
that make up the RSD.  
 
i. Applying the Thresholds of Persecution 
Under the first clause of the refugee definition, asylum-seekers claiming refugee 
protection must convince decision-makers that the harm suffered and/or feared, if 
returned to one’s country of origin, constitutes persecution.157  The concept of 
persecution, however, was not defined in the Refugee Convention.  As a result, it was 	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unclear from the outset of the refugee protection regime what would constitute 
persecution.  
 
The Convention’s failure to define the meaning of persecution was deliberate, 
highlighted by the UNHCR’s re-emphasis of the subjective nature of what would 
constitute persecution.158  The UNHCR was reluctant to even provide a general 
guideline, finding it impossible ‘to lay-down a general rule as to what cumulative 
reasons can give rise to a valid claim’.159  This reluctance was motivated by the desire 
to shun narrow interpretations and applications of the thresholds.  In Gashi (Asylum; 
Persecution) Kosovo, the tribunal warned that defining persecution could limit its 
dynamism and pragmatism. 160   It cited the UNHCR submission that ‘for the 
Convention to be a living instrument of protection, the term “persecution” must be 
interpreted in a manner that best achieves its humanitarian object and purpose’.161  
Weis agreed with the tribunal’s opinion, arguing that limited approaches to the 
definition of persecution led to restrictions of the refugee regime itself, threatening 
‘the humanitarian spirit of the Convention’.162 
 
Despite the opinion in Gashi, there is academic and other non-binding guidance 
developed to assist with determining whether the thresholds have been met in an 
asylum claim.  Persecution has been defined as ‘the sustained or systemic violation of 
basic human rights resulting from a failure of State protection’.163  The conception of 
persecution as serious ill-treatment which violates human rights law is reflected in 
Article 9 of the Qualification Directive, incorporated into UK law by Regulation 5(1) 
of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) 
Regulations 2006.164  To meet the thresholds of persecution, acts must be ‘sufficiently 
serious by their nature or repetition’ so as to constitute ‘a severe violation of basic 	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human rights’, especially those considered non-derogable under human rights law.165  
Additionally, in line with the belief that, whilst persecution itself cannot be defined, 
acts of persecution can be identified, Article 9(2) of the Directive provides a non-
exhaustive list of acts considered persecutory.166  The flexibility of this definition has 
allowed persecution to be identified on a case-by-case basis.   
 
In the LGB context, however, it is essential for two key reasons to apply the identified 
thresholds of persecution with the aforementioned flexibility.  The first is the way in 
which the abuses experienced by sexual minorities engage the evolving and open 
spirit of the Refugee Convention.  The second concerns the way in which the often 
distinctive nature of this persecution engages their fundamental rights.  Within asylum 
claims, substantive fairness has facilitated the recognition that discrimination could 
also constitute persecution, as it may ‘lead to consequences of a substantially 
prejudicial nature for the persons concerned’. 167   Although the mistreatment 
experienced may not be serious enough to meet the general understanding of 
persecution, fairness in substance allows claimants to obtain refugee protection on the 
basis of discriminatory treatment that, cumulatively, meets the thresholds of 
persecution.168   
 
It is also a matter of substantive fairness for decision-makers to grasp why 
discrimination is a central feature of LGB asylum claims, and why sexual minorities 
may seek protection from such mistreatment.  Without this understanding, decision-
makers would not be able to give the discriminatory treatment within an LGB asylum 
narrative the seriousness it may deserve, perhaps resulting in a negative decision.  
Sexual minorities commonly experience discrimination because their identities are 
perceived to violate the social norms of many communities and societies.169  The 
responses of such societies, both at state level and community level, may not involve 
examples of violent persecution, taking other forms instead, e.g., restrictions on the 	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access to healthcare, welfare, legal representation, on the right to private and family 
life, and on the right to work. 170   Furthermore, the unique experiences of 
discrimination in the LGB context can include secrecy, forced or pressurised 
marriages, and the struggle to form meaningful friendships and relationships.171  
Moreover, the fear of mistreatment can compel LGB individuals to behave in ways 
that fundamentally harm and inhibit their ability to express their sexual orientations 
freely.172  Sexual minorities experience these pressures differently to heterosexuals, 
since a defiance of social norms by the former can cause the exposure of one’s sexual 
orientation and result in harm ranging from dismissal from employment, to sexual 
violence, or even ‘honour killings’.173  A fair asylum system should apply the 
thresholds of persecution with a nuanced understanding of the severity of the impact 
of such practices on LGB people to ensure that, where appropriate, deserving asylum-
seekers obtain protection.  
        
Therefore, operating the evidentiary thresholds flexibly represents substantive 
fairness, as it encourages the decision-maker to understand the practical impact of the 
maltreatment upon a particular claimant.  Decision-makers could misjudge the serious 
nature of the particular mistreatment of LGB asylum-seekers, failing to understand its 
impact upon them.  It is essential that decision-makers grasp how discriminatory 
treatment can have different impacts on different groups of people.  For LGB people, 
discriminatory treatment is particularly serious, as it can result in their complete social 
exclusion, with little or no means of redress.174  Where there is discriminatory 
treatment of other groups, it may be that this group has the ability to seek redress from 
the state, which is rarely available to LGB victims.  Thus, for LGB claimants, a 
pragmatic application of the thresholds of persecution can dictate their inclusion or 
exclusion from refugee protection.   
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ii. Proving ‘Membership of a Particular Social Group’ 
Under the second clause of the refugee definition, the decision-maker must accept that 
a particular identity has motivated the persecution feared, an identity to which the 
claimant also belongs.175  For LGB claimants, this involves, first, proving that they 
belong to a ‘particular social group’ (PSG).  Secondly, it involves proving a direct 
‘connection’ or relationship between the Convention reason and the persecution 
forming the reason for the mistreatment.  In the refugee definition, this appears as the 
requirement that protection only be granted where persecution exists ‘for reasons 
of...’176         
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the recognition that sexual minorities are entitled to 
avail themselves of international refugee protection has been a sluggish process.  This 
has been exacerbated by the limited instruction provided by the Convention drafters 
as to the ‘Particular Social Group’ (PSG) category definition.177  The UNHCR 
Handbook, first published in 1979, merely stated that PSG ‘normally comprises 
persons of similar background, habits or social status’ and gave no further detail.178  It 
was not until 1985, with the US decision of Matter of Acosta, that, relying upon the 
ejusdem generis principle, a workable definition was provided.179  This clarified that 
sexual orientation could constitute the characteristic of a protectable social group for 
the purposes of the refugee protection regime.180  
 
As this definition of PSG has evolved in the case-law of traditional asylum-receiving 
jurisdictions, it has resulted in the growing recognition that LGB individuals can form 
a social group on the basis of their sexual identities.  The UNHCR has provided the 
following definition: 
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[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common 
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as 
a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, 
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or 
the exercise of one’s human rights.181 
 
An alternative definition is contained within Article 10(1)(d) of the Qualification 
Directive, which presents common characteristics and the perception of group status 
as additive requirements to fulfill in order to be eligible for refugee protection (see 
Chapter three, section 5.2).182  A fair system must ensure that the PSG definition is 
applied with the inherent evolving spirit that characterises the Refugee Convention, 
evidenced by the preceding principles.  Furthermore, understanding the complexity 
and variability of sexual identity and the process of its construction, expression, and 
experience, as outlined in the introductory chapter, is also important here.  It means 
that the PSG category must be interpreted inclusively to ensure that genuine sexual 
minorities can access refugee protection.183 
 
Moreover, for sexual identity-based asylum-seekers, another issue regarding the PSG 
test is extremely important.  Claimants must evidence their membership of the social 
group, i.e., prove that their claimed sexual identity is true.  There may be challenges 
involved for LGB claimants, as many LGB individuals fleeing persecution do not 
always express their sexualities publicly in their host countries until comfortable, and 
once safe, or they may never do so out of choice or conditioning.184  Given that 
sexuality does not necessarily have external markers, can be difficult to identify, and 
its expression varies from person to person, there are challenges involved in expecting 
claimants to prove their sexuality to fulfill the PSG criteria.185  Once again, the 
standard of what constitutes a PSG engages substantive fairness, as without its 	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inclusive and pragmatic application, sexual minorities fleeing persecution could be 
wrongly denied protection.  The PSG test could be applied to deny that their claimed 
sexual identity is genuinely held.  Given that many deserving applicants could be 
excluded from protection subsequently, a contrary outcome based on the improper 
application of the PSG threshold would be substantively unfair.  Therefore, 
addressing the flexibility of the evidentiary thresholds within the structural principles 
is essential.  
 
iii. ‘Reasonable Degree of Likelihood’ and the ‘Benefit of the 
Doubt’ 
The overall test of the RSD requires there to be a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ for 
believing that the applicant will be persecuted on a Convention ground in their home 
society.  This mostly hinges on the credibility assessment.  The European Asylum 
Curriculum describes the assessment of credibility ‘as a tool to establish a set of 
material facts to which you can apply the refugee definition (the findings of facts)’.186  
Establishing the credibility or believability of an asylum claim is the most important 
facet of the RSD.187  After determining whether the terms of the refugee definition are 
met, the process involves scrutinising the events described by the asylum-seeker to 
decide whether the claimant is deserving of protection.188  It is a contentious part of 
the determination, due to the significant discretion afforded to decision-makers and 
the inherent subjectivity of such discretion in a system that seeks to be as objective as 
practically feasible.189  
 
As credibility is such a complex, yet integral part of the asylum system, there is an 
overlap in terms of its character as a substantive and/or procedural issue.  From one 
perspective, it belongs to substantive fairness, because it relates to the decision-
making process, such as the use of objective evidence to verify a claim and the 
assessment of subjective evidence provided by the claimant.  From another 
perspective, however, it also contains a significant procedural element, due to the fact 
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that the production of evidence is something that claimants associate as procedural, in 
terms of producing documentary and narrative evidence to verify their claims for 
protection.  For the purposes of this analysis, the researcher acknowledges this 
overlap, allowing for the principle to remain one of substantive fairness, whilst 
acknowledging its procedural interface.  Moreover, to coherently examine the 
application of the overall evidentiary standard, its application is divided into stages 
and examined separately, recognising the internal (relating to the decision-maker’s 
analysis of objective evidence) and external (relating to the claimant’s submission of 
subjective evidence) elements of the credibility assessment.  Therefore, the 
substantive fairness chapter (Chapter three) examines the application of the 
‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ and ‘benefit of the doubt’ tests when relying on 
objective evidence to establish whether the fear of persecution is ‘well-founded’.  
This relates to the refugee definition, therefore, it belongs to the substantive chapter.  
The use of the tests in the examination of subjective evidence, namely, documentary 
and narrative evidence elicited from the claimants is contained in the procedural 
fairness chapter (Chapter four), because of asylum-seekers’ perceptions and because 
many of the issues with this part of asylum system relate to poor ‘procedural’ conduct 
on the part of the decision-maker.  In terms of length, this also gives the analysis a 
fairly even split. 
 
Assessing the credibility, or believability, of an asylum claim is an extremely difficult 
process.  This is due to the linguistic and cross-cultural barriers affecting 
communication, the mindsets of the claimant and decision-maker, evidentiary 
challenges, and the matter of applying specialist legal concepts.190  In many instances, 
the decision-maker must be prepared to work with only the testimony of the claimant, 
considering whether on the basis of that narrative there is a reasonable basis for 
believing that the claimant’s feared persecution is a likely prospect.191  Where there 
are challenges posed by the claimant’s ability to substantiate the claim, even to the 
degree of the lower evidentiary standard of the asylum system (‘reasonable degree of 
likelihood’ or ‘reasonable basis for believing’), decision-makers have the ‘benefit of 
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the doubt’ principle at their disposal.192  Where documentary or narrative evidence is 
flawed but still believable, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ allows refugee protection to be 
granted. 
 
The discretion afforded to decision-makers within the credibility assessments, 
allowing them to disregard or stringently apply the ‘benefit of the doubt’ principle, 
has arguably led to a powerful narrative regarding the operation of a ‘culture of 
disbelief’ within the RSDs within certain asylum granting countries.193  A ‘culture of 
disbelief’ describes practices within asylum systems of denying claims for refugee 
protection by relying on inconsequential reasons for disbelieving the experiences of 
asylum-seekers.194  The inconsequential reasons consist of perceived inconsistencies, 
implausibilities or a lack of detail that could be explained reasonably, with the 
believability of the claim being unharmed (Chapter 4).  Alternatively, this has been 
identified as a ‘culture of denial’ due to the attitude and decision-making being 
systemically inclined towards outright denying asylum claims.195  
 
Nonetheless, the requirement to apply the ‘benefit of the doubt’ principle with respect 
to the unsubstantiated or unsubstantiable parts of asylum-seeker narratives and 
statements has also been affirmed by the ECtHR:  
 
The Court acknowledges that, owing to the special situation in which asylum 
seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the 
benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their 
statements and the documents submitted in support thereof.196 
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The principle enables decision-makers to structure their discretion and decide 
whether, despite the lack of consistency or evidence, refugee protection is, 
nonetheless, warranted:  
 
After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there 
may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. [...] It is hardly 
possible for a refugee to ‘prove’ every part of his case and, indeed, if this were 
a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized.  It is 
therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.197 
 
For an asylum system to operate fairly, decision-makers must extend the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’ to claims where, despite weaknesses, the narratives of persecution are ‘on 
the whole coherent and plausible, and do not run counter to generally known facts’.198  
Both of these tests ensure substantive fairness.  Even where there are limitations upon 
the ability of a decision-maker to make a correct decision, for example, due to minor 
inconsistencies or evidentiary challenges, the tests allow a genuine and deserving 
claimant to succeed.  This is because the adverse consequences of a negative decision 
(to refuse the claim) are so significant, and because there are so many barriers 
involved in the claimant’s ability to present a faultless claim.  Substantive fairness 
thus requires adherence to a lower evidentiary standard than criminal matters, for 
instance.199   
 
The principle of applying the evidentiary thresholds dynamically is vital given the 
practical limitations of an asylum-seeker’s memory.  Human memories struggle to 
reproduce events without somehow shaping or framing them first, resulting in the loss 
of many objective details.200  For victims of torture, sexual violence and other aspects 
of persecution, the detrimental impact upon one’s memory is very real.  Studies note 
that victims of sexual violence found the trauma of these experiences to affect their 
overall mental health, as well as their general behaviour and conduct during the 	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asylum process.201  Those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
struggled with recounting specific occurrences, inhibiting the provision of detailed 
and consistent accounts, as demanded by decision-makers.202  The impact of trauma 
on memory is worsened further by ‘dissociation’, a mechanism of the brain that seeks 
to protect individuals from trauma by detaching its consciousness from one’s body, 
emotions and surroundings.203  When placed into high-pressure environments like the 
asylum process, the inability to recollect details of persecutory events is heightened, 
against prevailing assumptions.204  When utilised properly, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ 
principle, recognising these challenges and flaws, allows ‘believable’ claims to 
succeed. 
 
Moreover, this principle regarding evidential flexibility is a much-needed component 
of the RSD because human behaviour is rarely cogent and consistent.205  Human lives 
are rarely rationally expressed, especially in pressurised situations involving 
mistreatment.  Due to the environments of violence, abuse, hostility and oppression 
that asylum claimants seek refuge from, decision-makers must accept some 
inconsistency as a feature of asylum claims.206  Judgements about the likely pattern of 
human behaviour are unhelpful to credibility assessments.  In the LGB context, this is 
particularly acute, due to the experiences of stigma, shame and secrecy characterising 
minority sexualities, 207  and the effect of these experiences upon identity 
development.  A ‘perfect’ asylum narrative is rare, and often warrants more suspicion 
than one with minor inconsistencies, for the fact that real life experiences are rarely 
logical and seamless.208  As the UNHCR rightfully contends, even where a claim 
contains some false statements, the applicant can still establish a credible claim, and 	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this is what a correct application of the ‘benefit of the doubt’ principle intends to 
facilitate.209   
 
In the light of the role played by intersectionality and the complexity of sexual 
identities, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ should be applied with due regard for these 
principles.  Therefore, deciding whether to grant protection under the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’, the process must avoid recourse to stereotypical conceptions of identity and 
human behaviour.210  Given that human sexuality is shaped by factors including our 
social, cultural, religious and political environments, narrow and restrictive 
understandings of identity undermine the ability of asylum systems to produce correct 
decisions, particularly in narratives not adhering to commonly held stereotypes.211  A 
fair system recognises this and understands that the RSD must incorporate 
intersectionality and diverse understandings of sexuality.  This must take place in both 
the composite evidentiary thresholds and in the overall ‘reasonable degree of 
likelihood’ test.  This chapter now explores the principles of procedural fairness.   
 
3.2 Procedural Fairness in the Asylum Context 
The second theme of the structural principles is procedural fairness.  The framework 
in this thesis espouses four principles rooted in the doctrine of procedural fairness:  
first, a right to legal representation; secondly, the use and citation of correct guidance 
to assist in the production of fair decisions; thirdly, the right to access an impartial 
system; and, finally, the requirements regarding the recruitment and training of 
decision-makers. 
 
3.2.1. Access to Competent and Appropriately Skilled Legal Representation 
for the Duration of Asylum Process 
Access to legal representation is an essential component of the structural principles 
advanced here to outline the key components of a fair asylum system.  As 
demonstrated by the above discussion on the elements of natural justice, legal 
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representation is both a procedural safeguard and a practical necessity depending 
upon the nature of the right or interest in question.   
 
In the asylum context, legal representation is a critical right of claimants for several 
reasons.  First, the RSD is a complex process, far beyond a system of ‘applying a 
legal standard to a set of facts’.212  For example, in addition to the complex legal tests 
outlined in section 3.1.3 above, the RSD involves interpreting country situations to 
determine whether the fear of persecution is ‘well-founded’, evaluating evidence or 
determining claims where there is little or no supporting evidence.213  Secondly, the 
ability of claimants to navigate the asylum process is affected by several important 
intersectional issues.  Many asylum-seekers are unfamiliar with the terms of refugee 
law and asylum procedure.214  Additionally, there are linguistic and cultural barriers 
in terms of how claimants navigate the asylum process, as well as obstacles 
concerning memory and psychological trauma, as the subsequent investigatory 
chapters will describe.  Legal representatives are fundamental in helping claimants to 
overcome such barriers, and flag up for decision-makers issues that could inhibit a 
claimant’s participation in the asylum process.  
 
Furthermore, at tribunal level, the British asylum system is primarily adversarial, 
where the burden of proof is upon the individual seeking protection.215  The legal 
representative acts as a ‘bridge’ between the claimant, who is in possession of the 
facts, and the tribunal judge, who is in possession of legal knowledge and decision-
making power.216  A representative must negotiate these complex legal factors, 
because the asylum-seeker cannot do so.217  Within this environment, legal assistance 
enables the correct representation of an asylum claim, reducing the probability of 
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errors on the part of both the claimants and decision-makers.218  Representation 
enables a person to fully exercise all of his or her available rights and to properly 
protect such rights.   
 
To an asylum-seeker, it is critical to have access to legal advice or representation.  A 
survey conducted amongst asylum-seekers whose claims were being processed by the 
UNHCR found that ‘UNHCR case preparation and advice’ was a priority second only 
to medical care in a list of 15 possible services.219  For claimants present in Egypt for 
less than six months to seek asylum with the UNHCR office there, legal 
representation was their main priority.220   
 
The negative repercussions of being without legal representation within the asylum 
process have been widely documented in both adversarial and non-adversarial 
proceedings.221  For example, Schoenholtz and Jacobs found that legal representation 
had a positive impact on the outcome of asylum claims at all stages of the US asylum 
system. 222   Even in cases concerning nationalities that were, on average, less 
successful, legal representation fostered an uplift in positive decisions.  They cited the 
example of Indian asylum-seekers, where only 1% of unrepresented claims were 
successful, in contrast to the 31% success rate of represented claims.223  The serious 
disadvantages of being unrepresented during the asylum process have been disputed 
by researchers who claim the ability of asylum tribunals to address this through an 
‘enabling approach’.224  This could only be achieved consistently, however, if all 
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judges took this ‘enabling approach’ and were mandated to do so.225  Alternate 
research disputes the ability of judges to redress the disadvantage of being 
unrepresented; within the British asylum context, the prejudicial impact of being 
unrepresented at tribunal level has resulted in a lower success rate. 226   The 
overwhelming sense that access to representation can almost dictate the outcome of a 
case compounds the necessity for all asylum-seekers to be legally represented during 
the asylum process. 
 
In the asylum context, the right to legal representation is not a matter of discretion.  It 
is an obligation upon the asylum system to ensure, at their own cost, that asylum-
seekers are legally represented at these critical stages of the procedure. The UNHCR 
expressly provides and emphasises that asylum-seekers are entitled to legal 
representation ‘at all stages of the procedure’.227  The UNHCR also set out how 
asylum-seekers are entitled to utilise their representatives, such as having 
representatives accompany claimants to their asylum interviews.228  In Article 15, the 
EU Procedures Directive sets out the right to legal assistance and representation.  The 
right within Article 15 encumbers the state to provide asylum-seekers with a legal 
representative at the initial stages of their asylum applications, with the state bearing 
the cost.229  Furthermore, subject to certain provisions, asylum-seekers are also 
entitled to free legal assistance in the event that the public authority, i.e., the Home 
Office, rejects the claim.230   
 
Finally, the right to legal representation inherently requires that legal representatives 
have the competence and skills to adeptly handle each particular claimant’s case.  
This was also addressed by the UNHCR, which set out three qualifications in order to 
act as a legal representative: ‘a working knowledge of refugee law and RSD 
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procedures, experience assisting refugee claims, and a thorough understanding of the 
applicant’s claim’.231  
 
This requirement is essential in the context of LGB asylum-claims, given the 
intersectional, diverse and complex nature of sexual identity development and 
construction, and consequently sexual minority narratives of persecution.  To ensure 
that the British asylum system operates fairly, the obligation of understanding the 
characteristics of sexual identity-based asylum claims is incumbent upon decision-
makers.  The obligation is also placed upon legal representatives, given their role in 
presenting the claim itself, and engaging with the legal standards and evidentiary 
thresholds that have been described above.  The fundamental role that legal 
representatives play in shaping the issues surrounding the determination of LGB 
asylum claims is expanded upon within Chapters three and four of this thesis.      
 
3.2.2. Proper Application and Citation of Accurate and Relevant Guidance 
The second principle of the procedural fairness theme concerns the proper application 
and citation of accurate and up-to-date guidance.  It is arguably derived from a 
number of procedural fairness rights, such as the right to notice, the right to have the 
reasons for a negative decision communicated to the applicant, and the right to be 
consulted before a benefit is denied.  These rights relate to the ability to hold a 
decision-maker accountable.  The content of this principle is also rooted within the 
provisions of procedural fairness contained within the Procedures Directive. Article 
8(2)(b) encumbers public authorities to ensure that decision-makers have access to 
accurate and up-to-date information on the conditions within a claimant’s country of 
origin.  Furthermore, Article 10 contains equivalent provisions regarding the right to 
be informed of one’s rights and obligations, the right to notice and the right to reasons 
regarding an adverse decision.232   
   
This structural principle of the framework encompasses the proper application of 
accurate and relevant asylum guidance and its citation in negative decisions.  Many 
asylum systems accept the constraints placed upon their decision-making powers by 	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disseminating guidance to assist decision-makers with producing correct 
determinations.  For example, the Home Office aims to produce high quality decision-
making by issuing internal guidance on the conditions within specific countries of 
origin on various grounds of claim.233  These seek to control the discretion of initial 
decision-makers by outlining, through Asylum Policy Instructions (APIs), 
Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs), and Country of Origin Information (COI) 
reports, how a particular claim should be evaluated. 234   Thus, this principle 
emphasises the role of guidance in producing fair decisions.   
 
Through the rule of law, the court is also entitled to limit the power of public 
authorities.235  Similarly, the Immigration and Asylum Chamber (the tribunal dealing 
with asylum claims) also constrains the Home Office’s power, providing guidance 
through the ‘Country Guidance’ case system to facilitate good decision-making. 
Country Guidance cases allow the tribunal ‘to provide decision makers with generic 
guidance as to whether or not country conditions are such that they will generate a 
risk on return for broad categories of applicant’.236  In essence, the tribunal uses 
certain cases to provide general guidance on ‘the circumstances for a group of people 
with a particular characteristic, in the country in question’.237  Once a Country 
Guidance case has been reported, it is up to first-instance decision-makers and 
subsequent immigration judges to interpret and apply its guidance in similar claims.238  
In this way, Country Guidance cases are authoritative for Home Office and tribunal 
decision-makers.  The Country Guidance system aims to prevent a lengthy, inefficient 
and costly operation of decision-making within the British asylum system.  It does so 
by treating ‘like cases alike’ and ensuring that ‘generally recurring factors relating to 
country conditions are the subject of careful and authoritative assessment 
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periodically’.239  Together with the use of APIs, OGNs, and objective COI reports, 
Country Guidance cases are utilised to promote consistency within asylum decision-
making.240   
 
Due to the instructive role that Country Guidance cases play, simultaneously 
restricting decision-maker discretion and facilitating the production of fair and 
consistent decisions, the application of the aforementioned guidance forms a critical 
component of the structural principles.  This is subject to further development, 
however.  To ensure confidence in the guidance itself and the way it is used to 
produce fair (and hopefully, correct) decisions, asylum systems have the 
responsibility to ensure that their guidance is current, accurate and relevant.241  In 
certain countries, where the situation is dynamic or rapidly changing, information can 
become outdated, inaccurate or irrelevant.  Thus, although the Home Office should 
ensure that its guidance is regularly updated, decision-makers should also supplement 
this guidance with independent alternatives.242  This would allow decision-makers to 
overcome the shortcomings of internal documents or problematic case-law, especially 
where these do not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground.  
 
To ensure the accountability of the determinations themselves and reported issues 
with interpreting guidance, the structural principles recognise the importance of 
decision-makers directly citing their use of the respective guidance.243  This is where 
the duty to give reasons in administrative law is embedded within this particular 
structural principle.  Limiting the discretion of decision-makers in this way, by 
making them cite the guidance (and their interpretation) within adverse decisions, is 
critical to maintaining confidence in the British asylum system, and to the ability of 
asylum-seekers to challenge incorrect decisions.  In this way, through fresh asylum 
claims or appeals, incorrect decision-making can be held accountable. 
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The need for accountability and control regarding decision-maker discretion is just as 
important to sexual identity-based asylum claims as it is to claims on other 
Convention grounds.  Accountability through this particular principle is significant in 
LGB claims due to the substantial challenges regarding the availability of appropriate 
guidance.  For example, although objective country reports are utilised to provide 
instruction on the conditions in a claimant’s home society, in the LGB context, the 
availability of relevant, accurate and up to date information is often insufficient.244    
The reasons for insufficient guidance are varied, but generally, most human rights 
reports contain small, generalised sections on conditions for LGB individuals.245  
These reports do not provide, and were never intended to provide, the detailed and 
complex information that is required for an asylum determination.246   
 
One can point to two broader causes of this problem.  First, the stigma attached to 
sexual orientation means that information regarding the persecution of sexual 
minorities is either absent from the ‘official’ consciousness or deliberately suppressed 
by traditional asylum origin countries.247  Secondly, activists are placed under danger 
to obtain such information.  State authorities and non-state agents increasingly attack 
activists in order to prevent such information from leaking into the global 
awareness.248  Given the possibility of restrictions on the availability of satisfactory 
guidance in many LGB claims, decision-makers must rely upon the guidance 
available with the knowledge that it may lack the detail or accuracy needed for the 
RSD.  It is necessary that, where guidance is detailed, relevant and accurate, it be 
applied.  Where it is insufficient, the guidance should be supplemented by external 
alternatives.  At all stages, decision-makers must cite the guidance that they have 
relied upon in making the decision and explain how they have interpreted it.  This 
ensures that decision-making in LGB claims is transparent, and where needed, 
challenged.   
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3.2.3. The Rule Against Bias within the Asylum System 
The penultimate principle under the procedural fairness theme concerns impartiality 
within RSDs and, more broadly, within the asylum system itself.  Returning to 
procedural fairness in UK administrative law, this principle seeks to expand upon the 
rule against bias as identified in the test of Porter v. Magill.249  This principle is also 
based on the obligation within Article 8(2)(a) of the Procedures Directive, which 
mandates that the RSDs be conducted ‘individually, objectively and impartially’, 
which is also articulated by Article 41(1) of the EU Charter.     
 
The negative impact of partiality on the fair exercise of power is considerable.250 
Partiality essentially constitutes ‘undue or unfair favouring’ of one person over 
another,251 which in asylum may translate into favouring some asylum-seekers to the 
detriment of others.  In the asylum context, the structural principles espouse two 
complementary sub-principles in relation to the duty to act impartially: first, that 
applicants cannot be subjected to prejudicial or differential treatment within the 
procedure and the determination; and secondly, that at a macro-level, the system must 
operate without structural prejudices, independent, as far as possible, of competing 
political agendas.     
 
i. Access to impartial and non-discriminatory treatment within 
the asylum process and determination 
The first aspect of partiality that the structural principles deem critical to the fair 
operation of an asylum system is the elimination of ‘personal bias’.252  This concerns 
the personal feelings or preferences of the individual or, in the asylum context, the 
public authority official or the immigration judge.  Galligan describes the ‘guiding 
test’ of personal bias as whether, ‘because of some such factor, the judge or other 
official has pre-judged or is rendered incapable of properly judging or deciding the 
issue’.253   
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An imperative question concerns why it is necessary to constrain decision-maker 
discretion through explicit reference to principles on partiality and bias.  As 
acknowledged in the introductory chapter of this thesis, asylum systems do not 
operate in a vacuum.  In the UK, like many other asylum-receiving jurisdictions, the 
asylum system functions in the context of an increasingly negative narrative of 
migration.  Asylum-seekers are portrayed as ‘bogus’ economic migrants whose 
numbers must be restricted, particularly in times of economic hardship.254  A capacity 
for influence exists as asylum systems tend to be operated by government bodies, 
which are particularly sensitive to the impact upon their electability of societal 
attitudes towards particular issues.  For example, for the purposes of political capital, 
governments can make assurances to their societies that they are committed to 
reducing migration.  This influences their internal policies and the attitudes and 
approaches of decision-makers towards asylum claims.255  Due to the potential 
traction of these narratives upon the operation of an asylum system, it is necessary to 
explicitly proscribe partiality.   
 
In the light of the socio-political and economic climates within which the asylum 
system must position itself, impartiality is essential, at both procedural and 
substantive levels.256  Dworkin’s duty of ‘equal concern and respect’ and Locke’s and 
Rawls’ original contracting position, alongside the provisions espoused on differential 
treatment are relevant here.  The rule against personal bias also encompasses the right 
for asylum-seekers to be treated respectfully by those involved in making RSDs.  
Once again, justice must be seen to be done, to ensure that disrespectful treatment is 
not assumed by asylum-seekers to be motivated by bias or disapproval.   
 
In the LGB context, we return to the recognition of civil rights for sexual minorities 
as a relatively recent development in traditional asylum-receiving states.  Such rights 
are enshrined within the British asylum system.  For example, s.4 of the Equality Act 
2010 lists sexual orientation as a ‘protected characteristic’, in relation to which 	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Chapter 2 of the Act prohibits various forms of discrimination.257  Yet, the asylum 
system as a whole does not guarantee a full understanding of sexual identity, nor does 
it eliminate homophobia or prejudice in the minds of asylum officials. Given the 
documented existence of concerns about the quality and impartiality of decision-
making in the area of sexual identity-based asylum claims,258 the elimination of 
‘personal bias’ from asylum systems is a priority in relation to LGB claims.  It is 
essential to the integrity of the system and claimants’ cooperation with it that LGB 
asylum-seekers do not experience homophobia within the process.  This also extends 
to ensuring homophobic or stereotypical notions of sexual identity do not influence 
that decision-making. 259   One re-emphasises the aforementioned importance of 
focusing on the identities of LGB people, rather than their behaviour, to avoid 
wrongly treating sexuality as synonymous with sexual practice.  This is explored 
further within the following analytical chapters.   
 
ii. No structural impartiality, allowing the decision-making 
process to operate free from political agendas 
The second aspect of the rule against bias concerns the elimination of ‘systemic bias’.  
This describes prejudicial attitudes, behaviours or policies arising from within an 
organisation.260  Difficult to prove, due to the inability to trace it within the actions of 
decision-makers, it is equally difficult to eradicate.261  Systemic bias is supremely 
important to the asylum system, given its position within the aforementioned context.  
In recent years, the narrative of seeking asylum has been framed in deliberately 
impassioned and leading terms, away from the concept of harm.  Instead, asylum-
seekers are framed in ‘aquatic’ language, in terms of the opening of ‘floodgates’ or 
arrival in ‘waves’. 262   Asylum-seekers are portrayed as threats to security, 263 	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welfare,264 economic survival265 and community cohesion.266  Once again, the result is 
that this political climate, where asylum-seekers are viewed as opportunistic and 
burdensome, can easily influence the policy and overall attitudes of the hierarchy 
responsible for operating an asylum system. 
 
Looking at the UK context specifically, as a result of the traction that the anti-
migration narrative has gained, the Home Office has been under greater pressure to 
restrict the numbers of migrants entering and remaining with the UK.267  A feared by-
product of the posturing of successive governments and Secretaries of State to reduce 
migration figures is the erosion of impartiality at an institutional level.  Indeed, 
numerous refugee and human rights organisations have made accusations of systemic 
bias within a number of traditional asylum-receiving states, including the UK.268  It is 
alleged that the aforementioned political narratives inform the systematic practice of 
denying individuals refugee status (outlined as the ‘culture of disbelief’ or ‘denial’ 
under section 3.1.3 (iii) above), even where there is belief, to some extent, in the 
merits of their claim.269  
 
As a result of the ability for political narratives and policies to affect the way asylum 
claims are treated, this principle underscores that a truly fair asylum system should, as 
far as possible, insulate decision-making from political agendas.  This is to ensure 
confidence in the system and for decisions to be taken fairly and correctly, within the 
standards espoused by the Refugee Convention and international human rights law.  	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There would be significant concerns about the ability of asylum systems to protect 
vulnerable asylum-seekers in securing their lives if such systems did not adhere to 
these standards due to external pressures. 
 
Accusations of the operation of a ‘culture of disbelief’ have also arisen within the 
context of RSDs in LGB claims.270  As with claims based on other Convention 
grounds, several jurisdictions have denied the claims of LGB people on specious 
grounds and alleged poor credibility.271  In the LGB context, however, this is 
bolstered through the decision-maker’s reliance on stereotypical understandings of 
sexual identity.  The analytical chapters of this thesis will also play close attention to 
whether there is a systemic lack of impartiality on the part of British asylum decision-
makers in the context of LGB asylum claims.  Prior research and the destructive 
political narrative around asylum-seekers both indicate a practice of mistreating and 
denying genuine LGB claims refugee protection.     
 
3.2.4. High Quality Recruitment and Training of Decision-Makers. 
The final structural principle addresses the calibre of personnel involved in operating 
and maintaining a fair asylum system.  It engages procedural fairness in that it 
encompasses many of the rights of natural justice, such as the right to impartial 
treatment, notice, reasons and consultation, and interlinks with substantive fairness.  
This principle also builds on the previous discussion on Article 8(2)(c) of the 
Procedures Directive, addressing the knowledge and ability of decision-makers to 
make fair asylum decisions.   
 
Without appropriate recruitment and training, decision-makers will not have the 
ability to operate the decision-making process fairly.  Moreover, without the 
appropriate skills, decision-makers would produce decisions that are also unfair in 
substance.  If decision-makers cannot implement the instructions derived from the 
structural principles, the framework is rendered ineffectual, and the fairness of 
decision-making, procedurally and substantively, cannot be guaranteed.  	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Consequently, these principles address the quality of personnel in terms of the 
recruitment and training of decision-makers.  Addressing the ability of decision-
makers to implement the structural principles is just as important as defining the 
content of the structural principles themselves.  This is further exemplified by recital 
10 in the preamble to the Procedures Directive, which states that decision-makers 
must have ‘the appropriate knowledge or receive the necessary training in the field of 
asylum and refugee matters’.272  
 
The integral nature of recruitment and training mechanisms to securing fair decision-
making was discussed by the Home Affairs Select Committee report of 2003-2004.  
The report grounded its criticism of the poor quality of initial decision-making in a 
number of factors, including the ‘overall calibre and training of those responsible for 
RSDs at the initial stage’.273  Indeed, without ensuring that asylum decision-makers 
possess the appropriate experience and skills to make correct decisions, an asylum 
system cannot discharge its duty to act fairly.  Thus, the structural principles oblige 
asylum systems to address their recruitment and training methods to ensure that their 
decision-making power is exercised according to the high standards of fairness 
required in the asylum context. 
  
With regard to recruitment and training, the UNHCR spent several years intervening 
in the standards operated within the UK context.274  As a result, it identified key 
principles addressing the experiences and skills required by decision-makers to 
conduct fair decisions.  These standards are relied upon in this framework.  On the 
matter of recruitment, the UNHCR held it necessary to institute minimum educational 
requirements to ensure that prospective decision-makers could handle the 
complexities of refugee law and make high quality RSDs.275  The necessary minimum 
experience was a university degree (or equivalent) and specific experience or skills 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Procedures Directive (n 103) recital 10. 
273 Home Affairs Select Committee, ‘Asylum Applications’ (Second Report, 2003-04) HC 218, para 
144. 
274 UNHCR, ‘Quality Initiative Project: A UNHCR Review of the UK Home Office Refugee Status 
Determination Procedures’ (2005-2009). 
275 UNHCR, ‘(QI) Quality Initiative Project: First Report to the Minister’ (March 2004 – Jan 2005) 3. 
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relating to the asylum area.276  The UNHCR addressed the advertising of decision-
maker roles in the employment market.  The importance of targeted recruitment was 
highlighted by many decision-makers initially applying for civil service roles without 
the knowledge that they were to be involved with asylum determinations, and the 
disaffection of many with the asylum system.277  This would involve targeting job 
advertisements at those interested in employment within the asylum field, with clear 
asylum-specific requirements and descriptions regarding the role and ideal applicant.  
The UNHCR contended that this would improve the quality of decision-making, the 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the system overall, and morale and motivation of 
new recruits, which the structural principles support.278 
   
On the matter of training, the UNHCR highlighted that the training of decision-
makers, at initial stages upon recruitment and on a continuing basis, is also essential 
to maintaining a fair asylum system.  For new recruits, the UNHCR identified 
necessary training on developing competent interviewing skills and on working with 
interpreters.279  Additionally, they required training on conceptual and legal (and 
evidentiary) matters with regard to the Refugee Convention and ECHR, to help 
produce fair decisions. 280   The UNHCR also made clear that the period of 
foundational training would not be complete without testing the newly attained skills 
of decision-makers.281  Thus, it required new interviewers and decision-makers to be 
subjected to live interview sampling and competency assessments until it was clear 
that they had the sufficient skills to conduct fair and consistent decision-making.282  If 
they were repeatedly unable to do so, the UNHCR held it inappropriate for such 
recruits to be utilised as interviewers or decision-makers.  
 
Addressing the ongoing development of decision-makers, it was highlighted by the 
UNHCR that regular, ongoing training of a high quality nature in the long term 	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improved the consistency of decision-making.283  It allowed caseworkers to develop 
specialist knowledge and helped to ensure the retention of decision-makers. 
Identifying weaknesses in the British asylum system’s training programme at the 
time, the UNHCR recommended that ‘minimum standards’ for internal trainers be 
implemented, in the form of ‘training for trainers’ accreditation.284  It also called for 
such courses to be appraised regularly through written and oral feedback.  Finally, the 
UNHCR encouraged the use of external speakers and trainers to address asylum 
decision-makers, supplementing existing internal training.285  The structural principles 
endorse each of these salient recommendations, forming the basic guidelines on how 
training and recruitment issues can be addressed to ensure the fairness of decision-
making within any asylum system and on any Convention ground. 
 
Issues regarding training are extremely important to determining the claims of LGB 
asylum-seekers.  Researchers and academics have identified the necessity to train 
decision-makers (at both initial stage of recruitment and on an ongoing basis) on 
issues pertaining to sexual identity-based asylum claims.286  Indeed, this thesis has 
stressed, on several occasions, the need for decision-makers to understand the 
diversity of sexual identity and its complexity (and the impact of this on human 
behaviour).  They must also possess the ability to conduct intersectional decision-
making.  Logically, this requires training to ensure a basic knowledge and skillset 
amongst decision-makers, and to assist towards creating a uniformity of approach. 
Given the earlier clarifications regarding the absence of sexual identity from the 
Refugee Convention and the struggle of LGB individuals to be recognised as the 
subjects of refugee claims, one cannot presume that these aims have been met already.   
 
LaViolette describes the training required in the LGB context as ‘LGBT Cultural 
Competency Training’.287  This encompasses awareness and attitudes, knowledge, 
and skills, with regard to the identities and experiences of sexual minorities.  Just as 	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the UNHCR identified in its 2003-04 reports the existence of ongoing training courses 
on gender issues, issues of sexual identity also deserve to be addressed.288  The 
quality of such training should be secured through the use of external experts to 
critique and give feedback on the content of internal courses.289  External experts 
should also be used to address Home Office staff working on sexual identity-based 
asylum claims.  Without these specific skills, decision-makers would lack the 
knowledge necessary to determine LGB claims correctly and fairly.  Additionally, it 
would almost certainly result in deserving claims being denied protection due to the 
ignorance of decision-makers regarding the reality of LGB narratives of persecution.  
Thus, appropriate training and recruitment mechanisms are essential components of a 
fair asylum system. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This theoretical chapter had two objectives.  First, it sought to address why fairness 
was the appropriate standard for this investigation to assess the quality of the British 
asylum system’s decision-making in sexual identity-based asylum claims.  Secondly, 
it sought to propose the structural principles by which the British system will be 
assessed.  The first part of the chapter highlighted that fairness is the appropriate 
standard for this thesis because it is a principle that is furnished with clear meaning 
and with philosophical arguments bolstering its importance.   Furthermore, it is an 
accepted principle of UK law, as the provisions of administrative law and 
international and supranational law have evidenced.  Building upon the concept of 
fairness, the second part of this chapter advanced a set of principles that should act as 
the foundation of any fair asylum system.  Without respecting the fundamental rights 
of asylum-seekers, treating the Refugee Convention pragmatically and flexibly, and 
ensuring the high-quality recruitment and training of decision-makers, a fair system 
cannot exist.  Other central components of a fair asylum system include: the 
availability of good guidance and ensuring that it is properly cited and interpreted 
when any guidance is used, access to competent legal representation, and for an 	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asylum-seeker to be offered impartial treatment, both in the steps of the asylum 
process and the substance of determining the asylum claim.   
 
The structural principles form the components of an analytical framework and can fall 
into two broad themes.  The first relates to substantive fairness, which relating to a 
person’s interest in a fairly constituted decision.  For the refugee context, this chapter 
conceives substantive fairness around the relationship between fairness and rights for 
asylum-seekers, as a greater appreciation of this relationship is critical to ensuring 
substantive fairness in LGB asylum claims.  The second theme of the structural 
principles relates to the rights of procedural fairness, drawn from the procedural 
fairness principles in administrative law.  Within Chapters three and four, the British 
asylum system, as assessed through doctrinal and empirical research, will be 
subjected to a thematic analysis according to the structural principles identified in this 
chapter.     
 
 
	  	  
102	  
102	  
Chapter Three 
 
SUBSTANTIVE	  FAIRNESS:	  WELL-­‐FOUNDED	  FEAR	  OF	  
PERSECUTION	  FOR	  REASONS	  OF	  MEMBERSHIP	  OF	  A	  
‘PARTICULAR	  SOCIAL	  GROUP’	  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins the analysis of the British asylum system from the perspective of 
sexual identity-based asylum claims. Following the separation between substantive 
and procedural fairness in administrative law, this chapter examines issues of 
substantive fairness using the structural principles advanced in Chapter two of this 
thesis and the key concepts adopted in Chapter one (intersectionality and sexual 
diversity).  Despite this, it is important to note that some aspects of the analysis in this 
chapter speaks to procedural fairness too, due to the overlap between substantive and 
procedural fairness, and because substantive and procedural fairness are 
interdependent, with, for example, procedural tools being integral to improving 
substantive fairness.  Nevertheless, as the substance of the refugee protection regime 
is contained first in the refugee definition, this forms the primary focus of this 
chapter.  Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention provides that a ‘refugee’ is a person 
who has a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted, for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group and political opinion’.  This 
chapter explores the components of this definition, which outlines the eligibility for 
refugee protection.  It also examines the application of these components in the 
context of claimants seeking asylum in the UK on the basis of their sexual identity.  
 
The first part of the chapter focuses on the first clause in the refugee definition, 
namely holding a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’.  It begins by exploring the 
definition and thresholds of persecution with regard to issues common to LGB 
narratives.  It explores whether relocating to another part of one’s home society can 
negate the risk of persecution.  It also examines the role of objective Country of 
Origin Information (COI) to verify independently the LGB claimant’s fear of 
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persecutory harm.  The second part of the chapter addresses the second clause of the 
definition, which in the LGB context relates to persecution being, ‘for reasons of 
membership of a particular social group’.  Here, the investigation focuses on how 
‘particular social group’ has been defined and how this definition has been applied to 
LGB asylum claims.  At each stage of the investigation, the empirical data derived 
from research conducted for this thesis will be woven into the analysis.     
 
 
2. Defining the Notion of ‘Persecution’ and Applying this Definition 
to the Sexual Identity Context 
 
The Refugee Convention provides no definition of persecution.  The Convention 
drafters left no guidance on its interpretation in the travaux preparatoires.  They 
deliberately avoided furnishing the concept with a specific meaning for several 
plausible reasons: providing a correct definition was impossible, doing so was 
dangerous, for allowing its prescriptive application to exclude deserving claimants, or 
perhaps, they feared that a definition would become outdated and prevent the 
Convention from serving its humanitarian purpose. 1   Indeed, these ideas were 
summarised by the UNHCR’s acknowledgement that ‘there is no universally accepted 
definition of “persecution”’ and that all attempts to generate one had been fruitless.2  
Nonetheless, a working definition has developed, the process of which is explored 
here. 
 
In the sexual identity context, the British asylum system’s recognition that LGB 
individuals are eligible to receive refugee protection has involved understanding that 
they can experience persecution in unique and nuanced ways.  This is now reflected in 
the UNHCR guidelines and domestic guidance addressing claims based on sexual 
identity.3  The UNHCR emphasises the intricacy of such claims.  It states that an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hugo Storey, ‘What Constitutes Persecution? Towards a Working Definition’ (2014) 26(2) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 272, 273. 
2 UNHCR, ‘Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (December 2011) 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV, para 51. 
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assessment of persecution in a sexual identity-based asylum claim is a complex 
determination, incorporating ‘the circumstances of the case, including the age, gender, 
opinions, feelings and psychological makeup’ of the applicant.4  When assessing 
persecution, decision-makers should balance the notion of ‘individual dignity and 
human dignity’ with ‘the manner and degree to which they stand to be injured’.5  It is 
necessary, therefore, to scrutinise how the British asylum system strikes this balance 
with respect to persecution in sexual identity-based protection claims.   
 
To undertake this investigation, this section explores the evolution of the persecution 
definition, generally, first, and then in the British context.  Subsequently, it addresses 
common types of mistreatment experienced by LGB individuals and how they are 
perceived to engage the thresholds of this persecution definition.  These include 
criminal sanctions against same-sex sexual acts, psychological harm, and the role of 
discretion in reducing the risk of persecution. 
 
2.1 Persecution: A Definition in Development 
An early attempt by asylum-receiving jurisdictions to furnish persecution with 
meaning was related to the ‘ordinary’ or ‘dictionary’ definition.  This was based on 
the principle enshrined in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which states that words and phrases within international treaties should be 
treated ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning…in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose’.6  The definitions that arose were undoubtedly based on the 
Latin meaning of ‘persequi’, ‘to follow with hostile intent’, from which persecution is 
derived. 7   For example, in the Australian case of Jonah, the tribunal defined 
persecution as ‘to pursue with malignancy or injurious action’.8  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status Based on Sexual 
Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the Context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (23 October 2012) HCR/GIP/12/09, para 16. 
5 Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2007) 131-
132. 
6 ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (Adopted 23 May 1969, Entered into Force 27 January 
1980) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, art 31. 
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8 Jonah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1985] Imm AR 7. 
	  	  
105	  
105	  
Whilst these ‘dictionary’ definitions gained traction and the ‘ordinary’ approach was 
followed across jurisdictions, it was, nonetheless, unsatisfactory.  Divergent 
approaches to persecution across linguistic boundaries, depending upon how a 
particular language defined persecution, meant that a universal understanding of the 
concept could not be developed.9  This resulted in the ‘human rights’ approach to the 
persecution definition, which has become ‘dominant’ within the theory of refugee law 
and in practical decision-making.10  A human rights approach provides clarity by 
attaching the concept of persecution to identifiable (and arguably, universal) 
standards, whilst providing scope for elasticity and pragmatism. 
 
The human rights approach developed the concept of persecution in two notable 
ways.  First, Hathaway, the leading proponent of the human rights formulation, 
describes persecution as existing only where a state has breached its basic obligation 
to protect its citizens, forcing them to seek alternative protection abroad.11  If the state 
provided protection, persecution would not exist.  Thereupon, it is essential for a 
claimant to establish, within the analysis on persecution, the complicity of the state in 
the mistreatment experienced and/or feared.  Secondly, as the duties owed by a state 
to its subjects are central here, one should determine whether the state has actually 
failed to meet its obligations. 12   For Hathaway, the standards provided by 
international human rights law were the best tools for this assessment.  Both refugee 
law and international human rights law shared the purpose of protecting individuals 
against actions depriving them of their core dignity.13      
 
In summary, Hathaway argued that persecution would only exist where the 
maltreatment relates to a violation of one’s fundamental human rights. 14   The 
appropriate standard could therefore be abbreviated as ‘the sustained or systemic 
denial of core human rights’.15  This conception expands the decision-maker’s duty in 	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the RSD.  From initially applying a set and plain definition, a decision-maker must 
identify persecution as a human rights violation from a set of circumstances, an 
exercise of increased complexity.16     
 
Additionally, Hathaway explained what would constitute the denial of ‘core human 
rights’, attaching persecution to international human rights standards, as this thesis 
has done with fairness in Chapter two.  With reference to the International Bill of 
Rights, he argued that there was a hierarchy consisting of four categories of rights.17  
Depending upon the category infringed, there would be different consequences for the 
thresholds of persecution.  The first category of rights consists of those contained in 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) (and made binding by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)), from which no 
derogation is possible.  An example would be the right to be protected from torture or 
inhuman and degrading treatment.  If the State fails to protect against a breach of the 
rights in this tier, the thresholds of persecution are met immediately and protection 
warranted.  The second category concerns those rights that are found in the UDHR 
and ICCPR, but from which derogation would be permitted in times of ‘public 
emergency’.18  This incorporates rights such as the freedom from arbitrary arrest or 
detention, the right to a fair and public hearing in criminal proceedings, and the 
protection of person and family, private life and integrity, for example.  Here, the 
failure to protect these rights only constitutes persecution if the derogation is not 
mandated by the state for reasons of emergency.  These grounds are, nonetheless, 
subject to conditions contained within the basic principles of international law and 
non-discrimination.  The third category covers the rights from the UDHR that are 
incorporated into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), which codifies a state’s obligation to ensure that basic resources are 
equally accessible, free of discrimination.  These basic values include the right to 
work, housing, medical care, food and clothing.  A state would violate these rights 
where it either fails to apply these rights, or excludes a minority from access to 
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them.19  The deprivation would need to be extreme in order to meet the persecutory 
thresholds.  Finally, the fourth category consists of rights contained in the UDHR, 
which were not carried forward into any of the covenants, such as the right to own or 
to be free from arbitrary deprivation of property.  The infringement of these rights 
would not amount to persecution. 
 
Hathaway’s exposition of the human rights approach to persecution has been 
supported by many academics and asylum-granting jurisdictions.  For example, Anker 
reinforced the role that human rights standards must play in this part of the refugee 
definition.20  She offered a set of general principles to be used as a code of standards 
when determining whether the persecutory thresholds are fulfilled.21  From these 
standards, she concurred that ‘the fundamental failure of the State in providing 
protection’ is crucial to the definition of persecution and asylum determination.22  If 
the state is unwilling or unable to ‘assume its duty of protection to its nationals’, in 
either controlling its own agencies or non-state entities, a fear of mistreatment 
constituting serious harm for a Convention reason would constitute persecution.23        
 
2.2 The Notion of Persecution within the British Courts 
Within the British asylum system, the Court of Appeal cautiously adopted the ‘human 
rights’ approach in the case of Ravichandran.24  Quoting Hathaway, Simon Brown LJ 
believed it to be ‘instructive’.25  This was reinforced in the case of Blanusa.26 
Schiemann LJ underscored the need for decision-makers to focus their analysis on the 
gravity of the invasion into a person’s fundamental rights, examining the nature of the 
invasion and its length of time, for example.27   
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20 Deborah Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (3rd edn, Refugee Law Center, 1999) 177. 
21 ibid 176-177. 
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The adoption of the human rights approach was confirmed by the House of Lords 
decision in Shah and Islam.28  Here, Lord Hoffman relied on Hathaway in directing 
assessments on persecution to be based on the ‘seriousness’ of the harm feared.29  
Also, he stripped Hathaway’s definition to its most essential components: 
‘Persecution = Serious Harm + Failure of State Protection’.30  As the agents of 
mistreatment in this case were not the Pakistani state, but the appellants’ husbands, 
Lord Hoffman argued that the serious harm feared was only transformed into 
persecution by the state’s failure to protect them.31   
 
Hathaway’s definition gained more substance in the case of Horvath, where the 
House of Lords endorsed the basic conception of persecution advanced in Shah and 
Islam.32  Lord Hope, relying on the judgment of Lord Lloyd in Adan, argued that the 
refugee definition could be construed as comprising of two main tests.33  The first, the 
‘fear’ test, described being outside one’s country of origin due to a well-founded fear 
for a Convention reason.34  The second, the ‘protection’ test, described being unable 
or unwilling to rely on protection in their home country due to this fear.  These two 
tests, he advanced, were bound together by the idea of ‘surrogacy’, i.e., that protection 
should only be granted by the asylum-receiving state when the home state fails its 
protection obligations.35   
 
This remains the current position within the British asylum system, in conjunction 
with the guidance provided on persecution by Article 9 of the Qualification 
Directive.36  The directive not only replicates Hathaway’s definition in Article 9(1)(a), 
but has also clarified that persecution can also exist where less serious, derogable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Shah and Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 2 AC 629 [651] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
29 ibid [653]. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid [654]. 
32 Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489, [505] (Lord Lloyd). 
33 ibid [496-497] (Lord Hope). 
34 ibid.  
35 Hélène Lambert, ‘The Conceptualisation of “Persecution” by the House of Lords: Horvath v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department’ (2001) 13(1/2) International Journal of Refugee Law 16, 
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rights have been infringed, and the accumulation of those infringements is sufficiently 
severe to meet the thresholds of persecution.37  Article 9(2) provides a non-exhaustive 
list of the generalised kinds of acts that could constitute persecution, ensuring 
substantive clarity for decision-makers on how the thresholds could be met. 
 
In line with the structural principles advanced in Chapter two, this section 
demonstrates the flexible and evolving understanding of how the fundamental rights 
of asylum-seekers ought to be protected, and for this purpose, how persecution ought 
to be defined.  Grounding the persecution definition in human rights standards allows 
pragmatic application of the evidentiary thresholds, i.e., in terms of what constitutes 
persecution.  This constitutes a focus on the impact of the maltreatment on a 
claimant’s fundamental rights.  Having clarified the working definition of 
persecution, the following section investigates whether the British asylum system 
recognises the persecutory impact of maltreatment unique to the sexual identity 
context.  
 
2.3 Persecution in the Sexual Identity Context: Legal Sanctions Criminalising 
Minority Sexual Identities 
A frequent theme in LGB narratives of persecution is the escape from societies that 
criminalise certain expressions of minority sexual identity.  Studies indicate that some 
76 jurisdictions across the world maintain criminal sanctions against consensual 
same-sex sexual relationships.38  Of these states, the death penalty is instituted within 
approximately seven states.39  Other sanctions have also been instituted against LGB 
citizens by some states, e.g., outlawing same-sex marriages or homosexual 
propaganda.40  The result is that legal sanctions are a pervasive tool by which many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 ‘Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and 
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need 
International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted’ (Qualification Directive) (30 
September 2004) OJ L. 304/12-304/23, art 9(1)(b). 
38 Aengus Carroll and Lucas Paoli Itaborahy (International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA)), 
‘State-Sponsored Homophobia.  A World Survey of Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition 
of Same-Sex Love’ (ILGA, 8 May 2015) 
<http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2015.pdf> accessed 21 
May 2015. 
39 ibid 28.  Brunei Darussalam will also introduce the death penalty in 2016. 
40 ibid 66, regarding Ugandan criminalisation of same-sex marriage and 32, regarding propaganda 
laws. 
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states systematically ‘other’ and cause harm to their LGB citizens. 
 
In the British asylum system, the authority on treating such criminal sanctions is the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case of X, Y and Z.41  This case 
concerns three asylum claims relating to a well-founded fear of persecution on 
grounds of sexual orientation, where the applicants were Sierra Leonean, Ugandan 
and Senegalese.  In each case, the applicant appealed against the refusal of claims 
lodged in the Netherlands.  Although X and Y’s appeals were successful, Z’s appeal 
failed, leading the Minister to lodge appeals against the successful outcomes of X and 
Y, and Z to appeal against his refusal.  The CJEU was tasked with answering whether 
the ‘criminalisation of homosexual activities and the threat of imprisonment’ would 
constitute persecution under the Qualification Directive.  The CJEU addressed the 
question by explaining that ‘the mere existence of legislation criminalising 
homosexual acts’ would not be serious enough to meet the thresholds of 
persecution.42  If a term of imprisonment accompanying the law was actually applied 
in the country of concern, however, the legislation would be regarded as 
persecutory. 43   Therefore, decision-makers were guided towards making an 
‘enforcement-centric’ analysis, focusing on the legislation’s implementation.44       
 
This has been integrated into the British asylum system’s consideration of claims 
made on sexual identity grounds.  Within the 2015 asylum policy instructions on 
‘sexual identity issues’, the X, Y and Z case is cited, alongside the approach of the 
CJEU.45  Caseworkers are advised to focus on ‘whether these legal provisions are 
applied in practice’.  It is highlighted clearly that, first, the sanctions themselves must 
be of particular severity in order to meet the thresholds, ‘namely imprisonment rather 
than simply a fine’, and second, actual implementation is essential.46  As a result, if 
sanctions are ‘never, or hardly ever imposed, a claimant cannot demonstrate a real 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Joined Cases C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12 X, Y and Z v. Minister Voor Immigratie, Integratie 
En Asiel. 
42 ibid [55]. 
43 ibid [61]. 
44 ibid [58-59]. 
45 ‘API: Sexual Identity Issues’ (n 3) 10. 
46 ibid 10. 
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risk on this basis’.47  The instructions also acknowledge that sanctions could be part of 
a list of fundamental rights violations that cumulatively meet the thresholds of 
persecution.48   
 
This has been the broad approach of the Home Office even before the X, Y and Z 
decision.  In the second of two Freedom of Information requests made as part of the 
empirical research in 2014, the Home Office was queried about its position on 
criminal sanctions in cases based on sexual identity grounds.  Although the response 
pre-dates the CJEU decision and subsequent policy guidance, it reflects the 
consistency of the Home Office’s attitude towards legal sanctions against LGB 
expressions of identity: 
 
An individual could be removed to a country where, technically, 
homosexuality is a criminal offence but where, in reality, there is no real risk 
of persecution or of the authorities taking action against LGB people.  
However, if those laws are implemented and persecution results, then it would 
be likely that protection would be granted – if it is also accepted that the 
individual is LGB as claimed.49 
 
The approach of the CJEU and of the British asylum system is problematic, however, 
because it fails to appreciate the connection between criminal laws and society with 
regard to persecutory treatment.  In most countries, criminal laws, even if unenforced, 
reflect the society’s fundamental intolerance of LGBT rights, as explained by 
Monaghan’s comment on the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in X, Y and Z: 
 
Criminal laws are connectedly both normative and punitive.  They tell society 
what is acceptable and tell individuals what is not acceptable – they operate as 
a legal and social imperative not to do something, or, to be someone and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 ibid 11. 
48 ibid. 
49 ‘Freedom of Information (FOI) Request 31669’, Home Office, Gender and Sexual Orientation Team 
(13 June 2014) 6-7 (question 26). 
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license society to express its disapproval through stigmatisation, prejudice and 
discrimination.50   
 
Consequently, criminal sanctions, regardless of enforcement, provide state and non-
state agents with the necessary legitimacy to persecute individuals of minority sexual 
identities.  Superficially, state-imposed penalties merely provide agents with the 
direct tools of persecution.  Indivisible from such legislation, however, is the 
transformation of the LGB individual into a culprit.  Through this transformed status, 
state agents gain tacit approval to persecute individuals under the cover of 
‘investigation’, using blackmail, harassment, extortion and arbitrary detention.51  
Moreover, the law grants non-state agents, such as families, peers and community 
members, permission to persecute, having perpetuated the ideology that sexual 
minorities are social and legal pariahs.  For this reason, any abuse is seen to be 
deserved and will not be redressed by the state.52  By fuelling this culture of hatred 
and impunity, the state is additionally complicit in the persecution of LGB people by 
agents that are not directly under its influence and control.  The influence of the 
existence of criminal laws on the conduct of non-state agents, and the contribution of 
this to a persecutory environment was raised by one of the participants interviewed 
for this thesis: 
 
But criminalisation is enough because this means that individuals in case of 
need cannot turn to the state or to state officials for their protection even if it is 
happening, the persecution or the violation of their fundamental rights by non-
state actors, when their behaviour would be criminalised. So that this breeds 
an atmosphere of homophobia so that criminalisation is enough… (Lilian 
Tsourdi). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Karon Monaghan QC, ‘Case Comment: AG’s Opinion in X, Y and Z v. Minister Voor Integratie En 
Asiel (C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12)’ (24 July 2013) <http://eutopialaw.com/2013/07/24/case-
comment-ags-opinion-in-x-y-and-z-v-minister-voor-immigratie-integratie-en-asiel-
c%E2%80%9119912-c%E2%80%9120012-and-c%E2%80%9120112/> accessed 21 May 2015. 
51 Sabine Jansen and Thomas P. Spijkerboer, ‘Fleeing Homophobia. Asylum Claims Related to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in Europe’ (COC Nederland/VU University Amsterdam, 2011) 26. 
52 ILGA Europe, ‘Statement on Pending Preliminary Rulings by CJEU Regarding Alleged Persecution 
on the Ground of Sexual Orientation’ (2 August 2012) < http://www.ilga-
europe.org/home/news/latest/statement_cjeu_august_2012> accessed 21 May 2015. 
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If unenforced criminal laws did not reflect societal opinion, they would be challenged 
and repealed.  After all, between 2006 and 2015, 16 states decriminalised same-sex 
sexual acts.53     
 
Furthermore, whilst criminal sanctions are unenforced, their mere existence maintains 
the danger that a change in government policy or societal attitude could reintroduce 
their application.54  For example, in Malawi, colonial era laws were unenforced until 
January 2010, when two individuals were arrested and sentenced to 14 years of hard 
labour for ‘gross indecency’.55  Similarly, Ugandan sodomy laws were unenforced 
until 2012, when the Ugandan parliament oversaw the introduction and passing of a 
bill seeking to increase the penalties for same-sex sexual activity and to introduce 
sanctions for those failing to report such activity.56  In Zimbabwe, similar laws were 
also unenforced until President Mugabe’s increasingly homophobic rhetoric from 
1998 onwards, which, amongst a litany of abuses, resulted in sexual minorities being 
arrested on exaggerated charges.57   
 
A second problem with the Home Office’s approach is that an enforcement-oriented 
analysis is constrained by evidentiary difficulties.   Decision-makers will too-often 
struggle to establish whether enforcement takes place.  There is a problem of scarce 
objective information regarding the practice of certain states in matters pertaining to 
the rights violations of LGB individuals (section 4 below).58  The practices of states 
are obviously incompatible with the evidentiary demands of the asylum system.  For 
example, a state may not record its prosecutions under the norms against sexual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Carroll and Itaborahy (n 38) 25-26.   
54 Amnesty International, ‘Observations by Amnesty International and the International Commission of 
Jurists on the Case X, Y and Z v. Minister Voor Immigratie, Integratie En Asiel (C-199/12, C-200/12 
and C-201/12) Following the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 11 July 2013’ (2 October 
2013) POL 33/003/2013, 7. 
55 Amnesty International, ‘Malawian Couple Sentenced to 14 Years Hard Labour for “Gross 
Indecency”’ (20 May 2010) <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/malawian-couple-
sentenced-14-years-hard-labour-gross-indecency-2010-05-20> accessed 12 December 2013. 
56 Carroll and Itaborahy (n 38) 66. 
57 Human Rights Watch, ‘Letter to UN Human Rights Defenders Special Rapporteur Regarding Raid 
and Prosecution of Defenders in Zimbabwe’ (30 May 2010) 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/29/letter-special-procedures> accessed 12 December 2013. 
58 Jansen and Spijkerboer (n 51) 71. 
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minorities.59  It may prosecute individuals through alternative legislation to prevent 
the matter from coming to international attention.  It may also use different court 
systems (such as military or sharia courts) to facilitate prosecutions.  By overlooking 
these issues, the CJEU has reinforced the use of an imprecise and unmanageable 
approach in the British system, which invites inconsistency and unfairness into the 
RSD.   
 
The practical and conceptual limitations of this approach arose within the empirical 
data.  On several occasions, asylum-seeker participants were denied protection in 
connection to the Home Office failing to recognise the persecutory nature of criminal 
sanctions, in part, due to insufficient analysis: 
 
They said the law in my country did not say gay or homosexual; the law said 
unnatural contact.  This is the reason why they said the law is not valid [didn’t 
apply to gay men] (MASY003). 
 
The Home Office refused the asylum claim of MASY003, a Ghanaian gay man, 
contending that the laws in Ghana did not criminalise same-sex relations between two 
men.  In Ghana, Chapter 6 of the Criminal Code 1960, as amended by the Criminal 
Code (Amendment) Act 2003, outlaws ‘unnatural carnal knowledge’. 60   In 
MASY003’s case, expert evidence was required at the appeal stage to identify the 
impact of this legislation upon LGB individuals.  From one perspective, the decision-
maker’s reasoning in this case exemplifies the aforementioned evidentiary difficulties 
of establishing the use made of a law in a particular state.  From another perspective, 
it exemplifies ignorant decision-making as the legislation is a remnant of British 
colonialism, which remains in force across the Commonwealth.61  It is common 
knowledge that such laws apply to gay men.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 ibid 26; UNHCR, ‘Sexual Orientation Guidelines’ (n 4) paras 20-1. 
60 See also, Carroll and Itaborahy (n 38) 55. 
61 Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites, ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender identity in the 
Commonwealth: from History and Law to Developing Activism and Transnational Dialogues’ in 
Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites (eds), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
The Commonwealth: Struggles for Decriminalisation and Change (Human Rights Consortium, 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 2013) 1. 
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Arguably, a result of these evidentiary difficulties is the Home Office’s shallow 
analysis of country situations.  This is demonstrated in the case of MASY005, an 
Indian national whose claim for asylum was lodged and refused in 2013.  From an 
assessment of the refusal letter that he provided for analysis, the Home Office’s 
consideration of the criminal sanctions in India raises concerns about the quality of 
the decision-maker’s determination: 
 
Background information indicates that the Indian government did not oppose 
the Supreme Court ruling decriminalizing homosexuality within the Union 
territory of New Delhi, and actively distanced itself from statements made on 
their behalf calling for the ruling to be overturned (para 22.04 COIR India 30 
March 2012).  Furthermore, whilst Section 377 officially remains in force, 
background information confirms that it is rarely applied except when child 
abuse or rape is alleged.  On this basis it is considered that any harm that you 
may fear on account of being gay is neither state sponsored nor state 
condoned, and therefore does not amount to persecution as per para 13 of HJ 
(Iran) [2010] UKSC 31.62  
    
The Home Office cited information from Human Rights Watch that the decision to 
decriminalise homosexuality affected Delhi only.63  It also cited the International 
Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Commission (ILGHRC), which explained that the 
Supreme Court would review the legality of the Delhi High Court’s decision.64  
Despite the citation of such information, the caseworker treats the decision as 
decriminalising homosexuality across India.65  Furthermore, the decision-maker treats 
the matter as settled, despite acknowledging that the Indian Supreme Court would 
review the legality of the decision.  The caseworker is, therefore, unclear as to how to 
treat the developing legal situation in India with respect to the legal sanctions.  As a 
safeguard of sorts, the caseworker emphasises that the law is rarely implemented, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 MASY005, Reasons for Refusal Letter, page 15, para 97. 
63 ibid 12, para 95. 
64 ibid 13. 
65 ibid 12-14, paras 95-97. 
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which simultaneously and implicitly acknowledges that it is sometimes implemented.  
This determination is confused.   
 
The assertion that the risk of persecution was negated by the Indian government’s 
lack of opposition to the decriminalisation by the Delhi High Court is naive.66  It fails 
to acknowledge the role played by non-state actors in the maltreatment of LGB 
people, as sanctioned by the prevailing legislation.  It is notable that the caseworker 
copied and pasted substantial swathes of background information, but produced a 
small paragraph of analysis in relation to MASY005’s circumstances, which is 
unsatisfactory in the light of the complexity of India’s treatment of LGB people.  The 
volume of objective information reproduced by the caseworker suggests that there are 
problems with the application of such information.   
 
As a result of the caseworker’s analysis, MASY005 was returned to India.  
Subsequently, the Indian Supreme Court reinforced the legitimacy of the legislation 
criminalising homosexuality.67   NGOs have documented the increase in attacks 
against LGB people, establishing the clear connection between the legislation and 
mistreatment.68  The Humsafar Trust indicated that reports of abuse have trebled since 
the reinstatement of the law.69  By way of example, two policemen raped a gay man 
in Ahmedabad only weeks after the criminalisation was reinstated.70  The decision in 
MASY005’s case under the British system contrasts starkly with the American 
approach.  In the US, a gay Indian couple were granted asylum, having credibly 
established the threat of violence they faced in India, a decision bolstered by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 ibid 15, para 97. 
67 Jason Burke, ‘Indian LGBT activists outraged as supreme court reinstates gay sex ban’ The 
Guardian (12 December 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/11/india-supreme-court-
reinstates-gay-sex-ban> accessed 20 November 2015. 
68 Nita Bhalla, ‘Feature - Blackmail and Abuse: Gay Sex Ban in India Stirs Violence’ (Reuters, 6 April 
2015) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/07/gay-rights-india-idUSL3N0WX28Y20150407> 
accessed 21 May 2015. 
69 ibid. 
70 Anonymous, ‘Gujarat Policemen Rape Gay Man in Ahmedabad’ (Gaylaxy Magazine, 09 February 
2014) <http://www.gaylaxymag.com/latest-news/gujarat-policemen-rape-gay-man-in-ahmedabad/> 
accessed 21 May 2015.  The rape, taking place on 9 February 2014, is emblematic of the violence and 
harassment faced by the LGBT community in India.  It is pertinent that the victim was allegedly 
recognised by the police from his participation in Ahmedabad Pride in December 2012, where the 
policemen had been stationed. 
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Indian Supreme Court’s position.71  Although the American decision took place after 
the Indian Supreme Court’s decision, whereas MASY005’s took place before, this 
comparison is still important, as the Home Office still refuses to acknowledge the 
persecutory nature of criminal sanctions.72  Indian LGB asylum-seekers are still 
deprived of refugee protection in the UK.  
  
The problem with the British system’s approach to the criminalisation of minority 
sexual identities is its broad disregard for and/or failure to understand the human cost 
of criminal sanctions.  The approach lacks fairness.  It entrenches the discrimination 
faced by LGB asylum-seekers by neglecting to understand the practical realities for 
sexual minorities living under criminal sanctions.  Regardless of their enforcement, 
the legacy of these sanctions is an atmosphere of subjugation and stigmatisation for 
LGB people.  As a result, sexual minorities are forced to suppress the expression and 
exercise of numerous fundamental rights.  These rights include those articulated by 
the Yogyakarta Principles, such as the right to security for sexual minorities and the 
right to be protected by the state against harm.73 
 
Decision-makers remain ignorant of the fact that criminal sanctions do not solely 
restrict the sexual behaviour of LGB individuals.  In the LGB context, criminal 
sanctions are unique due to their extensive and devastating impact upon countless 
basic and essential freedoms of sexual minorities.  These laws influence the safety of 
LGB individuals in forming relationships and friendships, and finding community 
support.74  They heighten the fear of being caught or identified, and leave people 
vulnerable to violence and extortion, compounded by the fear of reporting such 
matters to the police.75  LGB individuals must exercise restraint in many ways 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Sandip Roy, ‘Asylum in USA for Indian Gay Couple: Sec 377 Ruling Swung Their Case’ (First 
Post, 3 January 2014) <http://www.firstpost.com/world/asylum-in-usa-for-indian-gay-couple-sec-377-
ruling-swung-their-case-1320969.html> accessed 21 May 2015. 
72 DV, ‘I went straight way to UK home office for claim asylum. But got 7 month prison’ (Detained 
Voices, 21 March 2015) <https://detainedvoices.wordpress.com/2015/03/21/i-went-straight-way-to-uk-
home-office-for-claim-asylum-but-got-7-month-prison/> accessed 22 October 2015. 
73 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (March 2007) 
principle 5. 
74 UNHCR, ‘Sexual Orientation Guidelines’ (n 4) paras 26-27.  
75 ibid.  
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because of the threat posed by legislation criminalising their identities.  This refers 
directly to the consensus within refugee law that expecting individuals to exercise 
discretion to avoid maltreatment is wrong, particularly given the psychological harm 
it causes.76  (The matter of enforced concealment will be addressed in greater detail in 
section 2.5.)  Outside of refugee law, international case-law has acknowledged the 
impact of criminal sanctions on the fundamental rights of LGB people, infringing 
their rights to private and family life.77  Thus, regardless of their enforcement (or not), 
the legacy of these sanctions facilitates an intolerable climate in which LGB people 
must live.    
 
The human cost of criminal sanctions is pertinently identified by MASY005, a 
research participant who had lived under legislation criminalising same-sex sexual 
relations.  He identified the struggle to accept his sexuality whilst living under stifling 
conditions where his identity was stigmatised and where his core freedoms were 
suppressed: 
 
[They say that gay sex is legal in India,] but the way that you can feel 
yourself, express yourself, you know, be open in public, you don’t have that 
freedom.  That’s the main problem and for me, I took 10 years to deal with my 
sexuality, to come to terms with the fact that I am gay (MASY005).  
      
The result is that the Home Office’s ‘enforcement’ approach is unfair.  It is 
inconsistent with the structural principles adopted in Chapter two, because it fails to 
treat the Refugee Convention as a ‘living’ document, applying the thresholds of 
persecution with the appropriate flexibility and understanding.  It fails to accord 
criminal sanctions their appropriate seriousness, in the light of the fact that they 
mostly reflect state and societal intolerance, and legitimise the persecution of LGB 
people by non-state agents.  As the mere existence of criminal sanctions constrains 
the core expressions of LGB individuals, constituting a severe attack on their 
fundamental rights, it is unfair for the British asylum system to follow an approach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality et al v. the Minister of Justice et al, CCT 11/98 
(9 October 1998) (USA) [28] (Majority Opinion) and [107] (Concurring Opinion of Sachs J). 
77 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 573; Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186; and 
Modinos v. Cyprus (1993) 16 EHRR 485. 
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centred on enforcement.  Treating the terms of the Convention and the thresholds of 
persecution pragmatically would involve recognising that the mere existence of such 
laws constitutes evidence of persecution that is actively pursued or promoted by the 
state.  The fairness of the British system could be improved by taking this approach to 
criminal sanctions.   
 
The fairness of the enforcement approach is impaired further by its practical 
limitations and the failures of British decision-makers.  Objective information will 
rarely provide the information required to make consistent and accurate decisions, a 
key requirement of the structural principles.  Where information is available, UK 
decision-makers conduct the investigations into enforcement poorly, often lacking the 
ability to understand a country situation.  Where information on the status of 
criminalising provisions is scarcer, these problems are exacerbated.  Accordingly, 
there are problems with the availability of information, its citation and application, 
and the skills and training of decision-makers.  As the enforcement approach has been 
supported by the CJEU, however, it has been cemented into the British system and 
will prove difficult to dismantle.  Having examined the Home Office’s reluctance to 
recognise how the mere existence of criminal sanctions can persecute LGB people, 
decision-making on other forms of persecution will now be investigated. 
 
2.4 Psychological Harm as Persecution 
As criminal sanctions show, LGB individuals routinely experience psychological 
harm.  This emanates from the suppression of their rights to express themselves freely 
and the constant fear of mistreatment, if identified.  Psychological harm is also a 
product of the physical maltreatment commonly experienced by LGB individuals, 
such as arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, police beatings, rape and involuntary 
medical interventions, for example, which would normally meet the ‘sufficient 
seriousness’ requirement of the persecutory thresholds.78  
 
For the purposes of understanding the maltreatment of LGB people in the asylum 
context, it is essential to link together the stigmatisation of minority sexual identities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 James C. Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy, ‘Queer Cases Make Bad Law’ (2011) 44 New York 
University Journal of International Law & Policy 315, 321. 
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and psychological violence.  Outside of the asylum paradigm, this has been widely 
researched and documented within Western countries.  Generally, non-heterosexual 
identities are either ‘othered’ or considered ‘deviant’ in many societies across the 
world.79  There are several reasons for this, including the minority status afforded by 
virtue of their population size, the gradual but slow recognition of the rights of sexual 
minorities, and the way in which LGB people defy stringent norms relating to the 
roles and duties of men and women.80  Although societal reaction to non-conformity 
may differ according to the culture in question, LGB individuals recognise their 
difference and experience stigma in relation to it.  After all, LGB individuals develop 
their identities within their society’s heteronormative value-system. 81   This 
stigmatisation is documented in Western countries. Experiences of ‘oppression, 
rejection, discrimination, harassment and violence have been shown to have negative 
physical and mental health effects’ on the lives of LGBT youth and adults regardless 
of whether they are raised in asylum-receiving or producing societies.82  For example, 
LGBT youth are considerably more likely to attempt suicide, carry weapons, engage 
in substance abuse, and adopt risky sexual behaviour.83  By way of further example, a 
study of gay men has highlighted the link between stigma and psychological harm, as 
internalised homophobia, stigmatisation and experiences of homophobic violence and 
discrimination have a deleterious impact on their mental well-being.84 
 
The experiences of stigma are compounded in the refugee context.  In many 
traditional asylum-origin states for LGB claimants, oppressive restrictions are 
imposed upon the daily lives of sexual minorities.  Social spaces where they associate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 UNHCR, ‘Sexual Orientation Guidelines’ (n 4) para 21. 
80 James D. Wilets, ‘Conceptualizing Private Violence against Sexual Minorities as Gendered 
Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective’ (1996) 60 Alb. L. Rev. 989, 991 and 
1011. 
81 Sari H. Dworkin and Huso Yi, ‘LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice: The Psychological Is 
Political’ (2003) 25(4) International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling 269-79, 272. 
82 Anthony R. D’Augelli, ‘Developmental Implications of Victimization of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual 
Youth’ in Gregory M. Herek (ed), Stigma and Sexual Orientation: Understanding Prejudice against 
Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals (Sage, 1998) 187-210.  
83 Ian Rivers and Daniel J. Carragher, ‘Social-Development Factors Affecting Lesbian and Gay Youth: 
A Review of Cross-National Research Findings’ (November 2003) 17(5) Children & Society 374, 377. 
84 Ilan H. Meyer, ‘Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual 
Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence’ (September 2003) 129(5) Psychological 
Bulletin 674-97. 
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are subjected to regular police raids, they are denied access to basic services unless 
they mask their identities and behaviour, and medical interventions can be used to 
‘cure’ their sexualities.85  Criminal sanctions can dictate the extent to which one can 
express an identity freely, framed by the constant fear of being identified as LGB and 
being mistreated on this basis.  There are psychological harms caused by verbal, 
emotional, physical and sexual abuse, such as forced prostitution, forced heterosexual 
marriage, ‘corrective rape’, coercion and blackmail. 86   Shidlo and Ahola have 
documented the psychological impact of such suffering, highlighting that many 
LGBT asylum-seekers suffer from substantial mental health problems: ‘common 
diagnoses are depression, dissociative disorders, panel disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, social anxiety, traumatic brain injury and substance abuse’.87  Thus, it is 
critical that decision-makers give proper consideration in RSDs to incidents of 
psychological harm with reference to the thresholds of persecution (both in isolation 
and combined with experiences of physical harm). 
 
With regard to the attitude of the British asylum system, this issue is highlighted by 
the Home Office’s guidance on sexual orientation issues that was adopted in 2010.88  
Although this document was replaced by instructions on ‘Sexual Identity Issues in the 
Asylum Claim’ in February 2015,89 the 2010 policy document governed the decision-
making recorded within the empirical work.  The 2010 document displays a broad 
absence of psychological harm from the conceptions of the Home Office.  
Commendably, the guidance recognises psychological harm as persecution: ‘lesser 
forms of physical and psychological harm that may constitute persecution include 
harassment, threats of harm, vilification, intimidation and psychological violence’.90  
Otherwise, the 2010 instructions, alongside the training materials used by the Home 
Office are silent on this matter.  There is no further explanation on the nature of 
psychological persecution in the sexual identity context and/or how such matters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Dworkin and Yi (n 81) 271. 
86 Ariel Shidlo and Joanne Ahola, ‘Mental Health Challenges of LGBT Forced Migrants’ (2013) 42 
Forced Migration Review 9. 
87 ibid. 
88 Home Office, ‘Asylum Policy Instruction: Sexual Orientation Issues in the Asylum Claim’ (5 
October 2010). 
89 ‘API: Sexual Identity Issues’ (n 3). 
90 ‘API: Sexual Orientation Issues’ (n 88) 4. 
	  	  
122	  
122	  
should be addressed.  As a result, there is no tangible framework for understanding 
how to treat psychological violence for the purposes of the thresholds of persecution.  
 
The absence of a framework is significant when considering how common 
psychological harm is amongst LGB claimants.  Amongst asylum-seeker participants 
within the empirical data, there were some instances of extreme psychological harm.  
Perhaps due to the stigma related to mental health, many were reluctant to discuss at 
length the psychological violence that they had suffered and continue to suffer.  
Nevertheless, 11 of the 20 participants identified some element of psychological harm 
in their narratives of persecution.91  Within the data, female participants constituted 
the majority of those claiming to have suffered psychological violence, which may 
suggest a greater willingness amongst women to acknowledge such harm.  The 
intersectional nature of this data alternatively indicates a greater manifestation of this 
kind of harm upon lesbian and bisexual women claimants.  This is consistent with the 
dissimilar experience of persecution between LGB men and women.  Women are 
often invisible in their societies or experience greater struggles to express themselves 
than gay and bisexual men, for reasons including their reduced mobility for socio-
economic reasons and restriction to the private domain.92  
 
It is testament to the seriousness with which psychological violence should be taken, 
however, that a female asylum-seeker from Morocco explained how psychological 
violence was her primary cause and motivation for seeking refuge in the UK: 
 
Because I didn’t, in some circumstances, I didn’t feel myself.  I didn’t feel 
safe, not 100%, you know.  I am not talking about physical abuse, but it was 
more like, well, psychologies, you know, psychology (FASY004).93 
 
The seriousness of the psychological harms experienced amongst the empirical 
research participants was further demonstrated by the fact that their conditions had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 MASY003; MASY005; MASY006; MASY008; FASY001; FASY002; FASY003; FASY004; 
FASY005; FASY007; and FASY009. 
92 Laurie Berg and Jenni Millbank, ‘Constructing the Personal Narratives of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual 
Asylum Claimants’ (2009) 22(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 195-223, 211-213. 
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been medically diagnosed or were being treated by healthcare professionals.  For 
example, FASY005, a woman from Uganda, identified that she was ‘under mental 
health’ and attended a hospital where she received ongoing care.  FASY007, a lesbian 
also from Uganda, explained that she had been diagnosed with PTSD and depression.  
FASY001, a Gambian woman, described her first consultation with a GP in the UK.  
Worrying for her poor mental health, he immediately referred her for counselling.  
Amongst the participants, two acknowledged that they had attempted suicide and that 
this was a part of their narratives of persecution.94  Furthermore, eight participants 
stated that they provided specialist medical evidence of the psychological harms 
experienced.95   
 
In explaining the content of the reports, both male and female interviewees attested to 
the harms that they had and were still experiencing.  FASY003, a Pakistani lesbian, 
was suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD): 
 
He asked me about my life and experiences and I told him how I had lived 
such a filthy life, sleeping with different kinds of men.  I began to suffer from 
OCD, I used to feel that I was constantly dirty.  Whenever I showered, I would 
not stop showering.  So now I don’t shower often, because I feel like if I start I 
won’t stop.  I wanted to wash my body to get rid of the dirt.  They wrote all 
about that (FASY003). 
 
MASY004, a gay man from Burkina Faso, spoke of the traumatic nightmares that he 
experienced on a recurrent basis: 
 
The medical report said because the problem I have in my country, when I 
come here, even now, I still feel the same.  I cannot sleep at night, sometimes 
when I’m sleeping, I see a lot of people come to me, trying to beat me, a lot of 
people with a knife, trying to kill me (MASY004). 
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The absence of meaningful guidance for decision-makers on examining psychological 
harm is worrying.  There is a foundation for according psychological harm its 
appropriate seriousness for the purposes of the thresholds of persecution.  For 
example, the United Nations Convention against Torture (UNCAT) defines torture as 
‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person (…)’.96   Within the empirical data, a legal 
representative echoed the potentially persecutory nature of psychological harm:  
 
I think there is an argument to say that where somebody’s mental health is 
going to be so impacted as a result of being in a society that’s so hostile, or in 
a family environment, whatever it is, you might not be able to say it is 
persecution, but you might be able to say it is an article 3 [ECHR] harm, 
because it’s inhumane (Liz Barratt).  
 
Psychological harm can exist independently of physical harm.  Often, however, 
psychological harm is connected to the physical harms included in a claimant’s 
narrative of persecution.  By way of example, FASY002 was shot by a relative, and 
alongside MASY006, FASY005 and FASY007, had been a victim of sexual violence.  
FASY009, FASY005, FASY007 and FASY002 suffered extreme physical abuse, as a 
result of which scars on their body were documented in torture, or ‘medico-legal’ 
reports.  FASY003 was forced into sex-work by the man who she had eloped with and 
married against her family’s wishes.  Again, the female asylum-seekers, on the whole, 
experienced physical violence of greater severity, the reasons for which are explored 
in Chapter four.  
 
Asylum-seekers explained the use of medical reports to situate the intersection 
between psychological and physical violence (see also Chapter four).  In the empirical 
data, a practitioner explained the importance of medical reports to document how 
physical and mental harms were part of her client’s experience of being tortured:  
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I would be thinking very seriously about getting a psychological or psychiatric 
report to say, “Yes, this person is suffering from PTSD and that’s very likely, 
or given their experiences, that all fits together”’ (Catherine Robinson).   
 
In other words, psychological harm can give legitimacy to the experiences of physical 
harm.   
 
Despite eleven participants identifying and evidencing experiences of psychological 
harm, seven of these were refused asylum by the Home Office.  This suggests that 
decision-makers consistently fail to assess psychological violence in the RSD or 
neglect to treat it with the seriousness warranted.  Again, the particular circumstances 
of MASY005 warrant further scrutiny.  His GP found him to be suffering from 
depression and suicidal ideation.97  MASY005 provided a discharge summary from 
the Community Mental Health Team and a copy of a report from his psychiatrist in 
India.  The poor consideration given to these documents by the Home Office relates to 
its assessment of the country situation in India.  In the Reasons for Refusal letter, the 
decision-maker denied that MASY005 would feel the need to hide his sexuality, 
negating the link between his suicidal ideation and his fear of return.98   Furthermore, 
the psychological harm experienced in India by the claimant was dismissed.  The 
Home Office asserted that MASY005’s medical documents showed he no longer felt 
suicidal.  Consequently, his mental health problems did not meet the high thresholds 
of Article 3 ECHR.   
 
Believing MASY005 not to suffer from suicidal ideation anymore represents the 
decision-maker’s simplification and ignorance of his poor mental health.  There was 
no basis in his medical evidence for this conclusion.  The Home Office supported its 
assertion with a statement from MASY005’s substantive interview: ‘(…) I am happy 
being homosexual and God don’t hate me anymore now because I can see that I am 
doing nothing wrong (…)’.99  The Home Office’s interpretation of this statement is 
arbitrary, because MASY005’s suicidal ideation continued, and his mental health was 	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98 ibid. 
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generally poor.  In fact, he spoke of his continued desire to commit suicide when the 
Home Office and the tribunal refused his claim.100  His apparent reconciliation of 
faith and sexuality would not suddenly and permanently negate or absolve his mental 
health issues.  The Home Office’s approach may also constitute a reluctance to afford 
medical reports from GPs and psychiatrists appropriate weight, reflecting the culture 
of disbelief examined in Chapter four. 
 
Arguably, the British asylum system avoids assessing psychological harm within 
LGB asylum narratives for the purposes of meeting the thresholds of persecution.  
The overall approach is inconsistent, as the system acknowledges the incidence of 
psychological harm by recognising the persecutory impact of enforced discretion, but 
limits its recognition to this domain only.  Furthermore, whilst the guidance 
acknowledges forms of psychological harm, within actual decision-making, the harms 
are ignored or undermined.  This is unfair, and in conflict with the structural 
principles.  These state that the fundamental rights of LGB people must be 
acknowledged by the system, that the provisions of the Refugee Convention should be 
understood flexibly, and the evidentiary thresholds applied pragmatically. LGB 
asylum-seekers experience a significant incidence of psychological harm, through 
enforced discretion, societal disapproval and physical harm.  As severe psychological 
harm can breach their fundamental rights, especially to private life and health, the UK 
asylum system must recognise this in its policy, guidance and training.  To do so, 
first, it must recognise that the fundamental rights of LGB asylum-seekers can be 
breached in these instances.  Subsequently, the system must grant these breaches the 
appropriate severity and seriousness for the purposes of the thresholds of persecution.  
This can be done through better guidance and training on how subjugating the 
fundamental expressions of LGB people affect their psychological well-being, tying 
into procedural tools of the structural principles.  The updated instructions of 2015, 
however, replicate the same guidance as in the 2010 counterpart.101   This highlights 
the ongoing need to address psychological violence with greater substance in both the 
guidance and in training, to ensure it is reflected appropriately within the decision-
making.  	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Finally, as part of recognising the severity of psychological harm within sexual 
identity-based asylum claims, it is essential that the Home Office recognises the 
intersectionality of that experience within the community of LGB asylum-seekers.  As 
the empirical data has found, the severity of psychological harm amongst LGB 
asylum-seekers is most severe amongst lesbian and bisexual women.  This 
undoubtedly relates to the fact that more of the women within the empirical research 
had actually suffered from persecutory physical harm.  Men were also more 
privileged than women along other intersectional issues, such as access to education, 
economic resources and escape routes.  A fair system would incorporate an 
understanding of these nuances into its decision-making, thus producing fairer, higher 
quality decisions.  Given that the 2015 instructions have not addressed issues of 
psychological harm meaningfully, however, this thesis believes that the treatment of 
such violence will not improve under the British asylum system.  This critique is more 
resonant in conjunction with the examination of the procedural treatment of mental 
health matters in Chapter four.   
 
Having found that the British asylum system fails to a great extent to view common 
tools to subjugate LGB people (criminal sanctions and psychological harm) as 
persecutory, the thesis subsequently investigates whether this and the problem of 
insufficient guidance is replicated across other types of mistreatment common in LGB 
asylum claims. 
 
2.5 Discretion: A Concept Retained?  
Having examined the Home Office’s treatment of the persecution experienced by 
LGB asylum-seekers, particularly in cases concerning the criminalisation of minority 
sexual identities and psychological harm, this section explores the expectations placed 
upon claimants regarding their mistreatment.  A fundamental question exists within 
refugee law and the asylum determination: can claimants be expected to alter their 
behaviour to avoid mistreatment?  In the LGB context, the expectation inherent in this 
question emerged as the ‘discretion’ requirement.  The ‘reasonable tolerability’ test 
encompassed this idea, asking whether LGB persons could be ‘reasonably expected’ 
to tolerate the suppression of their sexual expression in their home society in order to 
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avoid maltreatment.102  This accompanied the practice of decision-makers rejecting 
the protection claims of sexual minorities, asserting that, indeed, they could avoid the 
risk of persecution by ‘acting discreetly’ and concealing their identities upon their 
return home.103   
 
During the period in which this discretion requirement was utilised within the British 
system, several participants of the empirical research (whose claims were initially 
determined before 2010, but were challenged for several years after) were denied 
protection on this basis.104  The UKSC ended this practice in 2010.  The case of HJ 
(Iran) concerned two gay men, HJ, an Iranian national, and HT, a Cameroonian 
national.  Both appellants had sought asylum in the UK, but the Home Office and the 
tribunal refused their claims.  Eventually, their cases were jointly considered before 
the Court of Appeal, which applied the ‘reasonable tolerability’ test and found that the 
claimants could be reasonably expected to tolerate discreet behaviour in their 
countries of origin.  The appellants challenged this decision in the UK Supreme 
Court, which established that decision-makers were not entitled to refuse LGB claims 
on such grounds: 
 
To pretend that it [homosexuality or bisexuality] does not exist, or that the 
behaviour by which it manifests itself can be suppressed, is to deny the 
members of this group their fundamental right to be what they are – of the 
right to do simple, everyday things with others of the same orientation such as 
living or spending time together or expressing their affection for each other in 
public.105 
 
The decision was incorporated in Home Office’s 2010 instructions, along with the 
guidance of the UNHCR, explaining that ‘people cannot be required to behave 
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Claims’ (8 April 2010) 6.  According to the report, 56% of all cases were refused on the basis of 
discretion. 
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discreetly’.106  The instructions integrate the five-point test advanced by Lord Rodgers 
in HJ (Iran) on how the RSD in claims based on sexual identity should be conducted, 
which is: 
 
When an applicant applies for asylum on the ground of a well-founded fear of 
persecution because he is gay, the tribunal must first ask itself whether it is 
satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or that he would be treated as gay by 
potential persecutors in his country of nationality. 
 
If so, the tribunal must then ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available 
evidence that gay people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in 
the applicant’s country of nationality. 
 
If so, the tribunal must go on to consider what the individual applicant would 
do if he were returned to that country. 
 
If the applicant would in fact live openly and thereby be exposed to a real risk 
of persecution, then he has a well-founded fear of persecution - even if he 
could avoid the risk by living “discreetly”. 
 
If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact 
live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he 
would do so.107   
 
This UKSC decision was rightfully praised for eradicating the discretion requirement 
in the guise of the ‘reasonable tolerability’ test.108  It also had a significant impact 
upon decision-making in this area, whereby LGB cases that had and would generally 
be refused were now granted protection.  Indeed, the empirical data highlighted that 
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there was a ‘honeymoon’ period subsequently, before the focus of RSDs shifted to 
disbelief:109 
 
There was about four months where everyone who went to see them [the 
Home Office], won. They basically needed nothing.  They just went, well, I 
cannot do anything to be ‘discreet’.  So long as they were from an obviously 
dangerous country, then they won.  We had about 50 in four months, just like, 
we get about three or four a month and they just went woom, woom, woom, 
woom, woom (Erin Power). 
 
Despite the justified praise, conceptually and practically, the UKSC decision is not 
without issue.  Lord Rodger’s five-stage test advanced in HJ (Iran) does not eliminate 
discretion altogether.  Here, only the two stages of the test are discussed, as the other 
stages are not directly relevant to this discussion.  Instead, as it will now be explored, 
the test shifts the attention of the RSD to ‘openness’.  Correspondingly, the 
assessment of LGB asylum claims still turns on behaviour.110  First, Lord Rodgers’ 
test instructs caseworkers to query whether ‘the applicant is gay or someone who 
would be treated as gay by potential persecutors’.111  This crystallises the conditions 
for the ‘culture of disbelief’ that exists in relation to LGB claims, whereby decision-
makers insist on scrutinising a claimant’s self-identification.  Indeed, the first stage of 
each claim invites decision-makers to scrutinise the genuine nature of LGB identities.  
Should these queries be negative, the entire claim of an LGB asylum-seeker 
subsequently fails.  The question of whether a claimant is genuinely a sexual minority 
is an important one, but this thesis contends that the extent and nature of the scrutiny 
placed upon this in the sexual identity context is substantial and unique.112  At the 
second stage, decision-makers must consider whether LGB people ‘living openly’ are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Jenni Millbank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the 
Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13 (2-3) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 391-414. 
110 Janna Weßels, ‘HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) – Reflections on a new test for sexuality-based 
asylum claims in Britain’ (2012) 24(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 815-839, 827. 
111 ‘API: Sexual Identity Issues’ (n 3), 27, citing para 82 of HJ (Iran) (n 102). 
112 For example, often race and nationality can be externally verified.  Similarly, one’s religious views 
and political opinions can be verified by testing the claimant’s knowledge of them, for example, 
whereas sexual identity cannot.  At most, there would be parallels between LGB claimants and asylum-
seeking unaccompanied children, where age assessments can engender disbelief of the child’s status as 
a minor, and can be as problematic as the disbelief of sexual identity. 
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liable to persecution in the country concerned, before assessing whether the applicant 
would ‘live openly’ or ‘behave discreetly’ if returned.113  The Home Office’s internal 
training on LGB cases supports this construction of the RSD.  The materials include 
key paragraphs of HJ (Iran) as a handout and instruct trainees on how to conduct the 
examination according to the aforementioned test.114  
 
There are a number of reasons as to why the approach of the British asylum system is 
troubling.  The first criticism relates to the legal inconsistencies of the approach.  The 
empirical data explains that the approach of the British asylum system from HJ (Iran) 
is ‘problematic in terms of compatibility’ with the standards of human rights and 
refugee law.115  This argument is crucial, as the system has failed to acknowledge the 
inconsistency of its approach with the prevailing interpretation of refugee law.  The 
Home Office was selective in its incorporation of the CJEU’s decision in X, Y and 
Z.116  It adopted the guidance on criminal sanctions in its policy instructions, but 
ignored the guidance on discretion, where it stated that the question of concealment 
had no place within the RSD.  Relying on its principles in the case of Y and Z117 and 
on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case, Salahadin Abdulla,118 the 
CJEU stated that decision-makers must only establish, on the circumstances 
presented, whether an applicant would ‘reasonably fear’ being subjected to 
persecution on the basis of their experiences.119  This was in line with the terms of 
Article 4 of the Qualification Directive.  With regard to the thresholds of persecution, 
no provision of the Directive (or of the Refugee Convention) allowed for harm to be 
avoided through restraint or concealment.120  For this reason, LGB individuals could 
not be required to conceal themselves or exercise restraint in the expression of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 HJ (Iran) (n 102) [82] (Lord Rodgers). 
114 ‘Freedom of Information Request 27021’, Home Office, Families and Gender Team (9 October 
2013) Appendix B, ppt 25. 
115 Interview with Lilian Tsourdi. 
116 ‘API: Sexual Identity Issues’ (n 3) 10-11; X, Y and Z (n 41) [73-74]. 
117 Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z [2012] [62-65] and [78-
80]. 
118 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08 Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. 
Germany [2010] ECR I-1493 [90]. 
119 X, Y and Z (n 41) [73]. 
120 ibid [74]. 
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identities to mitigate the risk of serious harm.  Therefore, it is unmistakably clear that 
scrutinising an individual’s behaviour or conduct in this way is illegitimate regardless 
of the circumstances and has no foundation in refugee law.121  
 
There are also conceptual difficulties with the approach, which have significant 
practical consequences for the RSD.  First, Lord Rodgers’ emphasis on the distinction 
between discretion and openness, and on the openness of a claimant’s behaviour in 
their home society, is troubling.  The UKSC decision has been rightfully criticised for 
its failure to remove discretion from the RSD altogether.122  The decision also reflects 
decision-makers’ ongoing preoccupation with the behaviour of sexual minorities 
instead of their identity and expression.  This is highlighted by Lord Rodger’s 
‘attempts to conceive the meaning of “discretion” at paragraph 63, and again at 
paragraph 77, concluding, “what is protected is the applicant’s right to live freely and 
openly as a gay man”’.123  Accordingly, despite the British asylum system’s broad 
assertion that requiring or expecting a claimant to conceal their identities is 
inappropriate, it retains discretion and converts it into openness.  ‘Openness’ forms 
the heart of its approach, whereby only ‘open’ LGB claimants deserve protection.  
Where a claimant does not live their identity sufficiently in the public domain, 
protection is denied.  This is a subversion of refugee law.124  
 
A behaviour-oriented analysis highlights an endemic problem of this asylum system 
more clearly: the poor understanding of sexual identity and persecution on this basis.  
What should be protected is the right of claimants to express their identity, 
irrespective of the domain (public or private) in which this takes place.125  Openness 
is, to some extent, irrelevant to the asylum determination.  Crucially, discreet 
experiences do not eliminate the existence of a ‘real’ risk of persecution.  Potentially 
any expression, intentional or unintentional, even seemingly in the private domain, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Y and Z (n 117) [79].  
122 Weßels (n 110) 823-824. 
123 ibid 826. 
124 Y and Z (n 117) (Opinion of Advocate-General Bot) [92-101]. 
125 Jenni Millbank, ‘Gender, Sex and Visibility in Refugee Decisions on Sexual Orientation’ (2003) 
18(1) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 71-110, 109-111.  
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could reveal an LGB person’s identity and leave them vulnerable to serious 
mistreatment.126  
 
Additionally, Lord Rodger’s approach in HJ (Iran) categorises voluntary concealment 
for social reasons as not persecutory, making potentially erroneous assumptions about 
the threat of abuse and discrimination inflicted by social and family ties.  It 
underestimates their psychological harm, as discussed in section 2.4 above, and 
underplays the role of the state in creating conditions where an individual is indirectly 
compelled to be discreet to maintain social harmony.127  Criminal sanctions, in section 
2.3 above, are an example thereof.  The five-stage test in HJ (Iran) ignores the fact 
that assessing motives does not improve the quality of decision-making.  A motive-
oriented analysis provides LGB claimants with an additional hurdle to surmount.128  
This is unfair, constituting prejudicial treatment when the motives of other groups of 
asylum-seekers are not ascertained in the RSD.  For example, decision-makers are not 
concerned with why potential claimants fight against dictatorships or insist on 
attending their places of worship.  
 
Critically, this approach also ignores intersectional issues.  It does not recognise those 
struggling with their identities or with the disclosure expected within the system.  It is 
not flexible to the needs of the less educated or articulate, who may not be able to 
express their motives for the concealment of their sexualities.  Where a legal 
representative recognises this and works against it, a claimant can still succeed, but 
representatives with less competent representation, or none at all, are unfairly 
prejudiced.  Given the conceptual nature of the refugee definition, especially the 
thresholds of persecution, good legal advice and representation is essential to 
claimants overcoming the prejudicial hurdles placed ahead of LGB asylum-seekers.      
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This is linked with the practical and evidential challenges of the British approach.  
Within the empirical data, participants highlighted the challenges of the post-HJ 
(Iran) climate.  Practitioners explained the increased role forced on legal 
representatives to evidence that a claimant would only act discreetly in his or her 
home society due to a fear of maltreatment, not social or familial pressure: 
 
I think you’ve really got to explore properly with your client what they are 
actually saying, because – and this is, for instance, what I think about a really 
well thought-out statement, what a really detailed statement really does, is that 
for your average – not average – but for some people, if you say, ‘Why can’t 
you go back?’ – often one of the first things in their head is how ashamed their 
family are and they would have to hide their sexual identity…. And you 
actually realise, if you give them a chance, that it’s not them just saying, ‘I 
would choose to be discreet because I feel a bit ashamed’. They’re actually 
saying, ‘If I were openly gay, these things would happen to me, and because 
of that, I won’t be,’ and therefore you actually are protected by HJ (Iran). And 
I think the difference is actually quite small. I think it needs to be drawn out 
(Barry O’Leary). 
 
This indicates the very real problem of helping claimants to articulate why they would 
act discreetly if returned to their home societies, especially where claimants are 
under-educated, struggle with their sexualities, or do not understand the evidentiary 
demands of the RSD.  For claimants served by less experienced legal representatives, 
this could easily result in claimants being imputed as acting discreetly for non-
persecutory reasons.  For example, in MASY003’s case, voluntary discretion was 
cited as a reason for denying him protection.  The empirical data emphasised the 
tendency of the Home Office to erroneously read non-persecutory, voluntary 
discretion into the claimant’s motives:  
 
I was reading a determination from a client quite recently, he’s from Gambia. 
It’s accepted that he’s gay but they’ve said, because he lives in the UK 
discreetly, because he lives with his home community in order to survive, he 
will act like that on return. So he’s lost his case (Erin Power). 
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This approach was confirmed by the UKLGIG’s independent empirical research.  
Describing this development as the ‘New Discretion Test’, the report explained that 
claimants were being asked leading questions during substantive asylum interviews to 
determine how ‘out’ they were.129  Questions included, ‘did you lead an openly gay or 
discreet lifestyle’ and ‘what changed in the way you express your sexuality when you 
moved to the UK’.130  On this basis, the Home Office rejected the claim of a 
Malawian man in November 2011, arguing that ‘there is nothing indicative in your 
evidence of how you chose to express your sexual orientation that would demonstrate 
that you would be at risk of persecution on return’.131  Similarly, an immigration 
judge dismissed the claim of a Malawian woman in August 2010 for failing to ‘come 
out’ in the UK.132   
 
Although decision-making uses Lord Rodgers’ test to burden claimants with 
satisfying that they would not choose a discreet lifestyle voluntarily, the Home 
Office’s decisions on this issue are poor and inconsistent on this issue.  Decision-
makers often failed to evaluate a claimant’s motives for voluntary discretion with the 
necessary rigour: 
 
I think this relies a great deal on a caseowner being able to really rigorously 
understand the dynamics that are at play here in the country of origin that 
we’re talking about, the cultural and social dynamics, and maybe gender 
dynamics because that individual whose… If UKBA is going to argue that this 
person is going to be willing to be discreet about their sexuality in deference 
to their family, why is that the case? This is what we really need to think 
about. Is it because of the cultural, social and the gender dynamics in their 
country, and is that even acceptable? (Paul Dillane) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 UKLGIG, ‘“Missing the Mark” - Decision Making on Lesbian, Gay (Bisexual, Trans and Intersex) 
Asylum Claims’ (14 October 2013) 23-24. 
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Indeed, this quote shows that it is intersectional decision-making, once again, that is 
absent from the British asylum system, alongside familiar issues of training and 
decision-maker competence. 
 
The approach of HJ (Iran) facilitates perplexing and inaccurate reasoning within both 
the Home Office and tribunals.  In the Country Guidance case LH and IP, the judge 
described the claimant and his partner as ‘particularly discreet’: ‘very few people 
know of their sexual orientation and they do not make use of their freedom to go out 
and express their sexual orientation in public’.133  This is irrelevant, distorting the 
examination of the risk of persecution, which refugee law has attempted to make as 
objective as possible.  Their claim was rejected, with the Upper Tribunal contending 
that the appellants would live discreetly in Sri Lanka as they did in the UK, ‘in 
accordance with their preferences, not in order to avoid persecution’.134  This is 
problematic, because the claimants would still be at risk of persecution, even if acting 
discreetly.   
 
The British asylum system’s approach to discretion remains unfair.  Although the 
UKSC held that enforced discretion would meet the thresholds of persecution, this 
statement alone is misleading.  The actual approach fails to interpret the terms of the 
Refugee Convention with the pragmatism required by the structural principles.  The 
idea that discreet behaviour negates the risk of persecution and claimant’s 
requirement of refugee protection is not eradicated by HJ (Iran).  Instead, the focus 
on behaviour in the form of ‘out-ness’ and the claimant’s motivation demonstrates 
that the discretion concept has been retained.  This is unfair because claimants who 
are discreet to avoid maltreatment, but for various reasons do not expressly articulate 
the ‘acceptable’ reason for behaving so, are denied protection.  Thereupon, the HJ 
(Iran) test can have precarious consequences for naïve or poorly represented 
claimants.  Legal representatives have greater responsibility to explain why a claimant 
would act discreetly.  They must connect this to the feared persecution, and away 
from the idea that discretion is somehow voluntary (which would result in claimants 
being refused protection).  The guidance and the practice of the British asylum system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 LH and IP (Gay Men: Risk) Sri Lanka CG [2015] UKUT 00073 (IAC) [124]. 
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are thus unfair.  They are inconsistent with the correct approach, which focuses on the 
risk of harm to LGB claimants, not on their behaviour.  The existing approach is also 
discriminatory because applicants seeking protection on other grounds must not 
surmount such hurdles.  Finally, the persistence of discretion logic within the claims 
of sexual minorities represents a failure to understand the breadth and expression of 
sexual identity.  It overlooks how discretion encompasses a suppression of one’s 
fundamental rights, to significant psychological detriment, and cannot be a part of the 
RSD.   
 
Having concluded the investigation of issues pertaining to persecution, this chapter 
now examines whether LGB claimants can relocate within their home societies to 
avoid such mistreatment. 
 
 
3. Internal Relocation in the Sexual Identity Context 
 
Refugee protection is only granted where an individual is unable to receive proper 
protection within their state of origin.  Given the ‘surrogate’ nature of refugee 
protection, it is necessary to examine whether an individual could live safely within 
another part of the home state.  This is known as the ‘internal flight’ or ‘internal 
protection alternative’.  It is defined within Article 8(1) of the Qualification Directive 
as the process of establishing whether an asylum-seeker can live safely within another 
area of his or her country of origin, reducing the risk of persecution to below the 
threshold levels. 135  Where this is the case, protection from the asylum granting state 
will not be necessary. 
 
The viability of internal relocation is established through an assessment of the 
‘reasonableness’ of the proposed relocation. 136  Where it would not be ‘unduly harsh’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Qualification Directive (n 37) art 8(1).  This states, ‘Member States may determine that an applicant 
is not in need of international protection if in a part of the country of origin there is no well-founded 
fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm and the applicant can reasonably be 
expected to stay in that part of the country’. 
136 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Robinson [1997] 3 WLR 1162 [1169-
1170], [1172-1173].  See also paragraph 339O of the Immigration Rules (Chapter two).
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or unreasonable for the applicant to move to another part of their country, asylum 
protection would be denied.137  
 
The Home Office instructions restate the ‘reasonableness’ requirement advanced in 
the case of Robinson.138  They also incorporate HJ (Iran) to emphasise that relocation 
can never be proposed when it relies upon an individual’s discretion to secure their 
safety.  This is commendable; the instructions quote the case to underscore that in 
countries like Iran or Cameroon, an individual cannot relocate safely without 
fundamentally altering aspects of their behaviour, rendering the relocation 
unreasonable.139  The training materials also explain how ‘it is unlikely that relocation 
will be arguable in a gay/lesbian claim. We cannot argue someone can go from one 
area where they are persecuted to another’.140  By way of example, the training 
materials acknowledge the pervasiveness of prejudice across countries by referencing 
the UKLGIG’s description of Jamaica.141   
 
The guidance is good, but not without issue.  The training materials and instructions 
do not provide a clear direction for decision-makers on assessing relocation options.  
Furthermore, although the training states that relocation is unlikely to succeed unless 
objective information can establish a safe place for relocation, it tacitly reinforces that 
the ‘unreasonableness’ is for claimants to prove.142  This potentially burdens LGB 
claimants with another hurdle to surpass and provides decision-makers with a ready-
made ground to refuse claimants who have not proven their inability to relocate.  The 
burden is rendered more onerous due to the problems with the availability of objective 
evidence in the LGB context, clarified in the following section.143 
 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, the Home Office’s approach to internal 
relocation has improved immeasurably, a distinct result of the UKSC decision in HJ 	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141 UKLGIG, ‘Failing the Grade’ (n 103) 5. 
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(Iran).  Before the decision, the UKLGIG had found that 68% of the refusal letters 
analysed for the report had utilised the relocation alternative as the basis for refusing 
protection.144  Within these cases, virulently homophobic and violent countries, such 
as Jamaica and Iran, were determined to contain safe areas to which LGB asylum-
seekers could return.145  By contrast, in September 2013, the UKLGIG found that 
24% of the cases it analysed had cited the viability of internal relocation as a ground 
for refusal.146  This represents great progress.   
 
There is also considerable evidence of the tribunal’s ability to make positive and 
nuanced decisions.  The cases of DW (Homosexual Men; Persecution; Sufficiency of 
Protection) Jamaica CG and SW (lesbians - HJ and HT applied) Jamaica CG are 
prominent country guidance cases.147  In both DW and SW, the prospect of internal 
relocation was dismissed as ‘unduly harsh’, acknowledging the prevalence of 
prejudice across Jamaica.  As the risk of persecution arises even from the mere 
perception of one’s sexuality, internal relocation was not a viable option.148  The latter 
point was afforded particular importance in the challenges faced by lesbians, who 
would be ‘the subject of speculative conclusions, derived both by asking them 
questions and by observing their lifestyle and unless they can show a heterosexual 
narrative, they risk being identified as lesbians’.149   
 
In the 24% of cases where the UKLGIG found the viability of internal relocation to be 
cited by the Home Office, the decisions were still disconcerting.  Countries such as 
the Philippines, Pakistan, Malaysia, Uganda, Trinidad and Tobago, Ghana and Egypt 
were deemed as countries within which LGB applicants legitimately could relocate.150  
Yet, five of these countries retain outright criminal sanctions against LGBT identities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 UKLGIG, ‘Failing the Grade’ (n 103) 5. 
145 ibid. 
146 UKLGIG, ‘Missing the Mark’ (n 129) 22. 
147 DW (Homosexual Men - Persecution - Sufficiency of Protection) CG [2005] UKAIT 00168; and SW 
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negating internal relocation as a realistic alternative. 151   The state-sanctioned 
persecution of sexual minorities in Egypt and Uganda has been widely documented 
through the years, demonstrating the problematic nature of such decision-making.152   
 
Assessing internal relocation in the sexual identity context is extremely challenging, 
as it is contingent on objective country information.  The availability of relevant 
country information to establish the risk of persecution in LGB claims is an ongoing 
issue, and is explored in-depth in section 5 below.  In the relocation context, objective 
evidence is often insufficient; such information is rarely gathered and produced with 
the intention of informing relocation decisions.153  Seldom will reports consider the 
internal safety of particular areas and compare these with other locations for LGB 
people.  Consequently, decision-makers resort to inaccurate, irrelevant and outdated 
evidence to establish the safety of particular areas.  By way of example, in 2012, an 
immigration judge found that the Home Office decision-maker had relied on outdated 
case-law and information on Uganda dating back to 2008, despite the internal 
situation having changed significantly since then.154  Additionally, in a Country 
Guidance case on Zimbabwe, the Upper Tribunal relied on and gave weight to 
evidence from Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA).155  There is no reason to suggest 
that their evidence would be credible or significant.  Their work did not include 
LGBT activism, and there was no reason for believing that they would not hold views 
as prejudiced as the rest of the Zimbabwean society.156   
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Within the empirical data, several of the asylum-seeking participants had been refused 
protection initially on the basis that they could internally relocate.  Decision-makers 
had contended that FASY001 could relocate within Gambia, MASY005 could 
relocate within India, and FASY002 could relocate within Jamaica, without 
consideration of the practicalities: 
 
How can I go back in Jamaica to live?  So I was explaining to him that in 
Jamaica if a woman lives on her own and they do not see a man coming along 
the house to [visit] her, automatically they just know what she is.  And my 
children are all grown up. I can’t go and live with my children (FASY002). 
 
Given the instructive nature of the SW decision cited above, it is alarming that at the 
time of interview, FASY002, a Jamaican lesbian, was still waiting to be granted 
protection after more than four and a half years.  It is problematic that her claim had 
been refused on countless occasions and remains outstanding, despite the existence of 
a strong and unequivocal precedent.  It suggests issues of administrative delay, a 
lingering resistance to implementing tribunal cases, or of decision-makers lacking the 
skills, knowledge or time to conduct an RSD with the thoroughness required.   
 
The demarcation of such states as containing areas to where sexual minorities can 
relocate is also of concern.  It relies on the idea that the social and cultural mores in 
capital cities or metropolises are sufficiently different to provide safety, without 
providing the research that sufficiently proves it.  By contrast, experts have argued 
that whilst bigger cities may be more permissive, they do not necessarily provide 
‘safe havens’.157  It also suggests that the Home Office caseworkers, for example, 
have neglected to conduct intersectional assessments of how a particular claimant 
would fare, despite the obligation within the policy guidance to consider the 
‘financial, employment, housing, logistical, social, cultural and other factors’.158   
 
MASY005’s refusal letter embodies these concerns, where the caseworker contended 
that relocation to larger Indian cities such as Mumbai, Bangalore or Kolkata was 	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viable.159  This was justified by asserting that these cities had ‘emerging’ gay 
movements, contained sizeable Muslim populations, and because speaking English 
would assist him in gaining employment.  Yet, this fails to reflect an intersectional 
approach to the individual’s circumstances, as somebody vulnerable to discrimination 
on dual grounds, as a gay man and as a Muslim (in line with objective country 
information).160  It also makes a superficial assessment of the prospect of relocation to 
larger cities, as highlighted above.   
 
The Home Office’s approach in the case of MASY005 is not dissimilar to the Upper 
Tribunal’s assessment in a Country Guidance case on the risk to ‘same-sex oriented 
males’ in India.161  In both, the claimants were denied protection on relocation 
grounds.  The tribunal asserted: 
 
[I]t would not, in general, be unreasonable or unduly harsh for an open same-
sex oriented male (or a person who is perceived to be such), who is able to 
demonstrate a real risk in his home area because of his particular 
circumstances, to relocate internally to a major city within India.162    
 
The British asylum system’s assessment of the relocation prospects within India 
contrasts with the approach of the Australian asylum system in the case of 
1213081.163  Here, the Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia accepted the expert 
evidence on relocation options.  It acknowledged that ‘he would not be able to live 
openly as a homosexual in India at any location, as if he did this would result in his 
ostracism and probable further harm’.164  The expert witness had contended that there 
were no relocation alternatives that would reduce the risk of persecution across India 
to below the threshold levels: 
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on religious grounds [generally against Muslims]’. 
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At the dominant social-cultural level across India, attitudes of fear, hatred and 
disgust regarding homosexuality intractably persist (…) lesbians and 
homosexuals remain at real and great risk of persecution in numerous forms 
ranging from extreme violence to economic endangerment.165   
 
This shows the stark contradiction of relocation assessments between the two 
jurisdictions and the failure of the British decision-makers to take an intersectional 
approach to the analysis.  It suggests that the British system has not been conducting 
internal relocation assessments with the necessary rigour, or again, in accordance with 
the caveats in the LGB training materials.  With regard to India, particularly, it 
appears that emphasis is placed upon the positive changes occurring within a country 
in transition, such as the existence of local bars and clubs and NGOs supporting LGB 
individuals, whilst marginalising legitimate reasons for concern.166  This seems to 
reflect a tendency to view progress from a Western lens.167  It also suggests that 
political considerations, such as the perception of India as a place of democratic, 
economic and cultural progress influence relocation considerations.  This supports the 
arguments developed on the use of objective information in section 4 below. More 
broadly, it is also symptomatic of determinations operating in the aforementioned 
‘culture of disbelief’. 
 
It is clear that the fairness of decision-making on internal relocation has improved, 
with reference to the structural principles advanced in Chapter two.  The HJ (Iran) 
decision has made a significant contribution to protecting the fundamental rights of 
LGB persons and interpreting the internal relocation concept flexibly in the LGB 
context.  Prior to this decision, internal relocation was used in conjunction with the 
discretion requirement to reject the claims of sexual minorities, a practice that has 
been mostly abolished. 
 
Through tools of procedural fairness, the British asylum system has also been able to 
further address matters of substantive fairness.  The guidance and training, therefore, 	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has been improved to reflect the principles of HJ (Iran).  In the February 2015 
instructions, the Home Office further bolstered existing guidance with intersectional 
instructions.  These related to the acute difficulties faced by women with regard to 
relocation, and the need to conduct individual assessments of relocation, in full 
consideration of a claimant’s personal circumstances.168  This is an extremely positive 
development.   
 
Nonetheless, a spate of decisions at Home Office and tribunal level demonstrate an 
ongoing issue with making complex internal relocation assessments.  This is 
especially so when assessing states in transition regarding the rights of LGB people.  
This suggests that the current guidance may be insufficient.  The British asylum 
system should recognise that internal relocation options are rare in LGB cases, and 
mostly difficult to evidence.  It should avoid carrying out internal relocation 
assessments in cases where they are not warranted, or cannot be undertaken 
satisfactorily.  In the rare cases where it may be possible and appropriate to explore 
the option of relocation, real training should be offered on how this can be 
determined.  This should reference a claimant’s personal circumstances, the 
complexity of transitional societies and caveats relating to the availability of country 
information.  Thus, the system must improve its training and recruitment of decision-
makers, including judges, and work to understand and eliminate any reasons why 
decision-makers may avoid applying good guidance (such as bias or disbelief). 
 
 
4. ‘Well-Foundedness’: The Role of Country of Origin Information 
 
The final part of the refugee definition’s first clause requires the fear of persecution to 
be well-founded.  ‘Well-foundedness’ contains an obligation upon the applicant to 
demonstrate a reasonable risk of being subjected to persecution at the hands of a state 
or non-state actor, due to the failure of state protection.169  In refugee law, a subjective 
fear is not enough.  Only genuine refugees are granted protection, so there must be an 	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objective verification of the claimant’s fear.170  As a result, objective information 
regarding the conditions in a claimant’s country of origin plays an important role in 
verifying that the risk of persecution is ‘real’.  Objective information assists the RSD 
in several areas, on criminal sanctions and internal relocation, for example.  For this 
reason, the efficacy of its use requires scrutiny, especially in the LGB context, where 
relevant and detailed information can be hard to obtain.  An assessment of the ‘well-
foundedness’ of the claim relates to the credibility process, which is divided into the 
role of the decision-maker to establish the credibility of a claim through objective 
evidence (as examined here), and the subsequent evaluation of subjective evidence 
submitted by the claimant (as examined in Chapter four).  The conclusions drawn in 
each relate to one another and hinge on the application of the evidentiary thresholds. 
 
As the Home Office produces its own COI reports, which lead the assessment of 
country situations in the British system, COI must be investigated from two 
perspectives.  First, this section will examine the quality of the Home Office’s COI 
reports and, secondly, the decision-making that utilises such information. 
 
4.1 The Quality of COI Reports 
The Home Office internally produces COI reports for most countries, which focus on 
providing details on the country climate from a human rights perspective, for use in 
asylum and human rights related immigration issues.171  Also, the Home Office’s 
Country Specific Litigation Team produces Operational Guidance Notes (OGN), 
which ‘provide an evaluation of the relevant country information, general asylum 
policies and caselaw’.172  These provide guidance to decision-makers on how to 
determine claims made on common grounds of persecution.  
 
Prior to HJ (Iran), these documents had been criticised for being outdated, lacking 
detail regarding the persecution of sexual minorities, and containing poor or 
erroneous interpretations of country situations.173  Practitioners within the empirical 
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data praised the gradual improvement of Home Office-produced COI reports over the 
years.  This praise was contextualised, however, by the one-time absence of LGB 
issues from COI reports: 
 
They’ve got so much better. I mean, you have to remember – we’ve gone from 
a state where – I mean, they didn’t even refer to people, to lesbian and gay 
people, to now, some of them are really quite good (Barry O’Leary). 
 
Dillane also commended the improvement of COI and OGN documents, particularly 
regarding the diversity of the sources used and the ‘reasonable’ way in which country 
climates were interpreted from the perspective of LGB people.174 
 
Nevertheless, practitioners were still reluctant to rely on Home Office-produced 
reports, due to their perceived bias (‘they often put in the stuff that’s helpful to them’ 
Catherine Robinson), their failure to show the ‘true picture’ in certain states (S. 
Chelvan), the delay in updating them (Erin Power), and the use of culturally ignorant 
or incorrect information: 
 
I got angry about many years ago, other than the Pakistan reports I think it was 
as well, where they mixed paedophilia, the fact that certain Afghan 
communities, or certain Northern Frontier communities in Pakistan, older men 
will take younger boys. That is paedophilia; it is nothing to do with being gay. 
But that was used in an extract about tolerance in society, so it’s about getting 
the context right, that’s very important (S. Chelvan). 
 
Thereupon, practitioners highlighted the importance of independent research to 
supplement the Home Office reports, and of testing the content of the Home Office 
information.  This demonstrates, again, the heightened role to be played by legal 
representatives to address potential deficiencies of Home Office-produced COI.175 
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The Home Office should be praised for the improvements made to the quality of COI 
and OGN.  These reports reflect an improvement in the diversity of information used, 
incorporating reportage from the news media, international and domestic human 
rights organisations, and governmental and non-governmental organisations.176  They 
also reflect a concerted effort to include dedicated sections on LGB issues in each 
report.   
 
The Home Office strives to ensure the accuracy of these reports through an internal 
and external verification process.  Internally, policy officials and in-house legal 
advisors evaluate COI reports, and externally, they are produced with assistance from 
‘Still Human, Still Here’, a coalition of organisations working on asylum issues.177  
The reports are also ‘evaluated by the Independent Advisory Group on Country 
Information (IAGCI), which makes recommendations to the Independent Chief 
Inspector of Borders and Immigration’.178  The efforts of the Home Office to ensure 
the quality of their COI reports are impressive.  Nonetheless, to reduce the scope for 
bias and inaccuracy, and to aid confidence in the relevance and accuracy of the 
reports, further improvements can be made.  One option is the production of reports 
through a dedicated and independent body.  This could also work to address any 
political dimensions to report-generation, as addressed in the following subsection.   
 
4.2 The Application of COI Reports and Policy Guidance 
As identified in the structural principles and section 2.3 on criminal sanctions, 
decision-makers may have accurate guidance at their disposal.  Ensuring that they 
have the skills to apply it to the case before them is equally important, however.  
Consequently, exploring the application of COI in LGB claims is critical.   
 
Within the British system, the Home Office instructions discuss COI in the context of 
specific issues, such as criminal sanctions, internal relocation and state protection.179  
It also explains that the absence of information on the persecution of LGB people 	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does not mean that there is an absence of persecution against sexual minorities.180  
The instructions demonstrate some intersectional understanding in relation to female 
applicants, stating that ‘there may be very little evidence on the ill-treatment of 
lesbians in the country of origin’ and ‘the absence of specific legislation on lesbians 
in particular may be an extension of the general marginalization of women’.181  This 
guidance is good, but basic, offering no practical instructions on interpreting COI in 
RSDs and on taking decisions when COI is unavailable. 
 
The training provided to caseworkers on LGB issues mirrors this guidance.  COI is 
only considered in relation to the above-mentioned issues, e.g., acknowledging that ‘it 
is unlikely that relocation will be arguable in a gay/lesbian claim’ (with the proviso 
that the COI must otherwise demonstrate a safe and reasonable place for LGB people 
to relocate to).182  The training also advises new caseworkers against taking the 
unavailability of information as signifying the absence of persecution, particularly in 
the case of lesbians.183  It provides no guidance on the role to be played by COI and 
how it must be used.  Perhaps this is because such skills are covered in the foundation 
training (Chapter four).    
 
There are some issues with the implementation of COI.  First, the substantial 
importance given to COI in the RSD is hampered by the fact that the documents are 
mostly insufficient.  This results in inappropriate uses of evidence, as described 
above.  Decision-makers do not recognise that most NGO and COI reports are not 
written for use in asylum determinations.184  For example, the US Department of State 
reports are generated for business travellers and are used as tools of foreign policy. 
Amnesty International reports are also perceived inconsistently, deemed objective by 
some, or as tools of advocacy by others.185  Decision-makers often neglect to evaluate 
from where their information was obtained.  The British asylum system has 	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previously used gay travel guides as evidence of thriving life for sexual minorities in 
asylum-producing states.186  Yet, these guides are directed at foreign travellers, and do 
not address the threat faced by local sexual minorities.  Therefore, even seemingly 
objective information has implicit goals that are not necessarily directed towards 
assisting the RSD.  The asylum system should recognise these agendas within the 
production and use of COI, ensuring that they are accorded the appropriate value.      
 
Indeed, MASY005’s Reasons for Refusal letter provides an important example of 
these issues in practice.  Section 2.3 above discussed the Home Office decision-
maker’s shallow sourcing and analysis of COI on the treatment of LGB persons in 
India.  This points to problems within the asylum system regarding the use of accurate 
guidance (and understanding a country situation, particularly one in flux, like India’s), 
and regarding the basic skills and training of the decision-maker.  If caseworkers 
cannot make fair and accurate analyses in cases where information is available, one 
can only have limited confidence in their abilities where information is scarce.   
 
There are also examples of how the Upper Tribunal has not considered how 
insufficient COI should affect the assessment of an LGB asylum claim.  In LH and IP, 
the Tribunal accepted that the state had no interest in documenting abuses, that the 
main organisation in Sri Lanka, Equal Ground, was a small organization in a large 
population, and that abuse was underreported.187  It found, nevertheless, that the 
claimed existence of a persecutory climate in Sri Lanka was not well-founded due to 
an inability ‘to point to more than a few specific instances at or near the level of 
persecution’.188   
 
Within the empirical data, Dillane raised a second issue regarding the application of 
COI.  He praised the improvement of the COI and OGN documents, but pointed to his 
experience of decision-makers repeatedly failing to reference the COI or relevant 
OGN in refusal letters.  This rendered it impossible to determine whether they had 
been applied during the RSD.  In other cases, COI and OGN documents were outright 	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ignored by decision-makers.  The claims of LGB people were rejected through the use 
of irrelevant or outdated sources, even where the guidance acknowledged the 
existence of a risk towards sexual minorities.189  Dillane also contended that the mere 
application of OGN documents was not enough to address the issues in this area.  In 
many cases, caseworkers needed to discharge their duties with greater rigour, due to 
the limited nature of the guidance in OGN documents and often within COI reports: 
 
There’s a great deal of responsibility on the caseowners to discharge their 
assessment of the country situation and the consequences, and that duty should 
bring with it the need to look further afield than simply just the COI report. I 
think that’s important (Paul Dillane). 
   
The criticisms raised by Dillane regarding the persistent disregard of decision-makers 
for COI at their disposal and the limitations of these sources echo issues present in 
other areas of the RSD, e.g., internal relocation.  They give credence to the argument 
that LGB claims are affected by the ‘culture of disbelief’.  
 
This has intersectional implications.  The UKLGIG and the Chief Inspector of 
Borders and Immigration identified the ongoing ‘invisibility’ of lesbians from COI, 
and its prejudicial impact upon lesbian and bisexual women applicants.190  This again 
highlights the failure to conduct intersectional analyses and understand that the 
experiences of LGB people are not homogenous.  This is despite the guidance already 
containing such advice.  For example, on regular occasions decision-makers 
concluded that laws criminalising ‘homosexuality’ only affected gay men, whereas in 
fact, the laws can be used to persecute women in the same way.191  By way of 
example, a judge criticised the decision-maker’s one-dimensional assessment in a 
case concerning a Gambian lesbian in June 2013.192  This supports the contention that 
simplistic analyses are a result of the failure to look at the country climate overall, or 	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a failure to look for evidence that the claimant’s fear is genuinely held.  It contributes 
to concerns regarding the skills of caseworkers to undertake such complex legal 
processes.  It also supports the idea that the UK system operates a ‘culture of 
disbelief’ towards LGB claims. 
 
The ‘invisibility’ of lesbians appears to be a structural problem within the British 
asylum system.  This is demonstrated by the differential treatment of cases concerning 
lesbians under the country guidance system.  With regard to Jamaica, there was a 
clear delay of six years between the tribunal cases assessing the risk to gay men in the 
country and the assessment regarding lesbians or bisexual women.193  The prejudicial 
delay involved in the production of guidance for sexual minority women is further 
highlighted by the fact that a country guidance case on ‘same-sex oriented males’ in 
India was determined in January 2014.194  At the time of writing, a country guidance 
case for Indian lesbians was reported two years later.195  This is not acceptable, given 
that information in cases of sexuality minority women is acknowledged to be scarcer, 
and thus, a greater priority.  To combat this, a more comprehensive effort must be 
made to assess objectively the conditions for lesbian and female bisexual applicants.  
Prioritising the country guidance cases that explore the objective risk faced by sexual 
minority women is one potential measure.  Doing so would help to address the 
significant barriers faced by women in establishing that their fear of persecution is 
well-founded. 
 
This reluctance amongst Home Office decision-makers to consider COI appropriately 
was also found amongst country guidance cases in the Upper Tribunal.  Too often, the 
evidence offered by an expert witness is undermined, or accorded less weight in 
favour of the ‘superior’ understanding of the decision-maker. 196   In MD, the 
legitimacy of the evidence given by Dr Akshay Khanna, Research Associate at the 
University of Sussex, was challenged for his ‘sympathy’ and ‘avowed support for the 
rights of such persons’.197  Yet, there was no suggestion in his work that he could not 	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(and, indeed, had not) written or commented objectively, or that the tribunal had 
superior evidence or understanding.  Where appropriate, Dr Khanna acknowledged 
the absence of evidence on particular issues.198  By contrast, tribunals continued to 
rely on inappropriate evidence to determine that the states in question were safe, as 
pointed out in the UKLGIG report in 2010 and again in 2013.199  The Upper Tribunal 
did so in LH and IP, affirming the safety of gay men in Sri Lanka, given that 
‘holidays are openly and freely marketed on a gay friendly basis’.200  This reliance on 
inappropriate evidence is further supported by the exploration of the Upper Tribunal’s 
reliance on evidence from a women’s organization to document the climate for sexual 
minorities in Zimbabwe in LZ, as discussed in section 3 above.201    
 
Essentially, this reflects the resistance or failure of decision-makers to apply the 
evidentiary thresholds appropriately.  For example, the Upper Tribunal in many cases 
have applied the ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ test too stringently, failing to 
appreciate that in cases where there is insufficient information, the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’ must be extended to the claimant.  In the case of OO, despite admitting that its 
perception of the choices made by gay men in the country of origin was on the basis 
of ‘limited evidence’, the Tribunal found that Algeria was safe for gay men who 
concealed their sexualities because of societal disapproval.202  As stated earlier, the 
burden of proof in asylum claims mandates that there be a ‘reasonable basis’ for 
believing in the harm feared.  The tribunal recognised there was insufficient COI 
available and still decided that the ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ was not met and 
the ‘benefit of the doubt’ should not be extended.203  This finding is troubling.  
 
The failure to properly apply the evidentiary thresholds was also demonstrated by the 
case of MD.  Despite the expert witness pointing out that prosecutions rarely made 
their way to higher courts (hence not being sufficiently known), the Upper Tribunal 	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202 OO (Gay Men: Risk) Algeria CG [2013] UKUT 00063 (IAC) [80 and 83]. 
203 Satvinder Juss, ‘Sexual Orientation and the Sexualisation of Refugee Law’ (2015) 22(1) 
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found, ‘given the complete absence of evidence before us capable of leading us to a 
contrary conclusion, that such prosecutions are rare and have always been so’.204  It 
also placed great emphasis on the ability of NGOs to support LGB individuals and 
sufficiently document abuses to paint a full picture of the country climate for asylum 
purposes.205  This attitude also ignores the difficulties for LGBT organisations, which 
are often small and underfunded, to conduct all the work expected of them within 
environments that are hostile towards sexual minorities.206  Indeed, collating data for 
use in asylum claims is not a priority.  
 
The Home Office’s 2015 instructions on sexual identity issues enrich the guidance on 
COI.  The instructions explain that discriminatory or oppressive environments lead to 
a lack of information on the way that LGB people are treated.207  This affects the 
ability of claimants to substantiate their claims objectively.  It also instructs decision-
makers to be aware of country conditions for LGB people before interviewing 
claimants, such as the visibility of LGB people, the prevailing norms within the 
society and the legal status of sexual minorities.  This is extremely useful advice.  The 
instructions point out that gay-friendly travel guides do not necessarily translate into 
welcoming attitudes towards LGB locals.208  Where there is no information available 
on a specific country, caseworkers are told to make specific research requests to the 
Country Policy and Information Team.   
 
The improvement of the instructions on COI issues (and on the aforementioned 
associated areas) is to the credit of the Home Office.  One hopes that the advice is 
implemented by caseworkers in the future consideration of LGB claims.  Addressing 
how COI should be evaluated and applied could develop the instructions further.  For 
example, the guidance provided by the ECtHR is enlightening: 
 
In assessing such material, consideration must be given to its source, in particular 
its independence, reliability and objectivity.  In respect of reports, the authority 	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and reputation of the author, the seriousness of the investigations by means of 
which they were compiled, the consistency of their conclusions and their 
corroboration by other sources are all relevant considerations.209 
 
Therefore, the fairness of the British asylum system’s approach to COI is mixed.  
Whilst procedural fairness tools such as guidance and training have been well 
employed to provide some good guidance and direction, these have not necessarily 
translated into fair decision-making.  The main issue here stems from the reluctance 
or inability of decision-makers to engage with the correct evidentiary standards, 
resulting in decision-making that is unfair, in line with the structural principles.  The 
critique of this section is given further support by the fact that the Independent Chief 
Inspector has also identified problems with COI with regard to claims raised on all 
grounds.210  This suggests that the issues with COI are endemic within the British 
asylum system overall.   
 
It may be that the fairness of current decision-making can be improved through 
clearer guidance on using COI which corroborates the plausibility of a claim: where 
information is not available or reliable, the claimant must be given the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’.211  In such cases, the claim should be decided on the strength of the testimony 
alone.  As there often appears to be no obvious engagement with the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’ principle, there remains scope for the quality of COI assessments to be 
improved further.  Decision-makers must understand that there need only be a 
‘reasonable basis’ for believing that a risk of persecution exists.  To reduce or 
eliminate decision-maker arbitrariness, and the inflated role of COI, it is critical that 
the evidentiary thresholds be properly understood and applied.  Refusing to grant 
deserving claims protection by disengaging with the evidentiary standards, however, 
also suggests that the ‘culture of disbelief’ dictates the determination of LGB claims 
rather than their merits.   
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Finally, given the invisibility of women in COI assessments, decision-makers must 
properly grasp the breadth of the lives of sexual minorities in their countries of origin.  
They should appreciate the way in which the suppression of sexual minorities’ 
identities engages with their fundamental rights.  They should also encourage the 
ongoing production of guidance to assist in these claims, particularly for the most 
marginalised, e.g., lesbian and bisexual women. 
 
It is now important to address the second part of the refugee definition, in terms of the 
identity that motivates the risk of persecution. 
 
 
5. Membership of a ‘Particular Social Group’ 
 
Recognising sexual identity as the valid subject of an asylum claim has been a slow 
and protracted process across all traditional asylum-receiving jurisdictions.  The UK 
now possesses high standards of protection for LGB refugees, but it was extremely 
reluctant to recognise sexual minorities as legitimate subjects of refugee law in their 
own right.212  This section outlines the process of recognising LGB claims in 
traditional asylum-receiving states and then in the UK specifically.  Subsequently, it 
investigates the British approach to LGB claimants establishing that they are members 
of a social group that is at risk of persecution in their home society. 
   
5.1 The Recognition of Sexual Identity as a Social Group in Alternate 
Jurisdictions 
The Refugee Convention’s absence of express reference to sexual identity as a ground 
for claiming asylum, and the failure of Convention drafters to reference it within the 
travaux preparatoires, ensured the sluggish progression of recognition.213  This was 
illustrative, surely, that Convention drafters would not have conceived sexual 
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minorities as a community that required, or were deserving of, protection. 214  
Although LGB people were also persecuted in the context of the Holocaust, to which 
the Convention was a response, most of the states involved in drafting the Refugee 
Convention maintained criminal sanctions against same-sex sexual relations, similar 
to those addressed in section 2.3, and/or treated same-sex sexual attraction as a 
disease.215  
 
Whilst drafting the Convention, the Swedish delegate argued for the inclusion of a 
broad and general category, which would allow protection to be granted to individuals 
persecuted on grounds not conceived at the time.216  Indeed, this is testament to the 
‘living’ nature of the Refugee Convention, as outlined in the structural principles of 
Chapter two.217  Accordingly, the ‘Particular Social Group’ (PSG) category was 
included alongside race, religion, nationality, and political opinion to provide the 
flexibility and expansiveness aimed by the Convention.218   
 
It is due to the flexibility provided by the PSG category that LGB individuals were 
eventually recognised as the legitimate subjects of an asylum claim.  This first took 
place in the American context in the 1985 case of Matter of Acosta.219  In finding that 
Salvadorian taxi drivers formed a PSG, the Board of Immigration Appeals regarded 
the ejusdem generis doctrine, i.e., being ‘of the same kind’, to be instructive in 
illuminating that groups sharing a significant commonality could use the PSG ground 
to lodge refugee protection claims.220  This common attribute was characterised by its 
immutability, i.e., an attribute that one could not change and should not be required to 
change.221  This highlights a focus on the internal characteristics for a social group 
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defined by sexuality, which was supported by the subsequent US case of Matter of 
Toboso-Alfonso.222  
 
The internal nature of the characteristic defining sexual identity was contradicted one 
year later.  In the case of Sanchez-Trujillo, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal 
concentrated on external characteristics, namely, ‘voluntary associational 
relationship[s]’ that were fundamental to one’s identity as a member of that given 
social group.223  To satisfy the nexus with the PSG ground (the ‘causal connection’ 
between the risk of persecution and the basis on which it occurs), the Court held it 
necessary for the group concerned to be ‘cognisable’ within society. 224   This 
prioritises the status of one’s identity within society over the identity itself, 
highlighting the competing internally and externally characterised tests for defining 
PSG.  In the case of In Re Tenorio, despite being considered only months after the 
seminal Canadian case of Ward (explored below), Leadbetter J chose to fuse the two 
tests together, applying both the immutable characteristic of Acosta and the social 
perception element of Sanchez-Trujillo.225  This development may have impacted the 
British asylum system, as explored in section 5.2 below.   
 
In Canada, the Supreme Court endorsed the internally focused ‘protected 
characteristics’ approach in the case of Ward.226  La Forest J opined that individuals 
could only access refugee protection if the social group membership which motivated 
their mistreatment was classified by one of the three definitions:  first, groups defined 
by their shared innate or immutable characteristics; secondly, the voluntary 
association of members for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity, they 
should not be forced to forsake them; or thirdly, groups which are associated together 
due to their former voluntary status, but are not unalterable due their historical 
permanence.227  Due to the clear and flexible definitions it provided, Ward was an 
influential decision.  The judgment provided by the Canadian Supreme Court in Ward 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso A23 200 644 (Feb 3 1986), reviewed by BIA (Mar 12 1990) [822] (USA). 
223 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS 801 F. 2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) [25] (USA). 
224 ibid [19]. 
225 Matter of Tenorio, No. A72-093-558 (IJ July 26, 1993) (USA). 
226 Canada (AG) v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689. 
227 ibid 7-8. 
	  	  
158	  
158	  
has proven to be particularly instructive for the British asylum system, influencing its 
eventual recognition of LGB individuals as being capable of making asylum claims. 
 
5.2 The British Approach to Sexual Identity and ‘Particular Social Group’ 
As stated above, the British asylum system was reluctant to recognise sexual 
minorities as the potential subjects of asylum claims.  In the 1990s, the British system 
actively avoided recognising LGB individuals as potential refugees, despite lagging 
behind the progressive approaches towards PSG in the Canadian and American 
jurisdictions.228  For example, in the case of Golchin, the tribunal justified its refusal 
to recognise ‘homosexuals’ as a PSG by arguing that their group membership was 
voluntary and socially inconspicuous.229  Genuine sexual minority groups had no 
choice in the way that the Judiciary portrayed their identities.  In the case of Binbasi, 
the tribunal cited the allegedly ‘voluntary’ nature of LGB individuals’ vulnerability to 
persecution, and their ability to exercise self-control to prevent their mistreatment as a 
reason for denying recognition (an early incarnation of the discretion argument).230  
Gay men could alter their own behaviour to avoid persecution, whereas the PSG 
category protected those who could not change their identities.231   
 
The 1995 case of Vraciu, however, inadvertently led to the recognition of 
‘homosexuals’ as a PSG within the British asylum system.232  The adjudicator argued 
that protection was inappropriate.  The claim was based on the ‘general’ persecution 
of ‘homosexuals’ within Romania, rather than their ‘personal’ persecution. 233  This 
was an admission that, in the right circumstances, sexual identity could form the 
subject of an asylum claim, representing an unintentional, but significant step towards 
protecting LGBs fleeing persecution.234  
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In 1998, a Romanian man, Sorin Mihai, was granted refugee status in the UK.235  This 
was justified on the grounds that he was a ‘practising homosexual in Romania’ and, as 
a member of this PSG with a well-founded fear of being persecuted if returned there, 
his plight was considered deserving of protection.  At court-level, this was followed 
by the case of Shah and Islam, where, although the comments were obiter, i.e., not 
part of the judgment addressing the circumstances of the case, three Law Lords 
accepted that ‘homosexuals’ could also constitute a PSG. 236   Explaining this 
recognition in Shah and Islam, Lord Steyn relied on cases from other asylum-
receiving jurisdictions, such as Acosta, Ward, and the New Zealand decision of Re 
GJ,237 endorsing the internal, protected characteristics approach over the external, 
social perception test of Sanchez-Trujillo.238  In fact, Lord Steyn specifically avoided 
the Sanchez-Trujillo social perception approach, as he regarded the protected 
characteristics approach to be less restrictive and more inclusive of sexual minorities.  
Appropriately, he argued that social perception was not an appropriate requirement in 
this area, given that homosexuals ‘are, of course, not a cohesive group’.239  This 
rationale is significant to this thesis’ appraisal of the subsequent development of PSG 
within the British asylum system. 
 
Although Shah and Islam established that LGB people could form a PSG, the British 
system maintained its resistance to granting protection to sexual identity-based 
asylum claims.240  The willingness of the British asylum system to recognise the 
persecution of LGB individuals and their ability to submit legitimate claims for 
protection under the PSG was an incremental process.   
 
Eventually, the EU challenged the internal, immutability-based approach of the 
British asylum system.  Although the ‘Qualification Directive’ settled that ‘sexual 
orientation’ could form the subject of an asylum claim, it advanced a PSG definition 	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that combines the (internal) protected characteristics and (external) social perception 
approaches.241  The definition in Article 10(1)(d) states: 
 
[A] group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in 
particular:  
 
— members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common 
background that cannot be changed, or share  a characteristic or belief that is 
so fundamental to  identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to 
renounce it, and  
 
— that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is 
perceived as being different by the surrounding society.  
 
A literal reading of the test would indicate it is a cumulative test.  Divergent practices 
existed amongst Member States, however.  For example, the Irish Statutory 
Instrument No. 518 of 2006 held that applicants needed only to satisfy a single test, 
undermining the validity and relevance of a cumulative approach.242  The cumulative 
nature of the test was eventually confirmed by the CJEU, in the case of X, Y and Z.243  
Even before the decision in X, Y and Z, however, the British asylum system had 
adopted a conservative approach.  Regulation 6(1)(d) of the Refugee Protection 
(Qualification) Regulations 2006, implementing the Qualification Directive into the 
British asylum system, explicitly requires a cumulative approach.244 
 
Having outlined the development of the PSG area in the sexual identity context, both 
in refugee law and in the British asylum system, it is necessary to evaluate the 
decision-making of the British system. 	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5.3 ‘Particular Social Group’ Decision-Making in HJ (Iran) and the Post-
Decision Climate 
The British asylum system recognises that LGB individuals are entitled to refugee 
protection because sexual identity can form a PSG ground.  The actual decision-
making requires closer investigation, however.  It is essential to investigate whether 
the application of the PSG requirement is conducted fairly with regard to LGB 
identities.  This thesis has explained from the outset that the UKSC decision of HJ 
(Iran) has been treated as a new benchmark of decision-making in sexual identity-
based asylum claims, addressing historic wrongs that had resulted in the prejudicial 
experience of the British asylum system for LGB asylum-seekers.  As a result, the 
UKSC’s exploration of the PSG issue provides the starting point for this particular 
investigation, particularly in the light of the framework provided by Article 10(1)(d) 
of the Qualification Directive.  This sub-section will split the cumulative definition, 
examining first, the British asylum system’s approach to the ‘protected 
characteristics’ test, and second, the external ‘social perception’ test.   
 
5.3.1. Examining the ‘Protected Characteristics’ Approach: the Problems 
with Narrow Conceptions of Sexual Identity 
The ‘protected characteristics’ approach to PSG is contained in the first part of Article 
10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive.  Its formulation contains two alternative 
conceptions of a protected characteristic.  The first is where the innate characteristic 
or common background cannot be changed, and the second is where the characteristic 
is so fundamental to one’s identity that group members cannot be expected to 
renounce it.  Of these two conceptions, this section will evidence that the British 
asylum system has pursued the ‘immutable’ or unchangeable characterisation of 
sexual identity, over identifying it as fundamental to one’s identity.  
 
The UKSC’s decision in HJ (Iran) demonstrates this pursuit of an immutability-based 
approach to the ‘protected characteristics’ test.  When Lord Hope asserted his lack of 
doubt over whether sexual minorities could constitute a PSG, it was because the 
group was allegedly ‘defined by the immutable characteristic of its members’ sexual 
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orientation or sexuality’.245  By characterising sexual identity as unchangeable for the 
purposes of fulfilling the PSG requirements, the UKSC may have felt that it was 
recognising its integral, fundamental nature.  The consequence of characterising 
sexual identity as immutable, however, is that those LGB asylum-seekers whose 
identities are fluid and not fixed can be excluded or marginalised within the British 
asylum process. 246   Thus, although Lord Rodger correctly posited that ‘sexual 
orientation is either an innate or unchangeable characteristic or a characteristic so 
fundamental to identity or human dignity that it ought not be required to be changed’ 
(emphasis added), the fact that Lord Hope provides the lead opinion in HJ (Iran) is 
most damaging to the cause of sexual diversity.247   
 
HJ (Iran)’s contradictory statements on the conception of the ‘protected 
characteristics’ test highlight that the case represents a missed opportunity for the 
UKSC to clarify the correct approach.  Instead, the divergent approaches encourage 
decision-makers to use their discretion when dealing with PSG, as documented by 
Arnold.248  It also gives traction to the understanding that sexuality is ‘fixed’.  The 
notion that sexual identity is static engenders stereotyping in the RSDs of LGB 
claims.249  It encourages restrictive assessments of what constitutes a valid identity, in 
line with regressive and outdated tropes on sexual identity.  Thus, claimants are only 
considered genuine sexual minorities, capable of meeting the PSG requirement, where 
their identities are ‘articulated within certain parameters in order to be plausible’.250  
 
The traction gained by the UKSC’s pursuit of a conception of an immutable sexual 
identity is highlighted within other parts of the British asylum system.  At several 
instances, the Home Office guidance prioritises the immutability of the ‘protected 
characteristics’ approach, as highlighted by the following: 
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In addition to a common immutable characteristic…251 
 
Even if an immutable characteristic shared by a group is not externally 
obvious (for example, being gay) ...252  
 
These passages support the argument that, in the LGB context, the instructions treat 
the ‘protected characteristics’ approach as synonymous with immutability, ignoring 
the prospect that alternative conceptions provide the necessary inclusivity.  Even with 
some distance from the HJ (Iran) decision, the instructions (which were updated in 
2015) highlight that the British system has retained the restrictive understanding 
advanced by the case.   
 
The case also reinforced the stereotyping of minority sexual identities through a 
second problem.  This concerns the overall approach advanced on how to determine 
the claims of LGB people.  In the five-stage test advanced by Lord Rodgers in HJ 
(Iran), the RSD of LGB claims starts at the point where the veracity of the asylum-
seeker’s claimed sexual identity must be scrutinised.253  Lord Rodgers states that ‘the 
tribunal must first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or 
that he would be treated as gay by potential persecutors in his country of 
nationality’.254  The scrutiny on the individual’s identity, in the light of characterising 
sexuality as static, proves to be extremely dangerous.  At this point, decision-makers 
are instructed to determine the ‘genuineness’ of the claimed identity, inviting the use 
of stereotypes emanating from the immutable conception of sexual identity.  Thus, the 
ominous combination of immutability and disbelief is a significant problem in the 
determination of LGB claims under the British asylum system.  After recognising the 
development of this problem in the Australian context, Millbank labelled this issue a 
move from ‘from discretion to disbelief’.255    This describes the move from refusing 
LGB claims on grounds of discretion to the rejection of LGB claimants’ identities.  It 	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is for this reason that Chelvan, a barrister specialising in LGBT claims, identified 
within the empirical data that ‘the battlefield at the moment is in relation to proving 
sexual identity’.256       
 
The damaging nature of the ‘culture of disbelief’ characterising the determination of 
LGB claims is demonstrated by the updated Home Office guidance.  This states that 
where one material fact is rejected, associated material facts must be rejected 
alongside it:   
 
Even if a claimant’s assertion to be LGB has been determined as a material 
fact, the consideration of all material facts in the round may lead to the sexual 
identification material fact being called into question.257  
 
As mentioned, the UKSC’s five-stage test on sexual identity-based asylum means that 
as a first step, decision-makers must scrutinise whether they feel the asylum-seeker’s 
claimed sexual identity is genuine.  LGB claimants are, therefore, doubly 
marginalised.  First, the analysis is conducted with recourse to a stereotypical 
understanding of sexual identity as immutable.  Secondly, should the decision-maker 
decide on this basis that a claimant is not LGB, under the above guidance the entire 
claim may be refused.  This is discriminatory, because before a claim is properly 
evaluated, it is dismissed.  Such a course of action does not seem to exist in other 
grounds of claim.    
 
There is an important concern to raise here.  The consequence of a restrictive PSG 
definition is the ‘standardisation’ of non-heterosexual sexual identities, a lens through 
which all other claims are then examined for consistency and veracity.258  Thereupon, 
unorthodox asylum narratives, irrespective of their truth, are disbelieved or 
disregarded.  This forces claimants to alter the substance of their claims in inauthentic 
ways to successfully navigate the system.  This reconstruction of their identity, 
however, makes applicants vulnerable to conclusions that their narratives are 	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inconclusive, inconsistent and therefore lacking in credibility, a point to be explored 
properly in Chapter four.  The empirical data raised additional concerns regarding the 
negative impact of these issues on decision-making: 
 
I think actually probably they’re moving away from the law and actually 
starting more to say, ‘You’re not gay’.  I think they might be avoiding the law 
(Barry O’Leary). 
 
This excerpt highlights that the immutable conception of PSG facilitates poor 
engagement with legal standards, allowing the ‘culture of disbelief’ to dictate the 
determination of claims.  Indeed, the excerpt below from the empirical data ties the 
tendency to disbelieve the claimant’s sexuality to the success of dismantling the 
discretion argument: 
 
I think the obvious thing to say is – ‘Well, you’re not gay’ because then you 
don’t have to ever get into the HJ (Iran) territory.  So I think that’s probably a 
slight reaction to some of the positive legal developments (Catherine 
Robinson). 
 
Criticisms regarding the decision-maker failure to engage with the guidance and legal 
standards are familiar to the analysis within this chapter.  The criticisms regarding the 
PSG context are reinforced by Arnold’s empirical research.  She found that decision-
makers were willing to accept evidence of claimants expressing their identities in the 
UK as meeting the social perception test, or ignored it altogether.259  The reasons for 
this are unclear.  Nonetheless, it suggests that decision-makers have been reluctant to 
engage with the entirety of the test, using their discretion to depart from it when 
determining many LGB claims.  Although some claimants may benefit from this, it 
leads to inconsistency across RSDs.  The reluctance to engage with legal standards 
that are admittedly complex may also raise questions about the quality of training or 
the skills of decision-makers, concerns that were raised throughout the empirical data.  
Once again, asylum systems must ensure that their decision-makers have the 
competence, in terms of appropriate legal qualifications and training, to determine 	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asylum claims fairly.  They must also be supplied with sufficiently detailed guidance, 
which instructs them on how to conduct the determination in relation to the various 
components of the refugee definition.  The guidance is not as significant an issue 
when it is the UKSC decision that has caused these problems, however.  
 
It is necessary to address why the immutable characterisation has gained traction 
within the British asylum system.  Yoshino contends that the immutability 
characterisation is mutually beneficial for the vast majority of decision-makers and 
sexual minority asylum-seekers.260  Decision-makers, particularly those ignorant of 
sexual diversity, apply a largely heterosexual male lens to the RSD to ‘stabilise’ 
sexual identity.261  This makes LGB claims easier to consider.  Furthermore, Yoshino 
argues that it aids ‘monosexual’ asylum-claimants, i.e., gay men and lesbians.  The 
immutable characterisation essentialises and legitimises their identity and their right 
to asylum protection in the eyes of the decision-maker and society at large.  As a 
corollary, the fluid experiences of bisexuals and those who do not define themselves 
within the Western ‘LGBT’ framework are altogether ‘erased’ or restricted from the 
protection mechanism.262  They are feared to undermine the claims of ‘monosexual’ 
sexual minorities to protection within the broader narrative.  The irony is, however, 
that essentialised approaches to sexual identities hinder the British asylum system.  
They create a slower, more expensive, and less efficient asylum system, as the 
inadequacies of such analysis can be exposed and overturned on appeal.263  Thus, the 
British asylum system should implement intersectionality and sexual diversity at the 
heart of the RSD in sexual identity-based asylum claims.  This is essential.  This 	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includes ensuring that those vested with the responsibility of the RSD (including 
judges) have the ability, in terms of training and legal skills, and the impetus, relating 
to the broader working culture, to make nuanced considerations.  Doing so will 
improve fairness for claimants and efficiency for the system overall.   
 
Conceiving sexual identity as immutable is inconsistent with the way sexuality is 
generally characterised by theorists.  Diamond and Janus, for example, argue that 
sexual identity is fluid and flexible, changing in response to not only our social 
interactions,264 but also the intersections of identity, such as race, sex, culture, 
nationality and social status.265  Furthermore, Butler states that sexual orientation is 
created by and through culture, as opposed to being something innate, a supposition 
that would not find a place within the British asylum system as currently 
constructed.266   A participant of the researcher’s empirical work explained the 
historical characterisation of sexual identity as a political choice, which further 
contradicts the legitimacy of the ‘immutable’ classification within the British asylum 
system:     
 
I think this sort of unchanging innate characteristic, and it’s always been a 
problem around LGBT things because some people actually see it as a 
political choice, less now but it used to be.  Lots of lesbian feminists often 
said, ‘This is a political choice.  I’m not born.  This is my active choice’.  And 
then other members of the LGBT community said, ‘This is who I am and I 
can’t change it’ (Liz Barratt). 
 
An understanding of sexual identity as ‘immutable’ and reliant on the ‘LGBT’ 
framework ignores that this is a Westernised structure, which sexual minority asylum-
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seekers raised in alternate societies may not recognise.267  By failing to appreciate 
this, decision-makers export a foreign framework into the asylum system, rather than 
allowing claimants to present independent constructions of their identities.268  This 
reinforces Hinger’s standardisation critique, that claimants must present narratives 
that are familiar and recognisable to decision-makers, or fear being denied 
protection.269  Within the empirical data, asylum-seeker participants demonstrated 
their unfamiliarity with the Western framework of sexual identity through their 
ignorance of such terminology:  
 
In Jamaica, a lesbian is called a sodomite.  A gay man is called a battyman.  
So you don’t know nothing about LGBT or LGB… nothing like that.  And 
when you come here and they tell you about LGBT it takes me a while to get 
used to the different words, and you know, meanings and all that.  Because 
you know, we don’t use them nice words… you know battyman and that 
means to kill you, and sodomite [is] forbid[den] (FASY002)   
 
Many claimants did not learn of such terminology until their arrival to the UK.  This 
undermines the prioritisation of Western frameworks of sexual identity within the 
asylum setting.  It also privileges those asylum-seekers who have spent more time in 
the UK, familiarising themselves with its conceptions of sexual identity, over those 
who have not had that opportunity: 
 
Even LGBT I first time heard in this country.  Not in my country.  That is [the 
case], even when you do a lot of things, even [when] you don’t know what 
you are doing (MASY002).  
 
It is also important to recognise that there are many LGB asylum-seekers whose 
identities are not fully harmonised.  As with FASY003, some simply cannot articulate 
their identities because the process of identification is still ongoing due to 
intersectional reasons, such as trauma, poverty, education or opportunity: 	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This is a question that I have been asked many times, and the truth is, I really 
don’t know what I am.  All I know is that I am a human being, first of all.  All 
I know is that I really don’t have feelings for men… As I said to my Solicitor, 
if there was something inside of me, I was not even prepared to admit or 
acknowledge it because where I come from, in a village, these things cannot 
even be thought of (FASY003). 
 
Within the empirical work conducted for this thesis, practitioners and activists 
appraised the Home Office’s understanding of sexual diversity.  On the whole, they 
stated that the Home Office guidance was largely positive and decision-makers’ 
understanding of sexual identity had improved.  There remained clear scope for 
improvement, however: 
 
I think now, the guidance, which you’d have seen, their asylum policy 
instructions are actually quite good.  I think they do [understand how LGB 
identity is developed].  Whether everybody who’s sitting there applying them 
understands is a very different matter.  I think in the Home Office we have 
seen a change towards them getting it, yes.  I don’t think they’re excellent at 
it, but it is getting better (Barry O’Leary). 
 
O’Leary was conscious to frame his praise for these improvements through the prism 
of his experiences representing LGB claimants since 2001, where the understanding 
of sexual identity (and diversity) was far worse.270   
 
Despite such progress, this investigation finds that under the ‘immutable’ 
characterisation of the ‘protected characteristics’ approach, erasure occurs along 
intersectional lines.  The cases of claimants who are bisexual and/or women suffer the 
greatest marginalisation.  Rehaag has documented the experiences of bisexuals within 
the Canadian asylum system.271  He argued that the ‘immutable’ characterisation of 
sexuality within the Canadian asylum system marginalised the claims and identities of 	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bisexual asylum-seekers. 272   Bisexual narratives were routinely treated with 
scepticism, with decision-makers disbelieving the veracity of their truths and labelling 
bisexual claimants as ‘confused’.  Decision-makers failed to consider bisexual-
specific COI-related evidence and generally subscribed to the myth that bisexuals do 
not truly exist.273  These barriers faced by bisexual asylum claimants were found to 
result in lower success rates for bisexual asylum-seekers.  In the Canadian and 
Australian contexts, Berg and Millbank also cited the increased difficulty of bisexuals 
to succeed in asylum claims.274  Decision-makers contended regularly that bisexual 
claimants could avoid persecution by engaging in opposite-sex relationships.275  
Furthermore, those engaged in heterosexual relationships at the time of the decision 
were rejected on poor credibility grounds, exemplifying the ‘culture of disbelief’ 
within which LGB claims are often determined. 
 
These experiences have been mirrored in the British context.  First, the ‘immutable’ 
characterisation of sexual identity has arguably resulted in the disbelief and exclusion 
of bisexual claimants from protection.  For example, the case of Orashia Edwards, a 
Jamaican bisexual man, was documented in the British media.276  The authorities 
rejected his claim, despite the fact that he was in a same-sex relationship, because he 
had been married to a woman before.  In another case, a bisexual claimant was 
subjected to intrusive questioning that reflected the interviewer’s restrictive and 
overly sexualised understanding of sexual identity.277  Questions included, ‘Can you 
explain to me in detail what you mean by bisexual,’ ‘Can you explain to me what you 
mean by man to man,’ ‘How many boyfriends did you have in [country],’ and ‘Why 
have you got to behave as a bisexual in [country]’.  The interview descended into 
questioning of an explicitly sexual nature, concerning whether the claimant had anally 	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penetrative sex with his partner, whether they had used condoms, and whether he had 
ejaculated inside of him, for example.  These experiences reflect the prejudicial 
treatment that bisexual applicants face within the British asylum system, despite the 
fact that the Home Office guidance acknowledges bisexual identity.278  It also 
highlights the prevalence of immense sexualisation within LGB claims, despite the 
fact that these questions do not aid the RSD.  This issue is addressed in more detail 
within the procedural chapter (Chapter four).   
 
The empirical data identified the marginalisation of bisexual claimants within the 
British asylum system: 
 
Bisexual claims can be extremely difficult and you still see decision-makers, 
including judges, finding it very, very difficult to understand how somebody 
can be bisexual in their forties and fifties and now saying, ‘I want to live my 
life either in a relationship with a man or a woman,’ where there are children 
or a marriage in the background, or sometimes more than one marriage (Paul 
Dillane).  
 
Secondly, in addition to bisexual claims, the ‘immutable’ conception marginalises the 
claims of sexual minority women, whose identities and experiences are consistently 
assumed as mirroring those of gay men.279  There are clear differences in the 
experiences of gay men and lesbian and bisexual women, emphasised by the principle 
of intersectionality (Chapter one).  For example, the lives of gay men can engage the 
‘public’ domain far more than women, for whom there is less space for the ‘public’ 
expression of their identities in many countries.  Therefore, persecution against 
lesbian and bisexual women is often carried out within the home, at the hands of 
family members.280  The result is that the asylum system also provides less space for 
sexual minority women to present their sexual identities and persecutory narratives, 
without the significant risk of an adverse decision.  Claimants must explain away the 	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reasons for ‘risky’ expressions of their sexuality and former heterosexual marriages 
and children, despite the fluidity of their sexualities and the characterisation of forced 
marriage as a persecutory experience.281   
 
The empirical data highlighted the difficulties faced by women asylum-seekers.  Four 
of the ten women interviewed had been married previously.282  Of these, FASY002, a 
Jamaican woman, and FASY003, a Pakistani woman, were both denied protection at 
both Home Office and tribunal level because of these heterosexual marriages.  Their 
previous marriages were used to deny their claimed lesbian identity, reflecting the 
immutable, rigid perspective on sexual identity and the ‘culture of disbelief’.  This 
exemplifies why LGB asylum-seekers are compelled to standardise their identities 
and narratives to fulfil the strict confines of understanding present within the British 
asylum system.   
 
The empirical data highlighted the willingness amongst decision-makers and LGB 
claimants to erase the authentic identities in two prominent instances.  First, 
FASY005, a Ugandan woman, claimed asylum on the basis of being a lesbian, 
although she stated that she identified as bisexual.  Secondly, FASY008, another 
Ugandan woman, clearly stated to her Home Office interviewer that she identified as 
a lesbian and that she had been forcibly married on this basis.  The marriage resulted 
in the birth of a child.  Despite her marriage being forced, the Home Office 
determined her claim on the grounds that she was a bisexual woman: 
 
So she was saying, do you count yourself as lesbian or bisexual?  I told her 
because I was forced to marry a man I didn’t love, I just want to be a lesbian.  
And then they call me bisexual (FASY008).           
 
In FASY008’s case, the interviewer appears unable to conceive that a forced marriage 
to a man and a child resulting from this relationship did not mean that the claimant 
was bisexual.  	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These concerns are manifested in the prominent case of Aderonke Apata, a Nigerian 
lesbian asylum-seeker. 283   The Home Office relied on stereotypical, archaic 
understandings of sexual identity to refuse her asylum claim.  They contended that her 
previous heterosexual relationships and children proved that she was not a genuine 
lesbian.  In an appeal before the High Court, counsel for the Home Office stated that 
she was ‘not part of the social group known as lesbians’, because ‘you can’t be a 
heterosexual one day and a lesbian the next day, just as you can’t change your 
race’.284  The High Court also rejected Apata’s case, concurring that she had ‘engaged 
in same-sex relationships in detention in order to fabricate an asylum claim based on 
claimed lesbian sexuality’ and that she had adjusted her ‘customs and dress’ as a way 
of obtaining refugee status.285  This suggests that the Court can also operate in a 
‘culture of disbelief’ and suffer from narrow understandings of sexual diversity.  The 
Court did not recognise that developments in the dress of LGB asylum-seekers are 
often connected to their perceptions of safety and self-development.  It need not be a 
cynical move, but the natural self-expression of the claimant, given that asylum is 
conceived to protect these very freedoms.  Moreover, under administrative law, the 
Court is charged with rectifying the misuse of power, not reinforcing it.  Apata’s 
experiences exemplify that this disbelief, which is particularly virulent in LGB claims 
and embedded through the system, reflects partiality within the system.  The ‘culture 
of disbelief’ is a barrier to the free and fair consideration of LGB asylum claims at all 
stages of the British asylum system, because it rejects common-sense reasoning to 
deny deserving claimants protection. 
 
The immutability approach is unfair under the structural principles because it fails to 
interpret the terms of the Refugee Convention with the necessary flexibility, 
especially evidentiary standards.  Consequently, one should seek out alternate 
definitions of the ‘protected characteristics’ test.   The Article 10(1)(d) definition also 	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conceives a protected characteristic as one which is ‘innate’, or one which is ‘so 
fundamental to one’s identity’ a claimant cannot be expected to renounce it.  In 
practice, one of these alternatives could be used for all sexual identity-based claims, 
as arguably, sexual identity can be described equally as innate or as a voluntary, but 
fundamental characteristic.  As the PSG ground was founded on the basis of 
flexibility and expansiveness, it is necessary that a more generous approach to the 
definition be taken in claims pertaining to sexual identity.  This is in line with the 
structural principles regarding the Refugee Convention’s status as a ‘living’ document 
and the need to apply evidentiary thresholds flexibly.  Although alternate 
characterisations of the ‘protected characteristics’ test would encourage decision-
makers to understand the diversity of sexual identity, this is also contingent on the 
agency of decision-makers, and their ability to do so through adequate skills and 
training.  It also relies on their willingness and ability to evaluate claims free of 
personal and institutional bias.  Having identified the presence of systemic disbelief 
within decision-making, it is clear that an asylum system cannot operate fairly if such 
a partial approach is taken to determine LGB claims, exemplified by Lord Rodger’s 
five-stage test in HJ (Iran) and the cynicism of decision-makers.  
 
Incidentally, the HJ (Iran) case has already been criticised by existing work in this 
area, but from a sexually prescriptive perspective.  Hathaway and Pobjoy argued that 
the UKSC went too far in mandating protectability for an infringement of activities 
that were only minimally connected to one’s sexual orientation.  They feared that this 
‘catch-all’ approach would mean that ‘risk following from any “gay” form of 
behaviour gives rise to refugee status’.286  Hathaway and Pobjoy therefore proposed 
that only activities ‘intrinsically’ connected to one’s sexuality, i.e., encompassing 
expressions ‘reasonably required to reveal or express an individual’s sexual identity’, 
should be able to form the basis of an asylum claim.287  This is problematic precisely 
because it goes against the fundamental notion of sexual diversity and feeds into the 
‘immutable’ conceptualisation of sexual identity.  Indeed, Millbank’s response is 
appropriate, explaining how even seemingly innocuous expressions of minority 
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sexuality serve to expose the LGB identity.288  As a result, the work of Hathaway and 
Pobjoy is of limited use to a flexible and nuanced application of the refugee definition 
in the LGB context. 
 
Having examined the ‘protected characteristics’ test, this chapter now turns to the 
second part of the PSG definition, the ‘social perception’ test.   
  
5.3.2. The Exclusionary Potential of the ‘Social Perception’ Test 
The investigation returns to the second part of the PSG definition contained in Article 
10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive.  The ‘social perception’ test is fulfilled where 
a group ‘has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being 
different by the surrounding society’.289  Social perception is easily fulfilled in the 
states where laws are instituted against LGB people as tools of persecution, outlined 
by the CJEU in the case of X, Y and Z.290  It also has an important role to play in cases 
where the claimant does not identify as a sexual minority, but fears persecution due to 
perceived membership of a social group.   
 
There are a number of conceptual problems with the implementation of the social 
perception test, however.  Marouf explains that the subjectivity of social perception 
affords considerable discretion to decision-makers. 291   She argues that social 
perceptions are an inaccurate or unreliable component of the PSG criteria, as they 
depend upon the identity and emotional state of the perceiver, and the past 
interactions of group members.292  Furthermore, the visibility of a social group is not 
static, but dynamic and constantly changing, reliant on the personal expressions and 
interactions of group members in a public or social setting.293  Given that perception 
is reliant on the perceiver’s personality, assumptions, beliefs and expectations, in 
relation to the individual, their society, and more broadly, their worldview, social 	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perceptions can be unreliable.  The scope for such inaccuracy has grave consequences 
within the asylum system, which seeks to be as objective as possible and values 
consistency in decision-making.294  Therefore, necessitating all LGB asylum-seekers 
to meet the social perception test is antithetical to maintaining a consistent and 
reliable approach to the PSG requirement within the RSD.295    
 
Social perception tests cannot account for the impact of intersectionality on one’s 
sexual identity and perception within society.296  The makeup of one’s identity can 
dictate whether one’s social perception may be enhanced or reduced.297  Furthermore, 
the social perception test relies on the lives of LGBT people being lived in the public 
sphere, which fails on two accounts.  First, the lives and persecution of sexual 
minority women rarely take place within the public arena in the ways that they can for 
sexual minority men.298  Secondly, social perception contradicts the fact that many 
LGB people will seek to behave as discreetly as possible due to the fear of being 
subjected to harm (which HJ (Iran) highlighted is also persecution).299  The social 
perception test becomes ‘discretion in reverse’ for failing to recognise an individual’s 
PSG membership when that individual has been forced to act discreetly for his or her 
own safety.300  This is not just a theoretical argument, as the French jurisdiction 
operated the test to conclude that if a person hides their sexual orientation, it will not 
be perceived.301  Contrarily, Posner J noted in the US case Gatimi that: 
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If you are a member of a group that has been targeted for assassination or 
torture or some other mode of persecution, you will take pains to avoid being 
socially visible; and to the extent that the members of the target group are 
successful in remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other people in the 
society as a ‘segment of the population’.302 
 
The viability of the ‘social perception’ test is also dependent upon the availability of 
sufficient and appropriate documentation, the challenges of which were discussed 
under section 4.  Most COI reports will provide scarce and undetailed information on 
social perception as they are not drafted to fulfill such complex needs.303  The 
consequence is that decision-makers must contend with this absence in different 
ways.  They can opt to make arbitrary decisions based on the poorly conceived 
information that is available.  Alternatively, they can place greater emphasis on other 
elements in the asylum determination, such as the evidence of past persecution.  This 
reinforces the criticism of inconsistency and, therefore, unfairness.   
 
The discretion that is consequently afforded to decision-makers in interpreting and 
applying the test also contributes to inconsistency within PSG decision-making.304 
Claimants from the same countries of origin and with broadly similar persecutory 
narratives could receive different decisions based on the analytical choices of that 
particular decision-maker. 305   Furthermore, as social perception focuses on the 
outward appearance of LGB individuals (such as their characteristics and behaviour), 
the danger of stringently operating the test is that decision-makers begin relying upon 
commonly held physical stereotypes of sexual minorities.306  This could involve 
granting ‘effeminate’ men or ‘masculine’ women protection over those whose 
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identities are not perceived according to such stereotypes.  The tendency of decision-
makers to rely on stereotypes has been documented above, underlining that any 
approach affording decision-makers the opportunity to ignore the diversity of sexual 
minorities is a dangerous one.  
 
Requiring societies to distinctly classify LGB people by their sexualities for the 
purposes of the RSD is also illogical and unfair.  Arguably, societies intolerant of 
LGB identities also have insufficient representations of non-heterosexual identities in 
their public spaces.  The lack of public consciousness within which minority sexual 
identities often operate makes it implausible that some societies would distinctly 
categorise them.  Thus, like the protected characteristics approach, the social 
perception test also relies on Western, ‘LGBT’ formulations of sexual identity and the 
assumption that they are replicated in asylum-producing societies.307  This was raised 
within the empirical data: 
 
The perception of what homosexuality is, for instance, can differ from one 
country to another (take for instance the fact that even in Europe, the term 
‘homosexuality’ can have in certain cases a negative connotation, but not in 
others where it is perfectly ok to use it in a pro-equality frame).  Talking to 
people who do not use the words we use in a European context, including 
because they may not even know them, doesn't happen without sensitivity. 
You have to understand and accept that their experience may not be described 
by the words that we would use, or that equality-promoters would use in the 
European context (Joël Le Déroff).  
 
Turning to appraise the social perception test under the British asylum system, there 
are clear examples where it has facilitated nuanced and intersectional decision-
making.  For example, in SW (Jamaica) CG, although PSG membership was not at 
issue, the tribunal’s analysis is informed by the social perception approach.308  The 
tribunal noted that Jamaican society was extremely homophobic and that ‘it is clear 
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that the anti-gay stance in Jamaica goes right to the top of the political structure’.309  
As a result, single women were forced to ‘present a “heterosexual narrative”, 
normally involving male friendships and/or children’,310 in order to avoid the risk of 
harm.311  Given that sexual minorities have distinct identities in Jamaican society, 
certain characteristics leave them susceptible to abuse, e.g., a woman living alone 
without a male figure is vulnerable to mistreatment as a suspected lesbian.312  Thus, it 
would not be difficult for Jamaican LGB asylum-seekers to meet the social perception 
test, even without examining the existence of criminal sanctions.  
 
With regard to the guidance provided by the Home Office, the improved instructions 
of 2015 are good.  They state that ‘LGB people in most countries will thus form 
members of a PSG’. 313   Social perception will be met where there are laws 
criminalising same-sex sexual acts or identifiable LGBT movements.314  Yet, the 
Home Office fails to guide decision-makers on how the social perception issue should 
be determined where these two factors do not exist.  Moreover, it neglects to address 
the aforementioned criticisms relating to the subjectivity of this particular approach 
by limiting the discretion of decision-makers through more instructive guidance.  
Thereupon, the guidance reinforces some of the issues outlined above. 
 
The Home Office training attempts to address these concerns, but it appears that the 
discretion of decision-makers is unfettered: 
 
Perceptions in the UK are not the same as perceptions in other countries 
though.  Our cultural views are not sufficient to understand cultural views in 
many other countries.  We must ask someone what it is about them that makes 
them perceived as gay or lesbian.315 
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The training accepts that perception differ across cultural boundaries, but offers no 
advice on how this can be overcome.  Moreover, ‘what it is about’ a particular LGB 
claimant that leads to them being perceived as a sexual minority is, to some extent, a 
departure from the requirement that a social group be distinctly recognised in a 
particular society.  After all, the Home Office guidance states that the group must 
‘have a distinct identity within the relevant country because it is perceived as being 
different by the surrounding society’.316  This is not analogous to the question of why 
an individual is perceived to be a sexual minority. 
 
The social perception approach has a role to play in the PSG segment of the RSD.  It 
especially benefits claimants from states that criminalise sexual minority identity, or 
societies, which view them distinctly, as with Jamaica.  But equally, applicants could 
be excluded from refugee protection within the British asylum system where it is 
difficult to identify societal consensus on LGB people.  This can occur where the lack 
of information makes this process difficult.  Exclusion can also occur where the RSD 
is informed by the varying cultural and sexual mores of a given society, and the 
perceptions that a decision-maker has of these mores, and of minority sexual identity.  
Thereupon, it appears that requiring all LGB asylum-seekers to meet the social 
perception test is unfair under the structural principles, as it represents an inflexible 
and narrow interpretation of the Refugee Convention.  It is also unfair because the 
evidentiary thresholds resist the pragmatism required to ensure that genuine and 
deserving refugees are not excluded due to a lack of recognition of sexual diversity. 
 
This examination of PSG issues with respect to LGB asylum claims highlights a 
number of problems with the statutory framework and the decision-making of the 
British asylum system.  The HJ (Iran) decision has directly promoted an exclusionary 
approach to the protected characteristics test, whereby an immutable characterisation 
of PSG marginalises diverse identities not fitting the white, Western, gay conceptions 
of sexual identity.  Though mutually beneficial to decision-makers and those asylum-
seekers whose lives are or can be aligned to this framework, it denies protection to 
others, in particular, female sexual minority and bisexual applicants.  The British 
asylum system would be much fairer if it chose a more inclusive definition in keeping 	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with the pragmatic spirit of the Refugee Convention and evidentiary thresholds.  
Similarly, whilst the social perception test benefits those whose societies show public 
intolerance for minority sexual identity, it is conceptually and practically unreliable, 
excluding those whose circumstances or identities do not fit the decision-maker or 
home society’s conceptions of sexual identity. 
 
Finally, the cumulative application of these two imperfect tests is also problematic.  It 
is unfair because both tests already have exclusionary potential in their individual 
capacity, but the cumulative application doubles this exclusionary impact.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that all genuine social groups can be 
defined by both criteria.  The structural principles recommend a flexible and 
evolutionary approach to the definitions of the refugee definition, and to the 
application of evidentiary thresholds.  Thereupon, an alternative application of Article 
10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive would be a fairer option.  The tests are better 
suited as complementary provisions, to ensure that genuine asylum-seekers are not 
deprived over relatively unimportant concerns.  The focus of the RSD is not how the 
group is defined, but whether the claimant is at risk of harm for membership of a 
social group.  The British asylum system must not lose sight of this.   
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
As stated in Chapter two, in administrative law substantive fairness involves ensuring 
that the outcome of a particular procedure does not wrongly injure a person’s interest.  
In the refugee context, as LGB asylum-seekers are solely interested in obtaining 
refugee protection, substantive fairness hinges on whether the outcome has been fairly 
constituted.  After all, if it is not, the consequences for LGB asylum-seekers are 
perilous, involving their life, liberty and security.  As the criteria for asylum-seekers 
to obtain refugee status are contained in the refugee definition, it is the components of 
the definition that were scrutinised in their chapter, holding the decision-making 
power of the Home Office and tribunal accountable, in line with the very function of 
administrative law. 
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Under the structural principles, the researcher explained how the realisation of 
substantive fairness in the refugee concept centred on the relationship between 
fundamental rights and fairness.  This had three components: first, respect for the 
UK’s fundamental rights obligations towards LGB asylum-seekers; second, treating 
the Refugee Convention as a ‘living’ document and interpreting its provisions 
pragmatically; and third, applying flexibly the evidentiary standards in the 
Convention.  The investigation has examined the British asylum system’s compliance 
with such principles, each of which will be evaluated in turn.  First, the British asylum 
system has shown genuine respect for the fundamental rights of LGB asylum-seekers 
by recognising that criminal sanctions are potentially persecutory, by removing the 
‘discretion’ argument relied upon by decision-makers to deny claims, and by reducing 
the number of claims denied on the basis that claimants can internally relocate within 
states that clearly persecute sexual minorities.  HJ (Iran) has played a substantial role 
in these developments.  Yet, problems remain with the satisfaction of this principle 
because the system does not recognise that the ‘mere existence’ of criminal sanctions 
meets the threshold of persecution, it fails to appreciate the seriousness of 
psychological harm and, ‘discretion’ has not been totally removed from the RSD.   
Instead, the RSD still focuses on a claimant’s behaviour, rather than ‘identity’, 
evidenced by questions turning on a claimant’s ‘openness’.  Poor decisions on internal 
relocation also persist. 
 
Secondly, the improved attitudes (and decisions) on criminal sanctions and internal 
relocation also represent the British asylum system’s willingness to treat the terms of 
the Refugee Convention in a flexible manner.  This could be improved further, 
however, by understanding that psychological harm is a serious form of persecution, 
recognising more extensively the practical difficulties of relocation in the LGB 
context, and emphasising the limitations of COI.  Greater flexibility on the PSG 
definition is also much needed. 
 
Thirdly, although the increased number of positive decisions in the post-HJ (Iran) 
climate suggests improvements with the application of evidentiary standards, this is 
not clear from this investigation.  Rather this investigation has found that the British 
asylum system’s grasp of the appropriate standards is often limited and, therefore, 
extremely concerning.  For example, the PSG definition demonstrates some 
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regressive application of the evidentiary standards.  This exists for both the individual 
components, given the restrictive approach to the ‘protected characteristics’ test and 
the inherent limitations of the ‘social perception’ test, and for the test’s cumulative 
operation.  All these issues deny genuine refugees international protection.  Similarly, 
the stringent application of the ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ test with regard to 
persecution and COI fails to recognise that the evidentiary burden is low, and is 
supplemented by the ‘benefit of the doubt’, as Chapter four explores more fully. 
 
Therefore, appraising the substantive fairness of the British asylum system, it is clear 
that the compliance with the structural principles is mixed.  The attempt to adhere to 
matters of substantive fairness is reflected in improved guidance, training and 
decision-making.  The persistence of negative decisions based on poor and unfair 
decision-making highlights that problems remain, however. 
 
This	   state-of-affairs is (at least partly) due to the HJ (Iran) test for evaluating LGB 
claims inviting disbelief into the structure of the determination with its first step 
scrutinising the ‘genuineness’ of the claimed identity (see Chapter four for further 
development of this argument).  It also invites the same focus on behaviour over 
identity regarding the ‘openness’ of the claimant, despite dispensing with the 
discretion test.  Disbelief, ‘openness’ and the ‘immutability’ conception of PSG have 
led to the persistent stereotyping of LGB identities along Western, white, gay male 
tropes.  From these issues, it is clear that decision-makers still do not understand 
sexual diversity, or that the relevant matter in refugee protection is identity, not 
behaviour.  They remain ignorant of intersectionality, in terms of the breadth of 
analysis and understanding required for fair decision-making.  The role of the legal 
representatives is even more critical, creating greater inequality in a system where a 
good representative with experience in LGB issues can be a lottery.  
 
Additionally, the Home Office’s internal guidance is good, but fails on many 
occasions to provide meaningful instruction on how to conduct the necessary analysis, 
such as on internal relocation.  If this is the task for training, not guidance, then it is 
also troubling that even in cases of good guidance, the advice is actively ignored.  For 
example, claimants are still refused on the basis of previous heterosexual 
relationships.  On COI or relocation, it appears that decision-makers simply do not 
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have the skills or experience to make the complex decisions required of them.  This 
suggests issues with the basic skills of Home Office decision-makers at the time of 
their recruitment, or issues with training.  They may also suggest the pervasiveness of 
partiality, namely the ‘culture of disbelief’, and that disbelief has taken priority over 
good quality, fair decision-making.  These issues are explored in greater depth in the 
procedural chapter, which follows. 
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Chapter four  
 
 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: THE CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT 
AND THE ASYLUM PROCESS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter three investigated the British asylum system’s determination of sexual 
identity-based asylum claims from a substantive fairness perspective.  This chapter 
follows the separation between fairness in substance and procedure advanced in the 
theoretical chapter (Chapter two) of this thesis.  It focuses on issues of procedural 
fairness within the British asylum system, specifically those around the assessment of 
asylum-seekers’ credibility with regard to (subjective) documentary and narrative 
evidence, having examined the assessment of objective COI evidence in Chapter 
three.  It is important to address why these stages of the credibility analysis are 
included in the chapter on procedural fairness.  To restate the logic advanced in 
Chapter two, as LGB asylum-seekers and legal representatives perceive and treat the 
setting up of credibility through the submission of documentary and narrative 
evidence as part of the procedure, they are examined here.  For the claimant, they are 
an ‘external’ part of the process, relating to what is required of them, whereas the 
examination of COI is ‘internal’ and specific to the decision-maker.  Thus, the 
credibility analysis within this thesis also relates to the information provided at the 
screening and substantive interviews, highlighting further how the analysis is attached 
to procedural aspects of the asylum system.  
 
This chapter also examines the impact of detention and accelerated procedures upon 
LGB claimants.  There are several reasons for this: first, because they were flagged up 
as issues in the initial doctrinal research stage; secondly, as they formed a significant 
part of the asylum narratives for a substantial number of the asylum-seeker 
participants within the empirical data; and thirdly, because the goal of this research 
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was to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the British asylum system, and 
detention and accelerated procedures are critical components of this system. 
 
As procedural fairness relates closely to the lived experiences of LGB asylum-seekers 
claiming refugee protection, this chapter is greatly influenced by reflecting on the 
procedural accounts of LGB asylum-seekers interviewed for this thesis.  Indeed, it is 
because of the fact that dignity underpins the notion of fairness and of fundamental 
rights that this chapter focuses on the personal narratives of the claimants regarding 
the experience of the asylum process and the challenges associated with direct 
participation in this process.  Dignity, thus, is a key virtue of this chapter and of the 
thesis as a whole, underpinning the discussion of fairness in Chapter two. 
 
Some aspects of this analysis speak to substantive fairness, rather than procedural 
fairness.  As explained throughout this thesis, there is an overlap between substantive 
and procedural fairness.  This can be attributed to the complex and disparate nature of 
refugee law, the multidimensional ways in which the dignity of claimants is affected 
and, specific to this chapter, the way in which certain aspects of procedure can affect 
the outcome of an asylum claim.  As previously stated, substantive and procedural 
fairness are interwoven.  This chapter also develops issues that were already raised in 
the previous chapter.  It highlights that the ‘culture of disbelief’, for example, is an 
issue relevant to both substantive and procedural fairness, arising where any 
evidentiary standards or procedural decisions are involved.  
 
Therefore, using the analytical framework provided by the structural principles in 
Chapter two, this chapter explores the most important procedural issues in the British 
asylum system from the LGB perspective.  First, the chapter examines credibility 
assessments, with regard to the roles of documentary evidence and narrative evidence 
in successful asylum claims.  Following this, the chapter explores the other procedural 
aspects of the system, such as the impact of detention and accelerated procedures on 
LGB asylum-seekers.  Subsequently, it examines the recruitment, training and 
conduct of British asylum system personnel.  The role of the legal representative in 
presenting the experiences of LGB asylum-seekers underpins each of these aspects, 
therefore, it is considered throughout this chapter.   
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2. Determining LGB Asylum Claims: Documentary Evidence and 
Narrative Evidence  
 
The credibility assessment describes the process whereby information relating to the 
claimant’s fear of persecution on a Convention ground is gathered and examined.  
Subsequently, a decision is taken as to whether the material elements of the narrative 
warrant the granting of refugee status.1  The European Asylum Curriculum (EAC) 
defines credibility as ‘a tool to establish a set of material facts to which you can apply 
the refugee definition (the findings of facts)’.2  Decision-makers must ask of the case, 
‘how do they know whether they should accept the facts presented by the applicant as 
supported by his or her statement and the other evidence available in the case?’3   
 
Arguably, there are two interconnected stages within a credibility assessment.4  The 
first is where documentary evidence substantiates the claimant’s narrative to the low 
standard of proof required, i.e., the reasonable degree of likelihood.5  The second 
stage is triggered where there are inconsistencies or issues with the narrative and/or 
supporting documents.  Here, where the evidentiary thresholds are not met outright 
through objective and/or subjective documentary evidence, the decision-maker must 
scrutinise the narrative evidence and decide whether the ‘benefit of the doubt’ should 
be extended to the claimant.6  To clarify, objective evidence refers to COI reports, 
whereas subjective evidence refers to the documents a claimant may submit to 
substantiate the claim, as well as their narrative evidence.  Thus, the second stage of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessments in EU Asylum Systems’ (May 2013) 27. 
2 European Asylum Curriculum, ‘Module 7 on Evidence Assessment’ section 3.1.12 (points to 
remember). 
3 UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof’ (n 1) 27. 
4 James A. Sweeney, ‘Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law’ (2009) 21(4) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 700-26, 710-711. 
5 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958 [994]. 
6 Secretary of State for the Home Department, ‘Immigration Rules’ (last amended July 2008) HC 293, 
paragraph 339L. 
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the credibility assessment is a substitute pathway, occurring when the documents 
provided are suspect or where no evidence is available.7   
 
Although the asylum process contains shared responsibilities on the part of the 
claimant and the decision-maker, academics have noted that claimants are not 
expected to ‘prove’ their credibility.  For example, Sweeney states that since 
‘credibility is an element of an alleviating evidential rule, it is anathema to ask asylum 
seekers to “prove” credibility’.8  The New Zealand Refugee Appeals Authority 
agreed, stating that forcing applicants to ‘prove’ their credibility would place an 
unwarranted limit on the protection afforded by asylum law.9  This would be illogical, 
when credibility does not form part of the Refugee Convention criteria of eligibility 
for protection. The sense that claimants must ‘prove’ their credibility, however, may 
be a consequence of the adversarial approach to the British asylum system (Chapter 
two).  This burden of ‘proving’ one’s credibility is particularly acute in the LGB 
context, as outlined below.  
 
Before exploring the credibility assessment, one must emphasise the omnipresence of 
the ‘culture of disbelief’ within it.  Millbank first identified this culture in the LGB 
context.10  She noted the consequences of prohibiting Australian decision-makers 
from rejecting LGB claims by asserting that claimants could ‘act discreetly’ to avoid 
persecution.11  Instead, decision-makers refused LGB claims through ‘disbelief’, 
rejecting the veracity of claimants’ sexual identities.  This thesis argues that British 
decision-making has undergone a similar trend, concretised by the UKSC decision in 
HJ (Iran) that was intended to liberate the UK system from such unfair decision-
making.  To restate, Lord Rodger’s five-stage test for determining LGB claims begins 
with whether the decision-maker ‘is satisfied on the evidence that’ the claimant is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Michael Kagan, ‘Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder-Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee 
Status Determination’ (2002) 17 Geo. Immigr. LJ 367, 374. 
8 Sweeney (n 4) 719. 
9 Re SA, Refugee Appeal No. 265/92 (New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority 1994); Kagan (n 
7) 374.  
10 Jenni Millbank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the 
Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13 (2-3) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 391-414. 
11 ibid. 
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genuine sexual minority, or would be treated as such ‘by potential persecutors in his 
country of nationality’.12  The test has been integrated into the British asylum 
system.13  Verifying the ‘genuineness’ of the claimant’s identity forms the first step of 
determining sexual identity-based asylum claims.  As argued at the outset of the 
investigation, this test further embeds the ‘culture of disbelief’, an element of 
institutional bias, into post-HJ (Iran) decision-making.  Although this thesis 
recognises the need to ascertain whether a claimant truly holds the identity claimed, 
the inflexible, prescriptive examination of these identities at both interview and 
determination stage is unique to the area of LGB claims.  Indeed, legal representatives 
interviewed for this thesis identified the existence of a ‘culture of disbelief’ in LGB 
decision-making:   
 
I think that has perhaps improved, but there’s still very lengthy questioning 
and really, I guess, the approach is from a position – like I said, this culture of 
disbelief – ‘I don’t believe you’ (Catherine Robinson). 
 
Thus, it is the manifestation of the ‘culture of disbelief’ in the interviews and RSDs of 
LGB claims, in terms of excessively scrutinising claimant identities, that grounds the 
investigation of credibility assessments.  This section examines the two stages of the 
credibility assessment in turn.  First, it explores the British asylum system’s 
consideration of documentary evidence provided by claimants to support their 
fulfilment of the refugee definition.  The evidentiary standard here is the ‘reasonable 
degree of likelihood’ test.  As Chapter three examined the role of independent 
Country of Origin Information, this section will focus on the provision of mostly 
subjective evidence by the claimant.  Secondly, this section will explore the UK 
system’s treatment of narrative evidence, with respect to the lower evidentiary 
threshold, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ test.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
13 Home Office, ‘Asylum Policy Instruction: Sexual Orientation Issues in the Asylum Claim’ (5 
October 2010) 12-13.  
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2.1 Providing Subjective Documentary Evidence to Prove a ‘Credible’ 
Sexual Identity  
In the asylum process, although there are shared responsibilities between the decision-
maker and claimant, the primary duty to substantiate the claim lies with the 
applicant.14   This burden is also articulated in the UNHCR Handbook.15   The 
placement of certain responsibilities upon the applicant is understandable.  Only a 
claimant can explain why he or she holds a well-founded fear of persecution and is 
deserving of protection.  For example, a claimant’s submission of subjective 
documentary evidence can add weight to the content of his or her claim, once 
assessed.  By contrast, where objective evidence is concerned, the decision-maker 
may be in a better position to authenticate the claim.16  Consequently, the UNHCR 
emphasises the shared duties of the asylum process.  It directs decision-makers to 
avoid applying the burden of proof too stringently and to recognise that ‘the duty to 
ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the 
examiner’.17  This section focuses on the assessment of subjective documentary 
evidence, namely, how LGB claimants provide such documents to establish a 
‘credible’ sexual identity. 
 
The Home Office 2012 instructions on assessing credibility recognise the use of 
documentary evidence as the primary route towards a successful claim.18  They also 
recognise the shared responsibilities of claimant and decision-maker.  The guidance 
underlines the shared duty of the caseworker and claimant to ‘ascertain and evaluate 
evidence to establish a claim’, despite the burden of proof being placed on the latter.19  
It also explains how decision-makers should evaluate supporting evidence.20 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Home Office, ‘Asylum Policy Instruction: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status’ (30 July 
2012) 9. 
15 UNHCR, ‘Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (December 2011) 
HCR/1P/ENG/REV.3, para 196. 
16 ibid 196-197. 
17 ibid. 
18 ‘API: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status’ (n 14) 9. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid 19. 
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Although the guidance is of good quality, there are problems with its implementation.  
This thesis asserts that there is a dual problem with how this guidance is implemented 
within the decision-making on LGB issues.  First, the evidentiary thresholds are 
applied inflexibly, reflecting the ‘culture of disbelief’.  Claimants are often refused 
protection if they do not provide documentary proof of their sexual identity.  Yet, the 
Home Office has not articulated definitively how the thresholds can be met.  
Secondly, the evidentiary thresholds are stringently applied because documentary 
evidence is viewed through a Western lens of sexual expression.  Therefore, ‘valid’ 
identities are invariably those that have been documented and expressed in conformity 
with Western conceptions of sexual identity, as explored in Chapter three.  These 
arguments are explained in further detail below.   
 
In the post-HJ (Iran) climate, sexual minorities are encumbered with providing as 
extensive documentation as possible to prove that their self-identification as LGB 
(and, thereby, their claim to protection) is genuine.  The empirical data corroborated 
the high incidence of claims being rejected on grounds that the identities were false.  
It also highlighted the correspondingly intensified issue for claimants and legal 
representatives on how to verify a claimant’s identity: 
 
A lot of the refusals I do see through the lesbian and gay immigration group – 
it’s because the Home Office say somebody isn’t gay. So we want to work 
very, very hard at showing that this person is gay. Now, you get into the whole 
issue then of: how do you prove somebody’s gay or lesbian? (Barry O’Leary). 
 
The question posed by O’Leary is a critical one: how does one prove one’s sexual 
identity, an internal characteristic that cannot be externally verified?  In the 
Portuguese context, the sexual identity of the claimant appears to be accepted, and its 
validity is not scrutinised within the RSD.21  The consequence is that there is little 
reliance on understanding a claimant’s sexual behaviour, reducing the role of the 
credibility assessment.  By contrast, the credibility assessment plays a critical role in 
the UK system and has placed at its heart issues that the Portuguese system has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Nuno Ferreira, ‘Portuguese Refugee Law in the European Context: the Case of Sexuality-based 
Claims’ (2015) 27(3) International Journal of Refugee Law pp. 411-432, 427. 
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avoided: stereotypical and essentialised notions of sexual identity according to 
Western-centric (yet outdated) conceptions.22  Addressed in Chapter three, this issue 
reappears in credibility assessments, resulting in inconsistent and often exclusionary 
applications of the evidentiary boundaries.  These applications place greater pressure 
onto legal representatives, support workers and claimants to substantiate LGB claims 
(and sexualities) to meet unspecified boundaries, in ways that may be inauthentic to 
the applicant’s identity. 
 
Within the empirical data, every asylum-seeker participant attempted to meet the 
burden of proof through subjective evidence.  They mostly provided evidence of their 
sexual identities that were obtained whilst living in the UK.  The participants 
understood clearly the importance of substantiating their claims (and sexualities).  
Solicitors and NGOs underscored this for participants, mandating that such evidence 
be in place before approaching the Home Office:  
 
But after, when I met the organisation (Imaan) and they changed my solicitor, 
the second solicitor was really good and professional. She explained to me 
more and more and more, and she said that the Home Office need to know that 
I am involved with LGBT life in London.  So I had to prove that I am [a 
lesbian], I have LGBT friends and I am in some LGBT events, and like this 
stuff (FASY004). 
 
Participants also articulated the pressure that they felt to substantiate the genuine 
nature of their sexual identities, aware of the disbelief operating within sexual 
identity-based asylum claims.  These comments also impliedly document the 
recognition amongst many claimants that it is not enough to share their narratives.  If 
they do not ensure that decision-makers recognise their expressions as genuine and 
validly connected to a genuine sexual identity, they risk being denied protection: 
 
You feel under so much pressure to do these things that it’s beyond, beyond 
just to prove [proving] your sexuality.  You know you are fighting your whole 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Kristen Walker, ‘The Importance of Being Out - Sexuality and Refugee Status’ (1996) 18 Sydney 
Law Review 568, 589-590; Sarah Hinger, ‘Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Identity in Gender and 
Sexual Orientation Based Asylum Claims’ (2010) 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 367, 400.   
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life to have liberty, you know, as a lesbian. Now you have to prove.  So that’s 
why I told you today I felt emotionally drained.  Because that pressure I feel 
is, I still even feel I have it because I have been so used to it for a long time.  
It’s immense.  It’s really immense.  So I felt there is so much pressure to prove 
(FASY007). 
 
FASY009’s experiences are especially important, exemplifying the broader impact of 
the culture of disbelief on the applicants themselves.  FASY009, a Nigerian lesbian, 
believed that the only way she could substantiate the genuine nature of her sexuality 
and asylum claim was by engaging in a relationship.  This provides a specific 
example of how genuine sexual identities must manifest themselves through sexual 
behaviour or romantic expression in order to be believed by the Home Office.  These 
expressions are recognised as ‘valid’ by the decision-maker’s Western lens and 
reliance on stereotypes because they reflect essentialised notions of sexuality.  
FASY009 described the struggles that she experienced to provide this evidence 
without the necessary material support: 
 
I don’t know if they understand my sexuality because they are asking me to 
prove it.  And I told them that I can’t and they asked me why I couldn’t.  So I 
told them, when I came here, I didn’t have a house, when I knew that I could 
live freely with my sexuality, I didn’t have a house, I didn’t have anywhere, so 
how can I get a girlfriend.  Actually, I met a girl in the park, because I’m 
always in the park, she wanted to come to my house, I don’t have a house, she 
got to know that I live in the park, so she ran.  So it is not easy for me 
(FASY009).   
 
FASY009’s experiences are extremely important for another reason.  A victim of 
trafficking, she escaped the house where she was detained and was forced to sleep on 
the streets until the Red Cross advised her to claim asylum.  Due to her lack of contact 
with LGBT organisations and her poverty, she was unable to express her sexuality 
freely.  FASY009’s desperation in the above excerpt to somehow prove her sexuality 
accentuates a disparity between claimants.  The intersection of socio-economic 
deprivation, discrimination as an asylum-seeker, and racism as a Black woman living 
in the North East of England, provide greater understanding of the challenges in the 
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production of evidence.  Documentary evidence plays a critical role in the claims of 
LGB asylum-seekers, but decision-makers do not appear to recognise that the 
claimants are often inhibited by their poverty and experiences of discrimination on the 
‘LGBT scene’ as asylum-seekers and ethnic minorities.23  The limited funds accessed 
by most asylum-seekers also means that claimants must already make choices 
between using transport, purchasing food, or other necessities, before considering the 
use of such funds to produce documentary evidence.24  
 
Understanding the intersectional nature of document production is fundamental.  The 
empirical data identified that a claimant’s circumstances often dictated their ability to 
provide documentation.  Some participants had spent time in the UK with some status 
and security, expressing their sexuality and collecting a ‘portfolio’ of accompanying 
evidence.  By contrast, applicants such as FASY009 were deprived of the opportunity 
to do so and were arguably placed at a disadvantaged position to meet the evidentiary 
burden.  Indeed, this disparity raises the question as to why LGB individuals should 
seek asylum at the point of entry, or before their cases are fully prepared, when doing 
so would prejudice their chances of success.25  Taking the time to prepare a claim 
before informing the Home Office conflicts with section 8 of the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 (given in full in Appendix C), which 
states that delays in claiming protection could undermine credibility (see section 2.2.2 
(iii) below).26  Yet, the disparity of the circumstances across the community of LGB 
asylum-seekers highlights the importance of documentary evidence and the 
prejudicial position of those who cannot show to have expressed their sexuality in 
certain recognised ways.27  It is valuable to compare FASY009’s evidence (two letters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Sharalyn Jordan and Chris Morrissey, ‘“On what grounds?” LGBT asylum claims in Canada’ (April 
2011) 42 Forced Migration Review 13-15. 
24 UKLGIG, ‘“Missing the Mark” - Decision Making on Lesbian, Gay (Bisexual, Trans and Intersex) 
Asylum Claims’ (14 October 2013) 14. 
25 Asylum-seekers are generally expected to make their claims for protection as soon as one enters the 
UK, or as soon as the need for protection arises.  See, Asylum Aid, ‘The Asylum Process Made 
Simple’ <http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/the-asylum-process-made-simple/> accessed 15 November 
2015. 
26 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, s.8; ‘API: Considering Asylum 
Claims and Refugee Status’ (n 14) 39. 
27 Walker (n 22) 589-590; Hinger (n 22) 390-400. 
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from the Red Cross and the Poppy Project) with evidence from MASY002, a 
Pakistani national who had spent time in the UK as a student before claiming asylum: 
 
Everyone send[t] me letters, emails and ‘Icebreakers’ [the group] send[t] me 
letters and everything. I got about 7 letters from friend[s] and 6 letter[s] from 
different organisation[s], such as Icebreakers, Black Group and one is Art 
Group and some other groups.  And he [decision-maker] saw my pictures from 
Gay Pride 2010.  I had more than 300 pictures (MASY002).   
 
In terms of intersectionality, there is also a gendered nature to the aforementioned 
experience.  This relates to the greater opportunities and freedom of movement for 
male asylum-seekers over female, as uncovered by the research conducted by 
Bhabha.28  Bhabha contends that the number of men accessing asylum systems across 
traditional asylum-recipient countries far outnumber the number of women, 
highlighting that there are intersectional barriers to female refugees accessing the 
asylum protection route.29  Within the empirical data, it appeared that many of the 
male asylum-seeker participants had certain privileges over the female participants, 
which assisted them within the asylum process.  Male participants were able to leave 
their countries of origin and seek refuge elsewhere without immediately seeking 
asylum and often without experiencing physical harm.  Upon the expiry of their work 
or student visas, for example, they became sur place refugees.  Sur place refugees 
refers to a category of individuals who require international protection after leaving 
their country of origin for some time, i.e., due to a change in circumstances.30  This is 
in contrast to refugees who claim protection at the time of fleeing, as refugee 
protection was conceived.  The mobility afforded by factors such as financial support, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jacqueline Bhabha, ‘Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum’ (2004) 
16(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 227-43. 
29 ibid 233. 
30 ‘Immigration Rules’ (n 6) para 339P; ‘API: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status (n 14) 
22.  Indeed, within the empirical data, four of the ten male participants interviewed for the empirical 
research were sur place refugees (MASY002, MASY005, MASY007, MASY009), compared with one 
female participant (FASY006).  Moreover, MASY001 was able to gather his documents and leave 
Guyana for the UK as soon as the risk of persecution arose, whilst MASY010 was able to seek refuge 
in the United Arab Emirates for a number of years before fleeing once again to the UK.  It is unlikely 
that the female participants would have had the privilege to do the same.  Indeed, the greater 
experiences of physical abuse, psychological harm and trauma amongst the female participants of the 
research also highlighted the privilege of male asylum-seekers over their female counterparts, on many 
occasions being able to escape potentially intolerable situations sooner rather than later. 
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regularised immigration status and less trauma contributed to the easier process for 
men to document the genuine nature of their sexual identities.  The construction of 
Western notions of sexual identity around gay men further privileges male asylum-
seekers over their female counterparts.  
 
The human cost of the burden to validate one’s sexual identity is hardly recognised 
within the system.  Professional Participant A explained how vulnerable and 
desperate sexual minority asylum-seekers placed themselves in exploitative situations 
to obtain evidence deemed critical to their claims.  The participant gave the following 
example: 
 
But because of this vulnerable situation he’s in, the wider, white, middle class, 
LGBTI scene has exploited him [the claimant], where people are saying to 
him, ‘Okay, you have sex with me and I’ll write a letter to say that you’re 
definitely gay because we’ve had sex with each other’.  So this Home Office 
bit that he feels he has to do in order to prove that he’s gay is putting him in a 
very dangerous, vulnerable situation when, in fact, we should be going to the 
police about this.  But he’s like, ‘No, no, no, this is how I’m going to get my 
status.  Don’t you understand?  I have to prove that I’m a gay man and this is 
the only way to prove it’ (Professional Participant A). 
 
This is both dangerous and degrading, at great cost to the claimant’s fundamental 
dignity.31   
 
This problem is heightened by the perception of claimants, representatives and 
decision-makers that evidence of a sexual nature is a ‘quick-fix’ route towards 
successful refugee status.  It is understandable why this trend has gained momentum; 
sexual practice is incorrectly viewed as absolute proof of sexual identity, despite the 
fact that, theoretically, heterosexuals could also produce and supply such evidence.  
Anecdotally, the researcher knew of claimants providing sexually explicit videos and 
obtaining refugee status within a fortnight.  The apparent receptiveness of the Home 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The interviews with Erin Power and Professional Participant A also explained the focus of decision-
makers on partners and relationships to establish the genuine nature of the claimed sexual identity. 
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Office encouraged the submission of such evidence.  The empirical data found that 
former claimants with refugee status, legal representatives and decision-makers 
actively promoted the submission of sexually explicit evidence.  They perceived it as 
an easier route towards overcoming the burden weighted against proving one’s sexual 
identity and meeting the evidentiary thresholds: 
 
So I have met some friends in the same situation and they said that they 
provide[d] like, they give to the Home Office some personal pictures or videos 
or, but I didn’t do [it].  I told [them] my choice.  So I didn’t [provide such 
documents] and it was like a decision.  If they don’t believe all these friends 
who make letters for me, so they, I don’t need to give them more than that. 
This is my border, this is my limit, that’s what I can show.  I cannot show 
other things about my private life.  I came to this country to live for freedom, 
not to be forced to show all my private life or personal relationship 
(FASY004). 
 
FASY004’s argument that she would set her personal boundaries and not compromise 
with these for the asylum process is powerful.  It addresses the idea that LGB 
claimants must compromise their privacy, at the expense of their fundamental rights, 
in order to prove their identities and obtain protection.  She refused to contract with 
the asylum process in this way.  
 
A culture of sexually explicit evidence only gains momentum upon the receptiveness 
of the Home Office to such submissions.  Even the acceptance of such documentation 
implies its legitimacy as an evidentiary tool.  Amongst Home Office personnel, some 
interviewers clearly rejected evidence of a sexual nature.  The empirical data revealed 
that some decision-makers responded appropriately when presented with sexually 
explicit evidence, rebuffing its submission:  
 
I told him, ‘I have pictures and videos, do you want to see?’ ‘No, no’.  ‘Do 
you want some data?’  ‘No, I don’t want to see’ (MASY010). 
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By contrast, it was alarming to learn that the Home Office interviewer in the case of 
FASY005, a Ugandan lesbian, actually initiated the request for sexually explicit 
evidence: 
 
When they asked for the video, that’s when I took it personally. I said, ‘that’s 
not something that I can provide’.  The interviewer asked me and I said ‘that’s 
not something I can do’.  And my Solicitor said, ‘that’s right’.  Because I 
knew for a long time that they asked for evidence like pictures, but now they 
want more than pictures, so what can you really give to them?  I don’t know 
(FASY005). 
 
Thereupon, some Home Office personnel are not only receptive to the submission of 
sexual evidence, but have actively requested it, regardless of the inappropriate and 
flawed understanding behind it.  FASY005 articulated her fears of a ‘slippery slope’.  
If sexualised evidence became normalised, what else would sexual minority claimants 
have to do in order to prove their sexualities?  A legal practitioner also explained how 
the submission of sexualised evidence (and its success in terms of obtaining refugee 
status for claimants) created a precedent even amongst legal representatives, 
legitimising its use as an evidentiary tool: 
 
Yeah, it’s outrageous.  I mean I would never, ever say to a client to give any 
of that information because I think the Home Office should not be asking for it 
and I think, as lawyers, you have to do your best for your client.  Absolutely, 
and if you’re absolutely instructed that that’s what they want to do, then your 
hands are tied.  But my job is to advise clients about what the Refugee 
Convention says and then push the Home Office to see it broader than ‘do 
they have a photograph of them and their girlfriend or them and their 
boyfriend?’  But I’ve seen messages from lawyers saying, ‘This is what I'm 
going to do,’ and I just think, ‘Don’t do that’ (Liz Barratt). 
 
This is problematic for two main reasons.  First, the evidential pressure placed upon 
LGB asylum-seekers, and the restricted perspectives of decision-makers on ‘true’ 
(and genuine) sexual expression violates the rights to dignity and privacy.  Claimants 
must compromise with their personal boundaries, as articulated by FASY004 and 
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Professional Participant A, in order to provide evidence that will satisfy decision-
makers’ expectations of what it means to be a genuine sexual minority.  That 
claimants perceive manipulative and debasing compromises, such as sexualised 
evidence or exploitative agreements, as the necessary steps for a successful claim 
exemplifies the degrading nature of the ‘culture of disbelief’.  The degrading nature of 
this experience is enhanced further when emphasising that LGB claimants are forced 
to take steps, at great personal cost, that would not be replicated in claims based on 
other Convention grounds.  It also raises the question as to whether LGB claimants 
are expected to compromise on their privacy because sexual identity, in the asylum 
context, must be publicly experienced and expressed.  After all, it is the ‘openly lived’ 
experience of sexual identity that the British asylum system purports to protect.32 
 
Second, the irony remains that sexually explicit evidence does not prove one’s sexual 
identity, it only proves that one has engaged in same-sex sexual behaviour.33  As 
stated in Chapter one, sexual behaviour is only one component of sexual identity, and 
even then, sexual practice need not characterise one’s minority sexual identity.  
Giving sexually explicit evidence credence provides ‘bogus’ migrants who are not 
genuinely LGB with the ability to obtain refugee status, provided that they are willing 
to engage in and document such behaviour.  This subsequently harms those genuine 
LGB asylum-seekers submitting such evidence, to simply hear that even a 
heterosexual could submit such evidence.  The approach of all parties involved, 
especially of certain representatives and decision-makers, is thus disappointing.  It is 
inconsistent with the principle of sexual diversity accentuated in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis.  It contradicts the responsibility to protect vulnerable asylum-
seekers from the violation of their fundamental rights (articulated under the structural 
principles), such as their integrity and privacy.  Moreover, it is dangerous and 
unethical, as it distorts the evidentiary thresholds and encourages LGB asylum-
seekers to perceive sexually explicit material as valid and even necessary evidence. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 HJ (Iran) (n 12) [87].  See question two of the five-stage test. 
33 Nicole LaMarre, ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Gendering of Sexual Identity: A 
Contemporary Analysis’ (2007) 2 The New York Sociologist 16-26, 16.  LaMarre explains how 
heteronormative conceptions of sexuality view desire and identity as identical, resulting in the 
stereotype that certain sexual behaviours correspond to specific sexual identities, i.e., same-sex sexual 
behaviour belonging only to sexual minority identities.  
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The 2015 Home Office guidance addresses this problem.34  Incorporating the CJEU 
decision of A, B and C,35 the Home Office directs personnel to refuse any evidence of 
a sexual nature, which is commendable.  The Home Office must also address the 
overall ‘culture of disbelief’ embedded in the way LGB claims are treated.  The 
current approach has promoted a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the documentary 
evidence likely to satisfy decision-makers, however, and places claimants in 
vulnerable, desperate and exploitative environments.  Overall, it is unlikely that the 
British asylum system will change, as the 2015 instructions on sexual identity 
reinforces the disbelief in LGB claims:  
 
A claimant’s self-identification as lesbian, gay or bisexual should not however 
be accepted as an established fact on the basis solely of the declarations of the 
claimant. For the purposes of the interview, any such declaration merely 
constitutes the starting point in the process and the point from which 
assessment of the facts and circumstances will be made.    
 
Indeed, looking at the UK system outside of the submission of documents, the 
UKLGIG found contradictory and inconsistent approaches to the evidentiary burden 
within the claims of sexual minorities.36  Differing outcomes on the basis of similar 
evidence meant that the evidentiary requirements were unclear and incoherently 
treated.  The UKLGIG summarised the documents demanded by different Home 
Office caseworkers.37  This highlighted, in the absence of specific guidance, the 
discretion handed to decision-makers on the evidentiary thresholds for a successful 
claim.  Requested documents included proof of how individuals first became attracted 
to same sex partners, when they first realised their sexuality, and details of the 
expression of their sexualities in the UK, items that could be difficult to supply.38  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Home Office, ‘Asylum Policy Instruction: Sexual Identity Issues in the Asylum Claim’ (February 
2015) 21. 
35 Joined Cases C-148/13, C-149/13 and C-150/13, A, B and C v. Staatssecretaris Van Veiligheid En 
Justitie [2 December 2014]. 
36 UKLGIG, ‘Missing the Mark’ (n 24) 13. 
37 ibid 13-14. 
38 ibid. 
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This has led to a call for the evidentiary requirements in sexual identity-based asylum 
claims to be clearly outlined.39   
 
The inconsistent application of the burden of proof was exemplified by the case of a 
Cameroonian man, as his failure to discharge the evidentiary burden was cited by the 
tribunal judge when refusing his appeal: 
   
There is no evidence in this case that the appellant is gay apart from what he 
has himself stated and the documents which he has produced from Cameroon. 
In particular he has had no other relations with men, and there is no evidence 
from the gay community in the United Kingdom about the fact that he is a 
homosexual.40 
 
The empirical data supports the UKLGIG’s findings of inconsistent and stringent 
evaluations of the evidentiary burden.  A practitioner provided an insight into the 
segmented consideration given to evidence, against the prevailing guidance41 and 
against the accurate application of the ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ test: 
 
What I sometimes see, and this worries me, is the compartmentalisation of the 
assessment of evidence by decision makers, mostly Home Office caseowners, 
but sometimes judges.  So you’ve got this range of evidence… and they’ll go 
through each piece of evidence and tell you why they reject it.  The Home 
Office does this regularly in the refusal letters that I see, that ‘I'm not putting 
any weight on it for this reason’, whatever the case.  You need to look at the 
evidence more holistically in the round.  What is all of this telling you about 
this individual?  And I would hope that is the way in which decision makers 
predominately deal with these types of cases, rather than compartmentalising 
the evidence, and as I say, systematically rejecting it piece by piece and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Senthorun Sunil Raj, ‘Protecting the Persecuted: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Refugee 
Claims’ (Churchill Trust, August 2013) 31. 
40 UKLGIG, ‘Missing the Mark’ (n 24) 13, citing tribunal decision of Cameroonian gay claimant 
(Hatton Cross, July 2013). 
41 ‘API: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status’ (n 14) 19; R v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Ex Parte Karanakaran [2000] INLR 122 [123].  
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breaking down the case that’s before them.  That surely can’t be the correct 
way to go about these things (Paul Dillane).   
 
Thereupon, it is not simply the burden of proof or the Western lens towards sexual 
identity expression that are issues within credibility assessments.  Restrictive and 
inaccurate applications of the evidentiary burden also result in LGB claimants being 
denied refugee protection.  
 
In the context of the evidentiary burden being misapplied, a practitioner warned 
against the over-reliance on documentary evidence as a means of obtaining successful 
decisions in LGB asylum claims.  Documents were important, but were not a 
substitute for a detailed asylum statement.  The importance of identifying and 
exploring the relevant issues in a claimant’s statement, rather than focusing only on 
evidence, was emphasised by one of the practitioners interviewed for this thesis: 
 
I think people are getting a bit too wound up about this, and it’s really 
upsetting me.  I think people need to realise there’s no short cut.  You need to 
explain this person’s experience.  I think yeah, actually, you do want some 
third party support, if you possibly can have it, because you want to – other 
people can really give testimony to somebody’s sexual identity.  Some people 
– not all people. If there’s a partner – whoopee – because then I’ve got 
somebody who basically is in a same sex relationship.  But just because you’re 
not in a relationship, doesn’t mean you’re not gay.  We don’t stop being gay 
when we’re single.  So any evidence – yes, you’ve got to do, in your 
individual case, you’ve got to do everything you can for your client.  But I 
would be very concerned about us going down the route of thinking that there 
must always be some other documentary evidence in a case, because it’s quite 
unusual.  It’s quite unusual (Barry O’Leary). 
 
Whilst O’Leary’s argument is important, the emphasis placed on documentary 
evidence must also be viewed in the light of the challenges of narrative evidence.  The 
Home Office’s dismantling of narrative evidence, as explored below (section 2.2), 
places even greater onus on documentary evidence.  Claimants and representatives 
prefer to obtain refugee protection through documentary evidence than to rely on the 
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inconsistent and disbelieving credibility assessments of narrative evidence.  Indeed, 
O’Leary explained the challenges faced by legal representatives when preparing 
narrative evidence in an overriding system of disbelief: 
 
It still operates in a system of disbelief, so if we prepared a statement and 
we’ve kind of got them into a position where it’s really difficult to doubt this, 
we’re okay.  If you’re not so prepared, there still seems to me, from talking to 
people at the UKLGIG, that there is a real problem over credibility, and that 
we’re operating in a system where it’s very easy just to believe that 
somebody’s not telling you the truth (Barry O’Leary). 
 
It appears, therefore, that (subjective) documentary evidence has been treated as 
playing a heightened role, even as a ‘quick-fix’, by all the stakeholders of the asylum 
system: by asylum-seekers who feel an immense pressure to fulfil stringent 
evidentiary requirements and resort to desperate and unethical measures; by decision-
makers who understand its value and prominence, but misapply the evidentiary 
thresholds due to disbelief and limited understandings of sexual identity expression; 
and by legal representatives and support-workers, who often prioritise (subjective) 
documentary evidence over a detailed narrative, because it reduces their responsibility 
and because credibility assessments of narrative evidence are so unpredictable. 
 
The British asylum system credibility assessment of subjective documentary evidence 
is unfair, as compliance with the structural principles is poor.  First, there are issues 
with the requirement that the asylum process be impartial.  The credibility assessment 
of documentation operates in a strong ‘culture of disbelief’.  There is not only a 
failure to accept the self-identification of LGB claimants, but a disproportionate 
scrutiny is placed upon their ability to evidence the truth of their sexual identities.  
This scrutiny is particularly problematic given that it is applied through a Western and 
stereotypical lens of sexual identity that contradicts the idea that claimants should 
present their authentic selves within the asylum process.  Consequently, claimants are 
left to use common misconceptions about sexual identity expression in order to 
successfully obtain protection.  Identities must be presented according to implicit 
frameworks in order to be recognised as valid by decision-makers or risk denial of 
refugee protection.   
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Secondly, compliance with the principle regarding access to competent representation 
is also questionable.  This investigation has found that some legal representatives are 
also complicit in questionable conduct regarding evidence.  Some representatives rely 
disproportionately on documentary evidence over narrative evidence and encourage 
clients to submit sexualised evidence.  In essence, however, those legal 
representatives are merely working with the assumptions of many decision-makers 
that subjective evidence ‘proves’ the sexual identity, and in the eyes of the 
representative, therefore, is a more secure route towards refugee status. 
   
Finally, substantive fairness is engaged by the aforementioned procedural problems 
and the ignorance of the intersectional oppressions that the Home Office’s conduct 
facilitates, on socio-economic, race and gender grounds.  First, it fails to respect the 
fundamental rights of LGB claimants, ignoring the degrading treatment that claimants 
must endure, at the expense of their rights to dignity, mental and physical integrity, 
and privacy, to ‘prove’ their sexualities.  Second, there is an inflexible, inconsistent 
and often segmented consideration of LGB claims and evidence, to deny that 
claimants meet the (low) standard of proof.  This does not reflect the inherent 
flexibility of the evidentiary standards, which are explored in greater detail below.  
 
These issues are amplified when narrative evidence is subjected to the credibility 
assessment, as the following section shall demonstrate.   
 
2.2 Applying the ‘Benefit of the Doubt’ to Credibility Assessments of 
Narrative Evidence 
The credibility assessment becomes even more critical to the RSD in certain 
circumstances.  In many cases, claimants, having fled their home societies and sought 
asylum soon after arriving, will not have sufficiently compelling documentation to 
obtain protection through the first (documentary) route. 42   Where documentary 
evidence is absent, insufficient or defective, the claimant’s narrative evidence, 
provided as a statement and at the substantive interview, is scrutinised.  A practitioner 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 European Asylum Curriculum (n 2) section 3.1.12 (points to remember); UNHCR Handbook (n 15) 
para 196.   
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explained the fundamental importance of the statement and the role of the 
representative to produce it: 
 
So if you bear that in mind, a lot of that time is spent working on the 
statement.  I’m spending 20-25 hours easily, maybe more.  Statements and 
setting up credibility are so hugely important in the asylum process (Barry 
O’Leary).  
 
Indeed, narrative evidence is often used as a means of establishing credibility, and 
explaining away issues that may be deemed as examples of poor credibility. 
 
As stated in section 2.1, credibility is concerned with the believability of a claim.43  A 
believable claim is a successful claim.  Where a claimant’s narrative evidence is 
subject to the credibility assessment, believability concerns whether it is appropriate 
to give the claimant the ‘benefit of the doubt’, i.e., the standard of proof is concerned 
with whether the persecution is ‘likely’. 44   This standard manifests the lower 
evidentiary requirements of narrative evidence when compared to documentary 
evidence.45  According to the UNHCR Handbook, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ is 
extended where the asylum-seeker’s statements are ‘coherent and plausible’ and do 
not ‘run counter to generally known facts’.46  The Handbook’s guidance on deciding 
whether to extend the ‘benefit of the doubt’ is also integrated into the Home Office 
instructions on assessing credibility.47  Thus, through its guidance and training, 
decision-makers within the British asylum system are familiar with determining 
whether the asylum-seeker’s claim is believable and with applying the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’ standard.  Once again, it is the verification of the claimant’s sexual identity 
that forms the crux of the credibility analysis of narrative evidence.  Thereupon, it 
also forms the focus of this investigation. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof’ (n 1) 27; ‘API: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status’ (n 14) 11. 
44 ibid ‘API: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status’ 16; Immigration Rules (n 6) para 339L. 
45 Sweeney (n 4) 711. 
46 UNHCR Handbook (n 15) para 204. 
47 ibid para 205; ‘API: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status’ (n 14) 16. 
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This particular investigation occurs in context of the UNHCR’s independent 
examination of all credibility assessments within the British asylum system.  The 
report found several problems with British decision-making, including the failure of 
decision-makers to list their credibility findings with regard to each material fact.  It 
was unclear which facts were relevant to the potential application of the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’ principle.48  Furthermore, the UNHCR found that the guidance on treating 
the ‘benefit of the doubt’ as an overall test was inconsistently applied.  Some 
caseworkers used the principle by segmenting the facts and applying it mid-way 
through the assessment, rather than at the very end.49  The UNHCR also criticised the 
UK system for insisting that claims be ‘coherent’, without defining the meaning of 
this standard.  It concluded that a more ‘stringent’ approach was being taken in British 
credibility assessments than the approach advocated in the guidelines.50  Thus, the 
‘benefit of the doubt’ principle was applied too restrictively.51  Moving forward, the 
UNHCR underscored the need for greater training in the application of the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’ principle and regular monitoring to ensure the principle’s flexible 
application.52  
  
In the light of these criticisms of British asylum decision-makers’ application of the 
‘benefit of the doubt’, the investigation of narrative evidence in the LGB context 
occurs through two lenses: memory and the prescription of ‘truth’. 
 
2.2.1. The Limitations Imposed by Memory upon the Presentation of 
‘Credible’ Narrative Evidence 
A claimant’s memory is the pivotal factor in the ability to present an asylum narrative 
that is coherent, plausible, consistent and sufficiently detailed,53 as the British asylum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof’ (n 1) 230-242. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid 249. 
52 ibid 241-242 and 250-251. 
53 Jenni Millbank, ‘“The Ring of Truth”: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular Social 
Group Refugee Determinations’ (2009) 21(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 1-33, 12; Audrey 
Macklin, ‘Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the Refugee Context’ in International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges, The Realities of Refugee Determination on the Eve of a New 
Millenium (Conference Publication, 1998) 137. 
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system also demands.54  Indeed, the UK guidance states that each material fact should 
be considered for its internal consistency, external consistency and for the benefit of 
the doubt.55  Memory, however, constrains the ability to provide such a narrative. 
 
Extensive research into memory has found that several factors inhibit the ability of 
asylum-seekers to recall events and, therefore, present narratives with the qualities 
described above.  For example, although human memory fades on a continuum, i.e., 
in a constant way, this depends on how the applicant regards those events.56  The 
details of an event that an individual deems peripheral are forgotten within the first 
six months after its occurrence.57  The ability to remember fades in a selective, non-
uniform way. An individual remembers only what his or her personal perceptions 
regard as central to the event.  Tests conducted as far back as 1932 indicate that when 
an individual’s memory lapses over time, the details that are forgotten are those 
deemed incongruent with the individual’s expectations.58   To ensure congruence 
within the story, humans alter and streamline their understanding and future 
description of an event.  Thus, in the asylum setting, claimants are often betrayed by 
their memories, their minds altering their frames of events, shedding details that may 
be important to the interviewer.  This exposes the potential for discrepancies to occur 
within narrative evidence due to the tension between the claimant’s memory and the 
interviewer’s expectations.  
 
The method of accessing one’s memory to present a consistent asylum narrative is 
also dictated by ‘reminiscence’. 59   This describes the way in which the brain 
‘releases’ new information regarding an event upon being requested repeatedly to 
recall it.60  Theorists have argued that once the brain has been requested to recall 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 ‘API: Considering Asylum Claims and Refugee Status’ (n 14) 13-18. 
55 ibid 18. 
56 Thomas Bingham, ‘The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues’ (1985) 38(1) 
Current Legal Problems 1-27. 
57 ibid. 
58 Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering (CUP, 1932). 
59 Jane Herlihy, Peter Scragg, and Stuart Turner, ‘Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories - 
Implications for the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: Repeated Interviews Study’ (2002) 324 (7333) 
BMJ 324-27, 327. 
60 ibid. 
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something, though the individual may not be aware of it, the search continues 
subconsciously, gradually uncovering further layers of information.61  As asylum-
seekers are requested to repeat their narratives on several occasions, reminiscence 
dictates that no two recollections of a particular event will match in their entirety.62  
Each time an individual is asked to recall an event, essentially this is a ‘reconstructed’ 
account.63  It is natural that aspects will vary; sometimes it is a refinement and 
clarification, and at other times, depending on the delay between the accounts, it is an 
entirely new reconstruction.  Consequently, studies establish why human memory is 
naturally predisposed towards producing inconsistencies through repeated instances 
of disclosure, and why inconsistency is a natural feature of the asylum narrative.  
 
Trauma has a significantly destructive impact upon one’s memory and ability to recall 
events.  Studies have shown that victims of trauma actively avoid being placed in 
situations that will trigger painful memories.64  If forced to do so, it often results in 
‘dissociation’.  Dissociation is defined as a ‘disruption in the usually integrated 
functions of unconsciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment’.65   
It describes the use of strategies of detachment to manage painful memories.  
Dissociation can occur both in the aftermath of the mistreatment and during the actual 
mistreatment, doubly affecting an individual’s ability to recall a traumatic 
experience. 66   For victims of trauma, the nature and quality of the memories 
themselves are also affected.  For example, those suffering from PTSD and 
depression were found to have higher levels of ‘overgenerality’ and ‘non-specificity’ 
in their autobiographic memories.67   Furthermore, whilst clear narratives frame 
autobiographic memories, traumatic memories were found to be more primitive, 	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63 ibid. 
64 Jane Herlihy and Stuart W. Turner, ‘The Psychology of Seeking Protection’ (2009) 21(2) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 171-192, 177-178. 
65 American Psychiatric Association, ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (4th edn, 
DSM-IV, 1994) 13. 
66 Daniel S. Weiss et al., ‘Predicting Symptomatic Distress in Emergency Services Personnel’ (1995) 
63(3) Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 361-368, 361. 
67 Jane Herlihy and Stuart W. Turner, ‘Asylum Claims and Memory of Trauma: Sharing Our 
Knowledge’ (2007) 191(1) British Journal of Psychiatry, 3-4; Belinda Graham, Jane Herlihy, and Chris 
R. Brewin, ‘Overgeneral Memory in Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ (2014) 45(3) Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 375-80, 378. 
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existing not as stories or narratives that can be recalled with specificity and detail, but 
as sensory flashbacks triggered by certain events.68  These studies weaken the belief 
that traumatised asylum-seekers can provide narratives with detail and coherence.    
 
In the refugee context, research has highlighted the limitations upon the memories of 
victims of violence and torture.  A study on the impact of sexual violence on 
disclosure during asylum interviews found that victims of sexual violence reported 
greater PTSD severity and experienced dissociative symptoms.69  This affected their 
ability to disclose experiences of trauma when interviewed.  Those experiencing 
symptoms of the greatest severity found recalling these events at the interview stage 
to be the most challenging.  Another study on discrepancies in autobiographical 
narratives highlighted the problematic nature of making poor credibility assessments 
on the basis of inconsistencies, given that discrepancies are a regular feature of 
asylum narratives.70  Where individuals suffered from PTSD or waited a significant 
period between interviews, the likelihood of discrepancies concerning the 
consistency, detail and coherence of asylum statements was increased.71  Those 
suffering from PTSD or depression were ‘less able to retrieve specific memories of 
their personal past within a given time limit when prompted to do so’. 72  
Consequently, decision-makers must grapple with the realities and limitations of the 
human memory, especially due to the prevalence of trauma and poor mental health 
amongst asylum-seekers.  This is particularly important in the LGB context, given the 
high incidence of poor mental health, torture and trauma therein (Chapter three).  
 
Therefore, there is scientific evidence to suggest that our memories cannot always 
produce consistent, coherent and detailed narratives.  This, alongside the impact of 
trauma on recollection, exposes the tension between the perception of decision-
makers regarding ‘credible asylum narratives’, on the one hand, and the reality of 
many genuine asylum-seekers’ abilities to produce them, on the other hand.  It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Herlihy and Turner, ‘The Psychology of Seeking Protection’ (n 64) 176. 
69 Diane Bögner, Jane Herlihy, and Chris R. Brewin, ‘Impact of Sexual Violence on Disclosure During 
Home Office Interviews’ (2007) 191(1) The British Journal of Psychiatry 75-81, 78-79. 
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crucial to explore whether the British asylum system has addressed this tension, and if 
so, how.   
 
On the whole, the British asylum system pays little attention to memory.  The training 
provided to the Home Office caseworkers on LGB issues does not provide guidance 
on memory with respect of narrative evidence. The 2010 instructions on sexual 
orientation are silent on this matter, whereas the 2012 guidelines on credibility 
instruct caseworkers to be ‘aware of the profile of the claimant’.73  This guidance 
directs decision-makers to expect a certain level of detail in the claimants’ 
disclosures, but provides a number of caveats, including but not being limited to, 
‘age; gender; mental health issues; mental or emotional trauma; fear and/or mistrust 
of authorities; feelings of shame; painful memories particularly those of a sexual 
nature and cultural implications’. 74   Although they do not explicitly reference 
memory, one could argue that consideration of the issue is engaged amongst these 
caveats.  
 
Within an interview for the empirical research, the Former Home Office decision-
maker was questioned on how the British asylum system would deal with the 
diminished memory of an asylum-seeker: 
 
There are, probably, sufficient safeguards built into the training of the people 
who carry out the process, if they follow their training.  So, if someone 
follows best practice, it wouldn’t be a problem to interview someone who has 
problems with memory (Former Home Office decision-maker).   
 
In the absence of detailed information on the content of initial training of decision-
makers, this thesis cannot verify this contention that the training contains safeguards 
to ensure that poor memory does not prejudice the consideration of narrative 
evidence.   
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Issues regarding the memory of asylum-seekers are significant in the LGB context 
because of the high incidence of trauma amongst sexual minority claimants (Chapter 
three).  Shidlo and Ahola concurred, finding amongst LGB asylum-seekers ‘common 
diagnoses’ of ‘recurrent depression, dissociative disorders, panic disorder, generalised 
anxiety disorder, social anxiety, traumatic brain injury and substance abuse’. 75  
Consistent with the relationship between trauma and poor memory, several asylum-
seekers within the empirical data explained the impact of their persecutory 
experiences upon the ability to recall events at the substantive interview: 
 
And my state of mind is not ready to start remembering certain things like 
that, to be honest.  Some are really, really painful and very traumatic 
[memories], that you know, like opening up about the kind of torture you went 
through, even if it was a woman I was talking to, some things are really, 
really, very extreme.  But really, you’re forced to say and otherwise, you’re a 
liar.  You’re this, you’re that.  So I feel it’s very uncomfortable (FASY007). 
 
This excerpt reveals the distressing process of complying with the asylum procedure, 
which demands detailed, coherent and consistent narratives.76  FASY007, a Ugandan 
lesbian and victim of torture, reveals a level of dissociation from her experiences.  
She was unable or unwilling to recall the persecutory treatment, given the threat of 
being re-traumatised.  Recognising the rigid nature of the system’s expectations, she 
described the pressure involved.  Should she fail to comply with the disclosures 
expected, her claim for refugee protection would be rejected.  Indeed, the Home 
Office eventually rejected her claim.   
 
FASY009 also articulated this struggle:   
 
When I told her, there was something she was asking me that I cannot 
remember, because before I claimed asylum, I was in a terrible situation… 
And I was trying to explain to her that, ‘you are telling me, you are asking me 
something which I cannot even remember’ and I was telling you, ‘I went 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ariel Shidlo and Joanne Ahola, ‘Mental Health Challenges of LGBT Forced Migrants’ (2013) 42 
Forced Migration Review 9. 
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through this kind of situation and you are asking me’, okay, she was asking 
me the address of a place, of a country I don’t know, a country I came to and I 
don’t know anywhere, and you are asking me about the address.  How can I 
remember the address after all of those things that I have gone through?  I 
can’t put that in my brain because a lot is going on in my head.  And we had 
an argument and I got upset there (FASY009). 
 
FASY009, a Nigerian lesbian, also describes the inflexibility of the system in terms of 
the questions at the substantive interview.  Her interviewer failed to acknowledge that 
there were several reasons behind her struggle to recall the details requested.  Instead, 
she continued to press for specific details without empathy.  FASY009’s memory may 
have been affected by the fact that she was a victim of rape and other violence.  Her 
other circumstances, such as spending very little time in the UK, and doing so as a 
victim of trafficking, with little freedom of movement, also mandated a more 
empathetic approach.  The interviewer should have recognised why FASY009 could 
not provide the requested information, instead of pressing for it regardless.  The 
resultant conflict may even have affected FASY009’s disclosure within the interview 
on other issues.   
 
At tribunal level, the empirical data also found a poor grasp of the relationship 
between trauma and poor memory: 
 
I think this is the only reason, the biggest reason why they could not accept 
me.  After that, they said, that the date at the big interview and the date at the 
court are different.  I said that I can’t tell them anything because I am taking 
medication here.  If you take the tablets, you forget lots of things.  I said, I 
can’t tell you that I remember everything (MASY004). 
 
For MASY004, a gay national of Burkina Faso who was taking medication to help 
with his trauma, there was poor knowledge at tribunal level of the relationship 
between trauma and memory, especially within a high-pressured environment like the 
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asylum process.77  The fact that he was taking medication for his poor mental health 
did not appear to be a relevant factor.  He flagged up his poor memory and its 
relationship to his poor mental health, but this did not appear to result in a more 
empathetic approach, as he was also refused protection at tribunal level.  This 
suggests that the poor understanding of memory is an issue throughout the asylum 
system. 
 
Despite direction to consider the ‘profile of the claimant’, decision-makers rarely 
implement this understanding on memory at the interview and decision-making 
stages.  Too often, the ‘culture of disbelief’ takes precedence over consideration of the 
practicalities of accessing traumatic memories, or of how humans frame their 
memories.  Arguably, it is the combination of poor understanding and the dominant 
culture of disbelief that leads to interviewers adopting restrictive or closed 
questioning styles78 to catch out asylum-seekers when they present their narratives, as 
the empirical data highlights. This disbelief also appears within the decisions 
themselves.  Reasons for denying the credibility of narrative evidence are used to 
deny refugee protection.  Even if decision-makers do not deprive claimants of the 
‘benefit of the doubt’, such imprudent conduct pressurises claimants and inhibits their 
ability or willingness to disclose.  This argument was raised within the empirical data: 
 
The whole question process is designed to catch people out, you know the 
same questions are asked continually but in different formats, and if people 
give some little detail different[ly], then it’s an inconsistency, therefore, bad 
credibility (Professional Participant A).    
 
This interviewing style was corroborated by nearly all of the asylum-seeker 
participants of the empirical research.  Equally importantly, this restrictive approach 
continues at RSD and appeal stage.  Inconsistencies are seized in order to deny the 
credibility of applicants’ narrative evidence, due to the culture of disbelief and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Jane Herlihy, Laura Jobson and Stuart Turner, ‘Just Tell Us What Happened to You: 
Autobiographical Memory and Seeking Asylum’ (2012) 26(5) Applied Cognitive Psychology 661-676, 
665.  
78 Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, ‘An Investigation into the Home Office’s 
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insufficient knowledge of how trauma and memory relate to one another.  The 
consequence is that claimants can be denied protection for reasons that deserve the 
‘benefit of the doubt’, as exemplified by MASY004 above and section 2.2.2.  
 
The empirical data underscored that time does not abate the impact of trauma.  An 
asylum-seeker participant of the empirical research had obtained time, maturity and 
perspective since the events forming the narrative of persecution, but still struggled 
with recalling the events in a non-pressurised environment.  This was due to the 
debilitating impact of trauma upon her memory: 
 
I have been living here for 10 years.  I had matured, I was independent, but 
still, I was struggling with telling them this aspect of myself.  What happens to 
people who newly come to the country and the Home Office just expects them 
to tell them everything?  If you had asked me 10 years ago, I don’t think I 
would have been able to tell them anything.  It was too scary, just sometimes, 
you know, it numbs your brain and you don’t remember that much.  But after 
some time, you sit down, you reflect and you think more about it, what exactly 
happened, you start to remember and you get there.  That’s how I think it 
should work (FASY010).   
 
FASY010, a Pakistani lesbian, describes the stark nature of the challenge presented to 
asylum-seekers to access traumatic memories, regardless of the time that has passed 
since their occurrence.  It also emphasises, in some way, the critical role played by 
legal representatives and support workers to invest the time necessary to produce 
narrative evidence of a high quality, as O’Leary discussed above.   
 
Once again, the empirical research highlighted the gendered, and therefore, 
intersectional division of experiences.  As Chapter three explained, a greater number 
of female asylum-seeker participants indicated that they were victims of trauma and 
sufferers of poor mental health.  Similarly, on the impact of memory on asylum-
seeker disclosure, aside from MASY004, only female participants highlighted the 
struggle to recall traumatic events.  Such struggles take place in context of increasing 
pressure from decision-makers for consistent and detailed narrative evidence.  Again, 
the gender divide is explainable by the fact that female asylum-seeker participants of 
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the empirical research were more likely to have had actual experiences of persecution 
than their male counterparts, reinforcing the link between trauma and poor memory.   
 
Thereupon, the British asylum system is procedurally unfair because it does not 
acknowledge the role of diminished memories amongst asylum-seekers, including 
LGBs.  With reference to the structural principles, detailed guidance and training on 
memory, and on the way in which trauma and mental health issues affect claimants’ 
willingness and ability to disclose information, is absent.  Thus, the British system 
does not integrate such knowledge into its interview or RSD process to ensure that 
decisions are approached and taken with sensitivity and flexibility.  This aspect of 
asylum procedure is also substantively unfair, as the evidentiary standards are, 
therefore, applied incorrectly.  The failure to apply the ‘benefit of the doubt’ test 
appropriately causes genuine LGB refugees to be deprived of refugee status for 
struggling with recollection due to their persecutory experiences.     
 
To address this, the British asylum system must ensure compliance with two of the 
structural principles under the procedural fairness theme.  First, the British system 
must ensure that there is proper guidance on the limitations of memory and the impact 
of trauma on asylum-seekers’ ability to recall.  Guidance is thus required on how 
credibility assessments are to be conducted, with reference to the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’.  Coordination between all instructions and training is vital, including the 
sexual identity instructions, reflecting the acute nature of this problem in the LGB 
context.  Secondly, the British asylum system must ensure that its decision-makers are 
trained in the same matters, in all claims, including within the LGB context.  
Immigration judges are not exempt from this obligation.  Empirical data and 
anecdotal experience of ignorance amongst immigration judges on this topic means 
that tribunal-level guidance and training is equally crucial to a fair asylum system.  
For practical guidance on how the UK system can improve its credibility assessments 
of narrative evidence, decision-makers should look to the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee’s training manual on credibility issues. 79   This provides instructive 
guidance on how the studies on memory should inform the asylum process.80  	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Manual’ 1 (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2013). 
80 ibid 63-102. 
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The Home Office has since improved its guidance on memory.  As these instructions 
did not apply to the asylum claims assessed within the empirical research, it is 
considered here simply for the purpose of examining future decision-making.  The 
2015 instructions reference memory by directing decision-makers to ‘take into 
account any personal factors which may explain why a claimant’s testimony might be 
inconsistent with other evidence, lacking in details, or there has been a late disclosure 
of evidence’.81  The examples include, ‘variations in the capacity of human memory’, 
‘painful memories’ and ‘emotional trauma’.82  Furthermore, the 2015 instructions on 
sexual identity state that decision-makers should not ‘necessarily expect claimants to 
recall all minutiae of previous relationships or even, in some circumstances, the 
names of previous partners’.83  Although this is an improvement, it still fails to 
integrate the pre-existing knowledge of the limitations of human memory, both 
generally and in the context of claimants with trauma and poor mental health.  The 
instructions do not provide practical guidance on applying the ‘benefit of the doubt’ to 
narrative evidence limited by poor memory.  This is despite the studies on memory 
focusing on the asylum context, and offering meaningful guidance on modifying the 
credibility assessment accordingly.84  Consequently, until the British asylum system 
incorporates these understandings in a systematic and coordinated way, i.e., through 
guidance and training for Home Office and tribunal decision-makers, this thesis does 
not envisage any significant change in the system’s unfair treatment of memory.    
 
2.2.2. The Role of ‘Truth’ in Credibility Assessments of Narrative Evidence 
Establishing the role of ‘truth’ in the credibility assessment is critical to the fair 
operation of an asylum system.  As stated above, the role of the credibility assessment 
is to determine whether the claim is believable, not necessarily true.  In the case of 
narrative evidence, believability articulates the low evidentiary standards of the 
‘benefit of the doubt’ test.  The practice of treating ‘truthful’ asylum claims as 
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synonymous with ‘credible’ asylum claims has little support.85  For example, the 
UNHCR states that ‘[e]ven where the initial submission includes false statements (…) 
the applicant can still be able to establish a credible claim’.86  So, untruths within a 
claimant’s narrative should not necessitate the denial of refugee protection.  This 
reinforces that credibility is not a ‘search for the truth’, but an evaluation of the 
narrative’s ‘likelihood’.87  This is reflected, to some extent, in the Home Office’s 
credibility guidelines, which reference the UNHCR Handbook’s warning that ‘it is 
hardly possible for a refugee to “prove” every part of his case and, indeed, if this were 
the requirement the majority of refugees would not have been recognised’.88  
 
A ‘credible’ claim is thus not interchangeable with a ‘truthful’ claim.89  A ‘credible’ 
claim is one that ‘could have happened’, i.e., that is generally plausible, consistent 
and externally verified, where appropriate and possible.90  This is summarised by the 
UNHCR, which states that a claim is considered credible where a narrative ‘is 
coherent and plausible, not contradicting generally known facts, and therefore is, on 
balance, capable of being believed’.91  The UNHCR thus treats ‘being credible’ as an 
alternative to ‘being true’, not as a synonym to it.92  If claimants were to prove that 
their statements were ‘true’ rather than ‘credible’, this would be tantamount to 
imposing a more stringent evidentiary burden of proof, excluding deserving 
claimants. 
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Having established that truth plays a limited role in the assessment of narrative 
evidence, this sub-section appraises the British system’s application of this principle.  
It examines the law and policy on the matter of truth and believability before 
scrutinising its implementation.  
 
The 2012 instructions on assessing credibility reflect the focus on believability over 
truth.  They direct decision-makers to consider whether they ‘believe the applicant’s 
evidence about these past and present events and how much weight to attach to that 
evidence bearing in mind the low standard of proof required’.93  Decision-makers are 
also given guidance on how to implement the ‘benefit of the doubt’.94  Accordingly, 
the instructions were praised within the empirical data: 
 
Again, I say that the API on credibility is commendable and is very good (Paul 
Dillane).  
   
The 2012 instructions explained the importance of considering all the facts ‘in the 
round’ and putting any inconsistencies to the claimant to explain.95  The 2015 
instructions have since taken this further: 
 
The question to be asked is whether, taken in the round, the caseworker 
accepts what he or she has been told and the other evidence provided.  In 
practice, if the claimant provides evidence that, when considered in the round, 
indicates that the fact is ‘reasonably likely’, it can be accepted.  A caseworker 
does not need to be ‘certain’, ‘convinced’, or even ‘satisfied’ of the truth of 
the account – that sets too high a standard of proof.  It is enough that it can be 
‘accepted’.96 
 
Moreover, on the impact of ‘lies’ on credibility, the guidance states: 
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A claimant’s testimony may include lies or exaggerations for a variety of 
reasons, not all of which need reflect adversely on other areas.  Depending on 
their relevance to the totality of the evidence, falsehoods will be troubling but 
do not mean that everything the claimant has said must be dismissed as 
unreliable.97 
 
Thus, a claimant can tell some lies and still warrant the ‘benefit of the doubt’ being 
extended to grant refugee protection.98  
 
In terms of implementing the guidance on believability in narrative evidence, this sub-
section examines the way that decision-makers have actively placed ‘truth’ into their 
credibility assessments.  This is exemplified by decisions relating to the behaviour, 
sexual identity and other identity categories relevant to LGB asylum-seekers. 
 
i. ‘Unreasonable’ Behaviour 
When assessing the narrative evidence of LGB asylum-seekers, pronouncements are 
regularly made on what is considered to be reasonable behaviour.  What is deemed 
‘unreasonable’ is, therefore, lacking in credibility.  Such assessments, that the 
experiences of asylum-seekers cannot be true because they are unreasonable, are then 
used to disbelieve the veracity of the claimant’s sexual identity.99  When claimants 
cannot surpass this first hurdle of the Lord Rodgers test in HJ (Iran), it is unlikely that 
the rest of their claim will be given further consideration.  The ‘benefit of the doubt’ 
is not considered because the ‘false’ sexual identity negates the entire claim.   
 
The UKLGIG noted that many surveyed claims were refused on this ground.  It was 
not credible that claimants would pursue ‘risky’ sexual behaviour potentially 
exposing their sexualities.100  For example, decision-makers disbelieved the likelihood 
of claimants engaging in a same-sex relationship, despite knowledge of ‘Sharia law’ 
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and its sanctions.101  These decisions contain a narrow understanding of human 
behaviour, and ignore the fact that human lives are not always lived rationally and 
logically.  The oppressive environments under which sexual minorities are forced to 
live exacerbate this, alongside the reality that sexual minorities must transgress 
prohibitive social codes to somehow express their sexualities.102  This is complicated 
further by intersectional factors (see below).  The concept of ‘reasonableness’ is also 
framed by culture: what may seem risky or irrational to the Western mind may not be 
so in an alternate culture.103  Decision-makers should be cognisant of these factors to 
ensure fair credibility assessments.   
 
Consequently, prescriptive understandings of plausible and, therefore, credible 
behaviour, informs the British asylum system in terms of the interviewing style (i.e., 
‘catching out’ claimants through questioning).  Poor credibility then also forms a 
common reason why LGB asylum claimants are refused refugee protection.  This is 
demonstrated by an example offered within the empirical data: 
 
A young Ugandan woman claimed that a member of her family walked in and 
found her in bed having sexual intercourse with another woman and I can’t 
quote the refusal decision word for word, but the argument deployed was, 
‘Given the consequences, if somebody had found out that you’re having sex 
with another woman, we don’t think that a reasonable person would have 
risked having sex with a member of the same sex in your country’.  That 
argument is astonishing (Paul Dillane). 
 
FASY007, a Ugandan lesbian who had been refused protection at the initial and 
appeal stages, and was due to be returned to Uganda, also provided a similar example: 
 
Well, they say that they went to the schools I went to in Uganda and the 
schools clearly stated that no homosexual activities take place.  So they 	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believe that there is no way, if a school has a policy of no homosexuals 
accepted, there is no way I would go ahead and try and play with girls.  They 
say there is no way I would hide in bathrooms late at night and maybe have 
sex with my girlfriend (FASY007). 
 
In these cases, the claimants were refused asylum due to the decision-maker’s 
confidence that the actions in question could not have been true. These experiences 
highlight a lack of empathy.  They show the unwillingness of interviewers and 
decision-makers to place themselves in such environments when evaluating the 
credibility of claimants’ experiences.  It is particularly challenging that decision-
makers have used weightless assurances from the country of origin to deny the 
validity of claimants’ experiences.  What is also problematic, however, is that these 
issues have been highlighted prior to the period in which this investigation occurs.  In 
its 2010 report, ‘Failing the Grade’, the UKLGIG highlighted the burden placed upon 
sexual minority claimants to ‘avoid the behaviours that resulted in their 
persecution’.104  In its 2013 follow-up report, the persistence of this problem forced 
the UKLGIG to raise the issue again.105  Here, the placement of ‘truth’ over 
believability into the credibility assessment manifests the refusal of decision-makers 
to grant the ‘benefit of the doubt’ to issues that cannot be objectively verified and are 
not otherwise inconsistent with the narrative presented.  It suggests poor 
understanding of how the standard operates, or a reluctance to engage with it 
altogether. 
 
This approach (and the approaches identified below) further exemplifies the disbelief 
that exists in the credibility assessments of narrative evidence.  The assertion of 
‘likely behaviour’ (in both interviews and decisions) over examining whether the 
actual behaviour of LGB claimants deserves the ‘benefit of the doubt’ is one 
dimension of the acute disbelief in sexual identity-based claims.  Not only is the self-
identification of LGB claimants rejected, but also there is an absence of empathy for 
the way that LGB asylum-seekers express their identities in oppressive environments.  
This climate of intolerance results in choices that the privileged can dismiss as 	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implausible.  Thus, a poor grasp of the lived reality of diverse sexual identities 
contributes to the reluctance to engage the low evidentiary standards.  Furthermore, 
disbelief and the scrutiny of LGB identities grant decision-makers the discretion to 
use ‘truth’ to dismiss narrative evidence that often deserves the ‘benefit of the doubt’.   
 
ii. Stereotyping  
Stereotypes exist regarding the common attributes of all identity categories.  The 
Home Office training is clear on the fact that stereotypes have no place in the 
decision-making on sexual identity-based asylum claims, as they are antithetical to 
the sexual diversity principle.106  Stereotypes are also proscribed in the training on 
LGB claims: 
 
The training is clear on the fact that people who are gay should not be 
expected to fit stereotypical perceptions of what it is to be gay.  Interview 
questions would not therefore include questions about sexual activity or reflect 
stereotypical notions of what it means to be gay (FOI 27021). 
 
This is emphasised with specific examples: 
 
We do not expect people to go to gay pubs or clubs.  We may expect people to 
be able to explain how they know they are lesbian or gay.  They should be 
able to explain why they are attracted to their partner, or someone that they 
love (FOI27021). 
  
Nevertheless, stereotypes regarding the ‘true’ nature and expression of sexual identity 
persist in the negative credibility assessments of LGB narrative evidence.  They are 
used in the British asylum system to deny the authenticity of the claimant’s sexuality 
and, thus, the claim.107  By way of example, the following factors have been taken as 
overwhelming indicators that a minority sexual identity is false: non-engagement in 
sexual relationships; lack of knowledge of gay bars, clubs, literature and 	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organisations; the failure to know the correct names of such LGB venues; the inability 
to disclose the full names and details of their sexual partners; and the lack of conflict 
between an individual’s sexuality and culture or religion.108  The Chief Inspector of 
Borders and Immigration’s independent investigation in 2014 found that stereotyping 
was used in one fifth of LGB claims examined, bolstering this criticism of the British 
asylum system.109  
 
The empirical data supported the persistent reliance on stereotypes to deny the 
veracity of sexual minority identities and claims.  Most concerning was that these 
stereotypes contained prescriptions not only on the traditional expressions of sexual 
identity, but also on the demeanour and presentation of LGB individuals.  Decision-
making should have evolved beyond such basic essentialisms of sexual identity when 
the guidance and training has:   
 
Do you go to Pride, do you know about Pride?  You know, those are the 
ridiculous questions they ask.  My friend told me they asked a friend of hers if 
she knew Oscar Wilde and that kind of rubbish.  If they know about Alan 
Turing in Manchester.  If they know Manchester, so if they go to clubs, if they 
go to gay establishments and all that (FASY001). 
 
The response of FASY001, a Gambian female asylum-seeker, demonstrates reliance 
on stereotypes regarding the correct, i.e., ‘true’ expression of sexual identity by 
genuine minorities within the British asylum system.  Framing stereotypes according 
to British culture is especially counterproductive, as asylum-seekers may not 
subscribe to them.  Additionally, if someone is seeking refuge from persecution, 
safety is the ultimate priority, not sexual expression.110  This is especially true for 
survivors of trauma or torture.  Furthermore, practical issues, such as poverty, also 
dictate an LGB claimant’s expression in the UK, as discussed earlier.111  Thus, it is 
unlikely that many asylum-seekers would have an advanced knowledge of ‘LGBT 
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life’ within the UK.112  Moreover, not all LGB people attend bars, clubs, pride events 
or read Oscar Wilde, which the Home Office guidance acknowledges, but decision-
makers fail to implement.113	  	  	  
 
The empirical data also raised the existence of stereotypes based on demeanour and 
physical appearance: 
 
Well the first judge said to me, ‘oh, you don’t look like a lesbian!  You don’t 
dress like a lesbian’.  What I had on that day, I had on my jeans and my top, 
my pullover and my slacks.  And he said to me I don’t look like one [a 
lesbian], I don’t dress like one.  So I was just asking, ‘what does a lesbian look 
like and what does a lesbian dress like?’  I don’t know (FASY002).   
 
The experience of FASY002 is surprising for two reasons.  First, these comments 
were made by a tribunal judge and, secondly, the reliance on stereotypes regarding the 
appearance of sexual minorities has been criticised and debunked thoroughly within 
the British asylum system over some years.114   The persistence of such logic 
exemplifies why the training of immigration judges is equally important. 
 
As Walker describes, the power dynamics of the asylum process dictate that some 
‘violence’ is carried out by the system against claimants (and inevitably accepted) for 
them to obtain refugee protection.115  Certain practices, such as the use of stereotypes, 
are characteristic of the ‘homogenising tendencies’ of the West. 116   Diverse 
experiences of sexual identity are negated in order to assimilate the ‘other’ into the 
dominant ‘gay and lesbian’ Western culture and perpetuate the supremacy of the 
‘hetero/homo’ binary.117 	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From those who have been forced to conceal their sexualities, the system demands the 
presentation of coherent and congruent narratives, alongside ‘approved’ expressions 
of minority sexual identity.  This is a difficult prospect where claimants are still 
constructing their sexual identities.  The fractured nature of LGB asylum-seeker 
identities is a fundamental issue.118  It is linked to the argument that a claimant’s 
narrative is more likely to be accepted as true if it is compatible with the framework 
of what decision-makers accept to be a likely story.119  Complete, harmonised 
identities are acceptable, not those which cannot also be presented and understood 
comprehensively.  Invariably, the terms of reference are based on the identities of 
white gay males living in the West.  MASY003 articulated this in terms of the poor 
understanding that decision-makers held of persecuted identities.  Upon obtaining the 
security of a safe haven, LGB asylum-seekers were not always interested in the 
‘open’, unrestricted expression of their identities, but in healing:  
 
On asylum-seekers, they should know that we have [had] a lot of bad 
experience[s] and it takes time for us to heal.  But they want us to, just as soon 
as you reach England, it become[s] like you put on new clothes immediately, 
go to your room and put on new clothes.  It can never happen like that.  People 
take even over 20 years or 10 years [to express themselves freely] 
(MASY003). 
 
A practitioner within the empirical data also explained this.  Although aware of the 
stereotype that LGB claimants would openly express their identities in the UK, 
through engagement with LGBT bars and clubs, support groups and the consumption 
of LGBT literature, some claimants clearly did not fulfill such expectations.  Some 
held negative self-images, which prohibited the presentation of identities that the 
Home Office could recognise:  
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I’m just thinking back of a young man from Lebanon whose views on himself 
were awful.  He couldn’t bear to live with himself and he self-harmed and 
everything.  It was about how he felt about being gay.  For some clients, this is 
an important part of their case, because it explains perhaps why they haven’t 
been out more or why they haven’t got more of an identity that is immediately 
accessible to the UKBA.  So maybe you don’t have a client who can name ten 
gay clubs, but they don’t because they haven’t come to terms with who they 
are (Liz Barratt). 
 
The British asylum system must appreciate that relying on stereotypes to promote 
what decision-makers consider to be ‘true’ or correct expressions of sexual identity is 
a flawed approach.  This is so due to the diversity of sexual identity, the impact of 
oppressive home societies on the identity development, and intersectional factors that 
inform individual conceptions and expressions of sexual identity.  Sexual identity is 
so broad and complex that it may be difficult, in some circumstances, for decision-
makers to understand the connection between one’s sexual identity and its expression.  
This is linked to Millbank’s arguments regarding the way in which even seemingly 
peripheral expressions of one’s sexual identity could somehow ‘reveal the stigmatised 
identity’.  These issues are also linked to intersectionality, which is explored in-depth 
below.   
 
iii. Ignorance of Intersectional Factors 
In many cases the reasons for finding poor credibility could be overturned with a 
better understanding of intersectional factors, such as the interrelation of sexual 
identity with a claimant’s culture, education or religion.120  Moreover, ignorance of 
intersectional explanations goes against the ethos of Home Office guidance.121  An 
example of good practice, intersectionality was emphasised by an immigration judge 
in a claim examined by the UKLGIG.122  The judge cited the case of HK v. SSHD123 
and stated: 
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It was made clear that the social and cultural background from which an 
asylum claimant has come is likely to be very different from the background 
with which a Tribunal Justice is perfectly familiar.  It may be very dangerous 
to characterise as implausible, behaviour which seems so against a United 
Kingdom background, when it may not be so at all against the background of 
the claimant’s home country. 
 
The empirical data revealed decision-maker disregard for intersectional 
considerations.  FASY003, a Pakistani lesbian, was denied refugee protection at the 
appeal stage because the immigration judge did not consider the globalised nature of 
contemporary society, or the fact that English was an official language of Pakistan.  
The interviewee dismissed this robustly: 
 
When I was refused in the first instance, I went to an appeal.  There, the judge, 
what can I say, was awful.  In his refusal he said, ‘oh, she claims that she does 
not speak English, but she spoke a few words, e.g., “accept” and “naturally”’.  
And tell me, in Pakistan, we used to watch [American] TV and movies, the 
way that the media works now, even an uneducated person would be able to 
say something in English, at least “please”, “thank you”, even those who 
haven’t been to school (FASY003). 
 
In an example cited by a professional within the empirical data, the Home Office 
decision-maker failed to grasp the cultural mores of the claimant’s home society and 
its impact on his conduct.  What appeared to disprove the claimant’s sexuality was his 
attempt to insulate himself from persecution on that very basis: 
 
A case recently, a guy married three times and that completely went against 
him because it could be quite expected that he married once, but not three 
times.  But if you read about the hierarchy in his clan, what was expected of 
him, he kept marrying to create a safety net for him (Professional Participant 
A). 
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A claimant’s educational background is often critical to his or her ability to provide 
an asylum narrative that a decision-maker can recognise as believable and deserving 
of protection: 
 
I don’t want to single countries out too much, but actually, yeah, I’ll be 
honest.  Like say, Jamaican men, you do come across some Jamaican men 
who can do it [provide a coherent account], but there is a big group of 
Jamaican men that the education system is very poor, they’ve often felt like 
they were really kind of pushed out of it.  Anyhow, they often haven’t 
accessed anything, and they can find it incredibly difficult to give a coherent 
account – coherent in the sense that a British person would think about it 
(Barry O Leary). 
  
Poor education was cited by one asylum-seeker to explain why she struggled with the 
demands of the asylum procedure: 
 
I was just from a small village, I was a proper village girl.  That’s what I am 
saying, that for a village girl, this is too much.  They asked me, ‘if you came 
on 7th January and you claimed on 11th January, why was this?’  But I have 
come from a village, I don’t know anything, a person of God may have sent 
me here, taking pity on my life, but I don’t know what to do.  And this 
happens very often with lots of people.  They don’t know the ways, the roads 
to take (FASY003). 
 
It is equally pertinent that FASY003 was unable to articulate any coherent sexual 
identity beyond being a woman who was not attracted to men (Chapter three).  
Educational and cultural factors were also almost certainly to blame for the fact that 
FASY002, a Jamaican lesbian, claimed asylum some time after her presence in the 
UK.  Prior to claiming asylum, she simply had no knowledge of the possibility to seek 
asylum, something that the British asylum system was unwilling to accept: 
 
Because I take [took] so long to seek asylum and they were saying, why didn’t 
I seek asylum when I first came in the country.  I explain[ed] to him and said, 
I didn’t know nothing [anything] about asylum when I came in this country. 
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Where I am from, when you talk about asylum, they talk about being mental 
and locked up.  But asylum never really crops up in subjects, questions or any 
conversation that I have [had] until I was talking to my friend and she would 
say, this is what you have to do (FASY002). 
 
A delay in claiming asylum was a common ground for disbelief within the empirical 
data.  Anecdotally, the researcher is experienced with the Home Office’s approach to 
such issues.  In their determinations refusing asylum claims, decision-makers ‘copy 
and paste’ generic assertions that, since claimants were well informed enough to enter 
the UK, they should have known of the asylum system.  
 
The Home Office’s approach to the apparent conflict between religion and sexual 
identity was also raised within the empirical data.  The training on LGB issues covers 
this issue, requiring religious claimants to address the impact of their sexuality on 
their faith: 
 
If they have a religious faith, how does your sexuality affect your religious 
views?  This is something they will probably have considered if they are gay.  
If they cannot provide an answer, it may imply that they are not really gay.  
We would have to ask them why they have not considered this.124   
 
As stated, the content of the training materials contain the expectation that religious 
sexual minorities must justify holding a faith, reflecting the stereotype that religion 
and sexuality are inherently incompatible.  This is highlighted by the erroneous 
conclusion that if a claimant has not considered the necessary tension between 
religion and sexuality, they may not be telling the truth.  Yet, this fails to appreciate 
that many sexual minority claimants may not present fully realised or harmonised 
identities, because the process of development is on-going, or because they consider 
the different facets of their identity to engage separate domains of their being, as 
highlighted by MASY007 below. 
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The UKLGIG criticised the decision-making on this issue, with both caseworkers and 
judges often questioning claimants from the perspective that religion and sexuality is 
incompatible: ‘Why did you believe God would accept your sexuality when it goes 
against what Ugandan religious and societal leaders would preach?’125  In the case of 
a Ugandan woman, she was repeatedly pressed to answer why she did not ‘confess 
her sexuality to a priest’, a projection of the interviewer’s assumptions about religion 
onto the claimant.126  Within the empirical data, two asylum-seeker participants had 
two different responses to this question.  MASY007 welcomed the question as an 
opportunity to present his ideas on the intersection of religion and sexuality, or in his 
case, how he believed them to exist as independent forces in his life: 
 
She asked me if I was Muslim and I said yes, and she asked how I could be 
gay if I was Muslim.  And I told her that these are two different questions, 
being gay has nothing to do with being Muslim, just as being Muslim has 
nothing to do with being gay (MASY007). 
 
By contrast, FASY007 was offended by the presumption that there is an inherent 
conflict between religion and sexuality, which LGBT people of faith must reconcile: 
 
Offensive, very offensive.  Asking me how do I justify my sexuality with God.  
And I just felt he was very, very offensive in that way, you know.  And I was 
appalled to know that these people can even afford to ask such questions 
(FASY007). 
 
An examination of these responses highlights that it is not the subject of the question 
that is the problem.  Indeed, allowing claimants to present their relationships with 
religion (if they have any) can be an important and revealing aspect of their narrative 
evidence.  Prejudicial questioning on this topic, however, may prevent genuine and 
open narratives, or may limit a claimant’s disclosure, as evidenced by the empirical 
data.  So it is critical that the question be phrased neutrally and devoid of any 
presumptions or prior judgements.  In this way, irrespective of whether the claimant 	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has considered this question or holds a positive relationship with religion, a claimant 
can be empowered to respond to it authentically.  Practically, the researcher has 
anecdotal experience of decisions refusing refugee protection because the claimant 
has not provided a satisfactory answer on this conflict, undermining the credibility of 
his or her identity.  Perhaps it is revealing that MASY007 was granted asylum by the 
Home Office within weeks of his substantive interview, whereas FASY007 was 
refused. 
 
Consequently, there are signs that the British asylum system confuses believability 
and truth in two significant ways.  The first is that the system places too much 
discretion in the hands of the decision-maker.  The guidance demonstrates this.  Even 
the 2015 instructions describe the assessment as whether the ‘caseworker accepts 
what he or she has been told’, rather than the overall believability.127  The articulation 
of the assessment allows excessive decision-maker discretion and, thus, greater 
inconsistency.  Even the former decision-maker interviewed for this thesis seemed 
unable to distinguish between the reasonable believability of a claim, and the 
decision-maker’s personal belief in the claimant: 
 
Credibility is saying, I believe you or I don’t believe you (Former Home 
Office decision-maker). 
 
There is a difference between a claim being believable and a decision-maker 
expressing personal belief in that claim.  The latter is more subjective, offering 
‘unstructured discretion’ to decision-makers,128 to a degree that is unique to LGB 
claims: 
 
It’s only in LGBT cases that people, judges and decision-makers, think that 
they can draw upon their own brilliance to determine somebody else’s 
sexuality (Liz Barratt). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Millbank, ‘The Ring of Truth’ (n 53) 22. 
128 Sweeney (n 4) 705. 
	  	  
232	  
232	  
Indeed, the second significant way in which the system confuses believability with 
truth relates to the rejection of LGB claimants’ self-identification of their sexual 
identity.  Lord Rodgers’ test in HJ (Iran) advocates for decision-makers to scrutinise 
the veracity and, thus, the truth of the claimant’s sexuality.129  Both of these issues are 
exacerbated by the ‘culture of disbelief’ that is prevalent within the institutions of the 
British asylum system.   In fact, the UKLGIG found that, between 2011 and 2013, 
85% of rejected sexual identity-based claims that were examined cited the disbelief of 
the claimant’s sexuality.130  Moreover, 60% of such claims were refused on similar 
grounds at tribunal level.   
 
It is clear from examining the British asylum system’s credibility assessments of 
narrative evidence in LGB claims that the current approach is unfair.  The 
assessments are inconsistent with the structural principles, because the British system 
distorts the correct evidentiary standards by prescribing what it considers to be the 
‘truth’ in LGB narratives.  Yet, the evidentiary standards are concerned not with the 
truth, but with believability.  The injection of truth into the credibility assessment of 
narrative evidence imposes a higher standard of proof than intended by the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’. This is engendered by a dismal combination of discretion regarding the 
decision-maker’s personal belief, and the refusal culture embedded by Lord Rodgers 
in HJ (Iran) to scrutinise the veracity of the claimant’s sexual identity.  A truth-
oriented approach does not provide the scope for decision-makers to apply these low 
evidentiary thresholds meaningfully.  Consequently, claimants are denied asylum on 
the basis of inconsistencies that hold little, if any, weight, as this exploration has 
demonstrated.   
 
The role of the ‘culture of disbelief’ in the misapplication of the evidentiary standards 
(see also, Chapter three on COI) highlights the breach of a second structural principle, 
namely the requirement of an impartial asylum procedure.  Additionally, this 
particular investigation concretises the fundamental disconnect between the 
commendable guidance and the reality of decision-making that has characterised 
much of this thesis’s investigation so far.  Therefore, the British system’s failure to 	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satisfy the structural principles relating to the citation and application of accurate 
guidance and impartiality are examined separately below.    
 
iv. The Relationship Between Guidance and Practice in Credibility 
Assessments 
There is an additional dimension to the partiality within LGB asylum claims that is 
reflected within the conflict between guidance and practice.  On many of the issues 
explored in this thesis, there exists good guidance from the Home Office, but this 
does not prevent poor assessments.  The guidance cited above on credibility 
assessments and the idea of ‘truth’ is but one example.  Whilst praising the quality of 
the Home Office guidance, the empirical data highlighted the real problem, i.e., that 
decision-makers consistently failed to use it:  
 
So the API is not bad – I mean, I’m sure you’re familiar with it, and obviously 
it’s had input from good people.  It talks about things like shame, stigma, late 
disclosure, difficulties people might have, so I think that’s a really good 
starting point, but the reality is that it’s just not – nobody pays any attention to 
it (Catherine Robinson). 
     
The empirical data also accentuated the wastefulness of such disregard for good 
guidance, in terms of the discard of time and resources, at the expense of a fairer, 
more efficient and less expensive asylum system:  
 
I offer so many opinions in Ugandan and Cameroonian claims, and I 
repeatedly ask myself, ‘Why is it I’m still doing this?’  Because you’ve got the 
API on credibility, the API on sexual orientation, you’ve got an OGN that 
acknowledges that gay men and women may be at risk.  The OGN says ‘have 
regard to the APIs’, and yet, I see a refusal decision that will argue this 
individual’s sexuality is in doubt.  Despite evidence that they’ve offered, 
despite statement that you’ve given, and then the individual caseowner will 
offer their own interpretation… without any specific regard to the OGN or 
APIs, and I think that’s a matter of great concern because the waste there in 
terms of time and resources is just very, very frustrating (Paul Dillane).     
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As with other issues analysed in this thesis, the problem with credibility assessments 
is multi-layered.  First, the determinations of LGB asylum claims are procedurally 
unfair under the structural principles, because they fail to cite and apply the guidance, 
which, on the whole, is good, despite some scope for improvement.  The 
determinations are also substantively unfair, as they result in departures from the 
correct evidentiary standards.  The guidance is not the biggest problem, but rather the 
disregard that many decision-makers have for it, resulting in poor quality and unfair 
decisions.  Yet again, the cause of the unwillingness to apply the guidance lies in the 
structural principle mandating impartiality: the broader culture of the asylum system 
and the way that this culture facilitates disregard for the quality and fairness in 
decision-making.  The Supreme Court’s guidance in HJ (Iran) has only intensified 
and concretised this disbelief in LGB claims. 
 
Within the initial Freedom of Information request made to the Home Office, the 
researcher queried whether there were mechanisms in place to prevent the ‘personal 
opinions of case-owners from affecting the outcome of a case’.131  In response, the 
Home Office asserted that there were several safeguards in place, such as the 
‘management supervision and performance management processes’, of which no 
further detail was given.132  It also stated that ‘an effective quality audit process’ was 
implemented, which audited 5% of all interviews and decisions.133  The Home Office 
contended that these safeguards allowed them to pick up ‘inappropriate handling of 
cases’ speedily, yet this has not taken place.  These safeguards are not working.  On 
credibility assessments, for example, this investigation has highlighted issues 
regarding stereotyping and pronouncements on plausible behaviour.  These have 
persisted within the British asylum system since before HJ (Iran), and even after 
reports from UKLGIG, Women’s Aid and Amnesty International addressing such 
problems.134  Furthermore, these reports have highlighted the extremely gendered 
nature of prejudicial treatment, with the refusal rates of female applicants being far 	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higher.135  This conclusion is mirrored in the case of sexual minority women, as 
highlighted at many instances within the analytical chapters of this thesis.  If, as the 
Independent Chief Inspector reported, one in five LGB determinations relied on 
stereotyping, it is clear from their persistence that the internal safeguards have not 
worked.  This raises questions regarding the effectiveness of these safeguards or their 
actual implementation.   
 
In the response to the Freedom of Information request, the Home Office also cited a 
third procedural safeguard in the handling of LGB asylum claims, namely the ability 
to appeal against a refusal to the courts for reconsideration.136  This allowed claimants 
to raise issues regarding inappropriate handling for consideration by immigration 
judges.  This links to an important contribution made within the empirical data by the 
former Home Office decision-maker: 
 
The problem, as I personally saw it, was that such was the pressure on 
caseworkers and caseowners to make a sufficient number of decisions for their 
team, to have made their allocated number of decisions in a week, and hit the 
target, so that the minister could stand up and say, ‘We have made this many 
decisions’.  I’m not saying that any decision is better than no decision, but 
there’s always at the back of people’s mind a failsafe, that if I make the wrong 
decisions and it’s refused, well it’ll go to court, and the person will appeal, and 
the judge will grant them.  Well that’s a very expensive and inefficient process 
(Former Home Office decision-maker).  
 
Again, the investigation raises the issue that unfair initial decision-making leads to an 
expensive and inefficient asylum system.   
 
Individual decision-makers also perceive the Immigration and Asylum Chamber as a 
safeguard in the same way that the Home Office does as an institution.  They allow 
immigration judges to rectify their poor decision-making made as a result of the 	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target-oriented pressure.  Indeed, of the claims surveyed by the UKLGIG, 32.5% of 
disbelieved claims were allowed at the appeal, with the tribunal believing their sexual 
identities.137  This is an extremely problematic safeguard; not only is it expensive and 
inefficient, as underscored by the empirical data, but the unfair decision-making at 
tribunal-level highlights that it is also an inadequate safeguard.  
 
Having examined the most important part of the asylum claim – the credibility 
assessments of documentary and narrative evidence – it is clear that the British 
asylum system’s approach is unfair.  First, there is a distortion of the evidentiary 
standards.  Instead of being applied with their inherent flexibility, documentary 
evidence is used to increase the evidentiary burden upon claimants, making it harder 
to meet standards that are intentionally low (see also Chapter three on evidentiary 
standards in relation to COI).  Through rigid, essentialised conceptions of sexuality, 
flaws are found within the provision of documentary evidence and the quality of 
narrative evidence to exclude deserving LGB claimants from refugee status.  Second, 
the consequence of distorted evidentiary boundaries is the lack of respect for LGB 
rights, overlooking the desperate measures taken by claimants to meet the artificially 
heightened burden of proof.   
 
Thirdly, it is clear that the inflexible and exclusionary approach to the evidentiary 
standards in credibility assessments is fuelled by impartiality within the system.  The 
prevailing ‘culture of disbelief’, especially the disbelief of a claimant’s sexuality that 
is entrenched by HJ (Iran), has resulted in unfair treatment.  Consequently, exemplary 
guidance is ignored, in favour of rejecting claims through stereotypes and poor 
reasoning.  Fourthly, legal representatives are forced to take steps that are not in their 
clients’ interests; representatives are often equally desperate to do what is necessary 
to surmount the system’s increasing barriers against LGB claimants.  Finally, on 
issues of memory, for example, the guidance and training is lacking.    
  
Through this investigation it becomes apparent, however, that whilst it is necessary to 
identify how the British asylum system is unfair, simply doing so will not provide 
immediate answers to the necessary improvements.  The existence of a disconnect 	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between guidance and practice, the Home Office’s inadequate procedural safeguards, 
and pressures upon decision-makers to meet case resolution targets provide insight 
into the complexity of this task.  What is most concerning, however, is the pervasive 
nature of the ‘culture of disbelief’ in all areas of the RSD, both in substantive areas, 
such as the objection verification of the fear of persecution (the use of COI in Chapter 
three) and in procedural areas, such as the credibility assessment.  It suggests that 
until the political and structural concerns associated with this can be meaningfully 
addressed, there appears to be little hope of eliminating the inconsistent and unfair 
credibility assessments of documentary and narrative evidence.  Sexual identity-based 
asylum claims, as arguably the least understood and some of the most complex 
asylum claims due to the internal nature of sexual identity, become some of the 
easiest to reject.  
 
 
3. Detention and Accelerated Procedures 
 
This chapter now turns to examine the use of detention and accelerated procedures in 
LGB asylum claims.  Detention is the primary tool by which the British asylum 
system exerts control over those without immigration status in the UK.  Detention is 
used to establish the identities of detainees, finalise their immigration cases, or to 
enable their removal.138  The use of detention and removal centres to hold asylum-
seekers and other migrants is said to be ‘an essential element to immigration policy’ 
within the British asylum system.139  Indeed, the UK detains more asylum-seekers and 
holds them for longer than any other European state.140  Thus, for these reasons and 
the fact that detention formed a fundamental part of the experiences of the asylum-
seeker participants of the empirical data, examining the detention of LGB asylum-
seekers is a critical facet of investigating procedural fairness within the British asylum 	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system.  As part of this, there are two aspects of detention to consider: first, the 
impact of detention on LGB asylum-seekers, and secondly, the use of accelerated 
determination procedures, i.e., the ‘Detained Fast-Track’ system, in sexual identity-
based asylum claims.  Each of these can impact the extent to which LGB claims are 
dealt with fairly, for reasons outlined below.   
 
3.1 The Detention of LGB Asylum-Seekers 
The power of immigration officials to detain individuals is derived from the 
Immigration Act 1971.  In schedule 2, paragraph 16, it outlines the power to detain: 
those ‘subject to immigration control’, such as those arriving in the UK whose leave 
to enter requires examination; those whose leave to enter has been denied; illegal 
entrants and those suspected of being so; and those liable to administrative 
removal.141  Under the Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, these powers were 
extended so that the Secretary of State obtained the power to detain individuals.142  
The Home Office has provided guidance on its policy with regard to detention, 
highlighting that the purpose of utilising detention is ‘maintaining effective 
immigration control’.143  The courts have emphasised that detention must be utilised 
in accordance with Home Office policy.144    
 
The Home Office’s policy is that detention is generally utilised to facilitate removal, 
‘establish a person’s identity or basis of claim’, or where it is reasonable to believe a 
claimant will abscond.145   It maintains a ‘presumption in favour of temporary 
admission or release’ and tries to exhaust the alternatives to detention before making a 
decision in favour of it.146  Policy states that ‘detention must be used sparingly, and 
for the shortest period necessary’.147  It also acknowledges the inappropriateness of 
detaining individuals for lengthy periods.  Factors influencing a decision to detain are 	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also listed in the policy document.  They include the ability to facilitate a quick 
departure; evidence of absconding or not complying with the terms of release; breach 
of immigration laws; compliance with the terms of previous leave; the claimant’s ties 
to the UK; the status of the claimant’s immigration case; risk of harm to the public; 
age; and histories of trauma or ill-health (mental or physical).148  The considerations 
involved in a decision to detain are, therefore, lengthy and detailed.  In practice, 
however, the test that is often used by decision-makers to decide on detaining an 
individual is, ‘is the applicant more likely than not to abscond?’149  This suggests that 
maintaining ‘control’ over the individual is the primary goal of detention.  
 
The detention of asylum-seekers is constrained by fairness, as documented in Chapter 
two.  It is subject to considerations regarding length and suitability.150  The Reception 
Directive specifies limits placed on the indiscriminate detention of migrants, for 
example.  Article 17(1) states that Member States must consider the suitability of 
‘vulnerable people’ for detention, such as victims of trauma and torture.151  Although 
Article 17 is not specifically inclusive of sexual minorities, a flexible and dynamic 
definition of ‘vulnerable people’ would allow for LGB applicants to be considered 
vulnerable on the basis of their sexualities.  This is due to the nature of their 
persecution (as documented in Chapter three) and the often-contentious treatment of 
sexual variance by other detainees, as this thesis contends below.  Article 5(4) ECHR 
also enables asylum-seekers to challenge the legality of their detention.  Accordingly, 
immigration detention is subject to regular review in the British asylum system.152   
 
Although policy states the use of detention as a last resort and for the minimum time 
possible, detention is a critical facet of the British asylum system.  The role it plays 
has increased through the enhanced rhetoric around immigration that perceives 	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migrants as posing a ‘risk’ to the ‘social, moral and economic well-being’ of the 
country.153  As of January 2015, the UK has the capacity to hold 3,915 detainees at a 
time.154  Detention is governed by the Detention Centre Rules 2001, which aims to 
ensure the humane treatment of all detainees.155  Yet, detention remains contentious 
for allowing detainees to potentially be detained ‘indefinitely’156 and for its health 
impact on detainees’ mental well-being.157  Consequently, the 2015 Joint Inquiry by 
the All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees and the All Party Parliamentary 
Group on Migration has sought to examine the fair operation of the UK detention 
programme.158   
 
In the LGB context, detention appears to be a significant feature of sexual identity-
based claims.  Within the empirical data, 10 of the 20 asylum-seekers interviewed had 
experienced detention during the progress of their asylum claims. 159   If this 
represents, to some degree, the experiences of the LGB refugee community in the 
UK, it highlights that detention is a significant feature of sexual identity-based asylum 
claims.  Dillane, a participant of the empirical research, corroborated this assessment 
in a news article, contending that the ‘Home Office is detaining increasing numbers of 
gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans people who seek asylum, often for weeks or 
months’.160  For three reasons, this investigation finds that British detention practices 
with respect to LGB asylum-seekers are unfair and inconsistent with the ‘structural 
principles’ espoused in Chapter two.  First, the screening procedure determining a 
claimant’s appropriateness for detention is inadequate.  Secondly, detention often 	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results in LGB claimants’ fundamental rights being denied, and thirdly, is inherently 
inhumane within this particular context.  This section will now explore each of these 
reasons in turn.    
     
3.1.1 Inadequacy of the Screening Process 
The practice of immigration detention is constrained by a number of internal and 
external caveats.  For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights accentuates that detention must not be ‘arbitary’.161  Although the treaty did 
not expand upon the definition of ‘arbitrariness’, arguably, arbitrariness in detention 
exists when there is ‘inappropriateness, injustice and a lack of predictability’.162  The 
process of determining an asylum-seeker’s suitability for detention can take place at 
several different stages, by different immigration officers, depending upon the status 
of the claim.  For initial asylum claims, officers at the screening interview are 
responsible for determining a claimant’s suitability for detention.   
 
Participants within the empirical research conducted for this thesis criticised the 
screening process for being inadequate for deciding whether a claimant was suitable 
for detention:  
 
At the [screening] interview, you’re not meant to give any in-depth 
information.  So you’re not asked, for example, ‘are you a torture survivor?’  
However, if you are, you shouldn’t be detained.  So first you get detained, 
then you have to declare that you’re a torture survivor and shouldn’t be there 
at all.  It’s like, okay, a screening officer doesn’t have to have any training, 
anybody can be a screening officer.  Anybody can be one.  You’re just asking 
questions and ticking boxes, and then you ring upstairs and say, ‘Have you got 
any space in detention?’ (Erin Power). 
 
Power contended that the practice of detaining LGB claimants at the initial stage of 
their claim was arbitrary.  The decision to detain asylum-seekers is made by screening 	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officers, who lack the training and skills to make the important decision of whether a 
claimant is appropriate for detention.  Moreover, the screening interview, which 
contains standard questions regarding the claimant’s nationality and entry into the 
UK, does not ask the questions necessary to determine a claimant’s suitability for 
detention.163  
 
Due to the screening interview’s inadequacy, the role of legal representatives is 
heightened.  In this instance, representatives were forced to pre-empt the tendency to 
detain sexual minorities.  Representatives provided certain clients with letters to 
present to screening officers.  These letters stated that they could not be detained 
because they were victims of torture or trauma:   
 
I went with a letter from my legal representative explaining to them that I 
should not be detained because of my past trauma (FASY005). 
 
The response to these, however, varied.  At the screening stage FASY005 and 
FASY002 were not detained (FASY002 was detained at a later stage).  By contrast, 
the screening officer ignored MASY006’s letter altogether: 
 
My solicitor already mentioned in her letter, ‘Don’t detain him’ because of my 
situation I am facing back home and everything, but still they detain[ed] me 
(MASY006). 
 
The empirical data further highlights the absence of the infrastructure (in terms of 
relevant questioning) or training for screening officers to make informed decisions 
about detaining LGB claimants.  Both FASY007 and MASY006 were detained, 
despite being victims of torture.  The Medical Foundation worked on both of their 
cases and the Home Office was provided with Medico-Legal Reports to support the 
claims of torture forming their narratives of persecution.  These reports would not 
have been produced without their legal representatives not successfully obtaining 
their release from detention, as the Medical Foundation is not known to produce 
reports for detainees.  At the time of conducting the interview, FASY007’s legal 	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representatives were pursuing a claim of damages against the Home Office.  This is 
on the basis of her ‘unlawful detention’ as a victim of torture.  The 2015 
Parliamentary Inquiry into detention practice found that individuals with poor mental 
health were detained too often.164  This was in disregard of the fact that detention is 
not ‘conducive’ to the treatment of mental illness.  Furthermore, once detained, 
claimants unsuitable for detention struggled to secure their release.165  Rule 35 
reports, which are safeguards against the detention of vulnerable asylum-seekers, 
were often ineffective due to the Home Office’s failure to act on evidence that 
individuals were unsuitable for detention.166   
 
Therefore, the screening process does not meet the standards of fairness expressed 
within the structural principles, specifically the principle relating to the application of 
relevant guidance.  Although the policy guidance states that those with histories of 
trauma or ill-health should not be detained, the practice of screening officers fails to 
adhere to this.  The screening process is unable to follow such guidance, as the 
infrastructure is not in place to determine the appropriateness of detaining a particular 
claimant.  Equally importantly, it fails another principle regarding respect claimants’ 
fundamental rights relating to the Article 3 and Article 5 ECHR (prohibiting inhuman 
treatment and securing the right to liberty and security).  This argument is examined 
further below.    
 
3.1.2 Detention Denies Fundamental Rights 
The second reason for the unfairness of detention practice under the British asylum 
system is the deprivation of asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights.  These include the 
right to health-care, the right to legal representation, and the punitive impact of 
detaining LGB asylum-seekers. 
  
i) Healthcare 
On many aspects of the British asylum system, the empirical data identified the 
neglect of claimants’ well-being.  Within detention, FASY002, a Jamaican lesbian, 	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raised the issue of poor quality healthcare.  She found that not only did the nurse 
change the dates on her records to undermine the severity of her mental health, but 
also relied on stereotypes regarding poor mental health to deny that she was unwell: 
 
I suffered from a seizure just before I got out.  And I went to the medic and the 
man said to me that I do not look depressed; I attire myself properly, I am 
clean, my face does not look like someone depressed.  I asked for a copy of 
my medical report, they changed some dates on my thing.  They put the last 
time I have seen my doctor as 2010, and I was like, ‘no’.  The last time I saw 
him was in April 2013, before I went there in June…  I asked the doctor inside 
when I last saw my GP and he said April 2013.  I asked my doctor in there, 
what does a depressed person look like?  He’s giving me all sorts of stories, 
but he still can’t tell me what a depressed person looks like (FASY002). 
 
The healthcare operative stated that she did not appear to be sick, because she was 
‘appropriately dressed’ and was able to go to the gym.  FASY002 explained that 
exercise helped her to maintain her emotional and mental well-being whilst detained; 
it was not proof that she did not suffer from depression.   
 
The role of detention as an aggressor and creator of trauma (section 3.1.3 (ii) below) 
is exacerbated by the fact that detention dehumanises detainees by ignoring their 
mental health needs.167  The provision of healthcare, particularly in relation to mental 
illness, is extremely poor.  The inadequate funding and provision of medical support 
in detention is motivated by the refusal culture and the categorisation of asylum-
seekers and other migrants as economic burdens.168  As contended by Stevens, such 
inadequate provision of healthcare services also perhaps relates to the fact that the 
provision of medical services within detention centres is outsourced, alongside their 
management.169  Consequently, private medical companies, such as Drummonds 
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Medical Support Services and Serco Health, are responsible for addressing the 
medical needs of detainees.    
 
The neglect of detainees’ well-being is also reflected in reports from a former Serco 
employee.170  The former employee claimed that mental health concerns were not 
taken seriously in detention centres.  Even when deciding to deport individuals, 
appropriate assessments were not carried out due to the assumption that detainees 
were deliberately exacerbating their conditions.171  The same employee also reported 
the sexual abuse of detainees by a health worker.  Such reports severely undermine 
the credibility of the internal and external assurances mentioned below.  By way of 
example, the whistle-blower stated: 
 
The lack of engagement with mental health in relation to assessment and 
safeguards was very concerning. They weren't doing assessments to rule out 
mental health, the ACDT [Assessment Care in Detention and Teamwork] 
documentation wasn't getting filled out properly. God knows how many 
people they had deported without a proper assessment.172      
 
Serco refuted the accusations.  The Home Office did too, relying on the HM Chief 
Inspector of Prisons’ report, which found that ‘there was good primary mental health 
provision’ at Yarl’s Wood.173  Yet, the 2015 Parliamentary Report has also reinforced 
the relevance of the issue by finding inadequate healthcare in detention centres, in 
terms of the initial assessments by GPs, hospital treatment, delayed receipt of 
necessary medication, and infringements upon the privacy of detainees.174  Such 
incidents reflect the widespread refusal culture, which even affects the provision of 	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healthcare in detention.  Attitudes to healthcare serve as a disconcerting, but powerful, 
example of the partiality rooted within the British asylum system against all asylum-
seekers, not just LGB claimants.   
 
ii) Legal Representation 
The detention of asylum-seekers has a significant impact upon their access to legal 
representation.  The claimant’s restricted movement creates reluctance amongst legal 
representatives to take on detainees’ casework due to the difficulties in preparing the 
case.175  Similarly, there is a presumption that ‘detained cases’ will inevitably fail, 
which also inhibits the number of willing representatives.176  Detention impedes the 
control that an individual has upon their own case, due to their restricted access to 
computers, fax machines and post, and because many representatives are unable or 
unwilling to visit detention centres.177  The ability of the individual to access the 
evidence required is also unfairly inhibited, due to their poorer contact with support 
organisations, family members and friends.178  This is particularly acute in the LGB 
context, whereby claims are more complex, requiring a significant amount of time for 
legal representatives to understand and statement them, and where the evidentiary 
burden is increasingly onerous, as discussed above (section 2).179  
 
The empirical data underscored the considerable impact of detention on legal 
representation.  Detained asylum-seekers preferred to remain in detention for several 
months and wait for a representative experienced in LGB asylum to become available.  
Many claimants were unwilling to accept the alternative of a representative with no 
experience in LGB claims, avoiding the potential detriment to their cases:  
 
There are people who are not fast-tracked who could be waiting, for example, 
three months in detention to see a solicitor experienced in LGB casework 
(Professional Participant A).   	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The empirical data underlines the importance of access to quality representation. 
Detention impedes the ability of LGB claimants to instruct the representatives of their 
choice, i.e., those with experience and competence in sexual identity-based asylum 
claims.  The consequence is that claimants willingly extend their detention, at great 
emotional, mental and physical expense.  Ensuring their legal representative is 
appropriately skilled allows them the best chance of obtaining refugee status, given 
the critical role that representatives play within the process (Chapter two).  
Consequently, detention constitutes a serious impediment to the rights of LGB 
asylum-seekers, as it restricts the ability to instruct skilled representation and on-
going access for case preparation purposes, engaging the right to fair trial under 
Article 6 of the EU Charter. 
 
iii) Punitive Impact 
The dehumanising nature of detention is further demonstrated by the UK system’s 
failure to recognise its inherently punitive nature.  In the asylum context, it is 
tantamount to punishing them for claiming asylum.  Stevens has critiqued the purpose 
of detention in the UK asylum system.  She argues along similar lines, contending 
that an analysis of the detention system highlights its use as a ‘deterrent, or even as 
punishment for those seeking asylum in the UK’.180  Yet, the right to seek asylum is a 
basic human right.181 
 
The punitive intent and impact of the detention system is exemplified by the practice 
of detaining asylum-seekers in converted prisons or alongside former prisoners. The 
Prison Service runs the Dover, Haslar and Lindholme centres, where asylum detainees 
and in-mates are held together and treated interchangeably.182  This is troubling.  In 
the LGB context, many claimants have experienced incarceration as part of their 
experiences of persecution, given the number of states that criminalise minority 	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sexual identities.183  Thus, for many LGB individuals, detention punishes and re-
traumatises them, and subjects them to the same persecutory treatment from which 
they escaped: 
 
They send me to the toughest detention, like a criminal.  I’m not a criminal, 
you get me?  If it is an immigration issue, why should we send somebody to 
that place?  Toughest detention I tell you was Colnbrook (MASY003). 
 
MASY003, a Ghanaian national, was not exaggerating when stating that he was made 
to feel like a criminal, given that, in his words, he was detained with ‘drug dealers and 
murderers’.  Colnbrook is also a former prison used for immigration detention.  
Detention Action highlighted the methods used there to deprive detainees of their 
freedom of movement: 
 
People in Colnbrook are locked in their rooms at night, and during the day for 
roll-calls.  There is no freedom of movement around the centre: people are 
locked on the wing unless they have booked to use the facilities, in which case 
they are escorted by officers.184 
 
A 2010 Report by the Chief Inspector of Prisons also found issues similar to those 
raised by MASY003 and Detention Action.  The Chief Inspector found issues with 
safety, particularly in relation to significant drug use, and a disproportionate use of 
force and separation for the purposes of security. 185   This underscores the 
inappropriate nature of detaining asylum-seekers at such facilities and with former 
criminals.  It exemplifies further that such detention practices potentially violate the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, particularly their right to liberty and security 
under Article 5 ECHR and the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3. 
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This particular argument finds that the British detention procedure is unfair as it 
denies the fundamental rights of LGB asylum-seekers.  The structural principles in 
Chapter two outline the Home Office’s duty to respect and protect the fundamental 
rights of asylum-seekers, which, in terms of the rights to healthcare and physical and 
mental safety, have been neglected.  In detention, the physical and mental integrity of 
claimants (alongside their privacy) appears irrelevant.  Moreover, detention deprives 
LGB asylum-seekers of fundamental procedural rights articulated in the structural 
principles, namely the right to legal representation.  This provides a glimpse into the 
dehumanising nature of the asylum procedure, which is highlighted further with 
reference to the LGB context in the following section. 
 
3.1.3 Detention Can Be Inherently Inhumane 
There are a number of problems with detention that are specific to the LGB context.  
Detention can be uniquely experienced by LGB asylum-seekers, rendering it an 
inherently inhumane procedural tool.  This is exemplified by the intolerance faced by 
LGB asylum-seekers at the hands of detention centre staff and fellow detainees, the 
discretion that such behaviour forces of them, and the psychological impact of 
detention.  These are explained below. 
 
i) Homophobic Behaviour Forces Concealment 
The inhumanity of detention in the LGB context relates to the forced concealment of 
their sexualities.  Prior to claiming asylum, many claimants will have been forced to 
conceal their sexualities in their countries of origin in order to avoid persecution.186  
By being detained in their country of refuge, many must do so again in order to avoid 
further mistreatment.  For LGB claimants, detention with homophobic individuals or 
those from the same country can be traumatic, fearing the mistreatment that they had 
escaped.187   
 
LGB experiences of detention are not just characterised by fear, however, but actual 
experiences of social exclusion and verbal and physical harassment.188  Reports attest 	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to the abuse within detention centres, not only by fellow detainees, but also staff 
members and security guards.189  For example, the all-female detention centre, Yarl’s 
Wood, was exposed for the sexual abuse and mistreatment of detainees.190  In the 
light of such reports, it is worrying that in 2014 the UK government denied 
permission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Rashida 
Manjoo, to inspect Yarl’s Wood.191   
 
The media has also documented the physical and sexual violence towards LGB 
people within detention centres.  For example, several gay men reported being 
sexually harassed and raped by fellow detainees.192  The response of detention centre 
staff raises extreme concerns about the failure to treat such behaviour with the 
seriousness required.  In these cases, staff advised victims to adopt ‘discreet’ gender 
presentations and discouraged them from reporting the assault, warning that it would 
delay their asylum claim.193 
 
The UKLGIG’s research into LGB experiences of detention mirror these issues.  For 
example, a claimant shared a room with a detainee who threatened physical and 
sexual violence: 
 
I was threatened by a cell-mate.  After calling me all manner of derogatory 
remarks, in his words, ‘I will rape and fuck you to death and make sure I kill 
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you if they ever allow you stay a night in my cell’.  It all happened in front of 
a prison official.194 
 
Within the empirical data, participants also recounted their experiences of intolerance, 
aggression and abuse faced on the basis of their sexual identities: 
 
My roommate, she was always very aggressive towards me, and one day, she 
actually shouted at me, ‘You’re going to die, you’re fat, you’re ugly, you’re 
this, you’re that, you can’t be like that’.  I complained about it, but all [that] 
was done was changing her to another room.  I used to trust this person every 
day.  Just imagine how frightened I was.  And I was scared to go with other 
girls in the centre.  And every night I would sleep very worried about my 
safety (FASY007). 
 
FASY007 thus articulates the impact that the homophobic abuse in detention had on 
her emotional well-being and fear for her physical security. 
 
An asylum-seeker participant of the empirical research clarified that it is the fear of 
such mistreatment that results in the concealment of their sexualities in detention: 
 
I [had] been very careful and reserved.  I didn’t show anyone [my sexuality].  I 
thought if someone ask[ed] me, ‘Why are you here?’ I said, ‘It is some 
political battle in my country’.  I didn’t explore myself, why I’m here, so this 
hides it (MASY002). 
 
Enforced discretion has been identified as persecutory conduct in HJ (Iran), as 
discussed in Chapter three.  The Home Office can accept that enforced discretion is 
persecutory in a claimant’s country of origin, but remains insensitive to the physical 
and psychological impact of enforced discretion resulting from its detention policy.  
The continued detention of LGB asylum-seekers demonstrates the contradictory and 	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fractured nature of asylum decision-making, the segmented understanding of sexual 
identity, and a disregard for LGB claimant’s fundamental rights.   
 
Importantly, the empirical data does highlight the sensitivity of some detention centre 
staff by connecting sexual minorities together for mutual support:   
 
The support worker from the UKLGIG said to me, ‘Go and see your detention 
centre manager, tell him your situation and he might help you.’  And then I 
speak [spoke] to him, and he was really good.  He introduced me to other gay 
guys from Venezuela and they were in the same unit as me.  And so we made 
friends and I used to spend loads of time with them in the detention centre 
(MASY006). 
 
Thus, amongst certain detention centre staff, there appears to be some sensitivity to 
the plight of LGB detainees.  It also exemplifies, however, the enduring inconsistency 
in the quality of the asylum system experienced by sexual minorities.  The enduring 
impact of concealment and prolonged detention is described in the following sub-
section. 
 
ii) Psychological Harm 
The insufficient attention given to psychological harm is also a fundamental matter.  
The impact of detention on a detainee is unsatisfactorily researched, given the 
prominence of trauma, torture and poor mental health amongst asylum-seekers that 
this thesis has described.  In the Canadian context, Cleveland and Rousseau compared 
the mental health of detained and non-detained asylum-seekers.195  Their research 
found a strong correlation between detention and increased levels of poor mental 
health, such as PTSD, depression and anxiety.196  For those who had experienced 
trauma prior to seeking refuge, detention exacerbated psychiatric problems.  Where 
the experiences of pre-migration trauma were insignificant, detention still led to high 
incidences of trauma and poor mental health.197  Consequently, Cleveland and 	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Rousseau concluded that detention is a severe aggressor in destabilising the mental 
health of the already vulnerable category of asylum-seekers.198  
 
The empirical data identified that detaining LGB asylum-seekers had a destructive 
impact upon their mental well-being.  MASY003 explained that he attempted suicide 
whilst detained: 
 
People always hurt themselves.  They tried to commit suicide, even me.  I 
know my country, how they do, I’ve seen how they kill people.  I was young, 
but I saw it, I know how they do things.  I will not go through that.  I told 
them: ‘instead of that, let me die here’.  Then you can carry my dead body 
home (MASY003).  
 
The impact of detention upon the mental health of LGB asylum-seekers is especially 
important.  This thesis has found a significant incidence of trauma and mental illness 
amongst the participants of the empirical research.  For both LGB asylum-seekers 
who have suffered prior torture, trauma and/or poor mental health, and for those who 
have not, detention has a destructive impact upon their psychological well-being.  
This engages their fundamental dignity and integrity, and their right to avoid being 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, as secured by Articles 3 and 8 ECHR.   
 
The UK’s detention practice with respect to LGB asylum-seekers is unfair because it 
is inconsistent with the structural principles of Chapter two.  First, it fails the duty to 
have respect for the fundamental rights of LGB asylum-seekers.  This is evidenced by 
the poor screening procedures resulting in the detention of victims of trauma and ill-
health (and barriers placed against securing their release), poor standards of 
healthcare, the punitive impact of detention, experiences of intolerance and violence, 
and the psychologically debilitating impact of detention.  The contradiction between, 
on the one hand, treating enforced discretion in a claimant’s country of origin as 
persecutory and, on the other hand, accepting enforced discretion within detention, 
reflects quite clearly the British system’s poor understanding of sexual identity and its 
engagement with fundamental rights.  Secondly, the Home Office’s practice fails to 	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adhere to the law and guidance with regard to determining a claimant’s suitability for 
detention and the implementation of safeguards to ensure detention is reviewed 
regularly and can be challenged.  Thirdly, detention restricts a detained asylum 
claimant from instructing and accessing legal representation, especially a 
representative competent in sexual identity-based asylum claims.  This is to the 
claimant’s personal detriment, leading to claimants choosing to remain in detention 
until a preferred representative becomes available.  Finally, the Home Office fails to 
implement the detention of LGB claimants free of bias.  The ‘culture of disbelief’ is 
reflected in the unwillingness to afford medical reports their appropriate weight at the 
screening and review stage, or take the healthcare needs and psychological impact of 
detention seriously.  For LGB claimants, the ‘culture of disbelief’ is also present 
within their detention through the large numbers and the ongoing ignorance to their 
abuse and enforced discretion.  The weight and breadth of these criticisms is 
damaging, and should signify that the UK detention practice requires a substantial 
overhaul.   
 
3.2 Accelerated Procedures: Detained Fast-Track 
Amongst the issues regarding the detention of LGB asylum-seekers, the use of 
accelerated procedures of determination has been the most contentious.  Due to this 
contentious nature and the specific impact on LGB claimants, accelerated procedures 
warrant further analysis.  Within the British asylum system, the procedure is known as 
the Detained Fast-Track system (‘DFT’).  DFT is the Home Office’s case 
management system to process asylum claims under accelerated procedures, whilst 
the claimant remains under administrative detention at Yarl’s Wood or 
Harmondsworth detention centres.199  DFT aims to process an asylum claim within 
two weeks.200  Under DFT policy, a claimant is subjected to the track where there is a 
‘power to detain’ and where, based on the facts obtained at the screening interview, 
officials believe a quick decision can be made.201  DFT was pioneered as an important 
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component of the Home Office’s ‘New Asylum Model’.202  This was introduced in 
2007 to address the Home Office’s increasing backlog of outstanding claims.  
 
The UNHCR has mandated that a detention policy (e.g. DFT) must be ‘necessary, 
reasonable and proportionate’.203  Each case must be assessed on its merits.  The DFT 
process in the UK, however, has been criticised for being unfair.204  This has resulted 
in several legal challenges on this basis.  In Saadi v. UK, the ECtHR rejected the 
challenge, arguing that the short-term detention of foreigners who were not at risk of 
absconding did not violate their fundamental rights.205  The action of the British 
government was deemed proportionate to the aim of controlling their borders.   
 
More recently, in Detention Action v. SSHD, Detention Action sought judicial review 
of the fairness and legality of DFT before the domestic courts.206  Detention Action 
argued that the implementation of the system had changed so significantly since its 
introduction that the earlier judgments of Saadi and R (Refugee Legal Centre) v. 
SSHD207 were no longer applicable.  Detention Action contended that DFT was so 
unfair that it was unlawful, both in common law and under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.  
The High Court agreed, ruling in favour of Detention Action, with Ouseley J finding 
that ‘the DFT as operated carries an unacceptably high risk of unfairness’.208  Ouseley 
J agreed that there were serious failings with the system, but did not believe these led 
to the system being inherently unlawful.  Instead, the main factor of DFT’s unfairness 
was that lawyers, who had existed as the ‘crucial safeguard’ against the system’s 
injustice, were no longer able to do so.209  Lawyers were instructed far too late into 
the asylum process, often a day or so before the substantive interview.  This meant 
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that they could not undertake the necessary preparation to tackle the prejudicial 
position under which fast-tracked claimants were placed.  To overcome this aspect of 
unfairness, the Secretary of State changed the DFT procedure.  The Home Office now 
allowed 4 days between the allocation of a legal representative and the substantive 
interview, which Ouseley J found to sufficiently address the issue.210  Therefore, 
Detention Action’s challenge and subsequent appeal were rejected.211  
 
In 2015, the legality of the DFT procedure was scrutinised once again in the case of 
Lord Chancellor v. Detention Action, where Detention Action challenged the Fast 
Track Rules.212  The Rules addressed the procedure for appeals to the First-Tier 
Tribunal against the Home Office’s rejection of an initial asylum claim.  The High 
Court held that the Rules were ultra vires section 22 of the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007, because they were ‘structurally unfair and put appellants 
seeking to challenge asylum decisions of the SSHD [Secretary of State for the Home 
Department] at a serious procedural disadvantage’.213  The Lord Chancellor appealed 
this decision to the Court of Appeal, citing that there were five safeguards in place to 
overcome ‘any systematic unfairness that would otherwise result from the tight time 
limits’.214  These safeguards included the use of independent and impartial judges to 
preside over the appeals.215  Judges, as experts in the evidential, legal and procedural 
issues arising in asylum claims, would act as sufficient guardians of justice and 
fairness.  Under the Fast Track Rules, if judges deemed it necessary to the fair 
consideration of a particular case, they had the power to take a claimant out of the 
DFT process.216    
 
The Court of Appeal rejected Lord Chancellor’s argument.  The court accepted that 
immigration judges were able to address matters of fairness.  It believed the timetable 
for these appeals was so short, however, it was reasonably conceivable that many 	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appellants could not present their cases properly.217  Given the absence of Case 
Management Review Hearings from the DFT structure, it was also difficult for 
appellants to have their cases taken out of DFT unless the judges were persuaded to 
do so.218  Yet, this opportunity could only arise at the appeal hearing itself.  If the 
judge refused permission, the appellant’s representative would still need to be ready 
to present the appeal.  Although the Court of Appeal felt that the DFT initiative was a 
‘laudable’ way of processing claims efficiently, the potential consequences of 
mistakes within the process were extremely severe.   Thus, ‘fairness could not be 
sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency’.219  This decision has since led to the 
temporary suspension of the DFT procedure by the Home Office until they are able to 
ensure that the process will comply with the duties of fairness and justice.220 
 
Exploring DFT further is valuable for this investigation due to the disproportionate 
number of LGB asylum claims selected to enter the DFT process (until it was 
suspended in 2015).221  Within the empirical data, 7 out of the 20 asylum-seekers 
interviewed had been subjected to the DFT procedure. 222  This appears to be 
significant within the sample taken by the empirical data, although there are no 
publicly available statistics on the number of fast-tracked LGB cases.   
 
The views on DFT amongst asylum-seeker participants were mixed.  Two participants 
spoke of the procedure in favourable terms, valuing the speed and efficiency that 
motivated its implementation.  Notably, they also had the privilege of preparing their 
cases thoroughly before claiming asylum: 
 
I like the fast-track system because it is faster, you can get a quicker result.  It 
can be good or bad, but at least you know what is happening, what is going to 
be your future.  It is quite clear.  Everything is clear in front of you, it’s quite 	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good.  The other way, I don’t know what it is called, but it is quite a lengthy 
process, it kills lots of time, so fast-track is much better than that (MASY009). 
 
Nonetheless, there are a number of issues with the implementation of the DFT 
procedure in LGB claims raised by the standard of fairness applied in this thesis.  The 
first and greatest problem with DFT is the selection process to determine which claim 
will enter this track.  Like detention generally, suitability for DFT is determined at the 
screening interview.  This is despite, as established above, the inadequacy of the 
standard questions posed within the screening interview.  The questions simply do not 
address issues that would enable a screening officer to make an informed decision on 
a claimant’s suitability for DFT.  As the sub-section on detention suggests above, 
screening officers lack the necessary training and experience to make decisions about 
suitability.  Furthermore, the appropriate questions are simply not raised within the 
interview.  The UNHCR and other NGOs criticised the inappropriateness of screening 
interviews for determining a claimant’s suitability for DFT.223  Ouseley J also 
criticised the screening interview in Detention Act v. SSHD.  He stated that when 
assessing a claim’s suitability for DFT, ‘the effect on the fair presentation of the claim 
which the timetable and the fact of detention may have for that applicant’ must be 
considered.224  The screening interview is simply not constructed, in terms of the 
interviewer’s skills and experience and of the questions posed, to facilitate such 
complex considerations. 
 
Within LGB claims, the UKLGIG also noted the inadequacy of the process for 
determining a claimant’s suitability for DFT.  Decision-makers regularly used 
arbitrary considerations in their communications to justify selection for DFT.225  
These ‘cut and paste’ decisions reproduced paragraphs of DFT policy guidance 
without applying them to the circumstances of the claimants concerned.   As LGB 
claimants do not reveal details of their claims at the screening interview beyond their 
sexuality, it is difficult to understand the basis on which they are chosen for DFT.  If 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 UNHCR, ‘Quality Integration Project: Key Observations and Recommendations’, UNHCR 
Representation to the United Kingdom in London (August 2010) 
<http://www.unhcr.org.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/First_Quality_Integration_Project_Report_Key_
Findings_and_Rec_01.pdf> accessed 9 Sept 2015. 
224 R (Detention Action) v. SSHD [2014] (n 206) [106-112]. 
225 UKLGIG, ‘Missing the Mark’ (n 24) 28. 
	  	  
259	  
259	  
this is based on a mistaken assumption that such claims are straightforward and 
facilitate quick decision-making, the discussion on the production of evidence, 
particularly narrative evidence in section 2 above, highlights that this is not the case.  
In particular, O’Leary’s comments in the empirical data on investing 20-25 hours to 
produce a statement are instructive.  Rarely can LGB claims be conducted under 
accelerated procedures.  Thus, returning to the structural principles, the process is 
procedurally unfair because the decision-makers lack the necessary training and skills 
to conduct such claims, demonstrated especially by the arbitrary nature of the reasons 
communicated for justifying the decision. 
 
The Court of Appeal also addressed the defectiveness of the screening interview for 
determining DFT suitability.  On the subject of an LGB claim in the case of JB 
(Jamaica) v. SSHD, the court found that the screening interview failed to: 
 
[D]irect the interviewing officer’s attention to the need to investigate the 
nature and circumstances of the claim in a way that would enable an informed 
assessment to be made of the likelihood of being able to make a fair and 
sustainable decision in about two weeks.226 
 
The Court of Appeal criticised the Home Office for believing that it could quickly 
determine the appellant’s case under DFT.227  The appellant’s sexuality could not 
have been established without recourse to external evidence, which would take some 
time to procure.  The difficulty of ascertaining the truth of an individual’s sexuality 
meant that ‘no reasonable person in possession of all the information about the 
appellant that could and should have been available’ would believe that a fair and 
sustainable decision could be reached in two weeks.228  As a result, the failure to 
allow the appellant the time needed for his asylum claim meant the decision to place 
his case under DFT was unfair and unsustainable.229  As stated throughout this thesis, 
LGB claims are complex, relying on sexual minorities ‘proving’ the genuine nature of 
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their sexualities.  For decision-makers, objectively verifying the risk of persecution is 
difficult due to the evidentiary challenges of objective information (Chapter three).  
The production of subjective evidence, as discussed earlier in this sub-section and 
under section 2, involves other challenges.   As a result, subjecting LGB claims to 
DFT, without substantiated knowledge that they will be resolved quickly, is 
procedurally unfair.    
 
An associated problem with using the screening process for suitability assessments is 
that the DFT process contains insufficient safeguards to prevent especially vulnerable 
asylum-seekers from being fast-tracked.  The DFT policy states that victims of torture 
and those with a ‘mental medical condition which cannot be adequately treated within 
a detained environment’ should not be subjected to DFT.230  In practice, this is not 
always the case.  The poor safeguards for vulnerable claimants also formed the 
subject of Detention Action’s legal challenge of DFT.  Ouseley J argued that the 
suitability of detaining victims with mental illnesses was too broad a question for the 
legal challenge presented before him.231  Nonetheless, he acknowledged that the 
screening process and Rules 34 and 35 of the Detention Centre Rules 2001 were 
inadequate safeguards against the fast-tracking of vulnerable people.232  He stopped 
short of calling the DFT policy unlawful, but warned that, if left unaddressed, these 
issues could result in a higher risk of unfair decision-making.    
 
The findings within the empirical data support these criticisms of DFT.  Both 
FASY007 and MASY006, whose experiences were outlined in the previous section 
on detention, were subjected to the DFT procedure on the basis of their screening 
interviews.  This was despite the fact that FASY007, a Ugandan lesbian, had a partner 
and daughter outside (family life appears to be a consideration only in detention 
policy, not DFT policy) and was a victim of torture.  MASY006, a Pakistani gay man, 
was also a victim of torture and had attended the screening with a letter from his 
representative explaining that it was inappropriate to detain or process his claim under 
DFT.  Both claims were eventually taken out of DFT.  The Medical Foundation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 API: ‘Detained Fast Track Processes’ (n 150) s.2.3. 
231 Detention Action v. SSHD [2014] (n 206) [154]. 
232 ibid [155-157]. 
	  	  
261	  
261	  
documented their experiences of torture.  This would not have been possible if they 
remained under DFT, as the process of producing such reports exceeds the two-week 
timeframe of concluding an asylum claim.  These cases serve as an example that, too 
often, the DFT procedure has been implemented inappropriately.  Decisions are based 
on insufficient and erroneous assessments of the suitability of LGB asylum-seekers 
for detention, and their potential for a quick resolution.  In these claims, it is not just 
poor training that is the issue, but the ‘culture of disbelief’, which enables officers to 
ignore a claimant’s particular circumstances even when signposted.    
 
FASY007, a victim of torture, described the unfair impact of DFT on her claim.  
Under the procedure, her case was refused and she was prepared for deportation in a 
matter of weeks.  This is despite her unsuitability for DFT and subsisting relationship 
that supported her claim of being a genuine sexual minority: 
 
I was put up into the detained fast-track and in this, the final weeks, within 10 
days or 3 weeks, my case was finished and I was given a plane ticket for a 
deportation order, as they call it now.  [Detained] fast-track is just the worst 
experience, it’s the most unfair experience one can ever have in this justice 
system (FASY007). 
 
MASY008 described the impact of both detention and accelerated procedures upon 
his mental and physical well-being.  In doing so, he also demonstrated his 
unsuitability for DFT: 
 
When I was in detention, to be honest with you, I kind of programmed 
[myself] into survival mode because I knew what was happening… But yeah, 
I suffer from stress disorder, where I would literally blackout.  That happened 
in detention and I fainted and I hit my head and stuff, and they had to rush me 
to hospital.  You can imagine.  And while they were rushing me to hospital, 
they handcuffed me and everything (MASY008).  
 
The second area of criticism with regard to DFT concerns the preparation of one’s 
case and access to competent legal representation.  In the second half of 2012 alone, 
one firm of legal representatives estimated that 60% of claimants under DFT at 
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Harmondsworth were placed in detention for a minimum of a week without access to 
legal advice. 233   In 2012, 59% of claimants at Harmondsworth had no legal 
representation at their first-instance appeals.  Of these, only 1% of claimants were 
successful in their appeals, compared to 20% of claimants under DFT with legal 
representatives.234  DFT exemplifies the refusal culture most acutely, given that in 
2005, for example, 99% of fast-tracked claims at Harmondsworth were refused, with 
only 6% of appeals lodged being successful.235  Similarly, at Yarl’s Wood, 99% of 
claims were also refused, where only 3% of lodged appeals were eventually 
successful.   
 
Access to quality legal representation under DFT is thus a significant issue of 
concern, particularly given that detention inhibits access to one’s representative and 
truncates the time available to prepare the case.  Erin Power explained the increasing 
corporatisation of legal representation.  Only firms ‘authorised’ to represent claimants 
under DFT could do so, resulting in claimants losing their representatives.  Where 
alternatives were found, these representatives often lacked the experience needed for 
LGB claims: 
  
Legal rights in detention are worse than a lottery.  One firm has got the 
contract full stop, so you’re only going to see someone from that firm.  And 
then there’s one firm that has a lot of good detention contracts who are not 
very good at all.  And then Wilson [Solicitors] has [have] a detention contract 
and they are brilliant (Erin Power). 
 
DFT acts as an impediment to accessing competent legal representation, and the 
ability for claimants and legal representatives to present the case to the best of their 
ability.  Once MASY006 and MASY008 were subject to DFT, they lost their legal 
representatives, who did not have the funding or authority to represent them in their 
claims any further.  MASY008 was lucky in that his representatives referred his claim 
to a firm with the ability to represent him: 	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Paragon did not have that authority, so they had no choice but to cut me off.  
But they didn’t cut me off, they put my case down to a couple of firms who 
had the authority and I just talked to them (MASY008). 
 
By contrast, MASY006 was left in a position of insecurity until he was allocated a 
representative by the Home Office, a representative with a reputation for poor quality 
work in LGB asylum claims: 
 
When I got detained, my solicitor said, ‘We can’t help you when you are in 
detention.  We don’t have enough funding to support you’ (MASY006). 
 
As the structural principles contend, it is not enough for LGB claimants to have 
access to legal representation.  The representation must also be of a high quality; the 
representatives must be skilled and experienced in sexual identity-based asylum 
claims.  Under DFT, the adequacy of access to quality legal representation is 
sacrificed because speed and efficiency are considered greater priorities.  Access to 
poor representation is still unfair, due to the prejudicial impact that it can have upon 
the presentation of those claims, especially in the LGB context.  Furthermore, it 
creates inconsistency and prejudice within the experiences of LGB asylum-seekers, 
between those able to choose their representatives on the basis of their prior 
experience, and those that are deprived of this opportunity.  This is unacceptable; 
speed and efficiency should not supersede access to competent legal representation.   
 
Practitioners also highlighted the detrimental impact of DFT on the ability for legal 
representatives to adequately prepare and present LGB claims: 
 
I think the DFT system is a real problem.  I think it can be really quite 
destructive, and when they’re in there – we wouldn’t let anybody go near the 
Home Office until we’ve actually prepared the whole case completely – but 
when they’re in there, it’s very, very difficult then to do a statement or get 
evidence, and because it goes so quickly, I think the detention process could 
end up with them not really giving a good account of themselves (Barry 
O’Leary). 
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The challenges faced by legal representatives are critical.  In Lord Chancellor v. 
Detention Action, the Court relied on the witness statements of several legal 
representatives to understand the stresses placed upon them.  Witnesses described the 
difficulty of completing all of their tasks in connection with an appeal in the 
condensed timeframe.236  Timing was also an issue for counsel; they were rarely 
given more than 45 minutes for a conference with their clients, which was 
insufficient.237  The empirical data also raised similar issues regarding the burden 
placed upon legal representatives under DFT.  The consequence is that the truncated 
timeframes and associated pressures injured the ability of competent representatives 
to provide adequate standards of service.  Additionally, representatives without the 
necessary skills would also provide a poorer quality of service because of the high 
number of DFT cases and the speed required by the process: 
 
But there are also people under extreme pressure working in firms in London 
– firms that had contracts to service the DFT.  There are not enough of them, 
they’ve got too many cases.  So it’s just – and there’s only so many hours in 
the day and I think since the start of 2013, somebody at the Tribunal told me 
that the intake into the DFT is up 100%, so there’s a lot of pressure from the 
Home Office going into that, so they can say, ‘we’re processing things really 
quickly’.  But there’s obviously a fallout from that in terms of [the pressure] 
on the representatives that are trying to service those contracts – to do that 
work really – representation is really variable, because there is also the luck of 
the draw (Catherine Robinson). 
 
The operation of the DFT procedure in LGB claims is unfair due to its non-
compliance with the structural principles.  First, the decision to place someone within 
DFT relies on the screening process, which is not fit for purpose.  Personnel without 
the appropriate guidance, skills or infrastructure to make such a significant decision 
are tasked with doing so.  This engages the principles that concern guidance and the 
training and skills of decision-makers.  Secondly, the impact of this is the breach of 	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LGB claimants’ fundamental rights.  The subjection to DFT of victims of trauma and 
torture, and the experiences of some of the asylum-seeker participants of the empirical 
research, demonstrate the inadequacy of the screening process, as does the number of 
claims removed from the process.  Thirdly, DFT is detrimental to LGB claimants’ 
ability to present their claims properly, and their ability to access competent legal 
representation.  The procedure places an extraordinary pressure upon legal 
representatives to work within narrow confines and timeframes, which in many cases 
affects the proficiency of their work.  Additionally, the DFT ‘contract system’ for 
legal representatives often provides LGB claimants with access to lawyers of more 
limited experience and ability, when knowledge of the nuances in LGB asylum claims 
is essential to successful representation.  Finally, the fact that a disproportionate 
number of LGB claims appear to be fast-tracked raises questions about the partiality 
of the overall system, and the impact of the ‘culture of disbelief’ on deciding a 
claimant’s appropriateness for DFT. 
 
It is understandable that many asylum-seekers will value the speed that the DFT 
provides, especially in contrast to the delays often involved in the ordinary 
determination process.  Yet, as stated by the Court of Appeal, although speed and 
efficiency are important, they cannot sacrifice ‘fairness and justice’.  The British 
asylum system must seek to address these procedural challenges.  Although, it is 
commendable that the Home Office has suspended the DFT procedure in recognition 
of its procedural unfairness, it remains unclear how this unfairness will be overturned 
if/when DFT is reintroduced or replaced.  
 
The next section considers the role of personnel in affecting the experience of the 
British asylum system, particularly LGB claimants.  
 
 
4. Personnel: Recruitment, Training and Conduct 
 
No asylum system exists without its operation by personnel acting on behalf of the 
authority responsible for processing refugee claims.  Throughout the asylum 
procedure, claimants are exposed to personnel at all stages: screening interview, 
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substantive interview, detention, appeal, etc.  Through this investigation of the British 
asylum system for LGB claimants, the skills and conduct of Home Office personnel 
and tribunal judges have been central issues under scrutiny.  Accordingly, this section 
ties together the concerns raised thus far about the personnel operating the UK 
system.  The claimant-personnel interaction warrants a separate investigation due to 
the aforementioned need for cooperation between both parties for the procedure to 
operate smoothly.238  This section first assesses the conduct of personnel when 
dealing with sexual identity-based asylum claims.  Subsequently, it explores the 
Home Office’s recruitment and training of its personnel. 
 
4.1 The Conduct of Personnel within the British Asylum System 
The conduct of personnel operating the British asylum system is critical to its 
fairness.  It impacts the experiences of the claimants, in terms of their willingness to 
cooperate within the process and make the full disclosures required to determine their 
asylum claims properly.239  Sensitivity is especially important where claimants have 
suffered trauma or torture.  It is needed in the cases of LGB asylum-seekers, who 
have left societies intolerant of their sexual identities and will be sensitive to similar 
prejudices, also having, in some instances, internalised such ill-feeling.240  The Home 
Office’s guidance reminds decision-makers to conduct a ‘sensitive enquiry’, ensuring 
‘an open and reassuring environment’.241  This, it asserts, will ‘help to establish trust 
between the interviewer and claimant’ and facilitate the ‘full disclosure of sensitive 
and personal information’.242   
 
The UKLGIG explained the insensitivity of the screening interview to the needs of 
sexual minority claimants.243  LGB people were expected to reveal their sexualities to 
the screening officer in a semi-public setting, allowing waiting claimants to 
eavesdrop.  Those attending with family members were forced to disclose their 
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sexualities in front of them, even if they have not yet come out to their families.244  
Once again, the right to privacy of LGB asylum-seekers is overlooked; this is a 
repeated theme of this chapter’s investigation into procedural matters.  Yet, should an 
individual neglect to mention the basis of their claim, i.e., their sexuality, this is used 
against them, as a means of doubting their credibility.  Again, decision-makers use 
spurious issues to deny the validity of a claimant’s sexuality, ignoring issues of 
sensitivity, security and confidentiality: 
 
It is not accepted that you were not given enough time to mention the 
problems you have suffered due to your sexuality. Your failure to mention this 
at your screening interview leads to this aspect of your claim having no 
credence attached to it. It is also considered that you had a further 5 days 
between your asylum claim and substantive interview, where you had the 
opportunity to submit any further additional information that you may have 
forgotten to submit in your screening interview. It light of these points, it is 
therefore not accepted that you are a genuine homosexual and fear return to 
the Gambia as you claim.245  
 
Within the empirical data, the experiences of the asylum interviews were variable.  
Some participants described the warm, sensitive and open environments that decision-
makers created for them, particularly within the substantive interview setting.  Such 
conduct facilitated the process of disclosure: 
 
She was such an amazing lady.  She was very nice.  We just went inside, she 
behaved with me really well… She was asking about my rings, I was wearing 
so many!  And she was admiring them and she was looking at my photographs 
and asking, ‘who are these people?’  I just told her that these are my friends, 
and then she asked me about my life, and she was very cooperative with me 
(MASY007). 
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Yet, many interviewees had negative experiences of the conduct of the personnel 
operating the British asylum system, especially at the screening interview.  Claimants 
were subjected to aggression stemming from the overriding culture of disbelief and 
the conception of asylum-seekers as economic drains:   
 
The screening interview was okay from the beginning, but at the end, there 
was a little bit of discomfort between me and the lady who interviewed me 
because after the interview, before I signed the interview record, she started 
making bad comments.  She said, ‘I don’t believe you are gay.  You guys sit 
down here, they give you free food, [a] free bed to sleep [in], they look after 
you.  If they want you to go back to your country, you don’t want to go’ 
(MASY003). 
 
Participants also experienced insensitivity or outright homophobia, and these must 
have impacted upon their feelings of security in those environments and their 
willingness to disclose aspects of their claim:  
 
And while I was there, she asked me why am I claiming asylum and I told her.  
She said ‘okay’.  When she asked me where I was from and I told her, she 
called one of her colleagues and started laughing, telling her colleague, this 
guy’s gay from Jamaica and he’s claiming asylum, and both of them start[ed] 
laughing (MASY008). 
 
Furthermore, FASY002 was so unhappy with her screening interviewer’s 
insensitivity, she was confident enough to assert her desire to be interviewed by 
someone else: 
 
This man was calling out my number to all, like he say ‘number 35 for the 
lesbian case’.  I was like, ‘I’m not moving’ and I sat there and I wait, wait.  
And I said, ‘I’m not getting up’.  And I went to a lady and said, ‘can I get 
someone else to interview me because he’s just talking my business and I’m 
not really going to sit there and talk to him’ (FASY002). 
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The vast majority of the participants did not describe the impact of insensitivity, 
homophobia or other prejudice upon their negotiation of the asylum system.  One 
interviewee, however, asserted that the verbal aggression at the screening and 
substantive interviews (also encompassing the aggressive interviewing style) left her 
feeling intimidated and afraid.  This must have influenced her ability to cooperate 
with the asylum system: 
 
Through their conversation, they are provoking me and goading me, I was 
naïve and afraid, I was answering each of their questions (FASY003). 
 
In the empirical data, practitioners attempted to identify the cause of such poor 
conduct at the screening stage:   
 
Screening officers are not trained at all.  Well, they may be trained in 
screening, but they are not trained in LGB issues (Erin Power). 
    
Although the Home Office trains its decision-makers, and training on LGB issues has 
been available for immigration judges, screening officers do not have access to such 
training.  This does not necessarily explain the aggression and disbelief of screening 
officers, which speaks directly to the ‘culture of disbelief’ operating within the British 
asylum system.  Expressions of stereotypes by staff members that asylum-seekers are 
‘bogus’ or ‘inauthentic’ surely reflect the entrenchment of disbelief regarding the 
narratives of persecution presented by claimants.  Such disbelief attests to the inherent 
partiality within the asylum system.  
 
At the substantive interview stage, there are also issues with the conduct of decision-
makers.  The instructions on sexual orientation emphasise the use of open questions, 
for claimants to describe the development of their identity.246  The training provides 
meaningful guidance on forming open questions to empower claimants to present 
their lives and experiences as they wish to do:   
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Asking how many times you have had sex with someone is not a particularly 
good question.  It is better to look at how they met, how they were able to 
reveal their feeling to each other and other surrounding issues.247  
 
The training deserves praise for its workshop and discussion-led approach to the issue 
of questioning, including its emphasis on the claimant’s identity and expression, in 
line with sexual diversity.248   
 
Despite the exemplary nature of the training and the availability of good guidance, the 
UKLGIG highlighted problems with questioning within the substantive interview 
setting.  When questioning LGB asylum-seekers, interviewers’ questioning was 
overtly sexualised, veering into the obscene.  Interviewers consistently posed 
insensitive, sexualised questions about the sexual preferences of claimants, despite the 
fact that minority sexual identities cannot be reduced to their sexual practices, as 
underscored throughout this thesis.  Interviewers repeatedly conflated sexual practice 
and sexual identities as one.  Even sexual identity turned on one major issue – the 
claimant’s romantic and sexual relationships.  For example, claimants were asked the 
following questions: ‘Was it loving sex or rough?’, ‘So you had intercourse with him 
and not just blow jobs?’, ‘Can I ask why you did not have penetrative sex at any time 
in Nigeria up until December 2009?’.249  Interviewers also continue to pass judgement 
about claimants’ sexual choices, questioning their non-monogamy.250 
 
The ‘Free Movement’ blog also gained access to the questions posed to a detained 
bisexual claimant during his substantive interview.251  Their obscenity demonstrates 
that inappropriate questioning persists in sexual identity-based asylum claims, despite 
advocacy and training.252  Questions posed by the interviewer included: ‘Did you put 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 ‘FOI 27021’ (106) 25. 
248 Jenni Millbank, ‘The Right of Lesbians and Gay Men to Live Freely, Openly and on Equal Terms Is 
Not Bad Law: A Reply to Hathaway and Pobjoy’ (2012) 44(2) New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 497-527, 513. 
249 UKLGIG ‘Missing the Mark’ (n 24) 20. 
250 ibid. 
251 Colin Yeo, ‘Questions to a Bisexual Asylum Seeker in Detention’ (Free Movement, 24 January 
2014)  <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/questions-to-a-bisexual-asylum-seeker-in-detention/> 
accessed 18 June 2015.  
252 ‘FOI 27021’ (106) 26. 
	  	  
271	  
271	  
your penis into x’s backside?’, ‘When x was penetrating you did you have an 
erection?’, ‘Did x ejaculate inside you?’ and ‘What is it about men’s backsides that 
attracts you?’.253  This evidences the humiliating treatment that some LGB individuals 
are still uniquely subjected to, creating real concerns about the British asylum 
system’s respect for and understanding of the right to be treated with dignity.  Such 
questioning would not be replicated in claims based on other Convention grounds and 
on other PSGs, highlighting the prejudicial nature of the treatment.  This also engages 
Principle 2 of the Yogyakarta Principles on the right to be treated with equality and 
non-discrimination.254 The persistent sexualisation of LGB claims has led the tribunal 
to reproach the Home Office in a particular claim: 
 
I want to make a comment about the Appellant’s asylum interview. The 
Appellant was asked a series of increasingly explicit questions about her 
sexual activities with an alleged lover. These questions were quite 
inappropriate and unnecessary, bordering as they did on the pornographic. 
They were of absolutely no probative value: they were all leading, and could 
have little bearing on whether the Appellant, or anyone else considered her to 
be a lesbian… I therefore suggest that the Respondent desists from having 
officers ask such intimate questions: it is pointless and humiliating for 
interviewees and interviewers alike.255 
 
The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration confirmed the incidence 
of an overly sexualised approach to LGB claims.  His report into LGB decision-
making found inappropriate questioning of a sexual nature in 11% of all LGB claims 
examined, constituting 13 out of 112 claims investigated.256  The Chief Inspector also 
found that the use of sexualised and stereotyped questions most often entered the 
interviews when the interviewer failed to adhere to an open questioning style, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Yeo (n 251). 
254 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (March 2007), 
principle 2.  
255 UKLGIG, ‘Missing the Mark’ (n 24) 20, citing the tribunal decision of a Cameroonian woman 
(Hatton Cross, September 2010).  
256 Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency (n 78) 15 and 20-21. 
	  	  
272	  
272	  
reverted to using closed questions.257  This reflects the findings of this investigation 
regarding the use of interviews to expose the inconsistencies in claimant’s narratives 
(section 2.2.2).  
 
Within the empirical data, several asylum-seekers identified that they had not been 
subjected to such humiliating and prejudicial treatment.  Not only were sexualised 
questions avoided, but also, the questions allowed them to present their experiences in 
an empowering way:  
 
I think the questions and the topics he covered were very brilliant.  They were 
very relevant to his assessment because he had a guide-sheet, a guideline sort 
of.  I guess that’s part of what they give him, so there were questions that he 
needed to cover, or areas that he needed to cover on the sheet (MASY001). 
 
Practitioners agreed that on the whole conduct and questioning had improved.  There 
remained problems with decision-makers’ understanding of the relevant issues.  This 
was manifested in the persistence of problematic questioning and may reinforce the 
inadequacy of training: 
 
I think that Home Office officers have gotten a lot, lot better.  We’ve seen 
more understanding officers, but there are still many people who don’t, who 
aren’t trained properly, and don’t really understand the issues (Barry 
O’Leary). 
 
Although many participants were allowed to present diverse, complex identities, 
several asylum-seeker participants confirmed the subsisting incidence of sexualised 
questioning within their own experiences of the substantive interview: 
 
When I talk[ed] to her about the law and what actually happened, why I ran 
away, and the incidents, she came back to talk about how we practice sex; 
how we normally have sex.  She talked about all that and then she wanted to 
know, this was what she was asking; ‘how hard do you go; how do you have 	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sex; how do you enter each other’.  She want[ed] me to talk about all this.  
And when I stopped, she asked more about that (MASY003).  
 
Therefore, to improve the conduct of its staff, the Home Office must address its 
foundational training and training on LGB issues (and extend the latter to screening 
officers).  It must also acknowledge how the ‘culture of disbelief’ affects the conduct 
of its staff in sexual identity-based claims and work to modify this.   
 
Two important themes emerged from the empirical data in relation to the conduct of 
personnel.  The first is that sexualised questions are both reflective of inadequate 
training or practice regarding interviewing style, and of insufficient knowledge of 
sexual identity and diversity, especially the difference between same-sex sexual 
practice and holding a minority sexual identity.  This was previously found by 
decision-makers’ acceptance of sexually explicit evidence.  Sexual practice does not 
prove one’s identity.  Many people engage in same-sex sexual behaviour without 
identifying as sexual minorities.  The use of outdated conceptions of sexual identity 
and diversity was exemplified by FASY007’s experiences, where the interviewer 
asked her whether she had ever slept with a man in order to clarify her sexuality:  
 
So, um, he asked me a few questions, like, ‘have you ever had sex with a man 
to know that you are a lesbian?’  And I felt that is very, I didn’t know how to 
say it, but it’s very, ohhh…. And I thought, well, having sex with a man 
doesn’t prove your sexuality, does it? (FASY007). 
 
The ignorance of this question is even more troubling in the light of the training 
materials, which clarify the difference between sexual practice and identity: 
 
Sexual orientation and sexual conduct are two very broad and separate 
(although often linked) areas. On top of that, cultures and societies are also 
varied as we know. It is vital we judge each case on its own merits, on a case-
by-case basis.258 
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The second point to be derived from the sexualisation of LGB narratives within the 
substantive interview is that claimants are deprived of the ability to articulate their 
discomfort with such questioning.  They are disempowered and deprived of agency 
due to the imbalance of power within the asylum system, especially in the light of the 
‘culture of disbelief’.  Claimants fear the consequences of objecting to sexualised 
questioning; if they object, their claims could be denied:  
 
I wasn’t comfortable answering those questions, but I had no choice.  I wanted 
to say ‘no’ (MASY008). 
 
The empirical data also articulated the harm caused by ignorant questioning of a 
sexualised nature: 
 
I think the level of harm that you can do to an asylum-seeker if you aren’t 
giving due regard to the topics that you’re asking them, the way in which 
you’re asking them, is something to be concerned about (Paul Dillane). 
 
The harm can be explained in a number of ways.  Refugee status in LGB claims 
depends on the presentation of authentic identities that decision-makers accept as 
genuine; interviews must enable this process.  Furthermore, the high incidence of 
trauma and poor mental health amongst the sexual minority claimants also mandates 
sensitivity and respect when interacting with them.  Thus, drawing decision-makers 
away from the sexualisation of the narrative must be addressed from the root, because 
it is humiliating and an affront to the dignity of LGB people.  It does not help identify 
genuine sexual minorities, and it is harmful to claimants.  The solution lies within 
better recruitment and training. 
 
Although this investigation has found examples of good practice amongst personnel 
within the British asylum system, there are examples of systematic non-compliance 
with the structural principles.  First, personnel engage in the unfair treatment of LGB 
asylum-seekers because they are also affected by the inherent partiality within the 
system.  The ‘culture of disbelief’ empowers personnel to express their homophobia 
or stereotypes about asylum-seekers.  This culture is extremely damaging, as despite 
the existence of some good guidance and training, it allows personnel to depart from 
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them.  Thus, a great deal of decision-making is characterised by inadequate 
interviewing technique and the overt sexualisation of LGB narratives, despite training 
and guidance to the contrary.  The ‘culture of disbelief’ has an impact on another 
structural principle: respect for LGB claimants’ fundamental rights.  Indeed, the 
treatment of LGB asylum-seekers by many personnel neglects the rights of LGB 
persons to equality, non-discriminatory treatment, privacy and integrity.  These are 
systematically ignored.  Finally, although the guidance and training has been good, it 
is clear that such problems can only be resolved by improving the quality of guidance 
and training on sexual diversity and intersectionality further, and by addressing the 
recruitment of the British asylum system personnel.  This is explored in the following 
sub-section.   
  
4.2 The Recruitment and Training of Personnel within the British Asylum 
System 
Scrutinising the recruitment and training of decision-makers within the British asylum 
system is crucial to investigating the fairness of LGB asylum decisions in the UK.  
The structural principles within the theoretical chapter highlighted that a fair asylum 
system must maintain minimum eligibility requirements for potential decision-makers 
(Chapter two).  In line with the UNHCR’s standards, these consisted of university 
level academic qualifications, preferably in law or an asylum-related discipline, prior 
experience in the asylum field (through legal practice or NGO work, for example), 
and an active desire to work in the area of asylum decision-making.259  Stringent 
eligibility standards would facilitate quality decision-making, which is necessary 
given the significant consequences of an adverse asylum decision to a person’s 
physical and mental security. 
 
The insufficiency of the basic skills and experience of decision-makers was raised 
within the empirical data.  Dillane described his concerns regarding the recruitment 
standards employed for decision-making roles and the consequences of recruiting 
individuals without the skills required: 
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I think there is no specific requirement that caseowners are legally trained.  
I’m not necessarily saying that they should be, but I make the point that a 
caseowner navigating judgments like HJ (Iran) may not necessarily have 
taken away all the salient points or relevant issues (Paul Dillane). 
 
The empirical data provided some information on the eligibility standards utilised by 
the Home Office.  The former Home Office decision-maker interviewed for the 
empirical research explained that, during the period of his employment, the minimum 
educational requirements encompassed a specific number of GCSEs.  In his 
experience, most of his colleagues had University degrees, but this was incidental, not 
a requirement: 
 
But there were a certain number of GCSEs that you had to have, but most 
people applied at a considerably higher level than that, and most of my 
colleagues had degrees (Former Home Office caseworker). 
 
Furthermore, he clarified that he had obtained his job through a promotion within the 
Civil Service and that his qualifications, including the degree that he possessed, were 
not required or specific to the role to which he had applied, or the role that he was 
promoted to do as a caseowner/decision-maker.260  He contended, however, that 
despite the low minimum education requirements, numerous tests were conducted to 
ensure employees’ suitability for the role: 
 
There are rigorous tests that you would do.  There’s a certain amount of 
psychometric testing, and there are scenario tests that you do (Former Home 
Office decision-maker). 
 
Although there is little information in the public domain about the Home Office’s 
recruitment standards, an online search of job advertisements provides information 
consistent with the former decision-maker’s claim.  For example, an Administrative 
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Officer would make ‘decisions and initial recommendations’ on asylum claims.261  
One such role advertised in 2008 (prior to this research) sought a minimum of 5 
GCSEs in its job specifications.262  For a role as a Higher Executive Officer, one of 
the most senior decision-maker roles, an applicant required either a university degree 
or, alternatively, 2 A Levels.263  Furthermore, the request for prior experience is not 
specific to the asylum context.  Consequently, it appears that the Home Office’s 
recruitment of decision-makers is inconsistent with the structural principles.  The 
specifications remain too low for individuals granted such critical responsibilities, 
which appears to manifest itself in questionable interviewing styles and inconsistent 
decision-making. 
 
This is evidenced by Dillane’s comments under section 2.2.2 of this chapter, that 
whilst exemplary guidance exists on LGB issues and credibility assessments, these 
are rarely applied, or referenced if they are applied.  These experiences raise questions 
about the ability of decision-makers to apply guidance, in terms of their basic skills 
and experience, and decision-maker training.     
 
The empirical data also identified the active demotion of standards in the asylum 
system.  The Home Office actively reduced the seniority (and experience) required of 
personnel for particular roles within the asylum process.  According to Erin Power, as 
of April 2013, the Home Office had downgraded the level of staff required to conduct 
asylum interviews, meaning that these were now being conducted by less experienced 
personnel: 
 
Now they’ve adopted a new system that came into force on the 1st April 
[2013], where all those people who were trained, I don’t know what’s going to 
happen to them because they’ve lowered the grading of a person who now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Get Smaart, ‘UK Border Agency Officer’ <http://getsmaart.com/career-overviews/uk-border-
agency-officer> accessed 15 November 2015. 
262 UK Visas and Immigration, ‘Asylum Casework Directorate: Administrative Officer (Job 
Advertisement)’ (Online Jobs, October-November 2013) <https://www.online-
jobs.co.uk/ukba/Documents/UKVI0044_Information_for_Applicants.pdf> accessed 15 November 
2015. 
263 Home Office, ‘Higher Executive Officer (HEO) Case Owner & Presenting Officer (Job 
Advertisement)’ (jobsgopublic, May-June 2014) <http://www.jobsgopublic.com/job/higher-executive-
officer-heo-case-owner-presenting-officer-n-a/rss> accessed 15 November 2015. 
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does interviews.  So instead of being at a particular public service grade, 
they’ve dropped it one so they can save money (Erin Power).   
 
This is an extremely important issue. The Home Office’s adoption of such cost-saving 
measures appears to actively contribute to Erin Power’s description of ‘the slipping of 
standards’ within LGB asylum decision-making.  This investigation has already 
identified problematic questioning styles in LGB claims (section 2.2 and 4.1 above).  
Downgrading the quality of staff conducting the substantive interviews suggests that 
problematic questioning will not only persist, but also perhaps worsen.  The 
importance of these issues is underscored in the following paragraphs in relation to 
cost efficiency in an era of scarce resources. 
 
The economic dimensions of this discussion are especially important to the issue of 
training.  The training provided to decision-makers is examined within this thesis 
from two perspectives.  The first is with regard to the initial training provided to 
employees recruited by the Home Office to become asylum decision-makers.  The 
second concerns the training available on LGB issues.  On the initial training, the 
Home Office responded to the first Freedom of Information request, outlining that a 
‘25 day Foundation Training Programme’ was provided to all new asylum decision-
makers in-house by the Asylum Casework Directorate Learning Development 
team.264  The Home Office Presenting Officer Units were also provided with an 
adapted version of the course by the ‘appeals training team’.265  With regard to the 
second perspective, the Home Office explained that over 2010-2012, the ‘Learning 
and Development team trained all existing decision-making staff’ on LGB issues, 
with the training now being ‘incorporated into the 25 day Foundation Training 
Programme’.266  The Home Office made available to the researcher the training 
materials on LGB issues.  These have formed a core part of the analysis of the British 
asylum system within this thesis. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 FOI 27021 (n 106) 5-6. 
265 ibid. 
266 ibid. 
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The empirical data highlighted several issues with both of these training components.  
With regard to the foundation training, it appeared that the training provided to new 
decision-makers was of reduced quality and rigour when compared to the previous 
training.  The former Home Office decision-maker received training on two 
occasions, first in his capacity as a caseworker, and subsequently, in his enhanced 
capacity as a caseowner.  When comparing these two training programmes, the 
interviewee highlighted that the first training that he received was of better quality, 
despite the fact that the second training was for an advanced role: 
 
If I was completely candid, I’d say the training I had as a caseworker was far 
more rigorous than the training I had as a caseowner.  And the job, as a 
caseowner, was supposed to be a more overarching role that had responsibility 
end to end in the process… But the training for that process was an awful lot 
less detailed, and an awful lot less rigorous than the training for the job of 
someone who was a dedicated worker, who may not be involved at initial 
screening stages, but would be involved at the interview stage, the decision-
making stage, the implementation of the decision (Former Home Office 
decision-maker).    
 
The interviewee experienced a disparity in the rigour and quality of training provided 
to him on two occasions, although the second role was the more expansive and 
demanding.  He emphasised that both training periods took place over ‘weeks and 
weeks’.  The interviewee did not provide figures for both training periods, but 
described the length of the later training for the caseowner role: 
 
Even the second time that I did my training when I was training to be a 
caseowner, that took 60 days (Former Home Office decision-maker). 
 
It is possible that the reduced length of the second training period did not sacrifice 
quality for efficiency.  It is difficult to believe, however, that the Home Office could 
legitimately create training of a reduced duration for a more demanding role.  The 
interviewees’ prior experience and training did not appear to be a factor in the 
development of the second training, thus it cannot be that the latter training 
programme was intended to be supplementary.  The interviewee’s identification of the 
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reduced quality of the latter training supports the ‘slipping standards’ contended by 
Erin Power above.  He described this in his own terms: 
 
I have seen a decay in the quality of training myself, as I’ve explained to you.  
The early training I had was of the highest standard, and the later training that 
I had was possibly adequate, and it was adequate because I’d had previous 
training (Former Home Office decision-maker).   
 
This statement is even more powerful when comparing this training to that in 
operation today.  The further reduction of training that the former decision-maker had 
described as ‘adequate’ is extremely concerning.  From the Home Office’s response 
to the Freedom of Information request, it is clear that the training programme has 
been reduced further from 60 days to 25.  This must represent another significant 
compromise in the quality and/or rigour of the training, supported by the extensive 
problems with the decision-making that have been identified within this investigation, 
at both substantive and procedural levels.  If the interviewee was able to call the 60-
day training ‘adequate’ only because of the prior training that he had received, the 25-
day training period cannot be sufficient.  This comparison provides a powerful 
statement on the Home Office’s commitment to exemplary training standards and its 
understanding of the fundamental role of training in a fair asylum system.  If decision-
makers do not have the skills to make correct and properly assessed decisions, the 
process cannot be fair. 
 
These concerns were replicated within the empirical data amongst practitioners, who 
specifically highlighted poor interviewing skills amongst Home Office personnel: 
 
You do see, simply from the SEF [Statement of Evidence Form] interviews 
[transcripts] that I see over many years, both as a practitioner and here at 
Amnesty at intervening cases, a great level of divergence in the way in which 
people are interviewed, and I think that that is symptomatic there is a need for 
greater attention to the training they receive (Paul Dillane).  
 
Thus, it is clear that a substantial cause of the problems within decision-making lies 
with the quality of the initial training of new decision-makers.  Erin Power identified 
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above that the Home Office is using less experienced personnel to conduct 
substantive asylum interviews as of April 2013.  It appears likely, therefore, that 
during the process of researching and writing this thesis, interviewing standards will 
have continued to deteriorate. 
 
With respect of the training on LGB issues, participants of the empirical research 
commended the Home Office.  Practitioners praised the development and 
implementation of training where none had existed before, and the consultation of 
NGOs with extensive experience when developing such materials.  As the Home 
Office identified, the training was developed with the UNHCR, and NGOs such as 
Stonewall and the UKLGIG:267   
 
The Home Office have actually got better in recent years, of actually letting 
outsiders into this…our experience definitely is that there is undoubtedly 
better training, mainly through the work of the UKLGIG (Barry O’Leary). 
 
Practitioners also commended the Home Office for subjecting all decision-makers to 
compulsory training on LGB issues over 2010-2012, resulting in the tangible 
improvement of decision-making.268  Since this period, however, Erin Power reported 
that the training had been modified.  Whereas a full one-day course was initially 
provided, this was now a reduced part of the initial training programme for new 
decision-makers.  Consequently, they feared that previously eradicated issues were 
returning to the determinations of LGB claims: 
 
Two years ago now, they trained every single caseowner in the country, a 
formal one-day course, which was huge.  And we did see decisions change, so 
we saw far, far better questioning, much less focus on sexual activity, Western 
stereotypes.  But I think they’re slipping, I think some of the old questions are 
slipping back in because it’s different people now and they don’t get a whole 
day, it’s just part of the overall training to be caseowners (Erin Power). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 ibid.  
268 Interview with Erin Power. 
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This comment is important, as it summarises some of the key findings of this 
investigation, in terms of the narrow, closed questioning, focus on sexual behaviour 
rather than identity, and the restrictive understandings of sexual diversity, and links 
these issues to poor training.  Dillane also highlighted the problem of training, 
pointing out the conflict between the training and guidance on LGB matters, and the 
on-going rejection of LGB claims on spurious grounds: 
 
My problem is that if that training had been sufficient and if these internal 
documents, which are laudable, were sufficient, we wouldn’t continue to see 
the types of refusal decisions that we’re seeing today.  So there’s a problem 
there (Paul Dillane). 
 
On this basis, the empirical data identified concerns regarding the quality of the 
training on LGB issues, as discussed above.  Participants also accentuated the need 
for training to be offered regularly to embed the content within the minds and 
decisions of decision-makers personnel: 
 
You can’t talk to a group once in 2011 and then think that that’s okay then.  
You’ve got to continually, continually, continually inform your staff, train 
your staff properly, because some staff will get it straight away, some 
interviewing officers, it could actually just be an ignorance to really 
understand what it is about sexual identity (Barry O’Leary). 
 
It is insufficient for decision-makers to be trained on LGB issues at the outset of their 
training, never to return to the matter.  In the response to the initial Freedom of 
Information request, the Home Office stated that decision-makers had the option of 
repeating the training, if they felt it was necessary.  The choice implied is problematic 
because it enables decision-makers to never return to the training on LGB issues, 
should they feel it unnecessary.  Erin Power also highlighted the danger of allowing 
decision-makers such discretion, as many failed to acknowledge that they needed 
training in the first place, let alone that they required it again.269  Training must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 ‘FOI 27021’ (n 106) 5.  The FOI states that ‘the training is available to be repeated as necessary’, 
presumably granting decision-makers or their supervisors the discretion to decide whether additional 
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repeated regularly to ensure that the content is embedded within decision-makers’ 
understanding, abilities and skills.  Moreover, although an initial course may 
introduce the issues relevant in sexual identity-based asylum claims, the scope for 
learning is not exhausted.  The empirical research underscored an evolving approach 
to the training on LGB issues.  Training needed to, first, address the most pressing 
issues and, then, move onto more complex issues of identity: 
 
There’s not enough emphasis about identity, so that needs to be changed.  
There needs to be more work about what is LGB, because there’s an awful lot 
of stereotypes flying out there which is a very Western, even London-centric 
kind of view of what LGB is (Professional Participant A). 
 
Training on LGB issues is not an issue that only regards Home Office decision-
makers.  The empirical data addressed the training and knowledge of immigration 
judges: 
 
Judges aren’t trained, so when we are talking about training we are talking 
about the Home Office, so judges need to be trained.  They’ve had two talks, 
but they were voluntary attendance (Erin Power). 
 
It is troubling that immigration judges are not subjected to compulsory training.  As 
this investigation has found, tribunal judges also committed many of the same 
mistakes found within the Home Office with respect of LGB asylum decisions.  
Tribunal decisions were also inconsistent.  Judges essentialised LGB identities, 
ignoring sexual diversity, and failed to take an intersectional approach to such claims.  
Judges also misapplied evidentiary thresholds, subjecting LGB claims to prejudicial 
treatment and the burden of proving their sexual identities.  The lack of compulsory 
training for judges is also important in the light of Erin Power’s experiences of 
resistance to training on LGB issues within the Home Office.270  The voluntary nature 
of the talks allows immigration judges to defer to their ‘superior knowledge’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the empirical data, many decision-makers believed that they did not need such training, despite 
admitting subsequently that they had learned from it:  ‘People were like, “I don’t need to be trained, I 
know how to do this”.  But after the training, they were saying, “No, I really didn’t know.  I have 
learned a lot”’ (Erin Power). 
270 ibid.  
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rejecting the scope for greater learning.  The inconsistency of tribunal decisions 
demonstrates that this discretion is dangerous at appeal level too.  Without certain 
assurances, which depend on compulsory training, one cannot be confident that 
tribunal judges have the knowledge and skills to understand the unique challenges of 
LGB claims.  As highlighted in Chapter two, perceptions of fairness are just as critical 
as their practical operation.      
 
The empirical data also emphasised the importance of training legal representatives 
on LGB issues.  This would ensure that more representatives would be competent 
enough to represent LGB claimants, reducing the pressure on those who have 
developed a reputation for their expertise in such claims.  Regardless of duties of 
cooperation in the UK system, the burden of proof ultimately lies on the claimant.  A 
representative should be in a position to help a sexual minority asylum-seeker to best 
present their claim.  Training can facilitate this.  A participant of the empirical 
research explained that this issue involved ensuring that legal representatives could 
access such training on LGB asylum issues throughout the country.  Whilst such 
training would be accessible in London, the dispersal of LGB asylum-seekers across 
the country means that such training must be available to representatives outside the 
capital: 
 
We know there are huge swathes of the UK where refugee lawyers simply will 
not be able to access that training conveniently and if you are really looking to 
improve standards across the UK, that training needs to be outside of London 
as well.  I do think that there are very junior lawyers who are trying to do the 
best that they can with the knowledge that they have, but that training and 
materials can help them to understand and represent the client to the best of 
their ability (Paul Dillane). 
 
This examination has demonstrated a key problem with the procedural fairness of the 
asylum system for LGB refugees, which lies not only with the rigour and quality of 
the training delivered to new asylum decision-makers, but also with the truncated, 
static and one-off nature of the training that is delivered on LGB issues.  Poor quality 
training, alongside poor recruitment standards are in themselves procedurally unfair, 
and have contributed to the other issues of procedural and substantive fairness that 
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have been identified throughout this investigation of the British asylum system from 
the sexual minority perspective.  The training of immigration judges and of legal 
representatives is also a significant part of this overall problem.  Until the quality, 
rigour and repetition (and voluntary nature) of all training are not addressed, the 
overall fairness of the system cannot improve.  Poor training is inextricably linked to 
poor understandings of refugee law, leading to substantive unfairness also. 
 
Aside from the concerns regarding the length, quality and delivery of training, an 
additional issue is the well-being and retention of decision-makers.  The empirical 
data highlighted that the Home Office struggled to retain its staff: 
 
They have a huge issue with staff turnover in this area.  People won’t stay 
(Erin Power). 
 
The former Home Office decision-maker interviewed in the empirical data confirmed 
the high staff turnover: 
 
Most of my colleagues have left, who I worked with at the time, have left the 
asylum business proper, and may still work in the Home Office, but have got 
out of asylum (Former Home Office decision-maker). 
 
There is a valuable lesson within these comments.  It is essential to an efficient 
asylum system that it retains its decision-makers, particularly those who have 
amassed a significant amount of experience and skills.  The consequences of not 
addressing a high staff turnover are the economic costs of constantly recruiting and 
training new staff to the high standards necessary, and the negative impact on the 
quality of decision-making.  It is for this reason that the UNHCR and the structural 
principles in Chapter two emphasise the importance of recruiting individuals with a 
desire to work within the field of asylum.  Without such motivation (and the 
necessary working conditions), it appears that decision-makers eventually transfer to 
other roles within the civil service.  The excerpt above highlights this.  
 
There is an important component to this issue regarding the well-being of the Home 
Office decision-makers.  In the empirical data, the former Home Office decision-
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maker spoke of the rapid ‘burn-out’ of decision-makers due to the target-driven 
culture of the Home Office, and the constant exposure to traumatic experiences:  
 
When I entered into the job, we were told, doing this job has an 18 month, two 
year burn-out time, because it’s like I told you, best case scenario, you’re 
giving someone bad news, whatever you tell them.  And the things that you 
have to research, the photographs that you see, and the accounts that you read 
– so if you become inured to that, then it’s really quite bad (Former Home 
Office decision-maker). 
 
The emotionally charged nature of the work, exposure to trauma and persecution, and 
the pressures of the role, mean that trained decision-makers do not stay in the 
position, preferring other civil service roles.271  It is in the Home Office’s economic 
interests to address this, as it would reduce the continued need to recruit new 
decision-makers and retain experience within the institution.  It would also allow the 
Home Office to focus on improving the skills of its staff, rather than ensuring that 
they are merely able to function. 
 
It is important to place these arguments regarding the economic efficiency of better 
training and retention of decision-makers in the context of scarce resources: 
 
So there are various changes nowadays. You have the problem of spending 
cuts, but you also have the question of how to embed the side of culture, the 
part of human rights culture, like LGBTI people’s rights (Joël Le Déroff). 
 
Understandably, public authorities are faced with the challenge of making their 
asylum systems more cost-effective in an era where political and economic 
considerations are paramount.  As stated in Chapter two, the British asylum system is 
forced to balance these concerns with the requirements of fairness in the asylum 
context.  The former Home Office decision-maker explained that political and 
economic concerns dictated the ‘under-resourcing’ of the asylum system: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 UNHCR, ‘QI Project: First Report’ (n 259) 10.  The tendency for Home Office decision-makers to 
move to other Civil Service roles was also confirmed by the empirical data, in the interview with the 
former Home Office decision-maker. 
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Without this becoming a political conversation, the problem of under-
resourcing of the Home Office, and the under-resourcing of training of Home 
Office staff… the point that I’m making is that there are processes outside the 
asylum process, which politicise the asylum process.  So without those being 
addressed, the Home Office is an easy scapegoat (Former Home Office 
decision-maker).   
 
One appreciates that in the exercise of balancing political and economic factors with 
the requirement of fairness in the asylum context, it could appear logical to reduce 
expenditure through personnel, i.e., recruitment, training and salaries.  The imposition 
of targets is another strategy.  This is short-sighted, however, as the cost-cutting 
approaches of the Home Office have led to an asylum system that is unfair, inefficient 
and expensive.  This is demonstrated by the fact that not investing in the high-quality 
training of Home Office decision-makers means that the initial decision-making stage 
is neglected.  By weakening the quality of initial decisions, more rejected claims are 
taken to the immigration tribunal and appellate courts (where they are often 
overturned), to the system’s expense.272  This unfair, expensive and inefficient system 
could be addressed by a greater number of correct decisions in the first instance.  For 
emphasis of this argument, it is valuable to restate the former Home Office decision-
maker’s comments on the culture of initial decision-making: 
 
There’s always at the back of people’s mind a failsafe, that if I make the 
wrong decision and it’s a refusal, well, it’ll go to court, and the person will 
appeal, and the judge will grant them.  Well that’s a very expensive and 
inefficient process (Former Home Office decision-maker).   
 
This excerpt emphasises the complicity of Home Office decision-makers in their poor 
decision-making, and in the inefficiency of the British asylum system.  This is even 
more troubling given the problems with tribunal decision-making.  In cases where the 
tribunal makes an incorrect decision, claimants must take their cases to the appellate 
courts, or return to the Home Office to make further representations.  Yet, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 See Chapter One for details on the number of claims that are allowed on appeal. 
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important to underscore that this is not the fault of individual decision-makers, but the 
overarching culture and demands of the public authority.  In order to satisfy the public 
demand that immigration be managed strictly, the fairness of decision-making has 
been disregarded: 
 
They’re always going to respond to a public attitude.  No government is going 
to say, ‘Look, let’s open the doors to particularly vulnerable people’ and 
expect to stay in power.  So until you change the way people see our clients, 
then we’re always going to be carrying out a battle, aren’t we?  We’re always 
going to be up against, no matter how pretty the system was, there’s an 
underlying ‘deny, refuse, get them out’.  That is the underlying, whatever 
pretty policies and pretty trainings and apparently fair processes exist, the 
underlying message is ‘do not grant, do not allow’ (Erin Power).   
 
The investigation into the recruitment and training standards of the British asylum 
system has revealed their non-compliance with the structural principles.  Not only has 
the Home Office failed to adhere to UNHCR guidelines on the minimum 
qualifications and experience required from employees recruited to make asylum 
decisions (which the structural principles adopted), but it has also downgraded the 
quality of staff required to conduct asylum interviews.  Similarly, on the matter of 
training, the Home Office’s training programme is inadequate.  The degradation of 
the quality of training over the years is clear; the substantially reduced duration of the 
training has undoubtedly sacrificed its quality.  Additionally, the sacrifice in the 
quality of training on LGB issues, and the Home Office’s failure to understand that its 
repetition is fundamental to the improved understanding of sexual diversity amongst 
decision-makers, is damaging.  Moreover, there is no compulsory training on LGB 
issues for tribunal judges.  It is clear that these two issues can explain certain 
problems identified in this investigation regarding unfair decision-making in LGB 
claims.  The solutions to providing a fairer asylum system for LGB asylum-seekers 
are complex, multi-layered and interlinked.  The internal culture of decision-making 
within the Home Office, however, highlights the institution’s vulnerability to political 
issues.  These cannot be resolved easily.   
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5. Conclusion  
 
This procedural investigation of the British asylum system has demonstrated that the 
system is capable of treating LGB asylum-seekers fairly.  In many areas, it has 
successfully discharged its obligations towards LGB asylum-seekers under the 
structural principles, for example, by rejecting the submission of sexualised evidence, 
empowering claimants to present diverse narratives, and not detaining LGB victims of 
torture.   
 
Nonetheless, throughout this chapter, the persistent examples of negative treatment 
and decision-making demonstrate that too often the system is inconsistent and unfair 
towards LGB claimants.  First, the system’s fundamental rights obligations towards 
LGB claimants are repeatedly ignored.  As a result, claimants must make significant 
compromises with the right to privacy during the interviewing process (accepting the 
sexualisation of their narratives), for example, when trying to ‘prove’ their sexualities 
through documentary evidence and when seeking medical care whilst detained.  The 
physical and mental health impact of detention on LGB claimants is ignored, as are 
histories of torture and trauma on the suitability for detention or DFT.  The Home 
Office ignores enforced discretion within detention, whilst recognising its gravity in 
the context of persecution and the refugee definition.  This shows that the British 
system either remains ignorant, or is not serious about how LGB individuals’ 
fundamental rights operate.  Secondly, the British asylum system’s inconsistent, 
inflexible and often stringent operation of the evidentiary thresholds excludes 
deserving LGB claimants from protection, in light of the inappropriate way it applies 
the ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ and ‘benefit of the doubt’ tests in relation to 
documentary evidence and narrative evidence.  Here too, the resistance towards 
intersectional decision-making and understanding of sexual diversity means that 
evidentiary thresholds stand as lofty barriers against granting protection to complex 
sexual identities.    
 
The unfair treatment of LGB claimants can be understood with further reference to 
the structural principles.  The issues uncovered in this chapter place substantial 
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pressure upon legal representatives to overcome the flaws within the system. 
Representatives must take specific steps to pre-empt the poor decision-making of the 
system, giving their clients the best chances of success.  This often results in 
representatives believing that compromising their clients’ rights is necessary to secure 
refugee protection.  Detention and DFT force LGB claimants to access legal 
representatives without the necessary competence in sexual identity-based asylum 
claims.  As a result, numerous claimants are compelled to remain in detention for 
longer, at great personal harm, to access an appropriately skilled representative.  
 
With regard to guidance itself, this chapter has evidenced that, whilst the guidance is 
broadly of good quality, the British asylum system fails to integrate into its training 
and guidance the knowledge of human memory and the impact of trauma on memory.  
The consequence of this is that LGB (and other) claimants are subjected to inscrutable 
standards at interviews and within the RSD with regard to what is considered to be 
true and rational behaviour.  They are punished over acceptable and natural 
inconsistencies in their narratives through the deprivation of refugee protection.  
Nonetheless, good guidance cannot always ensure fair decision-making.  There are 
repeated examples of the disconnect between the content of training and guidance, 
one the one hand, and the decisions refusing LGB claimants refugee protection, on the 
other hand.  Additionally, on the issue of training, the overall quality of the training, 
both in terms of the foundation programme and the training on LGB issues, must be 
overhauled.  Moreover, the ongoing training needs of decision-makers, particularly on 
understanding the breadth and complexity of sexual diversity, have been insufficiently 
addressed.    
 
Finally, partiality within the asylum procedure has the greatest influence on the fair 
treatment of LGB asylum-seekers.  The clear presence of a ‘culture of disbelief’, both 
in terms of the attitudes of individual personnel and the culture of the Home Office as 
an institution, has impacted severely the system’s compliance with the structural 
principles.  The impact of this culture can be seen in the credibility assessments of 
narrative and documentary evidence, decisions regarding the suitability for detention 
and DFT, the administration of healthcare and consideration of medical issues, the 
attitudes of personnel, and the truncated quality of training for decision-makers.  
Furthermore, the ‘culture of disbelief’ has enabled the poor understanding of sexual 
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identity to persist, facilitated by homophobia and reduced, infrequent and static 
training.  As a result, although many of the issues discussed in this chapter also affect 
claimants seeking protection on other grounds, this ignorance means that LGB 
claimants experience these issues most acutely.  It also ensures that there is little 
motivation to improve the fairness of the system by conducting intersectional 
decision-making that applies the correct evidentiary standards. 
 
Compliance with the individual structural principles is intertwined.  For example, the 
bias and poor training and recruitment standards impact the respect for fundamental 
rights, access to legal representation or adherence to guidance.  Given the additional 
layer of political and economic discourses affecting the operation of the British 
asylum system, it is clear that there are no shortcuts to securing a fair asylum system 
for LGB asylum-seekers.  
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Chapter Five 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis investigated the fairness of the British asylum system for asylum-seekers 
claiming protection on the basis of their sexual identities.  The research makes an 
original contribution in two crucial ways: first, by drawing on a range of theoretical 
perspectives to probe the idea of fairness in the British asylum system, and second, 
through the collection of qualitative data on the diverse experiences of asylum-seekers 
and stakeholders working within the asylum system.  Most importantly, the latter 
comprised of detailed interviews with these stakeholders and two Freedom of 
Information requests submitted to the Home Office, allowing access to an unusually 
rich and diverse set of data.   
 
This thesis critically analysed, from a legal perspective, the treatment of sexual 
identity-based asylum claims in the UK.  The seminal case of HJ (Iran)1, which has 
been lauded as correcting certain historical injustices towards LGB asylum claims, 
played an important role in this thesis.2  By examining LGB decision-making in the 
post-HJ (Iran) climate, this thesis addressed an identifiable gap in the current 
research.  Limited research focusing on the perspectives of LGB asylum-seekers 
themselves, also led to this thesis using empirical data to foreground the experiences 
of sexual minority asylum-seekers.   
 
The methodology of this investigation was inspired by evaluation theory (Chapter 
one) and permitted the appraisal of the UK’s treatment of LGB asylum claims to be 
steeped openly in values encompassed by fairness.  The methodology also pursued a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
2 S. Chelvan, ‘Put Your Hands Up (If You Feel Love)’ (2010) JCWI Bulletin 56, 57. 
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mixed methods approach, combining the (initial) doctrinal research process with a 
subsequent qualitative empirical research component.  Through a socio-legal 
approach, this investigation could focus on analysing the experiences of LGB asylum-
seekers in the UK.  Juxtaposing the legal critique of the asylum process with insight 
into the human experience is critical for three reasons.  First, a socio-legal approach 
foregrounds the dignity of asylum-seekers by examining their responses to different 
facets of the asylum process.  This is often missing from legal analyses.  Secondly, it 
focuses on the empowerment and cooperation of the claimant, without which the 
asylum process cannot take place effectively.  Emotions of fear, vulnerability and 
mistrust, for example, drive the way that a claimant navigates the system, and thus 
heavily influence whether the claim is successful and whether the procedure itself is 
considered so.  Thirdly, the socio-legal approach of this thesis places the investigation 
within a broader context, relating to the perceptions of the asylum system and of 
migration within British society.  
 
Finally, the principles of intersectionality and sexual diversity advanced within the 
introductory chapter helped to further set the parameters of this investigation, 
particularly in relation to the nature and content of sexual identity.  A strong 
resistance has developed within queer theory to understanding sexual identity within 
the ‘heterosexual/homosexual’ binary.3  Moreover, the models for understanding 
‘queer’ identities do not account for affiliation with multiple groups simultaneously, 
such as on grounds of race or religion, for example.4  Researchers have documented 
how sexual minorities are often encouraged to self-categorise in ways that prioritise 
the sexual identity, by neglecting other important identity categories.  This ignores the 
fact that an individual’s experience of the world is shaped by their multifaceted 
affiliations.5  Restricting the characterisation of LGB identity through the perspectives 
of white sexual minorities, due to their ‘cultural visibility and academic productivity’, 
has, therefore, helped further advance the values of this thesis.6  Prior to conducting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 David Valentine, ‘“I Went to Bed with My Own Kind Once”: the Erasure of Desire in the Name of 
Identity’ (2003) 23(2) Language & Communication 123-138, 123. 
4 Layli Phillips and Marla R. Stewart, ‘“I Am Just So Glad You Are Alive”: New Perspectives on Non-
Traditional, Non-Conforming, and Transgressive Expressions of Gender, Sexuality, and Race Among 
African Americans’ (2008) 12(4) Journal of African-American Studies 378-400, 379. 
5 ibid 380. 
6 ibid 381. 
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this investigation, it became clear that a fair system for LGB asylum-seekers hinges 
on caseworkers and decision-makers grasping the diversity and complexity of LGB 
identities.  Sexuality cannot be contemplated in isolation.  Sexuality should be 
considered in conjunction with the influence of other identity categories on one’s life 
experiences, and specifically, their confluence.  These include categories such as: sex, 
race, gender, education, culture and class.7  The principles of intersectionality and 
sexual diversity have thus informed an analysis that sought to capture the variability 
in the experience of the asylum process. It also captured the variance in decision-
making, depending upon the complexity of a claimant’s identity, and its potential for 
recognition by the decision-maker.8  This applies not only to procedural aspects of the 
British asylum system, but to substantive matters too, such as the need to view the 
Refugee Convention as an evolving instrument, such that legal tests are grounded in 
the changing attitudes towards sexual identity.  
 
By way of example, the empirical data examined the case of FASY003, a Pakistani 
lesbian, whose poor education and ongoing internal debate regarding her sexual 
identity were issues important to her persecutory narrative and experience of the 
asylum system.  Similarly, for FASY009, a Nigerian lesbian, socio-economic factors 
and experiences of racism dictated her ability to document her sexuality within the 
UK.   
 
This thesis grappled with the idea of fairness, querying whether it held enough 
substance to direct and inform the investigation of the British asylum system.  If it 
did, what should be the standards of fairness in the asylum system?  To what kind of 
treatment were LGB (and other) asylum-seekers entitled?  Consequently, Chapter two 
explored the substance of fairness, using legal theory to explain the importance of fair 
treatment.9  Fairness describes how the inherently unbalanced relationship between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Danielle N. Shapiro, Desdamona Rios, and Abigail J. Stewart, ‘Conceptualizing Lesbian Sexual 
Identity Development: Narrative Accounts of Socializing Structures and Individual Decisions and 
Actions’ (2010) 20(4) Feminism & Psychology 491-510, 492; Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] U. Chi. Legal F. 139. 
8 Sarah Hinger, ‘Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Identity in Gender and Sexual Orientation Based 
Asylum Claims’ (2010) 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 367, 390-392. 
9 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (Belknap 
Press, 2007) 10-11. 
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the state (and its power) and the individual should be governed.  In this way, fairness 
encompasses the tacit equilibrium of the social contract, which mandates that states 
exercise their decision-making power with respect for the fundamental rights of 
individuals and their dignity.10   
 
Fairness is also a touchstone of the UK legal system.  Fairness is shaped through 
provisions of UK administrative law, international human rights law and 
supranational treaties, such as those enabling the UK’s membership of the EU and its 
ability to legislate on asylum matters.  In Chapter two, these provisions helped to 
create structural principles outlining the basis of a fair asylum system for LGB 
asylum-seekers.  For the ease of analysis, the principles were divided into those 
required to achieve substantive fairness and those necessary for procedural fairness.  
Most importantly, these principles were used as the analytical framework for the 
subsequent investigation of the British asylum system.  Although the principles are 
used to examine LGB asylum-claims, they are significant because they articulate 
standards deserved by all asylum-seekers. Thus, this framework forms a substantial 
part of the original contribution of this thesis, not only because of the standards 
espoused in the LGB context, but also because the framework can be used to evaluate 
the fairness of decision-making on all asylum grounds.   
 
Chapters three and four conducted the investigation into the British asylum system, 
examining the law and policy, and its implementation on various issues, with recourse 
to doctrinal and empirical data.  Chapter three analysed the UK system for LGB 
asylum-seekers with respect to substantive fairness.  To do so, it relied upon the legal 
framework established by Article 1A of the Refugee Convention.  The chapter 
focused on issues pertaining to claimants fulfilling the Article 1A criteria, establishing 
their entitlement to refugee protection.  It scrutinised the outcome of LGB asylum 
claims, examining whether the decision-makers’ RSDs were conducted fairly with 
respect of the Article 1A criteria.   
 
The conclusions of Chapter three mapped directly onto the components of substantive 
fairness identified in the structural principles of Chapter two.  It found that the HJ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 John Locke, First Treatise of Government, 42. 
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(Iran) decision had improved the fairness of decision-making.  For example, on issues 
of internal relocation and discretion, the British system often made nuanced decisions 
in recognition of the fundamental rights of LGB asylum-seekers.  It also found, 
however, ongoing problems regarding LGB rights.  The developing understanding of 
how sexual identity engages with fundamental rights resulted in the failure to respect 
LGB claimants’ fundamental rights, rigid (and exclusionary) approaches to the 
refugee criteria, and the misapplication of evidentiary standards.  Procedural tools 
provided greater insight into this non-compliance with the substantive structural 
principles.  A significant factor was HJ (Iran)’s facilitation of structural, cultural and 
evidentiary problems by entrenching disbelief into the analysis with respect to the 
claimant’s sexual identity.  Furthermore, the bias embedded within the British system 
by the ‘culture of disbelief’ enhanced the role of legal representatives in surmounting 
the obstacles within LGB claims.  It also placed great strain upon a limited number of 
representatives experienced in such claims. 
 
Chapter four conducted the investigation into the British asylum system with regard 
to procedural fairness.  This concentrated on the procedural aspects of asylum 
decision-making, including a primary focus on the credibility assessments of LGB 
claimants.  This process is not about fulfilling the refugee definition.  Rather, the 
decision-maker determines whether he or she believes the narrative of identity and 
persecution presented.11  The credibility assessment is perhaps the most important 
part of asylum decision-making, as the assessment takes place at two stages, 
concerning documentary evidence and/or narrative evidence.12  As the ‘credibility’ of 
an asylum-seeker is at the heart of the asylum claim, procedural fairness is even more 
important to the asylum system than in other areas of administrative law.  The entire 
success of an asylum claim hinges on whether a decision-maker finds the applicant 
credible enough to warrant protection.   
 
The conclusions of Chapter four mapped onto the components of procedural fairness 
under the structural principles.  For example, LGB claimants were disproportionately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Michael Kagan, ‘Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee 
Status Determination’ (2002) 17 Geo. Immigr. LJ 367, 371-375. 
12 James A. Sweeney, ‘Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law’ (2009) 21(4) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 700-26, 710-711. 
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subjected to detention and DFT, raising questions about partiality within the asylum 
system.  The chapter also identified issues with the quality of training, the conduct of 
personnel, the role of legal representatives and the quality of guidance on issues 
relating to memory and trauma, each of which relate to specific structural principles.  
As in Chapter three, however, many components of the asylum procedure had 
substantive implications.  For example, DFT, detention and interview (in the form of 
sexualised questioning) reflected disregard for the fundamental rights of LGB 
claimants.  Insufficient guidance and disbelief also distorted the evidentiary standards 
applied within the credibility assessments of LGB claims.  Thus, whilst the 
substantive and procedural separation worked, their intersection simultaneously 
underscored the system’s complexity and correspondingly, claimants’ need for high 
standards of substantive and procedural fairness in order to access a fair asylum 
system.  
 
The conclusions drawn from this investigation are now pulled together in a series of 
concluding observations outlined below.  These conclusions describe the British 
asylum system’s ongoing failure to understand the characteristics of sexual identity, 
namely their intersectional and diverse nature.  They also emphasise how sexual 
minority asylum-seekers are forced to navigate the asylum procedure within the UK 
in ways that are prejudicial and ignore the fundamental rights implications of such 
unfair treatment.  Subsequently, these conclusions place the unfair treatment of LGB 
asylum-seekers within a broader context of poor standards within the British asylum 
system overall, before describing some final thoughts on the unfair treatment of LGB 
asylum-seekers and areas of further research. 
 
 
2. Insufficient Understandings of Sexual Diversity and the 
Intersectional Nature of Identity 
 
This investigation has uncovered examples of good practice on matters of substantive 
and procedural fairness within the British asylum system and of certain improvements 
within the British asylum system’s treatment of LGB claims.  Yet, from the problems 
identified, it is clear that decision-makers and officials hold a poor understanding of 
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sexual identity, which is reflected in substantive and procedural matters alike.  First, 
the system continues to fail in its understanding of how the experiences of LGB 
asylum-seekers engage human rights standards.  For example, with regard to the 
actual asylum procedure, officials remain ignorant as to why LGB people are 
vulnerable to serious physical and mental harm in detention (Chapter four).  The 
empirical data shared the perspective of LGB claimants who hid their sexualities to 
avoid harm, emphasising this argument.   
 
The failure to understand LGB rights also exists regarding substantive matters 
pertaining to the refugee definition.  The UK system does not recognise the serious 
nature of even the ‘mere existence’ of legal sanctions criminalising same-sex sexual 
relations (Chapter three).  According to the UK system, the ‘mere existence’ of 
sanctions alone cannot meet the thresholds of persecution, although this thesis 
contends that their impact is persecutory.   
 
Secondly, the failure to understand sexuality is also exemplified by the system’s 
ongoing conception of sexual identity as a form of behaviour, not identity, despite 
guidance and training to the contrary.  The focus on behaviour is exemplified most 
clearly by the construction and interpretation of the five-stage test advanced by Lord 
Rodgers in HJ (Iran) on determining LGB claims (Chapter three).  Decision-makers 
are instructed to apply a test centred on the degree of ‘openness’ with which the 
claimant would choose to live.  Yet, a claimant’s ‘openness’ does not necessarily 
dictate the seriousness of the risk of persecution.  Furthermore, discretion does not 
repudiate the risk of harm.  Despite the CJEU identifying in the case of X, Y and Z 
that discussions on discretion or concealment have no place in the RSD,13 the HJ 
(Iran) test remains unchanged. 
 
The empirical data provided greater insight into the conflation of identity and 
behaviour.  For example, one of the reasons for refusing MASY003 protection was 
the assertion that he would be voluntarily discreet upon return to Ghana.  In a separate 
example, the asylum-seeker interviewees provided documentary evidence consisting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Joined Cases C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12, X, Y and Z v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie 
en Asiel [2013] [70]. 
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of expressions that consciously engaged the public domain, such as bars and clubs, 
Pride events, dating and support groups.  This would enable decision-makers to 
perceive their desire to live open lives in the UK, which they were prohibited from 
doing in their home societies.  The empirical data highlighted this further.  Legal 
representatives described the challenge to help a claimant articulate in their narrative 
evidence how they would be forced to act discreetly in their home country, not 
voluntarily, but to avoid persecution.  Accordingly, the empirical data highlighted the 
influence of ‘openness’ on moderating claimants’ and representatives’ navigation of 
the process. 
 
The explanation for these two issues lies in the key concepts of this thesis, 
intersectionality and sexual diversity.  The fair treatment of LGB asylum claims fails 
because the system does not recognise that intersectionality is critical to the ‘lived 
experiences’ of sexual minority asylum-seekers, especially those who are also ethnic 
minorities (i.e., not from white European backgrounds).14  Decision-makers produce 
their decisions through the lens of narrow Western conventions on sexual identity.15  
These stereotypes, including the Western ‘LGBT’ framework of minority sexual 
identity, are largely based on the experiences of white, middle-class and gay men.16  
Such stereotypes have been critiqued heavily within traditional asylum-receiving 
states for not reflecting the diversity of experiences within Western LGBT 
communities, as described above, and it is clear that they alone are insufficient for use 
in the context of sexual identity-based claims.  Many, if not most, LGB asylum-
seekers, not having been raised in the West, can struggle to relate their experiences to 
these constructions of identity.17  Indeed, within the empirical data, many asylum-
seeker participants were initially unfamiliar with the ‘LGBT’ framework.  Only by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Phillips and Stewart (n 4) 384. 
15 Cheryl A. Parks, Tonda L. Hughes and Alicia K. Matthews, ‘Race/Ethnicity and Sexual Orientation: 
Intersecting Identities’ (2004) 10(3) Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 241–254, 241-
242. 
16 ibid. See also, Joseph Adoni Massad, ‘Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab 
World’ (Spring 2002) 14(2) Public Culture pp. 361-385, 361-362.  This article charts the ‘missionary’ 
role that the LGBT rights movement has taken to ‘globalise’ LGBT rights through an inherently 
‘orientalist impulse’. 
17 Hinger (n 8) 390-395; Connie S. Chan, ‘Issues of Sexual Identity in an Ethnic Minority: The Case of 
Chinese American Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexual People’ in Anthony R. D’Augelli and Charlotte J. 
Patterson (eds), Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Identities Over the Lifespan (OUP, 1995) 89-90.  See also, 
Wah-shan Chou, Tongzhi: Politics of same-sex eroticism in Chinese societies (Haworth Press, 2000).  
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living in the UK were they exposed to the framework and able to utilise it, to varying 
degrees, to pursue their claims for asylum protection.  This has significant 
implications for the viability of Western-centric notions of sexual identity in the 
asylum context.   
 
The problematic nature of Western conceptions of sexual identity was identified 
within the investigation.  ‘Openness’ is used not only to identify the degree of risk, 
but it also implies that ‘openness’ is the standard for the lives of happy, congruent 
LGB identities (Chapter three).18  Without expressly wishing to live openly, LGB 
people cannot access protection.  Additionally, LGB identities are determined to be 
‘immutable’, i.e., fixed and discovered.  The system denies sexual fluidity and the 
difficulty of developing harmonious sexual identities within oppressive environments.  
As the empirical data highlighted, the process of identity development continued 
during the asylum process and after, once safety has been secured through receiving 
refugee status.  Moreover, stereotypes of ‘correct’ LGB expression and behaviour 
persisted in credibility analyses, despite the issue having been addressed on repeated 
occasions by training and guidance (Chapter four).  Undoubtedly, this is because the 
understandings within the system of sexual diversity remain inadequate. 
 
Using exclusive frameworks of sexual identity also lacks intersectional 
understanding.  Decision-making fails to apprehend that both experiences of 
persecution and constructions of sexual identity depend on several other lenses, such 
as race, sex, gender and education.  Even on issues of credibility, the failure to 
appreciate the way that a person’s poverty, poor education or cultural pressures 
dictate their behaviour indicates an unwillingness or inability of decision-makers to 
understand how our actions and experiences are influenced by multiple identity 
categories.   
 
The consequences of conducting single-axis analyses were clearly identified in this 
thesis. Bisexual claimants suffered erasure and marginalisation due to the dominance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Nicole Legate, Richard M. Ryan, and Netta Weinstein, ‘Is Coming Out Always a ‘‘Good Thing’’? 
Exploring the Relations of Autonomy Support, Outness, and Wellness for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual 
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and convenience of ‘monosexism’.19  Furthermore, the experiences of lesbian and 
bisexual women were also erased for failing to mirror the experiences of their male 
counterparts.  This is despite empirical data finding that lesbian and bisexual women 
asylum-seekers were more likely to suffer physical persecution, psychological harm, 
and rejection of their claims.  Within asylum-producing societies, men and women 
often occupy different spaces, leading to non-identical experiences of maltreatment.  
This also relates to the role of socio-economic factors and other privileges, which 
enables more men to be sur place refugees than women. 20   By conducting 
determinations without knowledge informed by intersectionality, the lived realities of 
LGB identities are disbelieved and rejected, to the detriment of their safety. 
 
The second concluding argument of this investigation explains the consequences of 
these problems for sexual minority asylum-seekers. 
 
 
3. Sexual Minority Asylum-Seekers are Forced to Navigate the 
Asylum Process in Ways Prejudicial to their Dignity and Integrity 
  
The British asylum system’s failure to understand the complexity, diversity and 
intersectionality of sexual identity forces LGB asylum-seekers to navigate the asylum 
process in ways that prejudice their fundamental rights.  Most clearly, this concerns 
their dignity and integrity.  Fair treatment is indelibly tied to the dignity of the 
individual (Chapter two).  The failure to broaden understandings of sexual identity 
through a diverse and intersectional lens is unfair for several reasons.  Most 
importantly, however, it is unfair because LGB claimants are forced to take certain 
steps that violate their dignity.  As claimants relying on other Convention grounds are 
not led to take these steps, the differential nature of the LGB asylum experience is 
also discriminatory. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kenji Yoshino, ‘Covering’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 769-939, 849-864; ‘The Epistemic Contract 
of Bisexual Erasure’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 353-46, 362 and 405. 
20 Jacqueline Bhabha, ‘Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum’ (2004) 
16(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 227-243, 232-234. 
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This is exemplified by the emphasis placed upon verifying the claimant’s sexual 
identity under the first step of Lord Rodger’s five-stage test from HJ (Iran).  It is 
understandable, logical even, that a decision-maker queries whether a claimant truly 
holds the identity motivating one’s claim for refugee protection, regardless of the 
Convention grounds.  In the area of sexual identity, however, this has a special 
vociferousness.  One must underscore the unique way in which this question is used 
to disbelieve the sexual identity of LGB claimants and reject their claims.  The refusal 
culture of the Home Office is adaptable; although the UKSC dismantled the denial of 
claims through the obligation on applicants to act discreetly to avoid persecution, the 
first step of Lord Rodger’s test enabled a shift of focus towards denying claims by the 
disbelief of a claimant’s identity. 21   The empirical data underscored that the 
pervasiveness of the ‘culture of disbelief’ in UK decision-making is exemplified by 
the shifting battleground for ensuring that LGB asylum claims are treated fairly. 
 
The disbelief in LGB claims regarding the validity of the claimed sexual identity is 
most clearly manifested within the evidentiary thresholds.  The importance of 
evidence in sexual identity claims is understandable; sexual identity is a characteristic 
that cannot be identified in the ways that religion, nationality or ethnicity may have 
certain methods of verification.  When disbelief enters the application of the 
evidentiary burdens, however, it is extremely problematic.  The failure to ‘prove’ or 
to convince a decision-maker of one’s sexuality, through documentary and narrative 
evidence, is synonymous with failing to comply with stringent notions of sexual 
identity.  The evidentiary burden, therefore, is inextricably tied to the way that 
disbelief also allows or encourages decision-makers to restrict and essentialise the 
scope of ‘legitimate’ sexual identities.  
 
First, to present an identity that is recognisable to the decision-maker and considered 
genuine and, thus, worthy of protection claimants must ‘standardise’ and simplify 
their identities.  The asylum system is complicit in the ‘violence’ of claimants having 
to erase and deny the aspects of their identity that a decision-maker chooses not to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Jenni Millbank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the 
Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13 (2-3) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 391-414. 
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recognise.22  This is anti-intersectional, as it pushes essentialised, single-axis sexual 
identities over those formed through multiple identity affiliations.23  LGB claimants 
must present narratives involving past heterosexual relationships or marriages at their 
peril.  They must ensure that their self-identification as a sexual minority involves the 
‘LGBT’ framework, or risk seeing their claims denied, even if this identity 
construction has been alien to them for their entire lives.  They must show conflict in 
their identities as a decision-maker deems is ‘authentic’, namely, on the intersection 
of their religious and sexual identities.  The irony is, however, that claimants become 
desperate participants of the violence against them, by advancing the supremacy of 
their sexual identities, and by validating and legitimising the decision-makers’ 
approaches towards the RSD.  There is no real choice in the matter; should they fail to 
do so, protection is denied.   
 
The empirical data demonstrated that this was more than a conceptual argument. 
FASY005, a Ugandan national, pursued her claim as a lesbian, although she actually 
identified as bisexual, willingly simplifying her identity for the asylum process.  More 
broadly, the empirical data also identified the way in which claimants were forced to 
navigate the expression of their identities in ways that were recognisable to the 
decision-maker, such as through the pursuit of relationships.   
 
Indeed, claimants must document their self-expression in ways mandated by decision-
makers, such as by visiting LGBT bars and clubs, consuming LGBT culture and 
literature, seeking support from LGBT organisations, and pursuing romantic 
relationships, as the asylum-seeker participants of the empirical data highlighted.  
Within the empirical data, legal representatives and support workers explained that 
there exists little capacity, little space to acknowledge that a claimant may still be 
traumatised from experiences in their home society, preventing them from expressing 
their sexual identities in the UK freely.  The role of the home society in hindering a 
claimant’s ability to present a fully harmonious identity is given little consideration, 
unless explicitly raised by the legal representative.  Regardless of the genuine and 
authentic nature of the identity and the associated expressions, the LGB claimant must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Hinger (n 8) 390. 
23 Phillips and Stewart (n 4) 380. 
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assimilate in order to succeed.  Through these interviews, the empirical data also 
provided an unexpected insight into how legal representatives were forced to 
recognise the limited basis of understanding within the Home Office and take the 
necessary steps to guide claimants towards successful refugee claims.   
 
Secondly, LGB claimants must accept, to the detriment of their integrity and dignity, 
the sexualisation of their identities.  The pervasive nature of this sexualisation, which 
permeates all stages of the asylum process, from interview to determination, was 
revealed through the empirical data.  Although there are examples of good practice, 
decision-makers largely acted on the conviction that scrutinising a claimant’s sexual 
expression is necessary when deliberating over the truth of his or her identity.  As a 
result, claimants must contend with the sexualisation of their narratives in some shape 
or form.  For some, it has taken the form of sexualised questioning at the interview 
stage, as experienced by MASY002 and MASY003, for example.  These claimants 
were asked explicit and demeaning questions about their sex lives, in some cases 
providing detailed and unnecessary information about individual sex acts.  Claimants 
are compelled to cooperate with these questions due to the power imbalance of the 
interviewer-interviewee relationship, fearing that non-cooperation could provide the 
grounds for denying protection.  For example, MASY008 explicitly stated that he did 
not wish to answer such questions, but felt that he had no choice in the matter.  This is 
an abuse of power, against which accountability through fairness is the only remedy. 
 
Where intrusive questioning lacks such explicitness, sexualisation still essentialises 
sexual identity.  It focuses on the idea that the ‘true’ expression of sexual identity is 
through relationships, engendering intrusive questioning on previous and current 
relationships.  Using relationships as a standard for genuine LGB identities is 
problematic.  In an anecdotal example, a Libyan lesbian was asked about her former 
relationships.  She explained her inability to initiate or maintain a romantic or sexual 
relationship because she was only able to leave the home with a male guardian.  The 
Home Office interviewer’s response to this was, ‘so then how did you know that you 
were a lesbian’, thereby highlighting the regressive logic that informs decision-maker 
questioning.   
 
	  	  
305	  
305	  
It is important to explain that other cultural issues facilitate the sexualisation of 
identities.  Decision-makers face increasing pressures to meet their case resolution 
targets.  Thus, disbelief and the reduced time available for an RSD combine to 
encourage decision-makers to ‘standardise’ sexual identity, resulting in sexualisation.  
For example, relationships provide time-constricted decision-makers with an easy, 
‘efficient’ topic for verifying a claimant’s sexual identity, as sexual or romantic 
relationships take place in most cultures and sexualities.  Yet, such an analysis, when 
utilised restrictively or exclusively, can deprive claimants of protection.  For example, 
where a claimant cannot provide important details about their partners, such as names 
and ages, they fall to be disbelieved as lacking in credibility.  Thus, essentialised 
notions of sexuality are inconsistent with sexual (and relationship) diversity.  
Decision-makers require the opportunity to fully explore the identities of LGB 
claimants without being forced to essentialise them because of time constraints.  The 
current pressures upon the decision-makers do not allow for this.   
 
The empirical data provided insight into the how the combination of disbelief and 
sexualisation manifested itself within practical decision-making, with respect of the 
credibility assessments of documentary and narrative evidence.  Decision-makers 
expected documentary evidence (of stereotypical expressions) to corroborate LGB 
identities, without understanding the ways that poverty, trauma and racism can inhibit 
the production of such evidence.  Although the guidance of the Home Office now 
prevents decision-makers from accepting sexually explicit evidence, during the period 
of this investigation decision-makers often accepted, and even encouraged, its 
submission.  This would be inconceivable in claims based on any other Convention 
grounds.  Many claimants do not know any better.  Where LGB claimants see others 
providing such evidence and obtaining refugee status in a matter of a few weeks, they 
are desperate enough to believe these steps are necessary to surmount the prevailing 
‘culture of disbelief’ in the Home Office.  This fuels the proliferation of sexually 
explicit evidence.  Consequently, claimants often place themselves in harmful 
environments, making exploitative deals with people to gain evidence that they 
perceive necessary.   
 
Therefore, it is clear that far from resolving the issue of fairness in the sexual identity-
based asylum context, the UKSC decision in HJ (Iran) has merely facilitated the 
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shifting ground: it is not the issue of discretion that is the most important, but whether 
and how a claimant’s identity can be rejected.  As a result of the disbelief embedded 
in RSDs, LGB asylum-seekers must compromise with their integrity and dignity in 
order to surmount the system’s evidentiary standards.  This is unacceptable from a 
legal and fairness perspective.  
 
Having characterised the experiences of LGB asylum-seekers, it is important to forge 
a connection between the issues in LGB asylum decision-making and the problems 
with the British asylum system overall. 
 
 
4. The Problems with Sexual Identity-Based Asylum Claims are 
Symptomatic of Problems within the British Asylum System 
Overall 
  
This investigation found numerous issues with the treatment of LGB asylum claims, 
which have been summarised in the preceding two arguments.  It is essential, 
however, to place many of the problems regarding sexual identity-based asylum 
claims within the context of the British asylum system overall.  This is because 
certain key criticisms in this investigation regarding the LGB asylum experience are 
relevant to the treatment of claims based on other Convention grounds.  On the many 
problems shared by LGB and non-LGB claimants, the empirical data drove the 
appreciation of such parallels.   
 
LGB claimants can experience issues uniquely, but often, the issues themselves are 
not unique to the sexual identity context.  LGB claimants can be impacted uniquely 
by unfair treatment for three reasons: first, minority sexual identities are complex, 
secondly, there is a poor understanding of sexual diversity amongst officials and 
decision-makers, and thirdly, many of the issues faced by all asylum-seekers can have 
distinct consequences for LGB claimants.  The argument that poor decision-making in 
LGB claims can be better understood by exploring the problems with the asylum 
system overall is evidenced here.  It is conducted by a comparison of the unfair 
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treatment of LGB and non-LGB claims, and by appreciating the distinct experiences 
of LGB asylum-seekers within them. 
 
The first point of comparison exists on the ‘culture of disbelief’.  This thesis has 
examined the operation of the ‘culture of disbelief’ in the sexual identity context.  It 
found that disbelief was a structured part of the determination of LGB claims, due to 
HJ (Iran)’s guidance on determining such claims.  The empirical data provided detail 
on how the ‘culture of disbelief’ manifested itself within the decision-making on LGB 
claims.  This has been explored above in relation to stringent credibility assessments 
of narrative and documentary evidence.  Too often, claimant’s sexual identities were 
outright rejected due to inconsistencies in their narrative, or the inability to meet the 
evidentiary burden through supporting documentation.  
 
The tools used to disbelieve claims are similar, but in the LGB context, the difficulty 
of ascertaining the truth of a claimant’s sexuality has allowed a particularly onerous 
burden to be a structured and approved part of decision-making.  The identification by 
academics, legal representatives and support workers within the empirical data that 
the entire asylum system operates within a broader ‘culture of disbelief’ is important.  
This is supported by research documenting how the British asylum system approaches 
claims with disbelief, or a culture of outright denial.24  Such research identifies that 
disbelief within non-LGB claims manifests itself through identical issues, such as 
stringent evidentiary burdens.  By way of example, Trueman examined the asylum 
claims of 200 Ethiopian asylum-seekers, finding that the British asylum system 
sought to discredit such claims through poor credibility findings.25  He concluded 
similarly that the ‘culture of disbelief’ was inhibiting the fair determination of these 
asylum claims.  Thus, acknowledging the existence of a ‘culture of disbelief’ within 
the entire system is an important part of finding solutions to address the fairness of 
RSDs in LGB and non-LGB claims.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Jessica Anderson et al.,‘The Culture of Disbelief: An Ethnographic Approach to Understanding an 
Under-Theorised Concept in the UK Asylum System’ (July 2014) Refugee Studies Centre, Working 
Paper Series No. 102; James Souter, ‘A Culture of Disbelief or Denial? Critiquing Refugee Status 
Determination in the United Kingdom‘ (2002) 1(1) Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration 48-59.  
25 Trevor Trueman, ‘Reasons for Refusal: an Audit of 200 Refusals of Ethiopian Asylum Seekers in 
England’ (2009) 23(3) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 281-308, 281. 
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Secondly, the recruitment, skills and training of Home Office personnel also affect all 
asylum claims made under the British system.  Recognising that these issues cut 
across the experiences of asylum-seekers on all grounds of claim was driven first by 
the structural principles, which explored and advanced the need for good quality 
training and recruitment standards.  The empirical data provided further clarity on 
these overarching issues, through the Freedom of Information requests and the 
interview with a former decision-maker of the Home Office.  Although only limited 
information was available for the purposes of this thesis on the recruitment procedure, 
the data found that the Home Office did not appear to adhere to the UNHCR’s 
standards.26  Within the empirical data, the experiences of the former Home Office 
decision-maker appeared to confirm this.  Additionally, a basic internet search of the 
Home Office’s more recent recruitment efforts revealed that these standards have not 
improved (Chapter four).  Applicants without university degrees or asylum-specific 
work experience were recruited for decision-maker roles.27  These findings are 
important.  Although they require further exploration outside this thesis, they suggest 
that the Home Office is not adhering to the recruitment standards espoused by the 
UNHCR.  Accordingly, the Home Office is inadvertently facilitating poor quality 
RSDs made by decision-makers who lack the necessary qualifications, experience and 
motivation.  As decision-makers are not recruited to work on specific grounds of 
claim, this issue is worrying for LGB and non-LGB asylum-seekers alike.   
 
On the issue of training, the empirical data provided awareness of its overall decline.  
The initial period of foundational training for all new decision-makers was subject to 
a decline in length and presumably quality, reduced from over 60 days to 25 days.  In 
the LGB context, a full-day course of training on LGB issues was reduced to a half-
day and integrated into the main body of the foundational training for decision-
makers.  Outside of the foundation training, the LGB training could be repeated, but 
dangerously, this was at the discretion of the decision-maker.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 UNHCR, ‘Quality Initiative Project: A UNHCR review of the UK Home Office Refugee Status 
Determination Procedures’ (2005-2009). 
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It is important to make some distinctions on the issue of training.  This thesis 
contends that the decline in the quality of training has had a significant impact upon 
the ability of decision-makers to conduct their decision-making fairly.   Indeed, this 
investigation found that too often decision-makers made inadequate evaluations 
because the RSD involves complex legal processes for which they lack the skills.  For 
example, decision-makers consistently applied the evidentiary standards of the RSD 
stringently.  
 
COI provides another concrete example of how both of these training sessions reflect 
poorly upon the skills of the decision-makers.  This investigation found decision-
makers appeared to have insufficient skills for interpreting COI and making decisions 
on internal relocation, especially where information was scarce, undetailed or 
outdated, or where contexts were in flux (Chapter three).  Decision-makers 
contradicted the guidance, or they failed to cite COI or policy guidance altogether, 
making it difficult to hold them accountable to their mistakes. For example, decision-
makers conducted segmented credibility assessments, despite the guidance to consider 
the relevant factors in a single test.  As these issues have also been identified in the 
investigation of the British system’s overall decision-making, this thesis contends that 
the decline in the quality of the initial training period has affected the decision-
making in LGB and other claims alike.28  The complexity of these issues may be even 
more heightened in the LGB context, due to changing societies, the implicit 
politicisation of COI, and issues with the fitness and availability of information for 
asylum purposes.  The actual deficiencies of decision-making, nevertheless, are not 
unique. 
 
Through the lens of MASY005’s refusal letter, the empirical data evidenced the 
insufficient nature of the decision-maker’s analysis of developing states.  In the case 
of India, MASY005’s home society, the decision-maker’s assertion that there was no 
risk of persecution arguably relies on political assumptions based on the state’s 
advancing economy and the perception that large metropolises are wholly liberal.  
Furthermore, the unclear legal status of the law criminalising homosexuality allowed 
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the decision-maker to conduct a superficial analysis that ignored the reality on the 
ground.  This thesis fears that the decision-maker did not have the skills required for 
such a difficult task.  
 
Furthermore, as the training on LGB issues has also declined, this has a separate 
impact on decision-making in sexual identity-based asylum claims.  The empirical 
data emphasises the necessary connection between the aforementioned poor 
understanding of sexual identity and poor standards of training.  A specific example 
of this is the return and persistence of stereotypes regarding LGB identities that 
practitioners and activists assumed to be eradicated.  Aside from the ignorance 
regarding sexual identity discussed above, examples of such stereotyping relate to 
claimants’ former opposite sex relationships and children, aspects of LGB lives 
deemed inconsistent with their identities.  Thus, the poor foundation training impacts 
the quality of decision-making on all grounds, but the poor LGB training impacts 
issues such as the difficulties with COI and the understanding of sexual identity.  This 
highlights how and why the LGB experience of the British asylum system can be so 
acutely prejudicial.  
 
The third point of comparison is with regard to reception conditions.  Issues regarding 
the reception of LGB asylum-seekers are also better understood by placing them in 
broader context of the role that they play within the British asylum system.  This 
investigation found detention to be an integral component of the British system, with 
current or former asylum-seekers formulating the majority of detainees (Chapter 
four).  The fairness of immigration detention and its operation has been subject to 
substantial criticisms.29  Such criticisms also outlined how many of the problems 
faced by detainee asylum-seekers were experienced regardless of the ground of claim, 
such the impact of detention as an aggressor of mental health.  Moreover, LGB and 
non-LGB claimants alike have been subjected to the DFT procedure, whose speed, 
efficiency and ability to control asylum-seekers has been prioritised over its impact on 
the fundamental rights of claimants.30  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Detention Action, ‘The State of Detention: Immigration Detention in the UK in 2014’ (October 
2014) 3. 
30 ibid 21; Lord Chancellor v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 840 
[49]. 
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Once again, these issues are important across all refugee claims, but their impact in 
the LGB context is separate.  On reception matters, the empirical data did not 
elucidate the comparison, but provided insight into the nefarious nature of detention 
and DFT in the LGB context, as discussed earlier.  LGB claimants were 
disproportionately subjected to such procedures in comparison to other claimants.  
This lacked real understanding regarding the exact consequences for LGB claimants 
regarding their safety in detention, and the impact of truncated time constraints upon 
their claims (Chapter four).  As LGB claimants appeared to be disproportionately 
subjected to detention and DFT, understanding its impact is critical.  Thus, once 
again, whilst reception issues are noted in all claims, the experience of LGB claimants 
contains important nuances.      
 
The fourth comparison is also tied to the issue of reception, specifically, the role of 
the legal representative.  The empirical data highlighted that on matters of both 
substantive and procedural fairness, the declining standards of decision-making and 
the omnipresence of disbelief heightened the role of legal representatives.  For 
example, legal representatives were forced to invest time in preparing narrative 
evidence as a way of setting up the claimant’s credibility (Chapter three).  
Representatives were also forced to preempt the tendency of the Home Office to 
detain asylum-seekers at the screening interview, by submitting representations 
regarding the claimant’s unfitness for detention (Chapter four).  Research into the 
impact of detention and DFT found that they had implications for access to one’s 
legal representative and the receipt of quality representation (Chapter four). 
 
Indeed, the empirical data discussed the increasing pressures placed upon all legal 
representatives in the light of changes to the British asylum system, such as legal aid 
contracts for certain firm to represent asylum-seeker detainees (‘detention contracts’).  
The empirical data also provided greater insight into how LGB asylum-seekers 
suffered under this changing regime, and how practitioners faced increasing pressures 
too.  For example, LGB detainees were willing to wait several months for a 
representative experienced in sexual identity-based asylum claims than accept a 
poorer alternative.  Thus, the empirical data has highlighted that in the LGB context, 
the issue is not simply about access to legal representation, but the ability to instruct 
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representatives that understand sexual identity and know how to present 
corresponding asylum claims.  Moreover, it highlighted that distortion of the 
evidentiary standards by decision-makers forced representatives to take unethical or 
inappropriate steps to secure their clients protection.  The critical impact of a legal 
representative upon the outcome of a claim is documented in Chapter one and 
throughout Chapters three and four.  It is fundamental to all claims, but in an LGB 
claim, representation by somebody ignorant of the relevant issues can be even more 
detrimental to its outcome.   
 
The final comparison concerns the system’s general disregard for medical factors, 
particularly psychological harm.  This is an extremely multidimensional issue, 
encompassing concerns regarding the ignorance of the mental health impact of 
detention; the inadequate provision of healthcare offered to detainees; overlooking 
how memory impacts on the presentation of a consistent and detailed identity 
narrative; the failure to consider the incidence of psychological violence; and 
undermining the content of medical reports.  By exploring the impact of these issues 
upon LGB asylum-seekers, the thesis has referenced research that looked at overall 
decision-making, not that specific to the LGB context (Chapter four).  Furthermore, 
the newspaper reports discussed in Chapter four regarding the quality of healthcare 
within detention also reference asylum-seekers generally.  The nuance provided by 
the empirical data concerns how LGB asylum-seekers, particularly lesbians and 
bisexual women, experience high incidences of psychological harm.  Surely this 
relates to the way that LGB asylum-seekers live in oppressive societies, where they 
must suppress their sexualities to ensure their physical safety, at mental and emotional 
cost.  The high incidence of psychological harm amongst sexual minority women 
speaks again to the way that their expression is often limited to the private domain 
and they are less likely to be sur place refugees than their male counterparts.  
Thereupon, although the Home Office’s disregard for medical factors relating to 
physical and mental health exists in all claims, this investigation has found them to be 
especially significant (in terms of their incidence) within the sexual identity context. 
 
From this we learn that the entire British asylum system has serious issues with 
fairness, not just from the perspective of LGB claims.  Each of these issues engages 
with the structural principles.  By comparing the poor treatment of LGB claims and 
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all other grounds of claim, we obtain a deeper insight into the fairness of the asylum 
system overall.  This is necessary to grasp the enormity of the task of improving the 
system.  It appears, however, that although there are issues with substantive fairness 
in all claims, e.g. relating to evidentiary standards, points of comparison also relate 
mostly to procedural fairness.  Indeed, this section has identified common problems to 
do with partiality, recruitment, training, reception, healthcare and legal representation.  
Given the aforementioned need for higher standards of procedural fairness, the 
comparison highlights the true scale of the problems embedded within the British 
asylum system.  Whilst LGB claimants have unique experiences and needs with 
regard to procedural fairness, arguably the issues of substantive and procedural 
fairness in LGB decision-making are caused by misconceptions surrounding the lived 
reality of sexual identity – which are obviously absent from non-LGB cases.  The way 
that LGB decision-making often has an additionally prejudicial dimension is 
exemplified when using evidentiary standards as a lens.  Evidentiary standards relate 
in all cases to the way a claimant is considered to be credible, and deserving of 
protection.  This is the crux of the entire asylum determination.  The problems with 
credibility assessments in the British system overall have been well documented.  In 
the LGB context, however, the credibility process has greater voraciousness, for the 
fact that disbelief of a claimant’s sexuality is embedded into the structure of these 
claims and allows decision-makers to rely upon outdated notions of sexual identity.  
 
Having explained that many problems faced by LGB asylum-seekers are symptomatic 
of deficiencies in the British asylum system across Convention grounds, the final 
section advances some thoughts on how the fair treatment of LGB decision-making 
might be improved. 
 
 
5. Final Thoughts on the Mistreatment of LGB Asylum-Seekers 
 
During the process of conducting this investigation and writing the resulting thesis, it 
became clear that the persecution of LGB individuals in their countries of origin and 
their unfair treatment within the British asylum system are tied together by a central 
issue: gender.  Indeed, our treatment of sexual minorities essentially concerns how 
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we, as a society, impose gender expression and identity onto people.  This is 
particularly acute within the law and its implementation.  Many theorists have 
addressed the complex relationship between gender, sexuality and societal (and legal) 
attitudes.  Law, for example, asserts that state and societal intolerance towards sexual 
minorities is not a reaction to their sexual practices.31  Through the expression of their 
sexualities, LGB individuals violate the sanctity of normative gender roles accepted 
within society, and reinforced by culture, legal provisions and religion.  In Law’s 
opinion, the ‘contempt’ for LGB people that is present within many societies only 
strengthens the ‘social meaning of gender’, i.e., the argument that gender norms are 
entirely socially constructed to serve their own ends and purposes.32   
 
Valentine concurs:  
 
Heterosexuality is ideologically linked to the notion of gender identities 
(masculinity and femininity) because the notion of opposite-sex relationships 
presumes a binary distinction between what it means to be a man or a 
woman.33   
 
As masculinity and femininity are perceived to be the natural expressions of 
heterosexual men and women, homosexuality is associated with gender inversion.34  
For this reason, Wilets describes how sexual minorities are treated as ‘gender 
outlaws’.35  They are subjected to violence for their failure to follow the heterosexual 
doctrine, i.e., that individuals should only engage in opposite-sex relationships and 
lead to the production of children, and that men and women should only express traits 
that are consistent with their narrative arcs of masculinity and femininity, 
respectively.36  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Sylvia A Law, ‘Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender’ (1988) Wis. L. Rev 187. 
32 ibid 187. 
33 Gill Valentine, ‘(Hetero)sexing Space: Lesbian Perceptions and Experiences of Everyday Spaces’ 
(1993) 11 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 395-413, 410. 
34 Gayle Rubin, ‘Of Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries’ in Joan 
Nestle (ed), The Persistent Desire: A Femme-Butch Reader (Alyson Publications, 1992) 466-82. 
35 James D. Wilets, ‘Conceptualizing Private Violence against Sexual Minorities as Gendered 
Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective’ (1996) 60 Alb. L. Rev. 989, 991 and 
1011. 
36 ibid. 
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The symbiotic relationship between law and society means that legal treatment only 
conveys societal attitudes towards gender roles.  In asylum-producing states, this is 
evident from the existence of criminal sanctions against same-sex sexual acts.  In 
asylum-receiving states too, the prescriptive nature of gender performance is reflected 
in the gradual recognition of LGB individuals as the subjects of rights and 
entitlements, as referenced throughout this thesis.  This is why it is essential for 
decision-makers within the British asylum system to understand the critical role that 
gender plays in the lives of all LGB people, regardless of their sex.  This 
understanding would enable claims to move away from their current focus on sex and 
behaviour, and move towards the non-conformity of the claimant’s sexual identity 
with the prevailing cultural, political, religious and social attitudes of the home 
society. 
 
Indeed, underpinning the RSD in LGB claims with gender is consistent with 
conducting intersectional decision-making.  It is intersectionality that reveals, within 
the course of the asylum process, the societal attitudes that all claimants, most acutely 
LGB claimants, must face.  It is intersectional analysis that has enabled this 
investigation to highlight that the British asylum system remains in the process of 
moving away from essentialised understandings of sexual identity that are also rooted 
in gender norms.  Intersectional decision-making is fundamental; the implications of 
ignoring intersectionality are significant.  Without intersectionality, simple, single-
axis identities gain credence and privilege within their groups.  Their experiences 
come to characterise the entire narrative of those particular categories.  Such 
phenomena take place at the expense of individuals or sub-groups whose identities are 
more complex, relating to multiple identity categories. 37    Marginalising the 
intersectionally complex, Crenshaw argues, can only be described as discrimination 
(and those that engage in such marginalisation, discriminators). 38  Discriminators 
cannot be said to operate a system characterised by fairness, no matter how one may 
define fairness.  This thought is particularly powerful in the context of the 
investigation conducted within this thesis.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection’ (n 7) 140. 
38 ibid 150-151. 
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Therefore, intersectionality allows the focus on gender within LGB claims to be 
conducted with respect of understanding how the performance and experience of 
gender is shaped by one’s race, culture, religion, sex and gender identity, for example.  
Accordingly, an intersectional, gender-focused analysis would hopefully move the 
RSD away from the shifting barriers that are placed against LGB claimants on the 
basis of essentialist tropes regarding LGB behaviour and identity.  It could re-orient 
the RSD back to an assessment of the risk of harm posed to the claimant.  Thus, better 
understanding the role that gender norms play in the lives of LGB asylum-seekers 
through the tools derived from intersectionality provides a potentially valuable 
opportunity for further research into the fair treatment of LGB claimants within the 
British asylum system.  Such research would build upon the investigation conducted 
here. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
List of Participants within Empirical Research  
 
Name/Code Category Details 
FASY001 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 26 
Nationality: Gambia 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: 
Undisclosed 
English Proficiency: Good 
FASY002 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 46 
Nationality: Jamaica 
Religion: Christian 
Marital Status: Married 
English Proficiency: Good 
FASY003 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 39 
Nationality: Pakistan 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Married 
English Proficiency: Poor 
FASY004 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 33 
Nationality: Morocco 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
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FASY005 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 33 
Nationality: Uganda 
Religion: Christian 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
FASY006 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 29 
Nationality: Saudi Arabia 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Divorced 
English Proficiency: Good 
FASY007 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 30-35  
Nationality: Uganda 
Religion: Christian 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
FASY008 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 41 
Nationality: Uganda 
Religion: Undisclosed 
Marital Status: Married 
English Proficiency: Good 
FASY009 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 20-25 
Nationality: Nigeria 
Religion: Undisclosed 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
FASY010 Asylum-seeker Sex: Female 
Age: 36 
Nationality: Pakistan 
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Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY001 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 40 
Nationality: Guyana 
Religion: Undisclosed 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY002 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 39 
Nationality: Pakistan 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY003 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 30-39 
Nationality: Ghana 
Religion: Undisclosed 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY004 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 40-49 
Nationality: Burkina Faso 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Married 
English Proficiency: Poor 
MASY005 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 29 
Nationality: India 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
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MASY006 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 23 
Nationality: Pakistan 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY007 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 24 
Nationality: Pakistan 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY008 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 30-39 
Nationality: Jamaica 
Religion: Undisclosed 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY009 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 20-25 
Nationality: Bangladesh 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Single 
English Proficiency: Good 
MASY010 Asylum-seeker Sex: Male 
Age: 45 
Nationality: Egypt 
Religion: Muslim 
Marital Status: Divorced 
English Proficiency: Good 
   
Professional Participant A ‘Professional’ (NGO 
Employee) 
Support Worker for British 
NGO 
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Liz Barratt ‘Professional’ 
(Practitioner) 
Solicitor and Partner at 
Bindmans PLC 
S. Chelvan ‘Professional’ 
(Practitioner) 
Barrister at Law at No5 
Chambers 
Joël Le Déroff ‘Professional’ (Lobbyist 
on LGBTI asylum issues) 
(Former) Senior Policy 
and Programmes Officer at 
International Lesbian and 
Gay Association (ILGA-
Europe)  
Paul Dillane ‘Professional’ (Former 
Practitioner and COI 
specialist) 
(Former) Refugee 
Specialist at Amnesty 
International UK, now 
Executive Director at 
UKLGIG 
Barry O’Leary ‘Professional’ 
(Practitioner) 
Solicitor and Partner at 
Wesley Gryk Solicitors 
Erin Power ‘Professional’ (Support 
and Advocacy) 
(Former) Executive 
Director at UKLGIG 
Catherine Robinson ‘Professional’ 
(Practitioner) 
Former Solicitor, now 
Barrister at Law at 1 Pump 
Court Chambers 
Lilian Tsourdi ‘Professional’ (Academic) PhD Candidate at 
Université Libre de 
Bruxelles 
Robert Wintemute ‘Professional’ (Academic) Professor of Human Rights 
at King’s College London 
   
Anonymous (referred to as 
‘Former Home Office 
decision-maker’) 
Decision-maker Former Home Office 
caseworker and caseowner 
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Timeline of Empirical Research 
 
 
Date Work Other Details 
22.01.2013 Application for Ethical 
approval submitted. 
 
05.03.2013 Ethical approval granted. Ref: SLSJPhd1213/05 
28.03.2013 
 
Submitted first Freedom of 
Information request to the 
Home Office. 
 
10.04.2013 Interviewed Robert 
Wintemute. 
Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Profession: Professor of 
Human Rights Law, 
King’s College London 
11.04.2013 Interviewed Barry 
O’Leary. 
Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Profession: Solicitor, 
Wesley Gryk Solicitors 
11.04.2013 Interviewed Erin Power. Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Profession: Executive 
Director of UKLGIG 
11.04.2013 Interviewed Professional 
Participant A. 
Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Profession: Support 
Worker with NGO 
12.04.2013 Interviewed Paul Dillane. Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Profession: Refugee 
Researcher, Amnesty 
International (UK) 
15.05.2013 Interviewed Joël Le 
Déroff. 
Location: Brussels 
Category: Professional 
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 Profession: Senior Policy 
and Programmes Officer, 
ILGA-Europe 
15.05.2013 Interviewed Lilian 
Tsourdi. 
Location: Brussels 
Category: Professional 
Profession: PhD Candidate 
and Researcher, Université 
Libre de Bruxelles 
16.05.2013 Interviewed S. Chelvan. Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Profession: Barrister, No 5 
Chambers 
17.05.2013 Interviewed Liz Barratt. Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Profession: Solicitor, 
Bindmans LLP 
 
 
17.05.2013 Interviewed Catherine 
Robinson. 
Location: London 
Category: Professional 
Professor: Barrister, 1 
Pump Court Chambers 
12.06.2013 Interviewed MASY001. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Guyana 
04.07.2013 Application sent for 
request for access to 
interview members of 
Judiciary. 
 
16.07.2013 Interviewed MASY002. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Pakistan 
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23.07.2013 Interviewed FASY001. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Gambia 
24.07.2013 Interviewed former Home 
Office caseworker. 
Location: Liverpool 
Category: Decision-maker 
01.08.2013 Interviewed MASY003. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Ghana 
01.08.2013 Interviewed MASY004. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Burkina Faso 
14.08.2013 Received response to 
application for Judiciary 
access with request for 
more information. 
(Letter from representative 
of the Judiciary). 
18.09.2013 Interviewed MASY005. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: India 
18.09.2013 Interviewed MASY006. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Pakistan 
18.09.2013 Interviewed MASY007. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Pakistan 
09.10.2013 
 
Received response to 
Freedom of Information 
Request. 
FOI Request 27021. 
 
16.10.2013 Responded to questions 
about research regarding 
application for Judiciary 
access.  
Letter was dated 
05.10.2013, but sent on 
16.10.2013.  No response 
received to this 
correspondence. 
11.01.2014 Interviewed MASY008. Category: Asylum-seeker 
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Sex: Male 
Nationality: Jamaica 
23.01.2014 Interviewed FASY002. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Jamaica 
23.01.2014 Interviewed MASY009. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Bangladesh 
23.01.2014 Interviewed FASY003. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Pakistani 
06.05.2014 Submitted second 
Freedom of Information 
Request to Home Office. 
 
13.06.2014 Received response to 
second Freedom of 
Information Request. 
FOI Request 31669. 
05.09.2014 Interviewed MASY010. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Male 
Nationality: Egypt 
08.09.2014 Interviewed FASY004. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Morocco 
09.09.2014 Interviewed FASY005. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Uganda 
09.09.2014 Interviewed FASY006. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Saudi Arabia 
10.09.2014 Interviewed FASY007. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Uganda 
23.09.2014 Interviewed FASY008. Category: Asylum-seeker 
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Sex: Female 
Nationality: Uganda 
02.10.2014 Interviewed FASY009. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Nigeria 
17.10.2014 Interviewed FASY010. Category: Asylum-seeker 
Sex: Female 
Nationality: Pakistan 
01.02.2014 – 13.03.2016 Obtained written consent 
from Professionals to be 
attributed to their quotes. 
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Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
 
“Re-thinking the British asylum model: is the system of asylum protection operated in 
the UK fair to lesbian, gay and bisexual applicants?” 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study as part of a PhD research 
project on the effectiveness of the British asylum system in protecting individuals 
claiming asylum on grounds of their sexual orientation.  Before you decide whether to 
accept or decline this invitation, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Please ask if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  Thank you for 
reading this. 
  
Who will conduct the research?  
Tawseef Khan 
School of Law and Social Justice 
University of Liverpool 
Liverpool, L69 3BX 
 
Title of the Research  
“Re-thinking the British asylum model: is the system of asylum protection operated in 
the UK fair to lesbian, gay and bisexual applicants?” 
 
1. What is the aim of the research?  
The aim of this research is to explore the opinions and experiences of the various 
groups of people involved within the asylum process for lesbian, gay and bisexual 
(LGB) refugees – e.g. asylum seekers, activists, legal experts and decision-makers.  
By interviewing them about their experiences, a better understanding is desired, of 
how these different groups feel about the current state of the British asylum system 
for LGB claimants. These interviews are part of a PhD project exploring the ideal 
asylum system for LGB claimants.   
 
2. Why have you been chosen to participate?  
There are a number of different groups that have been chosen to participate in the 
research.  This is so that the views and experiences of all the relevant groups can be 
included, to produce a research project that is balanced and unbiased.  As a member 
of the groups identified above, your experiences are valued highly, in the belief that 
they will contribute positively to the research. 
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3. What would you be asked to do if you took part?  
You will be asked to participate in an interview, which should take no more than 90 
minutes to complete.  The interview will take the format of a series of questions, 
which you are requested to answer as fully as possible – the list of questions will be 
available for you to look through at the beginning of the interview.  The interview will 
cover your experiences of the asylum process, your thoughts on how the process 
impacts upon LGB asylum seekers. 
 
If you have undergone traumatic experiences, there is the risk that the interview 
could bring to the surface feelings of pain and discomfort, associated with a 
recollection and re-examination of very personal and painful circumstances that you 
had perhaps forgotten.  Please remember that you will not be pressurised to answer 
any questions that you do not wish and regular breaks can be taken during the 
interview process. 
 
4. What happens to the data collected?  
The interviews will be audio recorded and then converted into hand-typed transcripts.  
Where the interviews have been conducted in a language other than English, these 
will be translated into English.  The transcripts will be analysed and considered with 
regard to the various issues within the British asylum process for LGB refugees. 
 
5. How is confidentiality maintained?  
The confidentiality of all participants will be secured.  All interview transcripts and 
resulting analysis will be kept anonymous, so that no interviewee can be identified by 
anything other than his/her gender, sexuality, country of origin and age. All data will 
be encrypted.  The audiotapes, transcripts, paper files and all digital data will be 
destroyed within 12 months of the award of the PhD. 
 
6. What happens if you do not want to take part or if I change my mind?  
Participation is optional. If you agree to participate you will be given this information 
sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.  You will be free to withdraw at 
any time without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself. 
  
7. Will I be paid for participating in the research?  
Unfortunately, there are no resources available to pay for your participation. 
 
8. What is the duration of the research?  
The research will consist of one interview that will last for a maximum of 90 minutes. 
 
9. Where will the research be conducted?  
The interview will take place at a mutually agreed location.  This is most likely to be 
at the office of the organisation through which you have been contacted.   
 
10. Will the outcomes of the research be published?  
The outcome of the research will only be published in the form of the resulting PhD 
thesis and in related publications.   
 
Contact for further information  
 
Tawseef.Khan@liverpool.ac.uk 
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What if something goes wrong? 
 
The following organisations provide free and/or low-cost counselling for LGB people: 
 
GMI Partnership 
(Consists of Positive East, the Metro Centre and West London’s Gay Men’s Project) 
Tel: 020 7160 0941 
Email: info@gmipartnership.co.uk 
 
London Friend 
Main Office: 
London Friend 
86 Caledonian Road 
London 
N1 9DN 
 
Tel: 020 7833 1674 
Email: office@londonfriend.org.uk 
Nearest tube: King’s Cross  
(There are other drop-in offices across London) 
 
Pace Health 
34 Hartham Road 
London 
N7 9JL 
 
Tel: 020 7700 1323 
Email: info@pacehealth.org.uk 
Nearest tube: Holloway Road or Caledonian Road 
 
Lesbian and Gay Foundation 
5 Richmond Street 
Manchester 
M1 3HF 
 
Tel: 0845 330 3030 
Email: info@lgf.org.uk 
 
Terrence Higgins Trust 
314-320 Gray’s Inn Road 
London 
WC1X 8DP 
 
Tel: 0808 802 1221 for an adviser or 020 7812 1600 
Email: info@tht.org.uk 
Nearest tube: King’s Cross/St.Pancras 
(Opening hours: 9.30am to 5.30pm Monday to Friday)
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“Re-thinking the British asylum model: is the system of asylum protection operated in 
the UK fair to lesbian, gay and bisexual applicants?” 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
If you are happy to participate please complete and sign the consent form below 
 
                          
Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the  
above project and have had the opportunity to consider the  
information and ask questions and had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and 
unpaid 
and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason 
and without detriment to any treatment/service. 
 
 
3.  I understand that the interviews will be audio-recorded  
and then transcribed (and translated into English, if applicable). 
 
 
4. I agree to the use of anonymous quotes and  
publication of the results of this work. 
 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above project 
 
 
     
Name of participant  
 
Date  Signature 
 
 
Name of person taking consent  
 
 
Date  Signature 
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Interview Schedule 
 
For Asylum Claimants 
Pre-Interview 
1. When you first claimed asylum, did you receive any information on your 
rights? 
2. Did you receive any literature in relation to these rights?  What did it say? 
3. How did you find your legal representative? 
4. What were your experiences with your legal representative? 
5. What was the process of claiming asylum like – i.e. in booking the 
appointment with the UK Border Agency for you to claim asylum/have your 
screening interview? 
6. Was your application put into the fast-track system? Were you told why / why 
not? 
7. When you were provided with NASS accommodation, what was this 
accommodation like? Were you given the option to state any preference in 
relation to the people with whom you would like to share accommodation? 
8. Did you feel comfortable there?  Explain why. 
9. Did you get legal aid for the interview and appeal stages? 
 
Interview 
10. How would you describe the asylum screening interview process? 
11. Were you asked if you wanted to have the interview tape recorded?  Did you? 
12. Were you asked if you preferred a male or female investigator?  Was this 
choice honoured? 
13. Did you use an interpreter? 
14. Were you asked if you preferred a male or female interpreter?  Was this 
choice honoured? 
15. Was the interpreter from the same ethnic background and/or the same country 
as you? 
16. Describe your experience with the interpreter? 
17. How would you describe the interviewer?  Did you feel comfortable around 
them? 
18. What kinds of questions were you asked?  How did you feel about the way 
these were asked?  How did you feel about the topics they were asking you 
about? 
19. Did you have any documentary evidence to submit in support of your claim?  
If not, why not? If yes, what was it?  
 
Decision and Appeal 
20. Was your asylum claim refused by the UK Border Agency?  If so, do you 
remember/understand what their reasons were? 
21. Did your case go to appeal? 
22. What were your initial impressions of the Tribunal appeal? 
23. How would you describe your experience with the interpreter at the Tribunal? 
24. Did the HOPOU attend the tribunal?   
25. What questions did /she ask? 
26. How would you describe the Immigration Judge? 
27. What kinds of questions did the Immigration Judge ask?  How did you feel 
about these questions? 
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28. How did you feel about the topics that were covered in those questions? 
29. What were the outcomes of the decision and appeal? Did you understand the 
reasons behind them? 
 
Identity/Persecution 
30. Do you identify as ‘LGB’ or do you have a different understanding of your 
sexual orientation?  How would you describe your sexual orientation? 
31. What led you to coming to the UK to claim asylum?   
32. Can you tell me about the nature/content of your asylum claim itself? 
33. Were there elements of sexual violence involved in your claim? 
34. Were any medical/psychological assessments made and reports submitted? 
35. What were the findings of the medical/psychological reports? 
36. Do you have any ongoing health conditions, as a direct result of the 
persecution you suffered in your country of origin i.e. mental health conditions 
such as depression or post-traumatic stress disorder?  
37. Was the truthfulness of your account doubted by the UK Border Agency or 
Tribunal decision-makers? If yes, how did you feel about it? [or something 
related to credibility] 
38. Did you at any point of the process feel that the decision-maker did not 
understand your cultural background? [or something related to cultural 
sensitiveness] 
	  
Conclusion 
39. What do you think of the asylum process as it currently stands? 
40. If you could suggest improvements to the system, what would they consist of? 
 	  
For Professionals 
1. Could you tell about your experience in the area of sexual orientation based 
asylum?  (i.e. the nature of your experience and how long) 
2. Could you give a general overview of how, in your perception/opinion, the 
field of sexual orientation based asylum has developed over the years? 
3. Historically, what have been the biggest problems with the system - and the 
most important solutions introduced to address them? 
4. How would you appraise the current British asylum system for LGB asylum 
seekers? 
5. What do you think are the greatest barriers to improving the system for LGB 
refugees? 
6. What are your thoughts on the use of training for asylum interviewers and 
caseworkers to combat these issues?  If in favour, what kind of training do you 
think is needed? 
7. In your experience, how have investigators/interviewers handled the screening 
interview process in the LGB context?  
8. What are your thoughts on the substantive interview stage, particularly the 
topics covered and interview style/technique?  
9. How do you think LGB identity development is understood and treated by 
interviewers and decision-makers?  If you could improve this understanding, 
what would you teach them? 
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10. More broadly speaking, do you think that the applicants’ culture in their 
countries of origin is relevant to the asylum process?  If so, how does it impact 
upon the process? 
11. What do you think of how the UK Border Agency has interpreted the 
persecutory thresholds within this area, particularly in relation to the 
distinction between persecution and discrimination? 
12. In order to best protect persecuted sexual minorities, how should ‘Particular 
Social Group’ be defined?  Is it enough that LGB refugees can be processed 
through this asylum area?   
13. What are your thoughts on the asylum appeal procedure? 
14. How are Immigration Judges grappling with applying asylum concepts to an 
LGB context? 
15. Do you know if there is training available for Immigration Judges on such 
topics?  Do you think training is important/necessary for Judges in particular? 
16. Are the principles of cases decided in the Appellate Courts quickly applied at 
the by Immigration Judges at the Tribunal level? 
17. In your experience, how can interpreters and their own cultural 
perceptions/prejudices affect the dynamic of the substantive interview or 
appeal hearing? 
18. What role do you think that evidence, in particular documentary evidence, 
should play within such claims? 
19. How useful do you regard Country of Origin Information reports in this field? 
20. What role do medical and other expert reports have to play within sexual 
orientation based asylum claims?  
21. In conclusion, what positive and negative points would you raise to summarise 
your experience of the asylum system? 
22. Are there any other issues within the LGB asylum decision-making process 
that you would like to highlight? 
23. Are there any other issues that you think need to be addressed in terms of how 
they affect LGB refugees, despite the fact that they are not directly considered 
to be a part of the asylum process i.e. housing, legal aid, and financial 
support? 
 
Questionnaire for the UK Border Agency 
Training 
1. How are UKBA case-owners/decision-makers chosen?  Are there any 
minimum education standards/eligibility criteria for the role? 
2. What training do UKBA case-owners and decision-makers receive, in relation 
to sexual-orientation based asylum claims?   
3. Does the training address the differing conceptions of LGB identity and the 
impact of other cultures on identity formation? 
4. Who is responsible for the delivery of training on sexual orientation based 
asylum? 
5. What can you tell me about the training received?  What does this training 
consist of, e.g., interview technique, cultural awareness, sexual orientation 
identity development? 
6. Is the training regularly delivered and updated? 
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Interviews 
7. Where an asylum claim involves the incidence of sexual violence, how does 
this impact upon the (rest of the) interview process and assessment of the 
claim?  How are interviewers and case-owners advised to behave in this 
situation? 
8. How are interviewers guided as to the appropriate range of questions and 
topics for an asylum claim based on sexual orientation grounds? 
9. How are interpreters chosen for the role of interpreting during asylum 
interviews?  Must prospective interpreters fulfill certain selection criteria? 
10. What is the UK Border Agency policy where the interpreter selected is of the 
same country of origin/religion/ethnicity as the asylum applicant? 
11. Are interpreters given any training prior to commencing the role? 
12. Are there any mechanisms in place to ensure that interpreters with potentially 
biased or prejudicial views are not tasked with interpreting for an LGB asylum 
claimant? 
13. Is there any monitoring of interviewers and their conduct and questioning 
during asylum screening interviews? 
14. Is there any co-operation or formal working relationship between the asylum 
interviewer and the decision-maker?  
 
Determining Claims 
15. How are the Country of Origin Information Reports collated?   
16. Who is responsible for producing these Reports?   
17. Can the Reports be said to be objectively produced?  Is there a process of 
independent verification of Country of Origin Information Reports? 
18. How does the UKBA ensure that the reports relied upon are accurate and up-
to-date? 
19. How are such reports interpreted?  Is there a realistic way to ensuring 
consistency of interpretation?  
20. What role do Operational Guidance Notes play in the assessment and 
determination of an asylum claim? 
21. How does gender play a role in the assessment of asylum claims based on 
sexual-orientation grounds? 
22. Where objective evidence is unavailable in an asylum claim made on sexual 
orientation grounds, how is the credibility assessment handled and made in 
such cases?  
23. How would you define or determine the difference between persecution and 
discrimination within the LGBT refugee context? 
24. What is the appropriate persecution threshold?  At what point does 
discrimination cumulatively meet this threshold? 
25. How does one come to a decision on credibility? 
26. What is the UKBA’s understanding of LGBT identity development?   
27. Are there resources that are available to interviewers and decision-makers, to 
assist in understanding the differing developments of identity? 
28. How does this understanding fit the context of LGBT asylum, given the 
diverse cultural backgrounds of the claimants?   
 
Housing 
29. In providing housing support for claimants, does the sexual orientation of a 
claimant have any impact upon the accommodation provided? 
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First Freedom of Information Request  
 
UK Border Agency 
Freedom Of Information Act Policy Team 
11th Floor 
Lunar House 
40 Wellesley Road 
Croydon 
CR9 2BY 
 
 
Date: 28th March 2013 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 I seek the following information about 
the UK Border Agency’s assessment of asylum claims made on grounds of sexual 
orientation:  
 
1. Is the UK Border Agency collating data on asylum claims where sexual 
orientation is raised as a ground of persecution? 
2. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many times 
has sexuality been raised as a ground within an asylum claim since the UK 
Border Agency began collating such data? 
3. Can a yearly breakdown be provided in relation to question 2? 
4. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many asylum 
cases where sexual orientation was flagged as a ground of claim were refused 
by the UK Border Agency in each year? 
5. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many asylum 
cases where sexual orientation was flagged as a ground of claim were refused 
by the UK Border Agency but then overturned at an appeal hearing? 
6. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many asylum 
cases on grounds of sexual orientation result in an application for leave to 
move for Judicial Review? 
7. What is the average refusal rate of asylum claims overall (on all grounds)? 
8. Overall, how many asylum claims (made on any grounds) have their initial 
refusal overturned at an appeal hearing? 
9. Overall, how many asylum claims (made on any grounds) resulted in an 
application for leave to move for Judicial Review? 
10. Is training provided to all asylum interviewers, case-owners, members of the 
HOPOU and other UK Border Agency staff on matters pertaining to sexual 
orientation? 
11. If so, what is the content of the training? 
12. Does this incorporate training on sensitivity when dealing with cases based on 
a claimant’s sexual orientation? 
13. Does this also incorporate training on the diverse ways in which sexual 
identity is developed and how a claimant’s culture can impact upon the 
persecutory narrative and entire asylum process? 
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14. How is the selection of material for the training done and what sources are 
used within the training? 
15. Who provides this training? 
16. Is the training overseen by or conducted in collaboration with the UNHCR or 
the European Asylum Support Office? 
17. Can you clarify what kind of training this is and what it consists of? 
18. How long does the training take? 
19. How often is it repeated? 
20. What training is provided on the interpretation of Country of Origin 
Information and Country Evidence, particularly in relation to sexual 
orientation? 
21. What form does this training take? 
22. Are asylum teams grouped according to experience of a particular country of 
origin? 
23. Are asylum teams grouped according to experience of a particular ground of 
claim? 
24. If so, does this grouping of asylum teams also occur in relation to sexual 
orientation based asylum claims? 
25. What instructions do UK Border Agency staff members receive on the role 
played by UKBA Operational Guidance Notes in the assessment and decision 
upon an asylum claim? 
26. How much weight is accorded to the Guidance Notes in sexual orientation 
cases, in terms of how much they can influence the final outcome? 
27. How are Operational Guidance Notes developed? 
28. Are such Operational Guidance Notes considered to be substitutable for 
Country of Origin Information? 
29. How are interpreters chosen for the interview process? 
30. How does the UK Border Agency prevent the personal views of an interpreter, 
such as their disapproval of an individual’s sexual orientation, from impacting 
upon the atmosphere of an interview and the disclosure of an asylum 
claimant? 
31. Does the UK Border Agency have any means of preventing the personal 
opinions of case-owners from affecting the outcome of a case, for example, 
their preconceptions regarding conduct and identity within sexual orientation 
based asylum claims? 
  
I would prefer to receive this information as a hard copy, in writing.  But 
alternatively, feel free to forward the information electronically to 
welfare@imaan.org.uk and info@imaan.org.uk.  
 
If the decision is made to withhold some of this data using exemptions in the Data 
Protection Act, please inform me of the same.  If some parts of this request are easier 
to answer than others, please release the available data as soon as possible. 
 
Should you require any further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me.  
Please also acknowledge receipt. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely 
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Second	  Freedom	  of	  Information	  Request 
 
UK Border Agency 
Freedom Of Information Act Policy Team 
11th Floor 
Lunar House 
40 Wellesley Road 
Croydon 
CR9 2BY 
 
 
Date: 6th May 2014 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 I seek the following information about 
the UK Border Agency’s assessment of asylum claims made on grounds of gender 
identity:  
 
32. Is the UK Border Agency collating data on asylum claims where gender 
identity is raised as a ground of persecution? 
33. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many times 
has gender identity been raised as a ground within an asylum claim since the 
UK Border Agency began collating such data? 
34. Can a yearly breakdown be provided in relation to question 2? 
35. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many asylum 
cases where gender identity was flagged as a ground of claim were refused by 
the UK Border Agency in each year? 
36. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many asylum 
cases where gender identity was flagged as a ground of claim were refused by 
the UK Border Agency but then overturned at an appeal hearing? 
37. In actual figures and as a percentage of total asylum claims, how many asylum 
cases on grounds of gender identity result in an application for leave to move 
for Judicial Review? 
38. In my previous Freedom of Information Request, the above questions were 
asked regarding sexual orientation based asylum claims.  The UK Border 
Agency response stated that the statistics would be released at the end of 2013, 
but they have not.  Can these figures now be supplied with regard to sexual 
orientation?   
39. Is training provided to all asylum interviewers, case-owners, members of the 
HOPOU and other UK Border Agency staff on matters pertaining to gender 
identity? 
40. If so, what is the content of the training? 
41. Does this incorporate training on sensitivity when dealing with cases based on 
a claimant’s gender identity? 
42. Does this also incorporate training on the diversity in the experiences of 
transgender people regarding the point of their self-identification and how a 
claimant’s culture can impact upon the persecutory narrative and entire 
asylum process? 
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43. How is the selection of material for the training done and what sources are 
used within the training? 
44. Who provides this training? 
45. Is the training overseen by or conducted in collaboration with the UNHCR or 
the European Asylum Support Office? 
46. Can you clarify what kind of training this is and what it consists of? 
47. How long does the training take? 
48. How often is it repeated? 
49. How are Country of Origin Information Reports developed? 
50. What training is provided on the interpretation of Country of Origin 
Information and Country Evidence, particularly in relation gender identity? 
51. What form does this training take? 
52. What mechanisms are in place for caseworkers to decide LGBT cases where 
there is an absence of sufficient objective Country Evidence? 
53. How are Operational Guidance Notes developed?  
54. Is the Country of Origin Information and assessments of a country’s situation 
internally or externally verified? 
55. What is the guidance in relation to the use of external country information in 
LGBT asylum claims? 
56. What is the UK Border Agency’s guidance to caseworkers on applying the 
internal protection principle to LGBT asylum claims? 
57. What is the UK Border Agency’s guidance on how the criminalisation of 
LGBT identities or sexual intercourse between members of the same sex or by 
transsexual individuals in claimants’ countries or origin must be treated in the 
evaluation of an asylum claim? 
58. Does the UK Border Agency monitor the decisions of LGBT asylum claims in 
terms of the conduct of the caseworker and quality of decision-making? 
  
I would prefer to receive this information as a hard copy, in writing.  But 
alternatively, feel free to forward the information electronically to 
welfare@imaan.org.uk and info@imaan.org.uk.  
 
If the decision is made to withhold some of this data using exemptions in the Data 
Protection Act, please inform me of the same.  If some parts of this request are easier 
to answer than others, please release the available data as soon as possible. 
 
Should you require any further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me.  
Please also acknowledge receipt. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 	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Communications	  Regarding	  Request	  for	  Court	  Access	  
 
Tawseef Khan 
127 Old Hall Lane 
Fallowfield 
Manchester 
M14 6HL 
Date: 28th June 2013 
 
F.A.O. Simon Carr 
Governance Manager 
Senior President’s Office 
Room E218  
Royal Courts of Justice  
London  
WC2A 2LL 
 
 
Dear Mr Carr 
 
I am a PhD candidate at the University of Liverpool, pursuing research into the 
fairness and efficiency of the British asylum process for sexual minorities.  My 
research project is entitled, ‘Re-thinking the British asylum model for sexual 
orientation-based asylum claims’.  As part of my research, I would like to carry out a 
thorough programme of empirical work, to incorporate the views and experiences of 
the various stakeholders of the British asylum procedure, from legal representatives, 
Tribunal Judges, the UK Border Agency and asylum seekers themselves, as I believe 
that this will yield the most balanced and thoughtful results and contribute to writing 
up the most nuanced and perceptive thesis possible.  Therefore, I am writing to 
request access to interview a sample of five judges from the Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber (IAC), on how asylum appeals should be decided, where the claim has been 
made on grounds of sexual orientation, and where judge has relevant experience in 
deciding several asylum appeals on this ground, how the judges have navigated the 
decision-making process.  The duration of each interview is estimated at one hour, 
and the entire process will last no longer than 90 minutes per participant.  In support 
of this application for access to judges of the IAC, I am enclosing herewith, the 
following documents for your kind consideration:- 
 
1. Business Plan 
2. List of Interview Questions 
 
Should you require any further information to assist you in reaching an informed 
decision with regard to my application for access to interview members of the 
Judiciary, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Tawseef Khan 
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Business Plan for Access to the Judiciary 
- Title of Research 
The proposed research is entitled, ‘Re-thinking the British asylum model for sexual 
orientation-based asylum claims.’ 
 
- Aims and Objectives 
The objective of the PhD Research is to examine the effectiveness of the British 
asylum system in determining asylum claims made on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, given the unique issues faced by lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) 
claimants, both in terms of how they experience persecution and how they experience 
the asylum process.  In light of previous research, the specific objective of the 
proposed empirical work is to contrast the conclusions drawn by previous researchers 
with the experiences of the stakeholders who are actively engaged within the asylum 
procedure e.g. legal representatives, asylum seekers, Tribunal Judges and UK Border 
Agency staff.   
 
- Methodology 
The research will take a mixed-methods approach towards the research planned and 
will be largely qualitative in nature.  It begins with a preliminary hypothesis that there 
are a number of issues entrenched within the asylum process which may prejudice the 
experience of the asylum system for sexual minorities, based on the doctrinal research 
that has preceded the empirical component of the entire project.  The research is a 
balanced and unbiased exercise in verifying the degree of truth of this hypothesis.  
Additionally, the researcher has developed an independent analytical framework from 
an assessment of the previous research, translating the consensus that exists within the 
academic community on what can be expected by LGB claimants when making their 
asylum claims, to a model asylum system for LGB claimants, which will be used as 
the yardstick against which, the entire British asylum system will be examined. 
Therefore, the research explores the direct impact of the current asylum system upon 
LGB claimants and their claims for asylum, for the purposes of assessing whether the 
landmark Supreme Court decision, HJ (Iran), has served to improve the quality of 
decision-making and overall fairness and efficiency of the British asylum system at 
all levels. 
 
In explaining the research design, it is important to again summarise the general 
research question – ‘is the asylum system achieving its goal of protecting those 
individuals fleeing persecution on grounds of their sexual orientation?’  In order to 
obtain an accurate answer to this question, it is important to balance the diverse 
viewpoints of all the relevant stakeholders.  Consequently, in the research, there are 
three classes of stakeholders whose experiences and perspectives will be considered; 
a) experts and practitioners specialising in the field of sexual-orientation asylum (i.e. 
academic experts and legal representatives); b) current or previous claimants of 
asylum on sexual orientation grounds; and c) decision-makers, such as Tribunal and 
Appellate Court Judges and Case-owners at the UK Border Agency.  
 
Each interview is estimated to last between 30 and 60 minutes, and the entire 
interview process will last no longer than 90 minutes, ensuring that participation 
within the research does not become a burden upon any participant. 
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- Benefits of Research to Judiciary (and Public Interest) 
The objectives of the research would not be met adequately if the perspectives and 
experiences of the judges, key stakeholders within the entire asylum process, were not 
incorporated.  The absence of a crucial stakeholder category would result in the 
research also failing to achieve triangulation and balancing the concerns and unique 
perspectives of all parties.  Therefore, judicial participation in the research is 
necessary to ensure the success of the research, particularly due to the empirical focus 
that has been chosen. 
 
Thus, it is clear how the research would benefit the Judiciary, in incorporating the 
views and experiences of a sample of judges, ensuring the final product is objective 
and balanced.  Furthermore, the research is of particular benefit to the Judiciary given 
the possibility that it could prove instructive for the future training of decision-makers 
and development of the British asylum system. 
 
The research also has significant public interest; it is a rare opportunity to readdress 
the popular narrative that exists regarding the fair and effective evaluation of asylum 
claims made on sexual orientation grounds.  It is also in the public interest for a legal 
procedure as contentious and as important as the asylum procedure to be 
comprehensively and impartially appraised, integrating the experiences of all 
stakeholders, free of all other agendas that commonly prevail in the public domain.    
 
- Guarantees 
Anonymity of all participants is guaranteed, unless they specifically wish to represent 
their views under their names.  Thus, members of the Judiciary will not be identified 
in any component of the research.  As a result of the anonymity guarantee and the 
nature of the research objectives, alongside the way in which the interview questions 
have been framed (to create a balanced and impartial result), it is absolutely clear that 
the discretion and independence of the Judiciary will not be impaired.  Additionally, 
there is a conscious effort for the research to be framed solely in terms of legal 
standards, thereby avoiding the competing agendas of the public discussion on wider 
issues of immigration numbers and resources, and resolutely eliminating the prospect 
of members of the Judiciary becoming embroiled in discussions of political sensitivity 
or controversy.  This is supported by the list of the interview questions, enclosed 
herewith.  To further guarantee this, all interviews will be tape-recorded and a 
transcript of the interview will be available to every participant, for the purposes of 
notice, clarification and further commentary.    
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Proposed Questions for Judiciary 
1. What are your general impressions of the area of sexual orientation based 
asylum? 
2. How would you appraise the need for training in this area? 
3. What training is available for Immigration Judges on sexual orientation based 
asylum?   
- What does it cover?   
- Is it country of origin/culture specific?   
- How often?   
- How often should training be provided on this topic? 
4. What is your approach when questioning a claimant at first-instance appeal?  
Is their cultural background a consideration in this? 
5. How would this approach differ if sexual violence was a part of the claimant’s 
narrative? 
6. How important is an exploration of a claimant’s sexual practices to their 
asylum narrative? 
7. What is your understanding of LGBT identity development?   
8. How does this understanding fit the context of LGBT asylum, given the 
diverse cultural backgrounds of the claimants?   
9. Are there resources that are available to you to assist in understanding the 
differing developments of identity? 
10. Are there guidelines that Immigration Judges should/would follow, akin to the 
UKBA asylum policy instructions? 
11. What can you tell me about the willingness of Immigration Judges to follow 
the principles/precedents from cases in the appellate courts? 
12. When deciding an asylum appeal on sexual orientation grounds, which areas 
and issues do you explore in your questioning? 
13. In your opinion, how much weight should the submission of documentary 
evidence be placed upon such asylum claims? 
14. What role should the submission of Expert Evidence, e.g. psychological 
reports, play in deciding asylum claims? 
15. How useful are Country of Origin Information reports on sexual orientation 
based persecution – and therefore, what role have they played for you in 
assessing claims on these grounds? 
16. In your experience, how do interpreters affect the dynamic of the appeal 
hearing?   
17. How is an interpreter chosen for a particular hearing?  Do you feel they should 
be chosen according to a differing procedure, in particular within the sexual 
orientation-based asylum context? 
18. How would you define or determine the difference between persecution and 
discrimination within the LGBT refugee context? 
19. What is the appropriate persecution threshold?  At what point does 
discrimination cumulatively meet this threshold? 
20. How does one come to a decision on credibility? 
21. How useful do you think inconsistency, plausibility and demeanour are, when 
making a credibility consideration in this context? 
22. What are your experiences of the HOPOU attending Tribunals in such cases? 
23. What are your experiences of the quality of lawyers and legal representation in 
sexual orientation based cases?  
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Tawseef Khan 
127 Old Hall Lane 
Fallowfield 
Manchester 
M14 6HL 
Date: 5th October 2013 
 
F.A.O. Simon Carr 
Governance Manager 
Senior President’s Office 
Room E218  
Royal Courts of Justice  
London  
WC2A 2LL 
 
 
Dear Mr Carr 
 
Thank you for your letter dated 14.08.2013.  I hope that my responses to your queries 
are satisfactory and enable you to proceed with my interview request: 
 
1. I can confirm that I have ethical approval for my research proposal, as a result 
of which I have already conducted 9 interviews with various legal 
practitioners specializing in this area of law and another 8 interviews with 
LGB asylum claimants thus far.   The Research Ethics Approval Application 
Form is to be used by researchers seeking approval from the University 
Committee on Research Ethics or from an approved School Research Ethics 
Committee (REC).  Chaired by Dr Louise Ackers, whose responsibility it is to 
take applications for Ethical Approval to the Research Ethics Committee.  The 
task of the REC is to review expeditable ethical applications for research that 
involves human participants including undergraduate students’ dissertations, 
MA dissertations, PhD dissertations, unfunded Staff research and funded Staff 
research, and ensure that the proposed research will maintain ethical standards 
in execution and abide by the ethical guidelines set out by the Committee on 
Research Ethics, University of Liverpool. 
 
In submitting an application for ethical review the Principal Investigator / Supervisor 
confirms that: 
 
• staff and students involved in the execution of the study have the relevant 
training or  
• adequate supervision, including health and safety 
• the premises where the study is to take place are appropriate  
• the research methods are justified and have been peer-reviewed 
• any relevant insurance matters have been discussed with the University’s 
Insurance and Risk Manager (i.e. if the research involves overseas sites, 
children or other vulnerable groups) 
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My Ethical Approval Reference is SLSJPhd1213/05.  For confirmation, please feel 
free to contact my Chair of the Research Ethics Committee for the School of Law and 
Social Justice at the University of Liverpool.  She can be reached at 
lawhla@liverpool.ac.uk or on 0151 794 3679.  For more information on the Ethical 
Approval application process, please see the University website at 
http://www.liv.ac.uk/researchethics/apply,for,research,ethics/index.htm#Law 
 
 
2. There is an extensive amount of research covering the relatively niche area of 
sexual identity-based asylum claims.  Some of the most significant research in 
the area comes from Jenni Millbank, Nicole LaViolette, Laurie Berg, 
Catherine Dauvergne, Suzanne Goldberg and the Fleeing Homophobia Report, 
for example, which has critiqued the status and treatment of LGBT asylum 
claimants in the UK and in other jurisdictions.  A bibliography of the most 
important publications is attached for your further consideration.  However, 
with the exception of Claire Bennett’s recent PhD project, which conducted 
empirical work into the experiences of lesbian asylum seekers in the British 
asylum system, none of this work has addressed the experiences of all the 
stakeholders within the British asylum system from an empirical angle.  
Furthermore, Bennett’s work only focuses on the perspectives of lesbian 
asylum seekers and does not incorporate the perspective of judges or other 
stakeholders.  Thus, this project is unique for balancing the experiences of all 
the stakeholders of the British asylum system in LGB asylum claims, for the 
purposes of triangulation and to make a final assessment of the system that 
integrates the priorities of all invested parties.  
 
3. The Research Design takes a mixed-methods approach for the fact that in 
addition to the use of qualitative interviews, the other significant method is the 
use of documental analysis, including the extensive doctrinal and case-law 
sources available.  Given the lack of empirical focus in the research that has 
preceded my work and exists in the academic and public domains, the mixed-
methods approach of my research, in incorporating the perspectives of the 
stakeholders of the British asylum system for LGB asylum claimants is 
important.    
 
4. In light of the submitted concerns, a reduced version of the interview can be 
conducted that will last no more than 45 minutes.  The interview schedule has 
therefore been edited to reflect the 30-45 minute guide time.  It must be 
reinforced that based on the previous interviews that have been conducted, 
these interviews should take no longer than 45 minutes. 
 
5. With regard to interview selection, a sample of one to two judges at each 
appeal stage that an LGB asylum claim can proceed to is requested.  Thus, I 
wish to interview one-two judges each from the First-Tier Tribunal, Upper 
Tribunal, High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, across England 
and Wales.  This would simultaneously avoid being too onerous a burden 
upon the Court Service, whilst also being wholly representative of this 
particular stakeholder category for the purposes of the research project.  
Interviewing up to ten Judges and including each level at which such a case 
could succeed , is comparable with the aim of interviewing ten legal 
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academics and practitioners, twenty asylum claimants and, if possible, five 
representatives of the UK Border Agency (as planned in my research).  
Furthermore, in relation to the ethical concerns of the project, it is also 
suggested that with regard to the participant selection, no Judge who is 
currently deciding an appeal concerning a sexual orientation-based asylum is 
put forward for the interview. 
 
6. In light of your recommendations that the interview schedule is too long and 
too complex, the schedule has been revised and is enclosed for your kind 
consideration accordingly.  This interview corresponds to the 30-45 minute 
guide time.  The questions are simply phrased, concerning integral and 
common concepts within the asylum system that all Judges will be extremely 
familiar with.  Thus, it is submitted that answering the questions listed in the 
interview schedule will not be particularly difficult or complex for the 
interviewees, as the questions cover the same topics that were also asked of 
the other stakeholder categories for the purposes of perspective and 
comparison, and this has not constituted a source of difficulties. 
 
7. The interview data from the Judges interviewed will be analysed in the same 
way as all the qualitative data.  The focus of the PhD chapters follow a 
deconstruction of the Refugee definition contained in the Refugee Convention, 
focusing on a particular component in each chapter.   This simplifies the task 
of analyzing and incorporating the empirical data; ahead of writing each 
Chapter, the transcripts will be assessed for comments pertaining to the issues 
relevant to that particular chapter and separated for use in that chapter.  Each 
issue will then be discussed with initial reference to the arguments that have 
been identified in the doctrinal research, to first present and examine the 
matters of contention, and then will integrate the perspectives of the various 
stakeholders who have been interviewed.  From the doctrinal arguments and 
the experiences of the stakeholders, preliminary conclusions with regard to the 
fairness and efficiency of the British asylum system for LGB claimants will 
therefore be drawn, on each component of either the system itself, or of the 
refugee determination analysis. 
 
8. With regard to the ethical issues that have been raised by the Judicial Office, it 
is confirmed that no interviews have been conducted with asylum seekers 
currently appealing the decisions of their asylum claims.  Emphasising the 
rationale of point 5, it is requested that with regard to sample selection, no 
judge is selected who is currently presiding over an appeal concerning a 
sexual orientation based asylum claim, further reducing the likelihood of any 
ethical concerns.  Furthermore, the research project, in identifying the 
potential for ethical conflicts, will not interview any asylum claimants whose 
appeals are still pending.  In relation to the second ethical issue, it is clarified 
that the waiving of anonymity has only been an option available for the legal 
academics and practitioners, either because they represent a Non-
Governmental Organisation, or because they wish for their academic ideas to 
be appropriately referenced.  However, for all other participants, anonymity 
will be maintained, including for all participating Judges, in full 
acknowledgement of the negative implications that could derive from the 
identification of a Judge. 
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I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Tawseef Khan 
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APPENDIX B	  
 
TABLE MAPPING THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 
‘STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES’ 
 
 
Fairness: UK 
Administrative 
Law 
ECHR EU Law Structural 
Principle 
Substantive  Right to Fair Trial 
 
(Ridge v. Baldwin 
[1964] AC 40  
 
Re HK [1967] 2 
QB 617) 
Articles 1-9, for 
example 
 
Article 13 
Recital 10, 
preamble to 
the 
Qualification 
Directive 
 
Recitals 6-7, 
preamble to 
the Reception 
Directive 
 
Article 21, 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights 
Respect for 
UK’s broader 
fundamental 
rights 
obligations in 
asylum context 
Substantive Right to Fair Trial 
(See above) 
1967 Protocol 
to the 
Convention 
 Embracing RC 
as ‘living’ 
document 
Substantive Right to Fair Trial 
(See above) 
Travaux 
préparatoires 
Article 
8(2)(c), 
Procedures 
Directive 
 
Article 9, 
Qualification 
Directive 
(especially 
9(2)) 
Applying 
evidentiary 
thresholds 
flexibly 
     
Procedural Right to Legal 
Representation 
 
(Pett v. 
Greyhound 
Racing 
Association Ltd 
[1969] 1 QB 125) 
 Article 15, 
Procedures 
Directive 
Competent and 
Skilled Legal 
Representation 
Procedural Right to 
Notice/Reasons 
 
 Articles 
8(2)(b), 9 and 
10, Procedures 
Application 
and Citation of 
Relevant 
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(Kanda v. 
Government of 
Malaysia [1962] 
AC 322  
 
R v. SSHD, Ex 
Parte Doody 
[1994] 1 AC 531 
HL)  
 
 
Right to 
Consultation 
before Benefit is 
Denied 
 
(Schmidt v. 
Secretary of State 
for Home Affairs 
[1969] 2 Ch. 149 
 
McInnes v. 
Onslow-Fane 
[1978] 1 WLR 
1520) 
 
Directive 
 
 
Article 41(2) 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights 
Guidance 
Procedural Rule against Bias 
 
(R v. Gough 
(1993) AC 646 
 
Porter v. Magill 
[2002] 2 AC 357 
HL) 
Article 14 
(non-
discrimination) 
Article 
8(2)(a), 
Procedures 
Directive 
 
Article 41(1) 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights 
Rule Against 
Bias 
Procedural Based on Rights 
to Notice/Reasons 
and Consultation 
(See above) 
 Recital 10 and 
Article 
8(2)(c), 
Procedures 
Directive 
High Quality 
Recruitment 
and Training of 
Decision-
Makers 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 
 
8. Claimant’s credibility  
(1) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person 
who makes an asylum claim or a human rights claim, a deciding authority shall take 
account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of any behaviour to which this 
section applies.  
 
(2) This section applies to any behaviour by the claimant that the deciding authority 
thinks—  
(a)  is designed or likely to conceal information,  
(b)  is designed or likely to mislead, or  
(c) is designed or likely to obstruct or delay the handling or resolution of the claim or 
the taking of a decision in relation to the claimant. 
 
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2) the following kinds of 
behaviour shall be treated as designed or likely to conceal information or to mislead— 
(a) failure without reasonable explanation to produce a passport on request to an 
immigration officer or to the Secretary of State, 
(b) the production of a document which is not a valid passport as if it were, 
(c) the destruction, alteration or disposal, in each case without reasonable explanation, 
of a passport, 
(d) the destruction, alteration or disposal, in each case without reasonable explanation, 
of a ticket or other document connected with travel, and 
(e) failure without reasonable explanation to answer a question asked by a deciding 
authority. 
 
(4) This section also applies to failure by the claimant to take advantage of a 
reasonable opportunity to make an asylum claim or human rights claim while in a safe 
country. 
(5) This section also applies to failure by the claimant to make an asylum claim or 
human rights claim before being notified of an immigration decision, unless the claim 
relies wholly on matters arising after the notification. 
(6) This section also applies to failure by the claimant to make an asylum claim or 
human rights claim before being arrested under an immigration provision, unless— 
(a) he had no reasonable opportunity to make the claim before the arrest, or 
(b) the claim relies wholly on matters arising after the arrest. 
 
(7) In this section— 
“asylum claim” has the meaning given by section 113(1) of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41) (subject to subsection (9) below), 
“deciding authority” means— 
(a) an immigration officer, 
(b) the Secretary of State, 
(c) the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, or 
(d) the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, 
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“human rights claim” has the meaning given by section 113(1) of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (subject to subsection (9) below), 
 
“immigration decision” means— 
(a) refusal of leave to enter the United Kingdom, 
(b) refusal to vary a person’s leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, 
(c) grant of leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, 
(d) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of 
directions under section 10(1)(a), (b), (ba) or (c) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999 (c. 33) (removal of persons unlawfully in United Kingdom), 
(e) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of 
directions under paragraphs 8 to 12 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) 
(control of entry: removal), 
(f) a decision to make a deportation order under section 5(1) of that Act, and 
(g) a decision to take action in relation to a person in connection with extradition from 
the United Kingdom, 
 
“immigration provision” means— 
(a) sections 28A, 28AA, 28B, 28C and 28CA of the Immigration Act 1971 
(immigration offences: enforcement), 
(b) paragraph 17 of Schedule 2 to that Act (control of entry), 
(c) section 14 of this Act, and 
(d) a provision of the Extradition Act 1989 (c. 33) or 2003 (c. 41), 
“notified” means notified in such manner as may be specified by regulations made by 
the Secretary of State, 
 
“passport” includes a document which relates to a national of a country other than the 
United Kingdom and which is designed to serve the same purpose as a passport, and 
“safe country” means a country to which Part 2 of Schedule 3 applies. 
 
(8) A passport produced by or on behalf of a person is valid for the purposes of 
subsection (3)(b) if it— 
(a) relates to the person by whom or on whose behalf it is produced, 
(b) has not been altered otherwise than by or with the permission of the authority who 
issued it, and 
(c) was not obtained by deception. 
 
(9) In subsection (4) a reference to an asylum claim or human rights claim shall be 
treated as including a reference to a claim of entitlement to remain in a country other 
than the United Kingdom made by reference to the rights that a person invokes in 
making an asylum claim or a human rights claim in the United Kingdom. 
 
(10) Regulations under subsection (7) specifying a manner of notification may, in 
particular— 
(a) apply or refer to regulations under section 105 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41) (notice of immigration decisions); 
(b) make provision similar to provision that is or could be made by regulations under 
that section; 
(c) modify a provision of regulations under that section in its effect for the purpose of 
regulations under this section; 
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(d) provide for notice to be treated as received at a specified time if sent to a specified 
class of place in a specified manner. 
(11) Regulations under subsection (7) specifying a manner of notification— 
(a) may make incidental, consequential or transitional provision, 
(b) shall be made by statutory instrument, and 
(c) shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of 
Parliament. 
 
This section shall not prevent a deciding authority from determining not to believe a 
statement on the grounds of behaviour to which this section does not apply. 
Before the coming into force of section 26 a reference in this section to the Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal shall be treated as a reference to— 
(a) an adjudicator appointed, or treated as if appointed, under section 81 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41) (appeals), and 
(b) the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 
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